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3Abstract
It is often suggested that the Serbian rebellion in Croatia in 1990-91 was orchestrated by 
Serbia, and, in particular, by its president Slobodan Milošević personally. Despite the 
popularity of this interpretation, however, the literature on the break-up of Yugoslavia is 
yet to offer a focused study of Serbia's role in the descent into conflict in Croatia. Many 
sources that have become available in recent years remain unused. Through a critical 
and cautious use of such sources, including extensive interviews with participants in the 
conflict and contemporary documentation, this thesis aims to fill this gap in the 
literature and to update our knowledge of this important aspect of the bloody 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. Honing in on Belgrade's relationships with Serb political 
and military/paramilitary leaders in Croatia, as well as Serbia's direct involvement in 
and attitude towards the road to war, it concludes that the existing focus on Milošević's 
Serbia has been misplaced. Serbia's stance towards Croatia was hardline, but Belgrade's 
influence over the Croatian Serbs was limited and its direct involvement in events 
minimal. Milošević did not have a grand plan to orchestrate violence in Croatia, and the 
leaders of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia were fundamentally independent and 
autonomous actors, who, far from being Milošević's puppets, were often in conflict with 
him. The interaction between Croat and Serb nationalists within Croatia provides a 
strong explanation for the descent into conflict there, including its rapid militarisation. A 
partial exception is provided by the region of Eastern Slavonia, where factors such as 
the late onset of the rebellion made the region much more amenable to Belgrade's 
influence, though principally after the war had already begun. The findings of this thesis 
point to a need for re-assessment of the role of Serbia in the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Abstract
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In April-May 1990 multi-party elections were held in Croatia, then one of six republics 
of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. A little more than a year later the 
republic would be rocked by a vicious and bloody war in which more than 12,000 
people died, a great many of them civilians, and hundreds of thousands fled their 
homes.
The basic sequence of events within Croatia that led up to this is not particularly 
controversial. The elections had seen the triumph of the Croatian Democratic 
Community (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), a nationalist movement led by 
Croatian dissident and former Yugoslav general Franjo Tuđman. The HDZ was 
committed to securing greater Croatian independence, and soon began making moves in 
this direction. This was, however, anathema to the republic's Serbian minority (or, at 
least, parts of it), who made up twelve percent of the republic's population and formed 
the majority population on about a fifth of its territory, mainly in the 'Krajina' region and 
parts of Slavonia.1 Over the course of 1990 and 1991, under the leadership of the 
Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS), the main Serb-inhabited 
regions in Croatia gradually seceded from Croatia, announcing their intention to instead 
'remain' in Yugoslavia along with the Republic of Serbia and other 'Serb lands'. This 
political rebellion against the authorities in Croatia was accompanied by a 
military/paramilitary rebellion, starting with the outbreak of the 'Balvan Revolution' 
(Log Revolution) in the Knin Krajina in August 1990. From spring 1991 onwards armed 
conflicts increasingly erupted between rebel Serb and Croatian forces, and the Yugoslav 
Peoples' Army (Jugoslavenska narodna armija, JNA) began to intervene, ostensibly to 
prevent such clashes. By the autumn the situation had reached open war, between 
1 'Krajina' means frontier or borderland, and its use for parts of Croatia is partly derived from the former 
'Vojna Krajina', military frontier, of the Austrian empire, though the territories only partly coincided. 
In the 1990s it was generally used to refer to the Serbian-populated regions of North Dalmatia, 
Eastern Lika, Kordun and Banija, though sometimes it was used in plural to refer to all the declared 
Serbian regions in Croatia. See Appendices, Figures 2 and 4.
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Croatian forces on one side, and rebel Serbs and the JNA on the other. The Vance peace 
plan, named after UN negotiator Cyrus Vance, then froze the conflict with a de facto 
partition of Croatia, with Serb rebel regions forming an internationally unrecognised 
Republic of Serbian Krajina (Republika Srpska Krajina, RSK), which survived until 
being militarily vanquished by Croatia in 1995.2
This sequence of intra-Croatian events is, however, only part of the story, because a 
decisive role in all of these developments is widely attributed to an actor external to the 
republic: the Republic of Serbia, and, specifically, its then president Slobodan 
Milošević. For most Croatians, indeed, the war in Croatia was above all a defensive 
'homeland war' against the expansionist 'aggression' of Serbia. Milošević was seen as 
the mastermind behind the conflict, manipulating Serbs in Croatia in his quest for a 
'Greater Serbia'. In Serbia, by contrast, the conflict was predominantly portrayed as a 
civil war and a war of self-defence by local Serbs against neo-fascist Croatian 
authorities, with Serbian officials largely denying involvement. As Milošević argued in 
1991: 'We are not in conflict with Croatia. This is not a conflict between the Republic of 
Serbia and the Republic of Croatia. This is a conflict between the Croatian authorities 
and the Serbian people [in Croatia]'.3 
Serbia's arguments were never given much credence in the West, however, and in the 
academic literature to date there has been a broad agreement on the destructive role that 
Serbia, and Milošević personally, played in the conflict. Most authors attribute the 
conflict not, primarily, to long-term factors such as alleged 'ancient hatreds' between 
Serbs and Croats, but to the decisions of political elites at the time and, above all, 
Milošević, who in many prominent works is portrayed as the driving force behind the 
war and the puppet master of the Croatian Serbs. Belgrade4 has been seen as standing 
2 For the borders of the RSK see Appendices, Figure 3. The Vance plan entailed the withdrawal of the 
JNA from Croatia, the return of all refugees and the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the Krajinas, 
which were to be demilitarised apart from regular police, with subsequent negotiations to determine 
their final status.
3 'Milošević Interview With Sky News Reported', Belgrade RTV Sat TV, 7/8/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-
153, 18/8/1991.
4 'Belgrade' is here used as short-hand to refer to the official governing authorities in Serbia, led by 
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behind all aspects of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia: instigating the sidelining of 
moderates, such as initial SDS leader Jovan Rašković, and their replacement with more 
hardline figures, such as Milan Babić; producing a shift in SDS proposals from cultural 
autonomy and rights within Croatia towards armed rebellion and secession; arming, 
organising and directing Serb rebels in Croatia, and ordering them to provoke conflict; 
conspiring to create JNA intervention to 'cut-off' Croatia and occupy its 'Serb' territories; 
and more.
This thesis offers a critical re-examination of the Serbian rebellion in Croatia in 1990-91 
and the view that this rebellion was orchestrated and directed by Serbia, and Milošević 
personally. It looks at Belgrade's relationship with Serb political and 
military/paramilitary leaders in Croatia in this period, as well as Belgrade's direct 
involvement in and attitude towards the road to war in Croatia. It seeks to answer a 
number of key questions: what relationship did the Serbian authorities have with the 
SDS and its main leaders, such as Jovan Rašković and Milan Babić? Were SDS officials 
acting on instructions from Serbia, and did they owe their positions to Serbia's support? 
What solutions to the 'Serbian question' in Croatia did the SDS and Serbia respectively 
envisage, and how did they intend to achieve those solutions? Did Serbia have a 
deliberate strategy of interfering in Croatia and directing or instigating developments 
there? What role did Serbia play in the arming of the Serbs in Croatia and their armed 
rebellion against the Croatian authorities? Had Serbia decided on war as the only way to 
achieve its goals from an early stage, or was any serious consideration given to 
negotiations or the pursuit of a compromise? And what was the role of the JNA? 
Many of these topics have previously received only a cursory examination in the 
literature on the break-up of Yugoslavia, while the wealth of relevant source materials 
that has become available in the last decade, most notably through the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), remains largely unused. Through 
Slobodan Milošević. I also interchangeably use the terms 'Serbia', 'the Serbian leadership', 'the Serbian 
authorities', and 'official Belgrade'. Federal institutions, also located in Belgrade, are identified 
individually. 'Zagreb' is used in a similar fashion.
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a critical and cautious use of such sources, supplemented by extensive interviews with 
participants in the conflict, this thesis aims to fill a gap in the literature, to update our 
knowledge of this important aspect of the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia, and to 
reconsider some widely held notions about Serbia's role in the descent into conflict in 
Croatia.
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1.1. Literature Review
There is a vast and varied literature on the disintegration of Yugoslavia, for which a 
number of different causes have been identified. These range from a 'clash of 
civilisations' and 'ancient hatreds' (interpretations widely rejected by scholars, though 
occasionally employed by journalists), to the roles of nationalism, economics, 
institutions, ideology, intellectual and political elites, and international politics, as well 
as various political dynamics such as 'security dilemmas'.5 The war in Croatia is usually 
discussed as part of wider works on the break-up of Yugoslavia, and most scholars note 
a multiplicity of factors underlying the conflict, both long and short-term. Longer-term 
causes commonly mentioned include, among others, the historic nationalisms and 
national projects of Serbs and Croats, the related desire of the Croatian Serbs to live in 
Yugoslavia rather than an independent Croatia, and their suffering at the hands of 
Croatian fascists in the Second World War (the Ustaše,6 and their Independent State of 
Croatia - Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH). However, an emphasis on shorter-term 
factors, and the decision-making of Yugoslav political elites at the time, has dominated, 
and it is on these factors that this thesis, and literature review, focuses.
In this respect, the existing literature can be divided into three categories, which I term 
'orthodox', 'multi-factor' and 'revisionist'. The 'orthodox' view, in Robert Hayden's 
words, has been that 'Milošević roused Serb nationalism to threaten the other peoples in 
Yugoslavia, thus forcing other republics to secede. Then Milošević activated a plan for a 
Greater Serbia, invading first Croatia, then Bosnia, and committing genocide in both 
countries.'7 As Louis Sell puts it: 'Yugoslavia did not die a natural death, it was 
5 Comprehensive overviews of contending explanations for the break-up of Yugoslavia can be found in: 
Jasna Dragović-Soso, 'Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations', 
in Leonard J. Cohen & Jasna Dragović-Soso (eds), State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New 
Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press 2007), pp.1-39. 
Dejan Jović, Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 
2009), pp.13-33.
6 Ustaše is the plural form of 'Ustaša'. Anglicised versions – Ustasha and Ustashas – are sometimes used 
in the literature, and I have kept these when quoting such works. For other forms of the word I use 
Anglicised versions - for example, 'Ustashism'.
7 Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts  
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murdered, and Milošević, more than any other single leader, was responsible.’8 Most 
prominent works can be placed in this 'orthodox' category,9 with its most vocal 
advocates including authors such as Sabrina Ramet, Norman Cigar, James Gow, Marcus 
Tanner and Viktor Meier.10
Authors such as Hayden, Leonard Cohen, Susan Woodward, Dejan Jović, Mihailo 
Crnobrnja and Aleksandar Pavković, on the other hand, have located the causes of the 
disintegration much more evenly among the different factions in Yugoslavia. They do 
not doubt the destructive role played by Milošević's Serbia, but see it as just one factor 
in the disintegration, for which they tend to offer more complex, nuanced and multi-
faceted explanations.11 I call these accounts 'multi-factor'.
Finally, there have also been a minority of 'revisionist' works, by authors such as Kate 
Hudson, Nora Beloff, Alex Dragnich and Diana Johnstone. These have vigorously 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), p.26.
8 Louis Sell, Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: Duke University Press, 
2002), pp.4-5.
9 As Jasna Dragović-Soso notes, in the literature to date there has been an 'overwhelming focus on 
Milošević and Serbia's policy' and 'a near consensus concerning the centrality of the role played by... 
Milošević in the disintegration process'. Dragović-Soso, op. cit., pp.17, 14.
10 See, for example: Sell. Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration Of Yugoslavia From The  
Death Of Tito To The Fall of Milošević (Oxford: Westview Press, 2002). Norman Cigar, ‘The Serbo-
Croatian War, 1991’ in Stjepan Meštrović, Genocide After Emotion: The Post-emotional Balkan War 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp.59-60. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International  
Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: C. Hurt & Co, 1997). Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation 
Forged in War (London: Yale Nota Bene, 2001), pp.218-9. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its  
Demise (London: Routledge, 1999). And: V.P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia  
in the 1990's (London: Cornell University Press, 2004). Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody 
Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (London: C. Hurt & Co, 1995), p.125. Branka Magas, 
'The War in Croatia', in Brad K. Blitz (ed), War and Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict and 
Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.662. Adam LeBor, Milošević: A 
Biography (London: Bloomsbury, 2003). Ivo Goldstein, Croatia: A History (London: Hurst & 
Company, 1999), p.126. Reneo Lukić, 'Greater Serbia a new reality in the Balkans’, Nationalities  
Papers, 22:1 (1994), pp.49-70. Christopher Cviic, ‘Croatia’, in David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, 
Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth (New York: Longman, 1996), 
p.208.
11 See, for example: Hayden. Leonard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the  
Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995). Dejan Jović, op. cit.. Mihajlo 
Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996). Aleksandar Pavković, The 
Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State (London: MacMillan Press, 1997).
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contested the 'orthodox' focus on Milošević and the Serbs and focused instead on other 
actors in Yugoslavia, as well as foreign states such as Germany and the United States.12
These broad-stroke categorisations are fluid - some prominent works straddle categories 
- and they mask the colour, complexity and diversity of different authors' arguments 
regarding the disintegration of Yugoslavia.13 But they are heuristically useful when 
providing an overview of the literature's greatest divergences on the subject of this 
thesis: the descent into war in Croatia. Here, 'orthodox', 'multi-factor' and 'revisionist' 
works vary most clearly on three key issues: the relative importance of the role of 
Belgrade; the role of Zagreb; and the extent to which the Croatian Serbs were puppets 
of Milošević.
Table 1 – Views on Key Elements of the Descent into Conflict in Croatia
'Orthodox' 'Multi-factor' 'Revisionist'
Role of Belgrade Fundamental, 
dominant
Just one of several 
factors
Insignificant
Role of Zagreb Insignificant Significant, one of 
several factors
Fundamental, 
dominant
Agency of 
Croatian Serbs
Puppets Some agency Independent
12 See, for example: Kate Hudson, Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia 
(London: Pluto Press, 2003). Nora Beloff, Yugoslavia: An Avoidable War (London: New European 
Publications, 1997). Alex N. Dragnich, Yugoslavia's Disintegration and the Struggle for Truth 
(Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1996). Diana Johnstone, Fools' Crusade:  
Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions (New York: Monthly Press Review, 2002). And: David 
Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 2009). Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons From 
Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 1999). John Laughland, Travesty: The Trial of Slobodan Milošević and  
the Corruption of International Justice (London: Pluto Press, 2007). 
13 In Silber and Little's account, for example, Milošević is the prime villain, but Slovenian and Croatian 
leaders also bear a heavy responsibility, while they and the authors of Balkan Battlegrounds point to 
Zagreb's role in provoking the Serbian rebellion, whilst also insisting that that rebellion was directed 
by Belgrade. Laura Silber & Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 
pp.82-118. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995,  
Volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, 
2002), pp.83-92.
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The most 'orthodox' works have clear answers to these questions (represented in Table 
1, above). Belgrade was the key, almost exclusive cause of the war and the Serbian 
rebellion, which was 'not an uprising by Serbs afraid of the Croats, but an offensive 
prepared long before 1991 in Belgrade and carefully coordinated from there right from 
the [start]'.14 Croatian actions were inconsequential in provoking the conflict, as the Serb 
rebellion was motivated not by justified grievances, but a nationalist agenda directed 
from Belgrade.15 It would have occurred even if Tuđman – who was open to 'any 
settlement with Croatia's Serbs... including [territorial] autonomy for Krajina’16 - had 
‘changed water into wine… and raised Serb victims of the Ustashas from the dead’.17 
Croatian provocations, to the extent that they are acknowledged, were 'mistakes' or 
'blunders' rather than evidence of malintent,18 or the work of minority ‘extremists’ rather 
than the ‘moderates’ dominant in the ruling HDZ.19 As Meier emphasises, 'there were no 
concrete acts on the part of the Croatian authorities which could be said to have 
instigated or justified the unrest. There were only errors and acts of sheer 
incompetence'.20 The Serb nationalists in Croatia, meanwhile, are generally seen as 
puppets of Milošević, who ‘was orchestrating the Croatian Serbs’ political 
machinations’ from an early stage.21 The Serb 'rebellion' was simply, as Gagnon argues, 
'a repeat of [Milošević's] stage-managed demonstrations that led to the overthrow of the 
Montenegro and Vojvodina leaderships' in 1988-89.22 Some 'orthodox' works do 
describe the Croatian Serbs in ways that imply they had some degree of agency, but the 
14 Cviic, p.207.
15 For example: Meier, p.155. Goldstein, p.126. Bennett, pp.135-6.
16 Bennett, p.147. Similarly: Budislav Vukas, ‘The Legal Status of Minorities in Croatia’, in Snežana 
Trifunovska (ed), Minorities in Europe - Croatia, Estonia and Slovakia (London: Asser Press, 1999).
17 Goldstein, p.126. And: Meier, p.155. Bennett, pp.135-6. Cigar. Gagnon, op. cit.. Richard Caplan, 
Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp.119-20. Gale Stokes, ‘From Nation to Minority: Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at the Outbreak 
of the Yugoslav Wars’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 6 (2005), p.10. Lukić, p.60.
18 Bennett, p.141. LeBor, p.145. Meier, p.155. Gagnon, op. cit., p.141.
19 Gagnon, op. cit., p.141. Likewise: Robert Hislope, Nationalism, Ethnic Politics and Democratic  
Consolidation: A Comparative Study of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Unpublished 
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1995), p.210. Ramet, op. cit., p.58.
20 Meier, p.155.
21 CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.1, p.85. For example: Silber & Little, pp.25-7, 98-103. Sell, pp.1-7, 
116-7. Gagnon, op. cit., pp.80-3, 92-5, 139, 142-9. Bennett, pp.127, 136, 242-6. Tanner, pp.225-6, 
231-3, 255-6. Meier, pp.xi, 118-9, 150.
22 Gagnon,  op. cit., p.14.
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focus is very much on arguing that 'the rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia did not only 
arise out of their own ranks but was [also] incited and even organised by Milošević'.23
'Multi-factor' accounts, on the other hand, see Belgrade as just one determinant of the 
escalation into war in Croatia, emphasising also the role of the Croatian authorities and 
local issues.24 Cohen, for example, agrees that Tuđman 'went out of his way to assure 
the republic's Serbs, and also international observers, that minority rights would be 
respected', but notes that he was also 'frequently insensitive' and such conciliatory 
efforts were 'at odds with the nationalist and anti-Serb rhetoric frequently adopted by 
Tuđman and certain quarters of his party's leadership'.25 Mile Bjelajac and Ozren Žunec, 
meanwhile, argue that the HDZ 'did almost nothing to persuade the Serbs of their good 
intentions',26 while Crnobrnja and Jovan Mirić even insist that Tuđman behaved in the 
‘most provocative way possible’ towards Croatia's Serbs,27 who 'had all reasons for fear 
and rebellion'.28 These works usually agree that Belgrade was promoting, encouraging 
or even directing Serb hardliners in Croatia, but place less emphasis on this, seeing it as 
just one element in the conflict.29 Mirić, for example, maintains that Tuđman's anti-
Serbian politics and Milošević's aggressiveness and manipulation of Serbs in Croatia 
were both essential requirements for the Serbian rebellion in Croatia which, absent one 
of these elements, would not have occurred.30 Some 'multi-factor' accounts also see the 
Croatian Serbs as essentially independent.31 Most notably, Rogers Brubaker has 
explicitly argued that the Croatian Serbs should be treated as a separate element in the 
conflict, maintaining that a 'triadic nexus' of three 'relational fields' existed: the 
23 Meier, p.153. Similarly: Gow, op. cit., p.19. Bennett, p.125.
24 For example: Silber & Little, pp.96-7. Crnobrnja, pp.145, 151, 169. Paul Roe, Ethnic Violence and the  
Societal Security Dilemma (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp.93-9, 108-9. Roger Peterson, 
Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe 
(Cambridge Unversity Press, Cambridge: 2002), pp.228-9.
25 Cohen, pp.208, 131
26 Mile Bjelajac and Ozren Žunec, The War in Croatia, 1991-1995 (The Scholars’ Initiative Research 
Team Seven, 2006), p.6.
27 Crnobrnja, p.145.
28 Jovan Mirić, Zločin i Kazna (Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 2002), pp.34. Similarly: Hayden, pp.69-70.
29 See, for example: Cohen, pp.131-3, 142, 201, 207, 225. Hayden, p.185, notes 7-8. Gibbs' account, 
though broadly 'revisionist', is also a good example of this approach: Gibbs, pp.67, 88-91.
30 Mirić, p.46.
31 For example: Pavković, pp.128-30. Crnobrnja, pp.152, 169. 
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'nationalising state' (Croatia), the 'national minority' (the Croatian Serbs), and its 
'external national homeland' (Serbia). The dynamic between all three actors, with 
Croatian nationalism encouraging the mobilisation of the Serbian minority, in turn 
fuelled by the regime in Serbia and in turn increasing Croatian fears, explains the 
conflict.32
Finally, 'revisionist' works have placed even greater emphasis on the role of the Croatian 
side in provoking the conflict, and portrayed the actions of both the Croatian Serbs and 
Belgrade as to a large extent reactive, defensive and justified. They also tend to consider 
the Croatian Serbs as independent actors. Hudson, for example, argues that the Serbs in 
Croatia had the constitutional right to self-determination, and simply opted to remain in 
Yugoslavia rather than Tuđman's new independent Croatia, 'which stripped the Serbs of 
their constitutional protections and rehabilitated the Ustasha regime'.33
There are thus considerable differences between rival accounts of the conflict in 
Croatia, and much polarisation. This polarisation permeates every aspect of scholars' 
accounts – even, as Ramet observes, ‘rather unimportant details'.34 Virtually every 'fact' 
is contested, and, as Bjelajac and Žunec write: ‘Everything depends on who is talking, 
and thus the academic work becomes a perfect example of how the social construction 
of reality works.’35 Something as basic as the content of the Croatian constitution or 
flag, for example, is portrayed completely differently by different authors.36 Despite this 
polarisation, however, there has still been relatively little meta-debate over which 
interpretations are more valid. Most authors simply present their own version of events 
32 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.58, 70-75.
33 Hudson, pp.77-98.
34 Sabrina Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the  
Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.5.
35 Bjelajac and Žunec, p.4.
36 Contrast, for example: Hayden, pp.185, 81-2. Stuart Hodges, ‘National Identity, Politics & 
Representation: Croatian National Identity 1990-1992’, Nationalism and National Identities Today:  
Multidisciplinary Perspectives, University of Surrey, CRONEM Annual Conference 2007 (12-13 June 
2007), p.5. With: Ramet, op. cit., pp.6-7. Tanner, pp.223-4.
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and their own 'facts'; the divergent accounts are hardly ever compared or brought 
together in a single field of vision.
The agency of the Croatian Serbs and role of Belgrade have attracted particularly little 
discussion. Moreover, although some works treat the Croatian Serbs as largely 
independent, this point is only rarely emphasised or explicitly explored as a counter-
point to the focus on Belgrade, and attention has instead focused overwhelmingly on 
just two of Brubaker's three 'relational fields' – Croatia and, above all, Serbia. As Nina 
Caspersen therefore observes: 'In the literature on the Yugoslav disintegration, the 
Serbian regime is commonly assigned overwhelming influence over the Serb leaders in 
Croatia and Bosnia, whose status as independent actors is consequently questioned.'37 In 
addition, many key 'orthodox' claims about Belgrade's role in Croatia – for example, its 
sidelining of Rašković and arming of Serb rebels (discussed later) - are yet to be 
questioned or challenged by the literature. 'Multi-factor' works simply place much less 
emphasis on these purported developments, or decline to mention them, while even 
'revisionist' works simply focus instead on documenting the actions of the Croatian side 
and emphasising the defensiveness of the Croatian Serbs.38
Before exploring in detail Belgrade's involvement in Croatia, however, it is important to 
consider how existing works have covered these issues: on what basis has it been argued 
that Milošević's influence over the various political and military/paramilitary leaders of 
Serbs in Croatia was decisive? How has Serbia been linked to developments in Croatia? 
How have the military rebellion of the Croatian Serbs, the role of the JNA, and 
Milošević's plans and intentions, been understood? Existing writing on these topics does 
not lend itself readily to categorisation, therefore the following sections of this literature 
review are topic-based.39
37 Nina Caspersen, Contested Nationalism: Serb Elite Rivalry in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s  
(London: Berghahn Books, 2010), p.31.
38 For example: Hudson, pp.77-98
39 Cohen, for example, treats the Croatian Serbs as largely independent actors and provides a very 'multi-
factor', rather than Belgrade-centric, account of the rise of Croat-Serb conflicts in Croatia, but also 
regards Rašković as much more radical than most of the literature, including most 'orthodox' works, 
suggest. Similarly,  Gordy takes a highly 'orthodox' stance on Belgrade's role in orchestrating the war, 
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Croatian Serb Leaders and Belgrade
Despite the tendency to portray the Croatian Serb nationalists as mere extensions of 
Milošević's politics, two initial Serb nationalist leaders in Croatia – the founding 
president of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) Jovan Rašković, and his effective 
successor Milan Babić – have nevertheless received some attention in the literature. 
Indeed, their power struggle is widely cited as illustrating the pivotal role of Milošević 
in orchestrating the conflict. Most authors see Rašković as advocating a relatively 
moderate political programme, consisting of ‘constituent status’ for Serbs, and/or 
cultural autonomy.40 A few authors do note more radical proposals from Rašković,41 and 
Marcus Tanner and Tim Judah consider him 'vague' and contradictory.42 Most would, 
nevertheless, agree with Robert Hislope's assessment that 'Rašković's more radical 
speeches can usually be traced to pressures from within the SDS or the sheer heavy-
handedness of HDZ policy', and that Rašković was 'at heart a moderate who exhibited a 
flexibility that made dialogue and a new settlement a real possibility'.43 Cohen appears 
to be a rare exception in stating that Rašković's own proposals had escalated by late 
1990 to the formation of a separate Krajina state.44 Misha Glenny, for example, 
explicitly argues that Rašković's proposals ‘neither compromised Croatia's territorial 
integrity, nor effectively created a “state within a state”', and ‘at no point did Rašković 
express an interest in taking Serb areas out of Croatia’, even if Croatia seceded.45 More 
recent works have concurred with these assessments. Caspersen, for instance, notes 
whilst simultaneously arguing against the typically 'orthodox' notion that Milošević was following a 
predetermined plan. Cohen, pp.132, 142. Eric Gordy, ‘Destruction of the Yugoslav Federation: Policy 
or Confluence of Tactics?’, in Cohen & Dragović-Soso (eds), pp.296-7. Gordy, The Culture of Power  
in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
Universty Press, 1999), pp.43-4.
40 For example: Silber & Little, p.96. Meier, p.148, 153-4. Keichi Kubo, ‘Democratization and Inter-
Ethnic Relations in Multiethnic Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Croatia and Macedonia’, Acta 
Slavica Iaponica. Tomus 21 (2004), p.187. Hislope, op. cit., pp.173-4. Roe, pp.102-8.
41 Peter Radan, The break-up of Yugoslavia and international law (London: Routledge, 2002), p.178. 
Caplan, p.117.
42 Tanner, pp.224-5. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: 
Yale Nota Bene, 2000), p.168.
43 Hislope, op. cit., pp.173-4. Similarly: Caplan, p.117.
44 Cohen, pp.132, 142.
45 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books, 1996), p.19.
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'considerable ambiguity' in SDS demands, but argues that Rašković's 'most important 
demand' was 'retain[ing] [the Serbs'] constituent status in Croatia', and that his initial 
cultural autonomy ideas had 'no territorial dimension'.46 There is also a broad consensus 
that Rašković sought to avoid war,47 Glenny considering this his ‘main political 
strategy’.48
Rašković is thereby placed in stark contrast to Babić, who is widely characterised as an 
‘extremist’ and ‘hardliner’ who opposed negotiations and pursued a policy of 
confrontation.49 Silber and Little, Robert Donia, Glenny and Judah all credit Babić, as 
opposed to Rašković, with ‘[introducing] the idea of territorial autonomy which later 
developed into a policy of secession from Croatia’.50 While Rašković was talking to 
Tuđman, Silber and Little argue, Babić was preparing an armed uprising, ‘the purpose 
of which was not to secure Serbs autonomy inside Croatia, but to take the Serbs, and the 
land on which they lived, out of Croatia altogether’.51
A similar contrast is seen in commentary on the two leaders' relations with Belgrade. 
Although a few authors note Rašković co-operating with Belgrade or following its 
lead,52 Rašković is usually viewed as an independent figure.53 Babić, by contrast, is 
perceived as Belgrade’s man. His separatist uprising was ‘directed by Belgrade’, whose 
‘bidding’ he was doing,54 and, as Glenny suggests, ‘it is extremely likely that [Babić and 
46 Caspersen, op. cit., 51, 65, 69. Similarly: Robert Donia, Radovan Karadžić: Architect of the Bosnian 
Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp.74-5.
47 Philip Cohen being a rare exception: Philip Cohen, ‘The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in 
Genocide in the 1990s’, in Thomas Cushman & Stjepan G. Meštrović, This Time We Knew: Western  
Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New York and London: New York University, 1996), pp.50-1.
48 Glenny, op. cit., p.17. Similarly: Tanner, pp.224-5. Even Christopher Bennett, who argues that 
Rašković ‘believed in the innate depravity of Croats’, maintains that he was not ‘determined to stir up 
trouble’ and ‘shied away from open confrontation with Zagreb’. Bennett, pp.126-7. 
49 Gagnon, op. cit., pp.100, 146-7. Silber & Little, pp.97-8, 104. Caplan, p.118. Tanner, p.225. Hislope, 
op. cit., pp.176-7. Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: the Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), p.187.
50 Glenny, op. cit., p.19. Judah, p.169. Donia, pp.74-5. Silber & Little, pp.97-8. Kubo, op. cit., p.187.
51 Silber & Little, p.97. Also: Radan, p.178.
52 Bennett, p.127. Gagnon, op. cit., p.143. Caplan, p.117.
53 With the exception of Philip Cohen, who claims that Rašković ‘closely consulted’ with Milošević. 
Philip Cohen, p.51. See, for example: Silber & Little, pp.95-7. Tanner, p.224. Caspersen, op. cit., 
pp.54, 57.
54 Silber & Little, p.97.
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Milošević] were personally acquainted and that Babić’s programme received the express 
approval of Milošević’.55 Babić’s radical strategy, moreover, is seen as Belgrade’s 
strategy, which promoted and even insisted on radicalisation. Gagnon, for example, 
claims that the SDS's 'Association of Municipalities' was a part of Milošević’s 
‘scenario’, ‘suddenly’ ‘imposed’ from outside on SDS leaders who, until then, had been 
talking only of cultural autonomy.56 Donia is the only major author to note that in April 
1991 Babić and Milošević came into conflict over Krajina's declaration of annexation to 
Serbia - surely a highly relevant fact when considering Babić-Milošević relations. Yet 
Donia then asserts that Babić quickly brought his programme 'back into accord with 
Milošević's policies'.57 Keiichi Kubo, meanwhile, appears to be alone in suggesting that 
Babić ‘was not acting on behalf of Belgrade from the very outset’.58 
Belgrade’s support is customarily considered key to the rise of Babić and his sidelining 
of Rašković. Christopher Bennett, for example, states simply that ‘Milošević replaced 
Rašković with Milan Babić’.59 The leaking of transcripts of Rašković’s meeting with 
Tuđman in July 1990 and the demotion of the Serbs’ status in the Croatian constitution 
have, however, also been seen as important factors weakening Rašković.60 Hislope, for 
example, argues that 'Babić was as much a product of Tuđman as he was of Milošević'.61 
Caspersen, meanwhile, additionally emphasises other factors, and whereas most authors 
place Babić’s triumph sometime in autumn 1990, she notes the struggle continuing into 
spring 1991.62 She also underscores that Babić had actively sought Belgrade’s support, 
and after consolidating his power ‘began asserting his independence’, presenting a more 
nuanced view of the relationship.63
55 Glenny, op. cit., p.17. Also: Sell, p.117. Josip Glaurdić, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the  
Breakup of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp.94, 148-9, 241.
56 Gagnon, op. cit., pp.142-3. Also: Caplan, p.119. Ramet, Balkan Babel, p.58.
57 Donia, p.76.
58 Kubo, 'The Radicalisation and Ethnicization of Elections: The 1990 Local Elections and the Ethnic 
Conflict in Croatia', Ethnopolitics, 6:1 (2007), p.38.
59 Bennett, pp.136, 127. Similarly: Ramet, op. cit., p.57. Caplan, p.118. Sell, p.117. Silber & Little, p.95. 
Donia, p.75.
60 Silber & Little, p.97. Caplan, p.119. Meier, pp.153-4. Caspersen, op. cit., p.64.
61 Hislope, op. cit., p.185-6. Also: Woodward, p.170.
62 Caspersen, op. cit.. As opposed to: Silber & Little, pp.97-100. Radan, p.178. Bennett, p.127. Judah, 
pp.168-9. Glenny, op. cit., p.17. Gagnon, op. cit., pp.146-7.
63 Caspersen, op. cit., p.58.
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Because of the perceived distinctions between Rašković and Babić, the argument is 
often made that a Croat-Serb compromise was possible, and Belgrade's alleged decision 
to undermine Rašković was thus an important cause of the war (along with, many 
suggest, Zagreb's alleged failure to seriously negotiate with Rašković).64 This is widely 
considered one of the key elements of Belgrade's interference in Croatia: not only did 
Serbia replace Rašković with Babić, showing the extent of its influence among the 
Serbs in Croatia, but it initiated, or stage-managed, the shift from cultural autonomy, 
minority rights and negotiations, to territorial autonomy, secession and armed rebellion, 
all of which are presented as thus having external, rather than internal, origins. Authors 
such as Richard Caplan therefore note that there was evidently 'broad support among 
Croatia's Serbs for dialogue with the Tuđman government, which Belgrade and its allies 
in the Krajina sought to undermine'.65
The Rašković-Babić distinction seems to have become an accepted truth, and those 
'multi-factor' or 'revisionist' works that do not emphasise or mention it are yet to offer an 
alternative account. This is despite the fact that very little evidence is provided of, for 
example, co-ordination between Babić and Milošević.66 The words of Rašković himself 
are also notable by their absence. Typically only a few of his statements from spring and 
summer 1990 are cited. Yet Rašković was very vocal and politically active until his 
death in July 1992. Nikica Barić, author of a major study of the Serbian rebellion in 
Croatia, cites a wider range of Rašković's statements, but ultimately declines to offer a 
final assessment of his politics, concluding only that he was 'controversial' and in mid-
1991 was 'sceptical' towards the politics of Milošević and Babić, possibly realising 
'what horrors a war between Serbs and Croats could bring'.67
64 For example: Glenny, op. cit., pp.18-19. Silber & Little, pp.95-7. Hislope, op. cit., pp.173-4, 185-6. 
Caplan, pp.117-8.
65 Caplan, p.118. Also see Gagnon, op. cit., pp.93-4.
66 Hislope and Caspersen are also the only authors to have dealt with the Rašković-Babić issue in depth, 
though Roe also provides a review of the secondary literature on this topic. Roe, pp.102-8. Hislope, 
op. cit. Caspersen, op. cit.
67 Nikica Barić, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1995 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing - Tehnička Knjiga, 
2005), p.219.
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In addition, whereas many authors mention the Rašković-Babić contest, only a few 
discuss other Croatian Serb leaders and their relations with Belgrade, such as Milan 
Martić or Goran Hadžić. Martić led the 'Balvan Revolution' and was Krajina's Minister 
of Interior until 1994, when he became its President. The authors of Balkan 
Battlegrounds68 argue that he was Belgrade’s ‘chosen instrument’, ‘created’ by Serbian 
state security (Državna bezbednost, DB) to be ‘the military figurehead’ of the Serb 
revolt in 1990.69 Caspersen agrees, writing that Martić’s police ‘were organised by the 
Serbian security service’ and ‘took orders directly from Belgrade’, although she does 
not analyse these relationships, or Belgrade's involvement in the security sector in 
Krajina.70 Hadžić, leader of the East Slavonia Serbs and then RSK President from 1992 
to 1993, has been positioned similarly in the very little that has been written about him: 
a ‘typical product of DB work’, a ‘man from nowhere' who became RSK president as a 
‘pliant political tool for Milošević’s men’.71
The 'Balvan Revolution' and the JNA
The 'Balvan Revolution' itself has yet to be analysed in any detail. Many prominent 
works argue that the Serbian rebellion was prepared in advance, by rebels ‘armed, 
organised and directed by Belgrade’.72 They describe a massive ‘covert shipment of 
arms into the Serb-populated regions of Croatia’, ordered by Milošević and conducted 
by the Serbian Interior Ministry (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, MUP) - most 
notably the DB - and elements in the JNA.73 Already in June 1990 MUP/DB operatives 
Franko “Frenki” Simatović and Radovan Stojicic “Badza” were allegedly infiltrated into 
68 The book is authored by unnamed CIA research analysts, and as such must be treated with a degree of 
caution, as it reflects the official position of the CIA.
69 CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, p.26.
70 Caspersen, op. cit., p.58. Similarly: Gow, The Serbian Project, p.81.
71 Judah, p.171. And: Gow, The Serbian Project, p.81. Caspersen and Barić discuss Hadžić's activities in 
1994-5, pointing to his loyalty to Belgrade, but much less so the earlier period when he was leader of 
the Eastern Slavonians and then RSK President. Barić, op. cit., p.472. Caspersen, op. cit., pp.106, 114-
6.
72 Silber & Little, p.97. And see the following footnotes.
73 Sell, pp.116, 123.
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Knin, to organise and arm Serbian rebel forces.74 This mass arming is usually said to 
have taken place from spring or summer 1990 onwards (although Cviic and Gagnon 
suggest it began in 1989):75 by August 1990 ‘Milošević’s gun-runners’ had ‘done [their] 
job well’; ‘Far from being defenceless’, the Knin Serbs ‘were well prepared’ and ‘could 
effectively pick and choose weapons from the JNA’s arsenal’.76 Given that the Serbs 
were armed en masse before Croatian efforts to acquire arms, the notion of Serbian 
'aggression', and Croatia's defensive rationale, is commonly endorsed – and Croatian 
efforts to arm 'were not enough to counter the work already done by Serbia's SDB, the 
JNA and the SDS.'77 It is notable that despite the boldness of these claims, few authors 
cite any specific evidence or sources for them.78
The eruption of the rebellion on 17 August 1990 was simply the next stage in Belgrade’s 
plan: ‘Armed civilians suddenly emerged and set up barricades on the roads’.79 Croatian 
police actions are not regarded as a cause of the rebellion; Gagnon, for example, 
explicitly states that Zagreb ‘made no move to stop [the Croatian Serb’s autonomy 
referendum], or to remove the barricades that Serbian forces had thrown up around the 
territory’: ‘despite Serbia’s accusations of a genocidal regime, Zagreb continued to 
moderate its rhetoric and act with “restraint”.’80 The authors of Balkan Battlegrounds, in 
particular, regard the 'Balvan Revolution' as having been, in fact, an operation of the 
Serbian DB.81
74 Judah, pp.170-1. Miloš Vasić, ‘The Yugoslav Army and Post-Yugoslav Armies’ in David Dyker and 
Ivan Vejvoda, Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth (New York: 
Longman, 1996), p.123. LeBor, pp.141-2. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, pp.25-33. Barić, Srpska 
pobuna, p.84.
75 Cviic, p.208. Gagnon, op. cit., pp.80, 143-4. Judah, pp.170-1. Silber & Little, p.103. Tanner, p.225-33. 
CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, pp.25-33. Lukić, p.54. Meier, p.150. Bennett, p.136. Ejub Štitkovac, 
'Croatia: The First War', in Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway (eds), Burn This House: The 
Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997), pp.155, 
162. Sell, p.116.
76 Tanner, p.233. Bennett, p.136. Also: Judah, p.170-1. 
77 Judah, p.173. Similarly: Tanner, pp.234-5. Gagnon, pp.101, 144. Meier, p.155. LeBor, p.149. By 
contrast: Crnobrnja, pp.152, 169. Hudson, pp.77-98.
78 Balkan Battlegrounds is a notable exception in this respect, but its sources are still mainly just Serbian 
press articles. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, pp.25-33.
79 Cigar, p.60. Similarly: Bennett, p.130. Meier, pp.154-5. Lukić, p.54. Ramet, Balkan Babel, p.58.
80 Gagnon, op. cit., p.94. Likewise: Lukić, p.54.
81 CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, pp.25-33.
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It has also been argued that from spring 1991 onwards 'armed extremist groups from 
Serbia', such as the 'Chetniks'82 of Serbian radical Vojislav Šešelj, 'began to infiltrate the 
Serbian communities in Croatia, fanning the national paranoia already aflame and 
urging the Serbian population to arm'.83 These were 'paramilitary forces armed, 
organised and sent' by Belgrade84 to do Milošević's 'dirty work' for him,85 'terrorising 
both Serb and non-Serb populations' in Slavonia.86 Thus, Eric Gordy maintains, the 
escalating conflict in the first half of 1991 was not a consequence of Croat-Serb tensions 
in Croatia, but of an 'administrative decision' by the regime in Belgrade.87
Some authors, however, including some more 'orthodox' accounts which describe 
Belgrade’s alleged arming of the rebels, assert that Croatian police actions also helped 
precipitate the rebellion. Silber and Little maintain that Croatia ‘had undertaken to 
prevent [the Serbs’] referendum’, and on 17 August 'used force, or at least a show of 
force… to try to stamp its will on the rebel regions’.88 The authors of Balkan 
Battlegrounds, as well as Crnobrnja and Susan Woodward, meanwhile, argue that 
Croatia’s ‘heavy-handed efforts to dominate the police force... poured salt on an open 
wound and enraged ethnic Serbs everywhere’,89 while Miroslav Hadžić goes so far as to 
say that in its determination ‘to quell the ‘Balvan Revolution’ by force, the new 
Croatian government gave the Serbs the justification to use force to protect 
82 Chetnik (Četnik) was the name given to Serbian nationalist militias active during the Second World 
War, loosely affiliated with Draža Mihailović. Formally an anti-Axis resistance movement, they have 
been accused of collaboration with the occupiers against the communist Partisans, as well as being 
associated with 'Greater Serbian' ideas and genocidal crimes against Croats and Muslims. In socialist 
Yugoslavia, particularly Croatia, the Chetniks were effectively regarded as the Serbian Ustaše.
83 Štitkovac, p.157. Also: Brendan O’Shea, Perception and Reality in the Modern Yugoslav Conflict  
(Taylor & Francis, 2007), p.9.
84 Judah, p.177.
85 Ognjen Pribičević, 'Changing Fortunes of the Serbian Radical Right', in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed), The 
Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1999), p.197. And: Sell, pp.137-8. Judah, pp.185-9. Tanner, p.245.
86 Gagnon, op. cit., p.105.
87 Gordy, The Culture of Power, pp.43-4.
88 Silber & Little, pp.100-1, 103. Also: Kubo, 'The Radicalisation and Ethnicization of Elections’, p.33. 
Hannes Grandits & Carolin Leutloff, ‘Discourses, actors, violence: the organisation of war-escalation 
in the Krajina region of Croatia 1990-1’ in Jan Koehler & Christopher Zurcher (eds), Potentials of  
Disorder (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp.30-31.
89 CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.1, p.83. Crnobrnja, p.152. Woodward, p.137. Also: Gow, op. cit., p.19. 
Hislope, op. cit., p.211. Pavković, p.129.
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themselves.’90 Moreover, while some authors emphasise the external origin and staged 
nature of this rebellion,91 others argue that it also had local origins. Hannes Grandits and 
Carolin Leutloff, for example, argue that the rebellion was motivated by ‘intense fear’ 
and was seen ‘as an act of self-defence’ (although this fear ‘did not [necessarily] 
correspond to a real threat’).92 Kubo, similarly, emphasises that the conflict clearly had 
local as well as external origins, as the first rebels consisted of local policemen.93 
'Revisionist' authors, meanwhile, focus on Croatian arming and organising as a counter 
to the focus on the Serbs - but are yet to offer any alternative account of the arming of 
the Croatian Serbs.94
The agenda of the JNA has also been interpreted in vastly different fashions. Jović 
argues that until a fairly late stage, the army was 'hesitant to accept the end of 
Yugoslavia' and 'still wanted to “defeat” the Croatian and Slovenian nationalists and to 
preserve Yugoslavia’s unity”;95 Miloš Vasić suggests that the JNA was thinking along 
these lines up to August 1991.96 Some posit that it was around March 1991 that the JNA 
abandoned this goal;97 others that the Milošević-JNA alliance went back years, with 
federal defence secretary 'Kadijević and Milošević... in complete agreement that the old 
federation was finished and that the future lay in a smaller Yugoslavia which would 
unite all Serbs in one state'.98 
Regardless of its precise ambitions, however, the JNA is usually seen as pro-Serb, and 
as complicit in the Serbian rebellion in 1990-91.99 Escalating Serb-Croat clashes and 
JNA interventions to 'separate the warring sides' in the first half of 1991, meanwhile, are 
90 Miroslav Hadžić, The Yugoslav Peoples’ Agony (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p.141.
91 For example: Sell, p.117. Gagnon, op. cit., p.94.
92 Grandits & Leutloff, pp.28-9.
93 Kubo, 'The Radicalisation and Ethnicization of Elections’, pp.32-3, 37-8.
94 For example: Hudson, pp.77-98.
95 Dejan Jović, op. cit., pp.358-60.
96 Vasić, p.127.
97 Florian Bieber, 'The Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia: The Army 
without a State?', in Cohen & Dragović-Soso (eds), p.323. Judah, p.175. Silber & Little, p.145. Sell, 
p.136-7.
98 Tanner, p.226. Also: Bennett, p.130. Lukic, p.54.
99 For example: Lukic, p.54. Tanner, p.238. Ramet, Balkan Babel, p.58.
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often located as part of Milošević's master plan for Serb occupation of 'Serb territories' 
in Croatia. Silber and Little, for example, describe a 'familiar pattern' of rebel Serbs 
provoking conflict and the army 'protecting renegade Serb areas' - 'Under a cloak of 
impartiality', helping create a Greater Serbia.100 By contrast, 'revisionist' accounts - and 
also some others, such as the largely 'orthodox' Balkan Battlegrounds - present JNA 
interventions as having genuinely impartial intentions.101
Milošević's Intentions
Serbia has been ascribed a pivotal, and highly direct, role in instigating the Serbian 
rebellion and the descent into conflict in Croatia, through a variety of means. There is, 
however, considerable divergence in interpretations of Milošević's intentions – what his 
exact goals were, and the extent to which he was implementing a premeditated strategy. 
Authors such as Bennett, Cigar and Bogdan Denitch, for example, have argued that 
Milošević was pursuing a 'Greater Serbia' for years before Yugoslavia's breakup.102 Sell's 
position is, however, more common: Milošević was pursuing 'a careful and well-
planned strategy', but this was initially aimed at dominating Yugoslavia, and only 
subsequently at 'using armed force to create a separate Serb state'.’103 Sell suggests that 
the 'Yugoslav option' was abandoned by spring or summer 1990.104 Gagnon agrees, and 
both maintain that, thence onwards, Milošević had a deliberate 'strategy of destroying 
Yugoslavia' to achieve his goals.105 It is even suggested that Milošević had a 'tacit' 
alliance with the Slovenian leadership, which sought Slovenia's independence from 
Yugoslavia, to this end.106 Jović also locates the shift from the 'Yugoslav option' in the 
100 Silber and Little, pp.135, 170. Also: Judah, pp.174.-7. Tanner, pp.241-7, 253-5. LeBor, p.150. Cviic, 
p.208. Meier, p.175.
101 For example: Hudson, pp.92-8. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.1, p.92.
102 Bennett, p.124. Cigar, p.57. Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p.42. 
103 Sell, pp.4-5.
104 Sell, pp.108-10.
105 Gagnon, op. cit., pp.92-3. Sell, p.127.
106 Sell, p.128. Silber and Little, pp.113-4.
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first half of 1990.107 Others, however, place it later,108 and authors such as Toni Petkovic 
and Gordy even claim that Milošević’s alternative to Yugoslavia was never thought-out 
or planned in advance.109 Gordy, indeed, though generally an 'orthodox' writer, doubts 
whether Milošević ever really had a long-term plan: he was simply 'carried by events' 
and, beyond his resolution to use force in Serbian interests, 'did not know what he was 
getting into'.110
Milošević and Tuđman's negotiations in 1991, most famously in Karađorđevo on 25 
March, have provoked similarly differing interpretations. There have long been rumours 
of a 'Karađorđevo agreement' between the two presidents, relating to a division of 
Bosnia and possibly Milošević's renunciation of the Krajina. Authors differ, however, on 
the extent to which they believe an agreement was reached, and how this related to 
developments in Croatia in 1991. Drago Kovačević argues that there was an agreement, 
but because it was difficult for Milošević to openly abandon the Krajina Serbs the two 
presidents opted for a 'controlled war', whose ultimate aim was the violent partition of 
Bosnia and the departure of the Krajina Serbs.111 Adam LeBor, similarly, maintains that 
even at the peak of the war in 1991 there was probably 'some kind of understanding' 
between the two leaders.112 Most accounts, however, suggest that whilst the two leaders 
found much common ground over Bosnia, agreeing 'firmly in principle' on its division, 
they failed to agree over the fate of Croatia's Serbs.113 It is – nevertheless - often 
suggested that these talks led Tuđman to underestimate the Serb threat to Croatia.114 This 
is seen as the result of deliberate deception by Milošević, who, as Dušan Viro suggests, 
'hooked' Tuđman onto the division of Bosnia through false promises of renouncing the 
107 Dejan Jović, op. cit., pp.358, 360.
108 Meier, p.162. Silber & Little, pp.26, 114, 117, 128.
109 Toni Petković, ‘Fight for Great Serbia: Myth and Reality’, Center for Southeast Europe, Working 
Paper Series 3 (2009), pp.4-5. Gordy, ‘Destruction of the Yugoslav Federation', pp.296-7. Similarly: 
Gow, op. cit., p.19. Lukić, pp.61-2. Cohen, pp.207-8.
110 Gordy, op. cit., pp.296-7.
111 Drago Kovačević, Kavez - Krajina u dogovorenom ratu (Belgrade: Srpski Demokratski Forum, 2003), 
pp.60-4. 
112 LeBor, p.168. Similarly: Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Milošević: Portrait of a Tyrant (New 
York: The Free Press, 2000), pp.88-9, 218.
113 Glenny, op. cit., p.149. Sell, p.119. Silber & Little, pp.131-2. Judah, pp.174, 283-4. Similarly: Tanner, 
pp.242-3.
114 Silber & Little, p.32. Meier, pp.167-8. Magas, op. cit., p.121.
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Croatian Serbs, in order to prevent a Croat-Muslim alliance and undermine Croatian 
defence preparations.115 An alternative view is presented by Ivo Lučić, however, who 
dismisses talk of a 'Karađorđevo agreement', either real or deceptive, as propaganda 
from Tuđman's opponents.116
As with the Rašković-Babić distinction, most authors deal with Karađorđevo only 
briefly. Minić, Lučić and Hudelist offer more detailed and comprehensive discussions.117 
But they failed to use some key sources, such as Tuđman's interview for the BBC's 
'Death of Yugoslavia' project, and could not, of course, consider the many other sources 
that have become available in the past decade.
This holds true for the literature in general. Although in recent years more work has 
been done on the conflict in Croatia, most notably by Caspersen, Kubo and Croatian 
scholars such as Barić, Davor Marijan and Ivica Miškulin, many topics are still not well 
served by scholars. Different authors present, for instance, the 'Balvan Revolution' very 
differently, but typically do so in just a few sentences, with little analysis or engagement 
with evidence supporting contrary interpretations. A major aim of this thesis is therefore 
to hone in on some of these under-investigated but contested topics, in the hope of 
narrowing the gap between different interpretations and contributing to greater 
understanding of some of the basic elements of the descent into conflict in Croatia.
The 'orthodox' view of Milošević's role in the break-up of Yugoslavia remains popular 
to this day, with authors such as Marko Attila Hoare and Josip Glaurdić being outspoken 
advocates of it.118 It was adopted by the ICTY Prosecution in key cases such as the trial 
115 Dušan Viro, Slobodan Milošević: Anatomija Zlocina (Zagreb: Profil, 2007), pp.150-5. Also see: Darko 
Hudelist, Tuđman – biografija (Zagreb: Profil, 2004), pp.689-710.
116 Ivo Lučić, 'Karađorđevo: politcki mit ili dogovor?', Časopis za suvremenu povijest, God. 35, br. 1 
(2003), pp.7-36. Ivo Lučić, 'The View from Bosnia and Herzegovina on Franjo Tuđman's “Bosnian 
Policy”', Review of Croatia History, No. 1 (6/2010), pp.75-80. Similarly: Sabrina Ramet, 'Confronting 
the Past: The Slovenes as Subjects and Objects of History', Družboslovne Razprave, 24 (58) (2008), 
p.41. Josip Glaurdić, ‘Inside the Serbian War Machine: The Milošević Telephone Intercepts, 1991-
1992’, East European Politics and Societies. Vol. 23, No. 1 (February 2009), p.93.
117 Miloš Minić, Dogovori u Karađorđevu o podeli Bosne i Herzegovine (Sarajevo: Rabis, 1998). Lučić, 
op. cit. Lučić, 'Karađorđevo'. Hudelist, Tuđman, pp.689-710.
118 See, for example: Marko Attila Hoare, How Bosnia Armed (London: Saqi Books, 2004). Glaurdić, op.  
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of Milošević, and has also been popular with the Western media (particularly during and 
since the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999). In the past decade in particular, however, 
there has been an increasing number of scholarly works which have brought into 
question more key aspects of this 'orthodox' interpretation. Nebojša Vladisavljević, for 
example, offers a radical revision of our understanding of Milošević's rise to power and 
the 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' in Serbia in the late 1980s, convincingly arguing that 
Milošević had much less control over this than is usually assumed, allying himself with 
a largely autonomous Serbian protest movement rather than engineering it all as part of 
a grand plan.119 Janine N. Clark has vigorously questioned the dominant view of 
Milošević as a warmonger and criminal leader, noting the limits of his influence and 
misrepresentations of his speeches.120 Jović has also convincingly explained the 
Croatian and Slovenian 'confederal' proposal of 1990-91 as entailing the (peaceful) 
break-up of Yugoslavia into independent states, rather than a looser federation as 
presented by many other authors.121 In his recent biography of Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadžić, meanwhile, Donia notes that he has abandoned his former view of 
Milošević as an advocate of 'Greater Serbia', and describes in detail how Karadžić 
operated independently of Belgrade.122 Former ICTY researcher Marko Prelec, similarly, 
argues that the Prosecution in the Milošević case presented a false view of his politics 
and that the evidence produced indicated, instead, the limits of Milošević's influence on 
events on the other side of the Drina, while Caspersen has concluded that, over time, the 
Croatian and Bosnian Serbs 'were able to curtail Milošević's influence and became 
increasingly independent', particularly in the latter case.123 At the same time, however, 
Caspersen largely concurs with the dominant view of Belgrade's role in the earlier 
period, that 'in the immediate prewar period and in the first years of war, Belgrade's 
cit..
119 Nebojša Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureacratic Revolution (New York: Palgrace Macmillan, 2008).
120 Janine N. Clark, Serbia in the Shadow of Milošević: the legacy of conflict in the Balkans (London: 
Tauris Academic Studies, 2008) pp.53-4, 90-1.
121 Dejan Jović, ‘The Slovenian-Croatian Confederal Proposal: A Tactical Move or an Ultimate 
Solution?’, in Cohen & Dragović-Soso (eds), pp.249-80. Also see: Hayden, pp.54-64.
122 Donia, pp.76, 81, 209.
123 Marko Prelec, 'Body of Evidence: The Prosecution's Construction of Milošević', in Timothy William 
Waters (ed), The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.356-76. 
Caspersen, op. cit., p.31.
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influence was very tangible',124 while Prelec emphasises the distinction between 
Milošević's relationships with the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, claiming that he was 
able to '[swap] members of the Croatian Serb government like a coach rotating his 
players'.125 
Most of the arguments of this thesis strengthen such 'multi-factor' or 'revisionist' 
approaches, though they call into question the continued emphasis on Serbia's influence 
over the Serbs in Croatia in 1990-91. As will be seen, this follows from a critical 
analysis of both old and new primary sources.
124 Caspersen, op. cit., p.31.
125 Prelec, p.364.
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1.2. Sources and Methods
This thesis is based above all on primary sources: personal accounts, documents, and 
media. Personal accounts include testimonies at ICTY, published memoirs and diaries, 
interviews conducted in 1994-95 for the BBC’s Death of Yugoslavia documentary and 
book, and my own interviews, conducted in Serbia and Croatia from 2007 to 2011. 
Documents are primarily from the archive of the former RSK, published by the Croatian 
Memorial and Documentation Centre (HMDC-DR), and exhibits at the ICTY, which 
come from a wide variety of sources, including the Croatian and Serbian state archives. 
Contemporary domestic media employed is primarily Borba, Danas, NIN and Intervju, 
as well as translations by the Foreign Bureau Information Service (FBIS).
At the ICTY, the conflict in Croatia has been extensively covered in the trials of 
Milošević, Martić, Babić, Hadžić, Serbian DB officials Stanišić/Simatović and others. 
Witness testimonies are generally extensive and detailed. From one key witness (and 
indictee), Milan Babić, we not only have twenty-three days of testimonies in three trials, 
but also his extensive pre-testimony interviews with the Prosecution (OTP, Office of the 
Prosecutor).126 We also have the benefit of these witnesses being asked to comment on 
documents and being cross-examined. In addition to this, the BBC interviewed 87 high 
ranking Yugoslav and international figures in 1994-95, including many of the key 
figures in the Croatian conflict, while I have conducted in-depth interviews with 46 
individuals in Serbia and Croatia, mostly former politicians (principally of the SDS and 
Krajina), but also some army and intelligence chiefs, journalists, and others.127 
Interviewees were selected by interest and availability. I aimed to be as comprehensive 
as possible, often interviewing several times in order to clarify and cross-check 
information in detail. My most extensive interviews, with Dušan Orlović, the first head 
of the Krajina DB (1991-92), spanned more than sixteen hours in total.
126 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.1.-2.36 (Babić Interviews).
127 See Bibliography for a full list of my own interviews, and information on BBC-DOY and RFE's.
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This wide range of accounts enables extensive cross-checking of information, and 
provides a fascinating insight into the motivations and perceptions of key actors at the 
time, as well as information on the numerous aspects of the conflict that were not 
publicly discussed and for which documentation is lacking – such as Krajina leaders' 
contacts with Milošević or the Tuđman-Milošević negotiations. As key actors such as 
Milošević were highly secretive in how they operated – even in private, confidential 
meetings of the state leadership, he would sometimes lie about sensitive topics to his 
colleagues, or deliberately avoid discussing them to avoid a written record – insider 
accounts can be a vital source of information.128
There are, of course, problems with using personal accounts, given years after the 
events in question, and many are quite evidently self-serving. At the ICTY witnesses 
also often have a clear incentive to be dishonest: to protect a former ally or political 
position; to condemn a former opponent; to avoid trial themselves; or to gain favours, 
such as relocation and a new identity, from the Prosecution. Indeed, several of my own 
interviewees were defence witnesses at The Hague, and gave much more one-sided 
accounts there than in person.129 As detailed later in the thesis, moreover, some key 
Prosecution witnesses, such as Milan Babić, have also given very questionable 
accounts.
Because of these reliability issues, most of the information presented in this thesis has 
been cross-verified with multiple sources, whose reliability has been individually 
assessed. Thanks to the ICTY and the HMDC-DR, we now have access to thousands of 
sensitive documents that would not normally have been available for decades, if at all 
(including minutes of meetings of the state leaderships, and party, police and 
intelligence reports), and the use of such contemporary documentation, and media from 
all sides, balances well against the pitfalls of participants' accounts.
128 See, for example: ICTY-Perišić: E-P02933-5 (Mladić Diary, December 1993); E-P782.E (Supreme 
Defence Council minutes, 7/2/1994), pp.56-60; Judgement (6/9/1011), pp.413-23; E-P00803.E 
(Interview Momčilo Perišić, 8/12/2003), p.10; E-P00807.E (Interview Momčilo Perišić, 9/3/2009), 
p.9.
129 For example, former RSK Foreign Minister Slobodan Jarčević.
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The war in Croatia and the disintegration of Yugoslavia are often used as case studies 
for the construction and testing of different theories of ethnic and civil conflicts.130 Such 
theory-focused works often suffer from a limited understanding of the cases themselves, 
however, while the great divergences in interpretations of every aspect of these cases 
has meant that authors have been able to construct completely opposing arguments from 
the same secondary works.131 This thesis does not attempt to offer a new theory of the 
conflict, or to confirm or refute the many existing ones. Instead, it aims to contribute to 
our understanding of certain key issues, leading to findings which may in turn aid our 
engagement with these different theoretical approaches.
The popular concept of 'security dilemmas' is worth some consideration, however. 
Originally a theory of International Relations (IR) that sought to explain inter-state 
conflicts, authors such as Barry Posen, Stuart Kaufman and Paul Roe have applied this 
concept to conflicts between ethnic/national groups within states, and specifically the 
Yugoslav and Croatian cases. In brief, actions taken to increase physical and/or societal 
security - by, for example, acquiring arms and limiting opportunities for national 
minority expression - are seen as aggressive rather than defensive moves by others, 
prompting similar moves in an escalating spiral of reaction and counter-reaction.132 Ali 
Bilgic has developed this concept further, and moved it away from a tendency towards 
determinism, by emphasising the agency of the actors involved (in, for example, 
defining the ways in which security is conceived and the means of achieving it are 
identified).133 Esther Visser and Isabelle Duyvesteyn have recently challenged this use 
of the 'security dilemma' concept, insisting on a strict definition whereby the perception 
of a 'threat' must be a misperception - whereas, they maintain, in the Croatian case 
130 For example: James Fearson, 'Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem', Annual Meetings of the  
American Political Science Association (New York, 30/8-2/9/1994). Gagnon, op. cit.
131 See, for example: Ali Bilgic, 'Towards a new societal security dilemma: comprehensive analysis of 
actor responsibility in intersocietal conflicts', Review of International Studies, Vol. 39, Issue 1 
(January 2013), pp.185-206. Esther Visser & Isabelle Duyvesteyn, 'The Irrelevance of the Security 
Dilemma for Civil Wars', Civil Wars, Vol. 16, Issue 1 (2014), pp.65-85.
132 Barry Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), 
pp.27-47. Roe, op. cit.
133 Bilgic.
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genuine security threats existed.134 The extent to which threats exist, how significant 
those threats are, and how one should achieve security is always a matter of 
interpretation (and contestation), however, and defensive measures taken in response to 
a minor threat may, for example, make that threat more substantial. The security 
dilemma has been applied to ethnic/national conflicts as a looser concept whereby 
actions intended to improve one's security, i.e. that are fundamentally defensive, end up 
increasing one's insecurity, because others perceive them as aggressive and respond in 
kind. This thesis make use of this looser concept of a security dilemma. For although, as 
Roe acknowledges, 'security dilemmas' may not be able to explain how a conflict 
situation arises in the first place, they do encapsulate one important means by which a 
conflict may escalate, and can help to account for certain developments in Croatia well.
134 Visser & Duyvesteyn.
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1.3. Thesis Roadmap
The central focus of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which the Serbian rebellion 
in Croatia in 1990-91 was orchestrated by Milošević and the authorities of the Republic 
of Serbia, or arose from an autonomous and independent movement(s) among Serbs in 
Croatia. The thesis homes in on the relationships between Belgrade and Croatian Serb 
political and military/paramilitary leaders, as well as considering the nuances of Serbian 
policy towards Croatia in this period. A conventional historical methodology is used, 
with a focus on the ideologies and roles of certain key individuals (such as Milošević, 
Rašković and Babić). This is not to suggest that the short-term decision making of these 
political elites was the fundamental cause of the war, or that the role of individuals was 
decisive, and that they were not themselves constrained and limited in their freedom of 
action. But the decisions and perspectives of these individuals certainly did have 
significant influence, and, most importantly, they acted as representatives of certain 
factions and trends in Croatia and Serbia.
In order to provide an in-depth investigation of Belgrade's role, the role of the Croatian 
side in the descent into conflict is not a fundamental point of investigation and analysis. 
Although this thesis does explore Croat-Serb interactions within Croatia as an 
alternative explanation for certain developments, it does not seek to cover, for example, 
the extent to which Serb fears for their rights in an independent Croatia were grounded. 
Instead, the main focus of investigation is on the most neglected, or unchallenged, 
aspects of Brubaker's 'triadic nexus': the agency of the Croatian Serbs, and their 
relationship with Serbia.
It is for this reason that I also partly put aside one purported component of Milošević's 
'attack' on Croatia: the Serbian state media's nationalist and one-sided portrayal of 
developments in Croatia. A fruitful analysis of the role of the Serbian media requires a 
much wider investigation of the situation in Croatia at the time, including the extent to 
which, for example, Serbian press allegations against Zagreb had a basis in reality. One 
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important means of indirect Serbian involvement in developments in Croatia is thus not 
fully covered by this thesis; the most direct alleged forms of involvement, are, however, 
examined. The reasons behind the rise of the SDS and its sidelining of rivals (mostly 
former communist Serbs) over the course of 1990-91 are also partly put aside for the 
same reason – this issue is too connected to Croatian politics to consider separately.
Chronological boundaries must also be noted: this thesis looks at the descent into war, 
rather than the war itself, and thus concerns primarily the period from the beginning of 
the Serbian movement in Croatia in 1989-90 to the start of the onset of the war proper, 
around summer 1991. Analysis of Belgrade's relationship with the Croatian Serbs 
extends slightly further, cutting off in early 1992, before the adoption of the Vance plan 
and the creation of the RSK, which began a new era in those relationships. Examination 
of later periods is, however, occasionally employed to shed further light on these topics.
It is also worth recording that, although I sometimes refer to 'Serbs in Croatia' or 
'Croatian Serbs', I am concerned principally with a section of the Serbs in Croatia, those 
of the largely rural Serb-majority Krajina and mixed Slavonia. A full third of Serbs lived 
in overwhelmingly Croatian cities, such as Zagreb, Zadar and Rijeka. Many of these 
Serbs were 'culturally 'Croatized'',135 and they tended to hold very different views from 
their rural co-nationals. Polls conducted in 1990-91 revealed major cleavages among 
Croatian Serbs, with approximately a third supporting the SDS's nationalist politics and 
a third opposing, a division that seems to have been largely geographic – Serbs in the 
Krajina supporting, and in the large cities opposing.136 For a variety of reasons, the voice 
of 'urban Serbs' was not well represented in Croatia in 1990-91, but there was, even 
then, a whole spectrum of Croatian Serb opinion, including a minority of highly pro-
135 Croatian Serb intellectual Drago Roksandić cited by Gale Stokes, ‘From Nation to Minority: Serbs in 
Croatia and Bosnia at the Outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 
6 (2005), p.5.
136 See poll data published by Dejan Jović in Danas, on 16/12/1989, 26/6/1990, 3/7/1990, 31/7/1990, 
7/8/1990, 4/9/1990, 2/10/1990, 6/11/1990, 4/12/1990, 1/1/1991, 5/2/1991, 5/3/1991, 9/4/1991, 
7/5/1991, 11/6/1991 and 30/7/1991, and Marinko Čulić, 'Trčanje ispod duge', Danas, 18/6/1991, pp.7-
9.
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Croatian Serbs active in Croatian nationalist parties.137 Rather than Serbian politics in 
Croatia in general, this thesis focuses on the Serbian rebellion in Croatia, which took 
place in the Krajina and Slavonia, and, for this reason, I do not examine the stances and 
roles of other Serbs spread throughout Croatia.
This thesis examines the evolving ideology of Rašković and the SDS (Chapter 2); the 
gradual descent into conflict between the SDS and the Croatian authorities over the 
course of 1990, including the eruption of the Serbian rebellion in Krajina and the 
militarisation of the conflict (Chapter 3); the Serbian leadership's views, strategies and 
proposals with regard to Croatia in this period, including its attitude to, and involvement 
in, the descent into conflict, its relationship with the JNA, and the latter's involvement in 
these developments (Chapter 4); the arming of the Serbs in Croatia (Chapter 5); 
Serbia's relationship with the SDS and its leaders, most notably Rašković and Babić, 
and its involvement in their factional struggle (Chapter 6); Belgrade's relationship with 
the Serbian rebels in the Krajina, particularly their main leader Milan Martić (Chapter 
7); and Belgrade's involvement in the political and military/security sector among Serbs 
in Eastern Slavonia, a region quite distinct from the Krajina (Chapter 8).
137 For example: Srećko Bjelić of the 'Coalition of National Understanding' and Croatian People's Party (a 
key figure of the 'Croatian Spring'/'Mass Movement' (Maspok) of 1970-71); Božo Kovačević of the 
Croatian Social-Liberal Party; and Đorđe Pribičević, vice-president of the Croatian Democratic Party, 
later an advisor to President Tuđman himself.
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Chapter 2: Jovan Rašković, the Serbian Democratic 
Party and the 'Serbian Question' in Croatia
Many key arguments about the conflict in Croatia have relied on certain understandings 
of the programme of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and in particular the agenda 
of the party’s founding president Jovan Rašković. It is often argued that Rašković made 
only moderate demands, such as cultural autonomy, but was undermined by Belgrade, 
which favoured instead the territorial and separatist politics of Milan Babić.1 This has 
also been argued by some former associates of Rašković, including influential Serbian 
nationalist author Dobrica Ćosić.2 Seen this way, Rašković represented a missed 
opportunity for compromise, which, if Belgrade (and, some suggest, Zagreb) had acted 
less maliciously, may not have been squandered.
This chapter considers this view by analysing the evolving programme of the SDS and 
its proposals for how to resolve the ‘Serbian question’ in Croatia. To what extent were 
the party's leaders ever prepared to accept a solution within an independent Croatia, or a 
Croatia in a confederal Yugoslavia? How did the proposals of Rašković and Babić 
differ, and what was Rašković’s attitude towards secession from Croatia – was he 
prepared to compromise to avoid war?
Two caveats must be registered. Firstly, this chapter considers only whether SDS leaders 
ever seriously considered negotiating a solution in Croatia given the way events 
developed, with the election of the HDZ and the policies it then conducted. It does not 
examine, whether, for example, they would have made more moderate proposals had 
there been a more moderate Croatian leadership. Secondly, this chapter uses terms such 
as ‘separatist’ to describe proposals for territories to secede from the Republic of 
Croatia. The Serbs of course argued that it was the Croats who were ‘separatists’ and 
1 For example: Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, pp.18-19. Silber & Little, pp.95-8. Hislope, pp.173-4, 
185-6. Caplan, pp.117-8. Donia, Karadžić, pp.74-5.
2 See, for example: Jovan Kesar, 'Jovan Rašković', Večernji Novosti, 5/9/2007, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
www.krajinaforce.com.
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that Serbs were just opting to remain in Yugoslavia. The word does, nevertheless, 
accurately denote the action of territories separating from Croatia, regardless of the 
cause or the ultimate destinies of either side.
The SDS, like the HDZ, was more a movement than a political party with strictly 
defined goals, and from the outset different leaders and factions within the party had 
different goals and agendas. (Even before the SDS was officially formed, there were 
threats of splits over the party’s name.)3 Attention is therefore paid to the differences 
between SDS factions. In 1990 Rašković was certainly the dominant personality and 
ideologue of the movement, however, and so the party's programme is first examined 
primarily as he presented it. The chapter will then proceed to consider the perspectives 
of other SDS factions, the differences between Rašksović and Babić, and their 
disagreements in 1991.
The SDS: A Brief Overview
The Serbian Democratic Party, conceived as representing the interests of Serbs in 
Croatia, was formed in Knin on 17 February 1990, with the Šibenik psychiatrist 
Rašković its president. The party won control of some Serb-majority municipalities near 
Knin in the April-May 1990 multi-party elections, and afterwards established an 
Association of Municipalities to unite them. Asserting constitutional amendments 
adopted by the Croatian assembly on 25 July were anti-Serbian, at a mass rally held on 
the same day a Serbian National Council (Srpsko nacionalno vijeće, SNV) was created. 
It was headed by Milan Babić, the president of Knin municipality and the Association. 
A ‘Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbian Nation in Croatia’ was 
adopted.4 In December 1990 Croatia then passed a new constitution, demoting the 
Serbs' constitutional status, and in Knin the Association was transformed into the 
Serbian Autonomous Province of Krajina (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, SAOK).
3 Interviews: Marko Dobrijević, Organisational Secretary of SDS, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 5/8/2007); 
Branko Marijanović, Vice-President of SDS, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 7/11/2007).
4 ICTY-Martić: E-141E (SNV Declaration, 25/7/1990).
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Initially the Knin economist Jovan Opačić was the de facto number two in the SDS, but 
he was rapidly sidelined by Babić, who had taken that mantle by autumn. By the end of 
1990 the ambitious Babić also came into conflict with Rašković. Babić would go on to 
lead SAOK into secession and war with Croatia. In spring 1991 he formed a separate 
SDS Regional Board for Krajina, which in 1992 formally became a new party, the SDS 
Krajina. Rašković, still formally president of the SDS, was gradually pushed aside and 
withdrew to Belgrade, where he died from a heart attack in July 1992.
The SDS Programme: Key Elements
There were three key elements to the SDS’s national programme: the party supported 
Yugoslav federalism and opposed a confederation; it insisted that the Serbs in Croatia 
were a nation with the same rights as Croats, including the right to self-determination; 
and it argued that the existing status of Serbs in Croatia was inadequate, and that further 
rights, including some form of Serbian autonomy, was necessary.
The SDS was firmly committed to the maintenance of Yugoslavia, arguing that ‘the fate 
of the Serbian people in Croatia depends on democratic federalism’.5 The borders 
between republics were only administrative, not state borders, and the creation of a 
confederation, which would divide the Serbian people between many separate states and 
potentially leave them threatened by ‘the politics of genocide’, was against the interests 
of the Serb people.6 The SDS also favoured a strengthening of the federal element in 
Yugoslavia, with, for example, the first chamber of the federal parliament being elected 
not by the republics but directly by citizens on the basis of ‘one man, one vote’.7
5 ICTY-Martić: E-137E (SDS Programme, 17/2/1990), p.11.
6 Z. Tarle, ‘How Čubrilović Welcomed Franjo’, Borba, 22/3/1990, p.13, in FBIS-EEU-90-063, 
2/4/1990. Also: Časlav Očić, Hronika Republike Srpske Krajine 1989-1991 (Belgrade: Sava Mrkalj & 
Zora, 1996), pp.41-42, retrieved from www.krajinaforce.com  . . Interview Branko Marijanović, Vice-
President of SDS 1990-91 (Belgrade: 7/11/2007).
7 ICTY-Martić: E-137E (SDS Programme, 17/2/1990), pp.11, 15.
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Secondly, at the core of SDS ideology was the belief that Serbs in Croatia were a 
‘sovereign nation’ equal to the Croats, not a national minority in a Croatian state. The 
Serbs in Croatia were living on ‘their historic territories’ where they had ‘lived for 
centuries and before the creation of the state of Croatia’,8 territories which were ‘always 
Serbian’ and ‘never Croatian’.9 Croatia, Rašković argued, was ‘a state of Serbian and 
Croatian territories’,10 and the Serbian nation there possessed ‘all the rights of a political 
nation’.11 As ‘Nations can secede, and not states’ then the Serbian nation had the right to 
self-determination, to independently ‘determine with whom it will live, in what regime 
it will live and how it will connect with other nations in Yugoslavia’.12 This view was 
shared by all the leading figures in the SDS, including moderates such as Vojislav 
Vukčević, who was forced out of the party in spring 1991.13
Finally, the SDS argued that Serbs in the Socialist Republic of Croatia were in an 
unequal position, subject to cultural assimilation and economic neglect, with equal 
rights only on paper.14 It was therefore necessary to introduce Serbian rights and 
autonomy in Croatia. As will be demonstrated, however, the exact nature of the rights 
and autonomy demanded, and the question of how the party would react to the 
confederalisation of Yugoslavia or creation of an independent Croatia, was always 
ambiguous, and became more radical over time.
8 ICTY-Martić: E-141E (SNV Declaration, 25/7/1990). Also: Jovan Rašković, Luda zemlja (Belgrade: 
Akvarijus, 1990), p.252.
9 Ibid., p.245.
10 Jovan Rašković, Duša i sloboda (Novi Sad: Slavija, 1995), pp.141, 227.
11 Rašković, ‘Primjedbe na nacrt Ustava Repbulike Hrvatske’, 11/12/1990 (author’s copy), p.1.
12 ICTY-Martić: E-141E (SNV Declaration, 25/7/1990).
13 Interview Vojislav Vukčević, Vice-President of SDS, 1990-91 (Belgrade, 27/7/2007 and 1/8/2007). V. 
Ilić, ‘Nisam ja izdajica’, Borba, 22/4/1991.
14 See for example: Marinko Čulić, ‘Čega se boje Srbi’, Danas, 29/5/1990, pp.13-15.
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2.1. Jovan Rašković
Jovan Rašković never issued a clear programmatic document. The SDS’s initial party 
programme mostly spoke generally about the principles of democracy, and contained 
nothing on the key question of how the party would respond to a confederation or 
independence.15 Rašković’s 1990 book Luda zemlja (Mad Country) is a collection of 
various extracts from his speeches, interviews and articles up to September 1990. It is 
not comprehensive, and subsequent major shifts in his rhetoric are absent. The 
posthumously published Duša i sloboda (Soul and Freedom) covers a wider period, up 
to his death in 1992, and is also an eclectic collection of interviews, articles and other 
documents.16
The real challenge in analysing Rašković, however, is the ambiguity and inconsistency 
of his rhetoric. He could apparently contradict himself on key issues in the space of 
sentences.17 The Croatian government pointed to the confused nature of Serb demands, 
and during Rašković’s meeting with Tuđman in July, Tuđman’s adviser Slaven Letica 
asked Rašković if he even knew himself what he wanted.18 Babić’s former deputy Lazar 
Macura argues that Rašković in fact ‘didn’t have a real viewpoint, it was just changing 
based on the situation’.19 To some extent this was true – Rašković rarely wrote speeches 
in advance, and admitted that he often said what would be popular with the crowd, even 
if he disagreed with it.20 Despite his pacifist and anti-war inclinations, for example, 
15 ICTY-Martić: E-137E (SDS Programme, 17/02/1990).
16 Unhelpfully, all extracts in Luda zemlja are also undated, while many in Duša i sloboda are undated or 
dated incorrectly. It has been possible, however, to work out when most of them are from.
17 For example: Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.309-10.
18 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.311.
19 Interview with Lazar Macura, Vice-President of Knin, 1990-93 (Belgrade, 2, 5/11/2007).
20 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.306. Tanasije Mladenovic, Usputne skice za portrete (Belgrade: Zavod za 
udzbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1995), p.148.
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Rašković sometimes even used aggressive, war-mongering rhetoric.21 This makes 
analysing his programme particularly challenging.
Rašković often presented his ideas in a confusing or ambiguous way, emphasising or 
omitting different parts of his programme for rhetorical purposes, depending on the 
audience and the political situation of the moment. He also saw parts of his programme 
as being integrally related and thus sometimes did not mention every element, 
contributing to the apparent ambiguity in his stance. This chapter argues, however, that, 
if we make our way through these 'verbal acrobatics',22 we can see that Rašković did 
have a coherent programme, that its evolution is traceable, and that it was, in fact, quite 
different from that usually attributed to him.
Rašković’s Initial Programme: Sovereignty, Cultural Autonomy and 
the Association
Rašković's initial core demands were threefold: recognition of the ‘sovereignty’ of the 
Serbian nation in Croatia; full cultural rights including cultural autonomy; and regional 
autonomy for Serb-majority regions via an Association of Municipalities.
Rašković demanded that the Croatian side recognise the fact that the Serbs in Croatia 
were a nation with equal rights to the Croats – that they recognise the ‘sovereignty of 
the Serbian national being’ and its ‘right to organise itself how it thinks is best for it’.23 
This recognition would be constitutionally effected in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
‘Serbian nation would need to enter’ into a new Croatian constitution, as the existing 
21 Compare, for example: Slavoljub Djukić, Lovljenje vetra: Politicka ispovest Dobrica Ćosića 
(Belgrade: Samizdat B92, 2001), p.179; HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, ‘Stenogram govora dr. 
Milana Babića, Dušana Zelembabe i Jovana Raškovića prilikom rasprave o amandmanima na Ustav 
Republike Hrvatske’, 6/7/1990, p.38; Sonja Biserko, Vukovarska Tragedija 1991: U mreži  
propagandnih laži i oružane moći JNA (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2007), 
pp.353-4.
22 Milan Jajčinović, 'Hrvatska s katedrale', Danas, 17/7/1990, pp.18-19.
23 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2 - Document 13, p.38.
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1974 constitution was a ‘farce’ which gave the Serbs rights only on paper.24 As far as the 
constitutional definition of Croatia was concerned, Rašković declared himself against 
any form of ‘group sovereignty’, however, and argued that Croatia should be a state of 
its citizens. The sovereignty of nations would follow from that, and in this respect 
Croatia should be defined as ‘the state of the Croatian nation, the Serbian nation in 
Croatia, and other nations’.25 This was consistently demanded by the SDS throughout 
1990, regardless of what additional autonomy it sought.26
Under its 1974 constitution, Croatia had been defined as 'the national state of the 
Croatian nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and the state of the 
nationalities which live within her'.27 The only subtle - but significant – difference 
between Rašković's proposal and the existing definition was that Croatia was no longer 
the ‘national state’ of the Croatian nation: it was only the state of each nation, equally. 
This reflected the SDS’s view of Croatia as a bi-national state.28 Rašković fleshed the 
idea out further in his December 1990 proposals for the Croatian constitution, 
suggesting that after the preamble about the historic right of Croats to their state, a 
section be added talking about the Serbs’ historic rights, including ‘all rights of a 
political nation, which belong to them in their entirety’.29 As Letica notes, this implied 
the right to self-determination, too.30 Rašković also proposed a dual-chamber Sabor 
(Assembly), the second chamber being a ‘Council of Nations’ where Serbs would have 
veto power over all decisions affecting them.31
24 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.251.
25 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.272. Also: Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp. 321-2. Marinko Čulić, 'Čega se 
boje Srbi', Danas, 29/5/1990, pp.13-15.
26 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 29, ‘Mišljenje Pravne komisije Srpskog nacionalnog vijeća u svezi 
nacrta Ustava Republike Hrvatske’, p.73. Interview Vojislav Vukčević, Vice-President of SDS, 1990-
91 (Belgrade: 2007).
27 Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.88.
28 Jasna Babić, 'Pod zvijezdom razdora', Danas, 19/6/1990, pp.17-19.
29 Rašković, ‘Primjedbe...', p.1.
30 Interview Slaven Letica, principal advisor to President Tuđman, 1990-91 (Zagreb: 8/10/2009).
31 Rašković, ‘Primjedbe...', p.3. This was indicated already in ICTY-Martić: E-137E (SDS Programme, 
17/02/1990), p.17, and proposed by Opačić in June: Marinko Čulić, ‘Olako uspunjene brzina’, Danas, 
3/7/1990, pp.16-17.
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Secondly, Rašković sought to establish the cultural unity of the Serbian nation through 
cultural autonomy. The Serbs must have their own cultural societies, museums, 
publishing houses, newspapers, radio and television in Croatia. They must have the full 
right to officially use the Serbian language and Cyrillic script (traditionally favoured by 
Serbs, though in declining use among Serbs in Croatia), and Serbian schools with 
different curricula.32 Rašković and others in the SDS were inconsistent, however, on 
whether they demanded these rights only for areas where Serbs were the majority 
population,33 or for the whole of Croatia – their more usual position.34
Thirdly, also essential was the formation of a Serbian region, or regions, in Croatia. 
Rašković argued that such a region – the ‘Krajina’ –35 in fact existed and had its 
‘natural, traditional and ethnic bonds’, and was ‘only broken up thanks to the leading 
Croat-centric politics’.36 Under socialism, every municipality in Croatia belonged to an 
Association of Municipalities (Zajednica općina) with its neighbours, voluntary 
associations for cooperation on areas of mutual interest.37 The Serb-majority 
municipalities were all included in Associations based on Croat-majority regional 
centres, and the SDS programme argued that this regional organisation, and the existing 
municipal boundaries, divided historic ‘Krajinas’ and did ‘not correspond with the 
historic interests of the Serbian people’. Citing the economic underdevelopment of the 
Serb-majority municipalities as an additional justification, the party promised to ‘strive 
for an administrative division of Croatia into regions and municipalities which would 
reflect more appropriately the ethnic structure of the area in which we live.’38
32 For example: ICTY-Martić: E-137E (SDS Programme, 17/02/1990), pp.14, 17-18. Rašković, Luda 
zemlja, p.251.
33 Ibid., p.251.
34 Rašković, ‘Primjedbe...', p.3. Stefan Grubač, ‘Nećemo da budemo naivni’, NIN, 5/19/1990, pp.10-13.
35 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.245.
36 Ibid., p.250.
37 Drago Flego and Miroslav Kutanjac, The Socialist Republic of Croatia (Zagreb: Mladost, 1982), p.36. 
Interview Drago Dimitrović, Secretary of SKH, 1986-89 (Zagreb: 9/10/2009). Interview Ratko Ličina, 
Sabor deputy and President of Gračac SDS, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 27/07/2007).
38 ICTY-Martić: E-137E (SDS Programme, 17/02/1990), p.16-17.
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Thus, the creation of Serbian regions and municipalities in Croatia was advocated from 
the outset, Rašković speaking about this at the SDS’s founding meeting, as well as in 
the following months.39 The SDS’s electoral strategy, in fact, was to concentrate on 
winning power in at least a few Serb-majority municipalities and then use them as a 
base for creating a Serbian region.40 The idea was to form an ‘integral region’ of the 
Serb-majority municipalities in Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun and Banija,41 and the chief 
means of doing this, it was decided after the elections, was the formation of a new 
Association of Municipalities.42
Initially this was titled the ‘Association of Municipalities of North Dalmatia and Lika’, 
to consist of the six Serb-majority municipalities of that region. However, this limitation 
was only tactical: the SDS's influence beyond that region was then limited, and it 
wanted to begin quickly implementing its programme without waiting for approval from 
other municipalities. It was always intended that the Association would unite all ‘Serb’ 
municipalities.43 The SDS also began campaigning for the re-drawing of municipal 
borders, organising local referendums among villages bordering the Serb-majority 
municipalities on acceding to them.44
This new, ethnically-based Association was also intended as something more than the 
existing Associations.45 In addition to independently deciding about questions of 
economic development,46 it was envisaged that the Association would have its own 
39 Domagoj Knežević, ‘Srpska demokratska stranka od osnivanja do konstituiranja prvog višestranačkog 
Sabora’, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 43, 1 (2011), p.9.
40 Interview Branko Marijanović, Vice-President of SDS 1990-91 (Belgrade: 7/11/2007). Radovan 
Kovačević, ‘Srbi u Hrvatskoj: Idemo dalje’, Intervju, 8/6/1990, pp.16-17.
41 Miroslav Ivić and Jadranka Klisović, ‘We will not demand any sort of state’, Danas, 25/3/1990, in 
FBIS-EER-90-074, 30/5/1990.
42 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.174. Domagoj Knežević, p.19.
43 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.250, Photo Album, p.116. Danas, 25/3/1990, in FBIS-EER-90-074, 
30/5/1990. Snežana Stamatović, 'Srbi po rodu – Hrvatska po domu', Borba, 18/6/1990, p.7. S. 
Stamatović, 'Inicijativa s punom podrškom', Borba, 28/6/1990, p.4. Ante Nazor, ‘Govori srpskih 
čelnika na proslavi u Kosovu kod Knina (VII. dio)’, Hrvatski Vojnik, No. 249-50, 7/2009, accessed 
1/11/2011 from: http://www.hrvatski-vojnik.hr/hrvatski-vojnik/2492502009/domovinskirat.asp  .  
44 Interview Ratko Ličina, Sabor deputy and President of Gračac SDS (Belgrade: 27/07/2007).
45 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.250.
46 Ibid., p.253. Danas, 25/3/1990, in FBIS-EER-90-074, 30/5/1990.
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regional assembly and autonomously manage the Serbs’ cultural autonomy, such as their 
schools.47 There was also some ambiguity on what degree of municipal self-government 
the SDS expected – the SNV’s Declaration also spoke of ‘full municipal self-
government’, which was very substantial at the time.48 Municipalities which served as 
centres of the Associations then had police Secretariats (Sekretarijati unutrašnjih  
poslova, SUPs), mid-level units which had authority over other police stations (Stanice 
javne sigurnosti, SJSs), and Knin had demanded a SUP in July, covering the other 
municipalities of the SDS's Association.49 This was also demanded by Rašković in 
August, though not formally mentioned in subsequent proposals.50
Rašković described this programme as ‘sovereign autonomy on the regional principle’, 
and maintained that a regional Association was a ‘condition for modern autonomy’ of 
which there were ‘hundreds’ of cases in Europe.51 For him, cultural autonomy and 
regional, territorial autonomy were inseparable concepts: ‘There cannot be any cultural 
autonomy without territoriality’.52 Thus, his proposals for ‘cultural autonomy’ always 
contained a territorial element, and it was this three-pronged programme that he 
advocated to Tuđman when they met in July: Serbian sovereignty, cultural autonomy, 
and the Association.53 He and others in the SDS often referred to this package, rather 
misleadingly, as ‘cultural autonomy’, claiming that that was ‘all’ they sought, one 
source of confusion about their actual proposals.54
The formation of the Association also served additional purposes for Rašković. It would 
serve as a ‘good base of resistance in the case of anti-Serbian behaviour of the Croatian 
47 ICTY-Martić: E-137E (SDS Programme, 17/02/1990). Interview Ratko Ličina (Belgrade: 
27/07/2007).
48 ICTY-Martić: E-141E (SNV Declaration, 25/7/1990).
49 S.S., 'Najava samostalne milicije', Borba, 3/8/1990, p.9.
50 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.329-35.
51 Ibid., p.250, Photo Album, p.116 (Politika, 18/6/1990), p.253. And: ‘Rašković Addresses Party Rally’, 
Belgrade Domestic Service, 23/6/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-124, 27/6/1990. ‘Association of Serbs in 
Croatia Founded’, Tanjug, 28/6/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-128, 3/7/1990. Snježana Stamatović, 'Srbi po 
rodu – Hrvatska po domu', Borba, 18/6/1990, p.7.
52 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 18, p.55.
53 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.307-12.
54 For example: Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.190. ‘Rašković Discusses Program with Press’, Tanjug, 
5/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-173, 6/9/1990.
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Sabor’, a space in which they could ‘organise a moral and political defence’55 and ‘fight 
off various pressures’.56 Moreover, Rašković explained on 6 July, the Association was 
just the ‘first phase’57: ‘We do not hide [the fact] that the new associations of 
municipalities are a base, for the establishment of the political and even territorial unity 
of the Serbian nation’.58
Rašković’s Alternative: Political-Territorial Autonomy and Secession
For Rašković, in fact, another option had always existed, beyond regional autonomy: 
political-territorial autonomy. The SDS’s founding programme said, ‘It is necessary to 
ensure constitutional possibilities to create territorial autonomies within individual 
federal units should the population in the territories with a special ethnic composition or 
a cultural and historical identity so decide in a referendum’. Something less than the 
status of Kosovo and Vojvodina under the 1974 constitution was intended, however, as 
the programme sharply criticised this ‘grotesque’ ‘Soviet’ model of autonomous 
provinces, blaming it for bloodshed in Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh.59 Rašković took 
the same position publicly.60
Indeed, in the first half of 1990 Rašković often argued that the Serbs were not seeking a 
second state in Croatia like Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo, which had 
enjoyed a level of autonomy Serbian nationalists had long criticised as excessive, and 
which Serbia was then in the process of reducing, in the face of resistance from the 
province's Albanian majority. He claimed to be against any such idea, which he argued 
would lead to similar bloodshed.61 This was one of his most common arguments: they 
55 Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, pp.16-20. And: Domagoj Knežević, 
pp.17-18.
56 Tanjug, 28/6/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-128, 3/7/1990.
57 Radovan Kovačević, ‘Srbi u Hrvatskoj: Idemo dalje’, Intervju, 8/6/1990, pp.16-17.
58 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, pp.37-8.
59 ICTY-Martić: E-137E (SDS Programme, 17/02/1990), pp.12, 15.
60 V. Đorđević, ‘The Victim is Defended with Democracy’, Borba, 10/3/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-057, 
23/3/1990. 
61 For example: Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, pp.16-20. Rašković, Luda 
zemlja, pp.275-6.
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were not seeking what the Kosovo Albanians had, only rights such as were found in 
'hundreds' of places in Europe.62 However, he and others in the SDS also applied this 
argument to their suggested ‘territorial-political autonomy’, which would be a ‘modern’ 
autonomy ‘such as today there is everywhere in the world’.63 
Rašković was ambiguous on whether or in what situation Serbs might claim political-
territorial rather than regional-cultural autonomy. He initially did not openly advocate 
the former, but rather mentioned it as a possibility, arguing that that this would depend 
on the behaviour of the Croatian side, and was thus an open question - despite still often 
claiming to be against wider autonomy.64 He argued that Serbian autonomy would be a 
‘dynamic creation’ which ‘will fluctuate in so much as Croatian politics will 
fluctuate’:65 if Croatian politics would ‘recognise the Serbian nation and its right to 
organise itself how it thinks is best for it, then that autonomy does not need to be wide, 
nor aggressive’, but if it would not, or if the HDZ was taken over by its ‘Ustaša core’66, 
the new Sabor was 'Croatocentric’,67 or ‘refused to accept the Serbs as a national 
entity’,68 then the Serbs’ only option would be to create a radical, ‘firm autonomy’.69 
Thus, he said, ‘the Croatian Sabor, HDZ and Dr Franjo Tuđman have an open card on 
the table’ and the Serbs would respond, as in a ‘game of chess. Move – to move.’70 In 
fact, Rašković handed himself and the SDS an open card to radicalise its programme if 
its demands were not immediately met.
62 Milan Četnik, ‘Sluga Duhog Naroda’, in Dobrica Ćosić et al, Zbornik o Jovanu Raškoviću (Novi Sad 
& Belgrade, 2002), p.236. ‘Rašković Discusses Program with Press’, Tanjug, 5/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-
90-173, 6/9/1990. Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.226, 254-5, 268. Babić used the same rhetoric: I. 
Radovanović, '“Dva rata” u mesec dana', Borba, 2/10/1990, p.2.
63 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, p.37-8. J. Babić, ‘Knin u klin’, Danas, 2/8/1990, p.13-15. Milan 
Jajčinović, ‘Krajina mimo ustava’, Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15. Interview Branko Marijanović, 
Vice-President of SDS 1990-91 (Belgrade: 7/11/2007).
64 For example: Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, pp.16-20. Rašković, Luda 
zemlja, p.177.
65 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, p.38.
66 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.231.
67 Četnik, p.236.
68 ‘Serbia's Rašković on Links With Croatian TV’, Tanjug, 18/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-139, 19/7/1990.
69 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, p.38. Also: Intervju, 8/6/1990, pp.16-17. Rašković, Luda zemlja, 
pp.177, 231, 252.
70 Ibid., p.251.
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Rašković argued that the Serbian nation in Croatia had the right to determine itself what 
form of autonomy it would opt for – the SDS would not set a strict programme, but 
would follow the wishes of the people.71 The main concept that the SDS promoted, 
however, was to link the Serbs’ relationship with Croatia with Croatia’s relationship 
with Yugoslavia.
Taken in isolation, some of Rašković's moderate statements in May-June 1990, seemed 
to suggest that he accepted the ‘plebiscitary decision of the Croatian nation’ in favour of 
‘an independent Croatian state with a weak or almost no Yugoslavia’, speaking only of 
his ‘cultural autonomy’ programme despite this.72 In other statements in the same 
period, however, he was clear: ‘regardless of [the HDZ victory], our orientation is still 
Yugoslavia’.73 For Rašković, recognising the 'right' of the 'Croatian nation... to organise 
the country however it finds appropriate', and its 'right to separate from Yugoslavia' did 
not imply any renunciation of his program, because he simultaneously sought that the 
Croats recognise 'the sovereignty of the Serbian national being in Croatia' and the Serbs' 
'plebiscitary right to determine where and with whom they will live'.74 And, as he said 
on 19 May, if the Croats ‘go for loosening or abolishing relations with Yugoslavia’, then 
the Serbs would have the right to do the same towards Croatia.75
The SNV's Declaration of 25 July 1990 – which Rašković said he accepted ‘in its 
entirety’76 - was clear on the question of degrees of autonomy: cultural-regional 
autonomy applied only in a federation, and in a confederation ‘full political-territorial 
autonomy’ would be sought.77 Just three months later, however this programme was 
formally abandoned in favour of a more radical alternative: territorial autonomy in the 
71 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 18, p.55.
72 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.189-90. Also Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 
20/5/1990, pp.16-20.
73 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.176.
74 D. Banjac, 'Stranka koja ukida strah', Borba, 16/7/1990, p.3.
75 Domagoj Knežević, p.20. Also: Intervju, 8/6/1990, pp.16-17. Marinko Čulić, 'Pohod udruženih 
voždova', Danas, 10/7/1990, pp.13-15. Biserko, p.362. M. B. & R. S., 'Da ne pukne misić', Borba, 
24/7/1990, p.5.
76 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 15, SNV founding meeting, 25/7/1990, p.40.
77 ICTY-Martić: E-141E (SNV Declaration, 25/7/1990).
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case of a Yugoslav federation, and, in the event of a confederation or independence - 
which were now equated - the ‘inalienable right to choose whether to remain and live in 
a single state with the majority of the Serbian people’.78
Radicalisation
The SDS Executive Board adopted its more radical programme on 20 October 1990, 
when Rašković was on a fund-raising tour in North America. Some authors have 
suggested that Babić radicalised the party in Rašković's absence.79 Rašković's own 
rhetoric, including before his trip to America, suggests a rather different interpretation, 
however.
The SDS's position on what would happen in the case of full Croatian independence 
was never explicitly defined – the SNV's Declaration, for example, did not address this, 
though emphasising that Serbs had the right to self-determination.80 On the one hand, 
Rašković stated in mid-July that as well as applying in the event of a confederation, 
territorial autonomy would ‘clearly… also be [proclaimed] in the case that there is 
neither a confederative Yugoslavia’, i.e. Croatian independence – though insisting, at the 
same time, that the Serbs had the right to self-determination.81 In other statements, 
including earlier in July, however, Rašković was very clear that in the event of Croatian 
independence the Serbs would themselves have the right to secede from Croatia and 
remain in Yugoslavia (via a referendum on their fate), outlining this in some detail.82 In 
fact, after this ambiguous July statement Rašković seems to have been consistent in his 
78 ‘Serb Autonomy Party in Croatia Issues Platform’, Tanjug, 21/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-206, 
24/10/1990.
79 For example: Glenny, p.17. Caspersen, op. cit., p.72.
80 ICTY-Martić: E-141E (SNV Declaration, 25/7/1990).
81 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.251-2. Also: Biserko, p.362.
82 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, pp.37-8. Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.245-6, 264-5. ‘Democratic 
Party Warning on Croatian Secession’, Tanjug, 26/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-145, 27/7/1990. Chuck 
Sudetic, ‘Serb Minority Seek Role in a Separate Croatia’, New York Times, 7/8/1990. D. Banjac, 
'Stranka koja ukida strah', Borba, 16/7/1990, p.3. M. B. & R. S., 'Da ne pukne misić', Borba, 
24/7/1990. Dušan Glavaš, Naša Krajina : ratni dnevnik 1990-1995. godine (Belgrade: Knjiga komerc, 
2005), p.19.
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rejection of any solution in a fully independent Croatia, and it seems likely that in that 
earlier instance 'political and territorial autonomy' actually meant the creation of an 
independent entity with the right to self-determination.83 On 5 September Rašković then 
announced a new idea on how the Serbs could implement their right to self-
determination in this eventuality: the formation of a united and independent Krajina 
state, including both the Croatian and Bosnian Krajinas.84 This was Rašković’s main 
proposal in the following months.85
Rašković’s attitude towards a confederation had also always been ambiguous. He 
sometimes equated it with independence, arguing in June 1990, for example, that what 
the HDZ was demanding, including ‘one’s own money and one’s own army’, meant 
creating an ‘independent state under the cover of a confederation.’86 In early July he 
argued that a confederation is ‘impossible and will not come to pass’ – only secession 
was possible, in which case the Serbs would in turn secede from Croatia.87 And as early 
as late July he argued that the SDS was for a federal Yugoslavia even if others seceded 
from it, and that they had no intention of allowing the confederalisation of Yugoslavia 
and the setting of ‘borders through the living tissue of the Serbian nation’.88 More often 
he espoused the Declaration’s programme - political-territorial autonomy in a 
confederation.89 But he dropped this stance in mid-September, arguing then onwards 
that if it ‘comes to a confederation’ then the Serbs would secede from Croatia and form 
83 Suggested by: V. Vignjević, 'Nećemo kriv', Borba, 6/9/1990, p.3. Z. Tarle, ‘How Čubrilović 
Welcomed Franjo’, Borba, 22/3/1990, p.13, in FBIS-EEU-90-063, 2/4/1990.
84 ‘Rašković Discusses Program with Press’, Tanjug, 5/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-173, 6/9/1990. V. 
Vignjević, 'Nećemo kriv', Borba, 6/9/1990
85 Jovan Rašković, ‘Ja ne želim biti vaš vođa’, Canada, 7/10/1990, accessed 1/11/2011: 
http://www.krajinaforce.com/dokumenti/Rašković_govor.html. ‘Knin Serbs Express Desire for 
Sovereign State’, Borba, 29/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-219, 13/11/1990. I. Tomljanović, 'Tezi i 
negodvanja', Borba, 1-2/12/1990, p.11. D. Drašković, 'Konfederacija put u katastrofu', Borba, 
17/12/1990, p.3. ‘Croatian Serbs Reject New Constitution’, Tanjug, 23/12/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-
247, 24/12/1990. Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15. Ratko Dmitrević, 'Povratak Krajine', NIN, 
20/12/1990, pp.12-14. 
86 Snežana Stamatović, 'Srbi po rodu – Hrvatska po domu', Borba, 18/6/1990, p.7.
87 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, pp.37-8.
88 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.264-5. Also: Marinko Čulić, 'Pohod udruženih voždova', Danas, 
10/7/1990, pp.13-15.
89 Chuck Sudetic, ‘Serb Minority Seek Role in a Separate Croatia’, New York Times, 7/8/1990. 
‘Rašković Discusses Program with Press’, Tanjug, 5/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-173, 6/9/1990. 
Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.278-9.
Chapter 2: Jovan Rašković, the Serbian Democratic Party and the 'Serbian Question' in Croatia
57
a ‘new independent state of Krajina’, including the Bosnian Krajina.90 Subsequent to 
this, Rašković rarely mentioned as an option any form of autonomy in a Yugoslav 
confederation.91
Rašković had often claimed to be against the creation of a Serbian state in Croatia, or 
even wider autonomy – but he always added caveats.92 Moreover, it seems that his 
stance against forming a Serbian state – to the extent that it was not simply a rhetorical 
device – related only to the degree of autonomy demanded, defended as modern 
autonomy ‘such as today there is everywhere in the world’,93 and thus only concerned 
outcomes in which the Serbs would settle for autonomy. He told Danas in December 
1990, for example, that he was ‘against the formation of a Serbian state in Croatia’, 
arguing that the ‘political autonomy’ he advocated was similar to that of regions in Italy, 
but simultaneously advocated the formation of a united Krajina state in the event of a 
confederation.94
Moreover, political-territorial autonomy had, in fact, already been proposed on 24 
September, when the SNV issued its first detailed set of proposals, authored by SDS 
vice-president Vojislav Vukčević, an SDS moderate and Rašković ally from Slavonia.95 
This document argued that the Serbian nation’s plebiscite on autonomy had been for ‘its 
sovereignty and its autonomy, which is to say for territorial autonomy where it 
represents the majority nation, and for cultural autonomy where it does not’. It proposed 
that the Croatian constitution mandate the existence of ‘Autonomous provinces as forms 
of territorial autonomy or as forms of cultural autonomy’, which would be constituted 
90 Ivan Bilić, ‘Kronologija rasped SFRJ i stvaranje Republike Hrvatske do 15. sijecnja 1992’. National  
Security and the Future. Vol. 6, No. 1-2 (01.03.2005), p.96. Drago Marić, ‘Bosnia and Hercegovina: 
Border Gamble’, Politika: The International Weekly, 22/9/1990, p.4.
91 ‘Serbian Assembly To Form in Croatia’, Tanjug, 26/1/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-018, 28/1/1991. 
‘Croatian Serbs Reject New Constitution’, Tanjug, 23/12/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-247, 24/12/1990. D. 
Drašković, 'Konfederacija put u katastrofu', Borba, 17/12/1990, p.3. I. Tomljanović, 'Tezi i 
negodvanja', Borba, 1-2/12/1990, p.11. A possible exception being: Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.309-
10.
92 Intervju, 8/6/1990, pp.16-17.
93 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, pp.37-8. J. Babić, ‘Knin u klin’, Danas, 2/8/1990, pp.13-15. 
Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15.
94 Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15.
95 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 29, pp.73-5.
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on the basis of local plebiscites. These provinces would have their own budgets and 
elected regional assemblies, Executive Councils (governments) and administrations, and 
their competences would include local development, culture, education, official 
languages and scripts, public information, health and social protection and urbanism. 
This was less than the autonomy acquired by Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1974, and 
similar to their status under Serbia’s 1990 constitution: there was no police or judicial 
autonomy, the provinces would have statutes rather than constitutions (although they 
would adopt these themselves) and their acts would be ‘in accordance with the 
Constitution and law’, although how this would be established or ensured was not 
mentioned. This was the political-territorial autonomy within Croatia of which Rašković 
spoke.
This proposal, moreover, was already premised on Croatia remaining in federal 
Yugoslavia, speaking of the will of the Serbian nation to ‘with other nations and parts of 
the Serbian nation live in Yugoslavia’, and proposing that the Constitution affirm that 
‘The Republic of Croatia is in the composition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’. 
It did not specify if it would also apply in a confederation. In place of an existing article, 
which stated that the ‘Croatian Sabor and nation directly, in accordance with the 
Constitution and Law, independently decide’ about relations with Yugoslavia, it also 
suggested that ‘the Croatian Sabor and all nations and national minorities, who live in 
the Republic of Croatia’ take such decisions, suggesting the Serbs' right to decide 
separately, i.e. to self-determination.
In early November the SNV issued the same proposal – which was without doubt, after 
the SDS’s radicalisation two weeks earlier, contingent on the maintenance of federal 
Yugoslavia.96 And in December Rašković, drawing up proposals with Vukčević, again 
96 ‘Serbs Propose Autonomous Province in Croatia’, Tanjug, 5/11/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-124, 
5/11/1990.
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proposed the same autonomous provinces in a federal state.97 Rašković intended that 
two such provinces would be formed, Krajina and Slavonia.98
Thus, Rašković’s position in late 1990 was that if federal Yugoslavia was preserved, the 
Serbs would seek territorial autonomies, a bi-national Croatian state with recognised 
Serbian sovereignty and a dual-chamber Sabor, and the right to official use of Serbian 
and Cyrillic across the state.99 In the event of a confederation or independence, the Serbs 
would secede from Croatia.100
97 Rašković, ‘Primjedbe...'. Interview Vojislav Vukčević, SDS Vice-President, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 
1/8/2007).
98 Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15.
99 Rašković, ‘Primjedbe...' .
100 Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15.
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2.2. Rašković's Colleagues
The SDS was a broad movement. While Rašković was its most prominent speaker and 
ideologue, others in the party had different approaches. Examining their proposals 
allows us to better understand the SDS, and provides essential context for examining 
Rašković's ideas. The national programmes of Knin leaders Jovan Opačić, Dušan 
Zelenbaba and Milan Babić, and the leaders of the SDS in Slavonia, will now be 
considered.
Opačić and Zelenbaba: The Greater Serbian Alternative
Jovan Opačić and Dušan Zelenbaba,101 both SDS Sabor deputies from Knin, represented 
the more radical wing of the SDS, which they temporarily left in September 1990.102 If 
federal Yugoslavia was not preserved, then their proclaimed goal was not Serbian 
autonomy, but the formation of a wider Serbian state on the ruins of Yugoslavia.
Opačić had founded the Serbian cultural society 'Zora' (Dawn) in 1989, and, until 
summer 1990, was informally the number two SDS leader. Like Rašković, his rhetoric 
was often ambiguous, but it was certainly more radical.103 He insisted from an early 
stage that republican borders were only administrative, and would have to be redrawn in 
the event of a confederation or Croatian independence.104 Initially, therefore, he 
advocated the maintenance of Yugoslavia to avoid such a ‘bloody drama of 
confrontation’.105 He also increasingly spoke of the alternative, however, which he 
101 Often spelled Zelembaba. He currently uses Zelenbaba, so I assume that this is correct.
102 Petar Samardžika, ‘Split in the Serbian Democratic Party: Leadership Dispute’, Politika: The 
International Weekly, 29/9/1990, p.7.
103 For example: S. Stamatović, 'Bolje rat, nego podaništvo', Borba, 9/7/1990, p.4.
104 NIOD, Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ area (Netherlands, Hague: NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, 2002) Volume I: Prologue, The history preceding the conflict: Yugoslavia up till 
1991, p.76, accessed 1/11/2011 from: 
http://www.srebrenica.nl/Pages/OOR/23/379.bGFuZz1OTA.html.
105 Vjesnik, 26/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-149, 2/8/1990. Nikola Solić, ‘No Democracy Without Plurality 
of Parties’, Vjesnik, 10/12/1989, p.8, in FBIS-EER-90-022, 20/2/1990. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, pp.18-
23.
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began to frame in positive terms: the creation of a Serbian national state, ‘from Lika and 
Kordun to Pirota [in eastern Serbia], that is to say from Subotica [in northern Serbia] to 
Dubrovnik [an overwhelmingly Croatian town in south-east Croatia]’, as he said as 
early as June 1990.106
Opačić also advocated a much more radical approach than Rašković. Already in March 
1990 he warned that if pro-confederation parties won the Croatian elections, the SDS 
would proclaim the ‘political autonomy’ of the Krajina, which would include Bosnian 
Krajina, and therefore presumably involve a substantial degree of autonomy.107 And in 
July he declared that if Croatia’s constitutional amendments were not withdrawn, ‘The 
Serbian people will be forced to create political autonomy, which will be the first step 
towards creating a unified Serbian state in the Balkans.’108 He left the SDS for the SPO 
in September and, although still speaking of defending Yugoslavia, thereafter fairly 
openly advocated the formation of a greater Serbian state.109
Dušan Zelenbaba, meanwhile, was a close ally and supporter of Opačić, who had 
brought him into the party.110 His rhetoric was more extreme than Opačić’s, but his 
stance, on forming a greater Serbian state on the ruins of a disintegrating Yugoslavia, 
was the same, with autonomy only a transitional step on the way.111
106 Marinko Čulić, ‘Pohod udruženih vozdova’, Danas, 10/7/1990, pp.13-15. Also: ICTY-Krajišnik: E-
P64A.12.1 (Founding of SNV, Banja Luka, 13/10/1990).
107 Z. Tarle, ‘How Čubrilović Welcomed Franjo’, Borba, 22/3/1990, p.13, in FBIS-EEU-90-063, 
2/4/1990.
108 Vjesnik, 26/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-149, 2/8/1990. Mladen Plese, 'The Passions of Conflict', Vjesnik, 
13/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-140, 20/7/1990. Also: BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.7.
109 For example: ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64A.12.1 (Founding of SNV, Banja Luka, 13/10/1990). Ratko 
Dmitrović, 'Kumovi napustili ćaću', NIN, 28/9/1990, p.16.
110 Srđan Španović, ‘Emperor Dušan and His Parish’, Start (Zagreb), 19/1/1991, in FBIS-EER-91-027, 
4/3/1991.
111 Dragan Barjaktarević, ‘Dr Dušan Zelenbaba, poslanik u Sabor Hrvatske: Rat je vec objavljen’, 
Intervju, 12/10/1990, pp.9-11. Danas, 10/7/1990, pp.13-15. Milan Jajčinović, 'Barikade u glavama', 
Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.26-27. Armina Galijas, Eine Stadt Im Kreig Der Wandel Der Bosinschen Stadt  
Banja Luka (1990-1995) (Doctoral thesis, University of Vienna, 2009), p.115. Anđelko Milardović, 
Srbijanski masovni pokret i hrvatsko pitanje (Zagreb: Globus, 1991), pp.167-8. Milan Jajčinović, 
'Creation of a West Serbia', Danas, 30/10//1990, pp.26-27 in FBIS-EEU-90-165, 17/12/1990.
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Milan Babić and SAO Krajina
Milan Babić, president of Knin, the Association (later SAOK) and the SNV, became the 
number two in the party by the autumn, displacing Opačić, and would proceed to 
sideline Rašković from late 1990 onwards. He subsequently lead Krajina’s secession 
from Croatia and the creation of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK).
Initially, however, Babić had adopted a centrist stance within the SDS. His public 
proposals were in line with the established programme, including the Association as the 
basis of autonomy until October 1990. His proposals were not particularly more radical 
than Rašković’s – in fact, he stated much more explicitly than Rašković that territorial 
autonomy would apply in the case of independence, including as late as 3 September.112 
In 1990 there were only two notable differences in their proposals.
Firstly, Babić spoke of the Association as eventually also including municipalities in 
Slavonia, which Rašković only mentioned later, in the context of territorial autonomy.113 
Secondly, although Babić and his allies referred, like Rašković, to the ‘experience of 
regional autonomies which exist today in Europe’ as an ‘example’ for their territorial 
autonomy, a significantly greater degree of autonomy was actually demanded.114 Unlike 
the SNV's earlier proposals and Rašković's own proposals that same month, SAOK’s 
December 1990 statute also included police and judicial autonomy and its own system 
of taxation, and said that the province’s acts could also be called ‘laws’. It also insisted 
that ‘There shall be no question of institutionalised state control’ over the province, with 
the exception of ensuring ‘the constitutionality and legality of the Autonomous 
District’s enactments’, a function to be performed by the Constitutional Court alone, 
with no explanation of how compliance might be ensured. 115 This was, as the Croatian 
112 ‘Croat Serbs Vote 'Overwhelmingly' for Autonomy’, Tanjug, 3/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-171,  
4/9/1990. Biserko, p.31. Also: Stefan Grubač, ‘Nećemo da budemo naivni’, NIN, 5/10/1990, pp.10-13.
113 Nazor, ‘Govori srpskih čelnika…’. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, p.35. Milojica Šutović, ‘Samoopredeljenje 
naroda i raspad Jugoslavije’, Kultura Polisa, god. VIII (2011), br.15, p.70, n.53. S. Stamatović, 
'Inicijativa s punom podrškom', Borba, 28/6/1990, p.4.
114 ICTY-Milošević: E-P351.6 (Draft Statute of SAOK), p.2.
115 ICTY-Milošević: E-P351.14a (Statute of SAOK, 12/1990).
Chapter 2: Jovan Rašković, the Serbian Democratic Party and the 'Serbian Question' in Croatia
63
government noted, a ‘state within a state’, much the same as Kosovo and Vojvodina 
under the 1974 constitution.116 
In December, Babić sent his draft proposal for the formation of SAOK to Croatia’s 
Constitutional Commission. The idea was resoundingly rejected, the Sabor instead 
adopting the new constitution demoting the Serbs' status. Babić then declared SAOK's 
formation, and also made it clear that territorial autonomy only applied in the case of a 
federation, and if Croatia separated from Yugoslavia, Krajina would separate from 
Croatia and ‘remain in Yugoslavia or in a state to be formed by the... Serb people’.117 In 
1991 SAOK then progressively seceded from Croatia, usually in line with Croatian 
steps towards secession from Yugoslavia: 'disassociating' from Croatia in February 
1991, seceding in March 1991, and, on 1 April 1991, declaring annexation to Serbia.
In his testimonies in The Hague Babić claimed to have supported autonomy in Croatia 
in 1990.118 But the available evidence suggests that he probably had a more radical 
agenda from the start. Veljko Popović, head of Knin government in 1990-91, recalls that 
even before the elections Babić told him that the Krajina should be an autonomous 
province like Kosovo and Vojvodina, and that Babić had always believed this, feeling 
that it should have happened in 1945.119 Indeed, Babić had been studying Yugoslav 
censuses for years, and had a ‘very systematic’ knowledge of them, down to which 
nation was the majority in each village.120 Babić’s public wish of luck to the ‘autonomy 
of Krajina’ when the Association was first formed, and his references to it including 
even parts of Slavonia, also suggest that this limited creation was only a transitional step 
for him.121 Already in July 1990 he was publicly outlining in detail, down to each 
village, the ‘ethnic territory of Serbs in Croatia’ - which included some predominantly 
Croatian areas -122 and the Serbian artist Milić of Mačve, meeting Babić that month, 
116 Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15.
117 Stefan Grubač, 'Pitanje koje postavlje zastava u Kninu', NIN, 18/1/1991, p.16..
118 ICTY-Milošević and ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić.
119 Interview Veljko Popović, President of Knin government, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 8/11/2007).
120 Interview Ratko Ličina, Sabor deputy and President of Gračac SDS (Belgrade: 2/11/2007).
121 Nazor, ‘Govori srpskih čelnika…’.
122 Biserko, p.31. Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 1/8/2007).
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later recalled Babić referring to the future ‘definitive separation of Krajina from 
Croatia’, after which they would ‘seek the annexation of Krajina to Serbia’.123
Babić’s attitude towards armed rebellion and negotiations, explored in the following 
chapter, also suggests that he was never seriously interested in a compromise solution. 
Babić's increasing hostility to negotiations in 1990 was partly motivated by his desire to 
assert himself as the sole leader and representative of Serbs in Croatia, but also reflected 
the fact that, for Babić, war was an acceptable option, and, by mid-1991 at least, his 
chosen option.124 As Borba noted in February 1991,‘Babić and his followers believe that 
it is sufficient to distribute arms to the people or to secede and end the whole story’.125
The fate of Serbs in overwhelmingly Croatian areas - the large Croatian cities and 
elsewhere - did not particularly concern Babić. He said that they would have to 
negotiate with Zagreb over their rights, but usually denounced such talks as treason.126 
Although rarely stated publicly, it seems to have been thought that at least some of the 
Serbs in rump Croatia might swap places with the Croats in Krajina.127 Zagreb Serbian 
leader Milorad Pupovac recalls that one Krajina leader told him that Serbs remaining in 
Croatia would simply be killed, expelled and assimilated, and notes that ‘One part of the 
Serbian politicians was prepared for that to happen’.128 Babić himself stated in 
December 1991, when most Croats had been forced out of the Krajina, that ‘All those 
123 Milić of Mačve, ‘“Mirni marš” na Zagreb’, in Ćosić et al, p.174.
124 See for example: Jovan Opačić, ‘Etika i politika (poslanica)’, in Ćosić et al, pp.166-67. Milorad 
Bošnjak, ‘The First Border-Area Inhabitant Before the United Nations’, Novi Rijec (Belgrade), 
20/7/1991, in FBIS-EER-91-125, 20/8/1991. Branka Magas & Ivo Zanić, The War in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1991-95 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p.202.
125 I. Radovanović and V. Ilić, ‘The Dilemmas of Natural Allies’, Borba, 8/2/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-034, 
20/2/1991.
126 Interview Vojislav Vukčević, SDS Vice-President, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 2007). Snežana Stamatović, 
‘Only Babić Understands Negotiations’, Borba, 15/3/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-058, 26/3/1991. ICTY-
Martić: E-1e (SDS Krajina Communique). HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 98: SDS Krajina, 
Announcement, 24/8/1991, p.209. Ilija Petrović, Srpsko Nacionalno Vijeće Slavonije, Baranje i  
Zapadnog Srema (ICTY-Dokmanovic: E-196. Novi Sad: Cvetnik, 1994), p.92.
127 See for example: Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.134. Domovina Intercept: B7077 (Karadžić-Cosić, 
15/2/1992). Biserko, p.85.
128 Milorad Pupovac, Čuvari imena: Srbi u Hrvatskoj i raspad Jugoslavije (Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 1999), 
p.199. See: Milan Bečejić & Uroš Komlenović, '“Povijesni sporazum” bez Tudmana?', NIN, 5/7/1991, 
pp.11-13.
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who want to leave Serbian Krajina for Croatia should be allowed to do so, and vice 
versa’, while at a meeting of the SFRY Presidency two months later top RSK 
representatives said that Serbs must ‘move’ from Zagreb and elsewhere in Croatia, 
criticising as ‘assimilated’ those who remained.129 It was above all on this issue, as well 
as Babić's stance on negotiations and policy (from April 1991 on) of annexation to 
Serbia, that Babić and Rašković would come to differ.
The Slavonians
The SDS was established late in Slavonia - from May 1990 onwards - and was always 
more moderately inclined there. The most notable leaders of the party were Veljko 
Džakula and Ilija Šašić in West Slavonia, and Goran Hadžić and Vojislav Vukčević in 
East Slavonia. There were significant concentrations of Serbs in both West and East 
Slavonia, but no municipality had an absolute Serbian majority, and only one, Pakrac (in 
the west), a relative majority, so there was no easy base for an autonomous region. SDS 
leaders nevertheless identified large swathes of Slavonia as being ‘Serbian’. Even the 
moderate leaders of the SDS in Western Slavonia, for example, eventually declared an 
expansive autonomous region which would have had at most a relative Serbian 
majority, and included three municipalities with relative or absolute Croat majorities.130 
In early 1991 the SDS accelerated its efforts to redraw municipal boundaries to create 
Serb-majority territories, and in February attempted to annex Pakrac to SAO Krajina, 
with its police joining the Knin SUP and throwing up barricades to prevent Croatian 
intervention. Džakula, president of the Pakrac SDS and the dominant leader of the party 
in West Slavonia, led these efforts. Initially, he seems to have been an advocate of 
Serbian self-determination, stating that 'If Croatia leaves Yugoslavia, and it is working 
129 ‘Babić: Krajina Plans To Recognise Slovenia’, Tanjug, 28/12/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-251, 31/12/1991. 
ICTY-Milošević: E-P596.7a (SFRY Presidency minutes, 2/3/1992).
130 See Appendices, Figures 2-4. ICTY-Martić: Witness Veljko Džakula, T-347-8. Interview Veljko 
Džakula (Zagreb: 30/9/2009). Census data available in: Keichi Kubo, 'The Radicalisation and 
Ethnicization of Elections'. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of  
Experts, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (27/5/1994).
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on that daily' then 'Serbs will secede from Croatia', while at the time of the Pakrac 
rebellion he declined offered talks with Zagreb.131 The rebellion was thwarted by 
Croatian police intervention, however. The failure to establish an autonomous rebel 
territory like Knin seems to have been an impetus to moderation, and Džakula 
reportedly thereafter 'reversed his policy completely'.132
The arrest of a large number of Serbs in Pakrac led to talks between a Slavonian SDS 
delegation and Zagreb (including Tuđman himself) that March. The Serbs, led by 
Slatina SDS leader Ilija Šašić, spoke about their dissatisfaction with the new 
constitutional definition of Croatia, as well as their ideas of re-regionalisation and 
territorial-political autonomies. Danas reported that at the time the Slavonian SDS had 
decided to solve the Serbian question within Croatia 'whether Croatia is in Yugoslavia 
or not'; Šašić had, however, maintained that 'Serbs want to continue to live in 
Yugoslavia as a united state'.133 At a meeting with the American ambassador to 
Yugoslavia the following month, meanwhile, Džakula, Šašić and Hadžić emphasised 
that they had not seceded from Croatia and 'do not see secession as the only desirable or 
acceptable solution', and 'stated several times that they are prepared to continue to live 
in Croatia' – but, they emphasised, 'only a democratic Croatia within a Yugoslav 
federation'.134 In May-June 1991 the Slavonians also held referendums on remaining in 
Yugoslavia.
The Slavonian SDS was very much on Rašković's wing of the party, and in Zagreb 
emphasised that 'all relations, especially conflicts, must be resolved in a peaceful and 
democratic way'.135 They even urged Serbian deputies to end their boycott of the 
131 Ivica Miškulin, 'Srpska pobuna u općini Pakrac 1990.-1991.: Uzroci, nositelji i tijek', Scrinia 
Slavonica, No.11 (2011), pp.365-6. Ilija Petrović, p.54. Stevan Zec, 'Srpski zbegovi jos postoje', 
Politika, 10/3/1991, in Ivica Miškulić & Mladen Barać (eds), Srpska Pobuna u Zapadnoj Slavonij,  
1990.-1995.: Nositelji, Institucije, Posljedice (Slavonski Broad-Zagreb: HMDCDR, 2012), p.266.
132 ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Goran Hadžić, T9401; Borivoje Savić, T674-6; Vojislav Vukčević, T11086.
133 Zeljko Krusel, ‘Srbi u Banskim Dvorima’, Danas, 19/3/1991, pp.22-23. Ivica Miškulin, 'Stranka 
ugroženog naroda – djelovanje Srpske Demokratske Stranke u Zapadnoj Slavoniji 1990.-1991.', in 
Miškulić & Barać, p.55, and pp.39, 43.
134 ICTY-Hadžić: T9443-4
135 Miškulin, 'Stranka ugroženog naroda...', pp.53-6.
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Sabor,136 and Džakula, Šašić and Hadžić all subsequently maintained contact with the 
Croatian MUP, most notably Croatian negotiator Slavko Degoricija, then assistant 
minister, working to avoid conflicts in the region.137 Whether they were prepared to 
accept a solution within Croatia as suggested by the Danas report is, however, 
ambiguous, and this certainly does not seem to have been the thrust of their activities. 
Their main divergence with Knin appeared to be over their support for negotiations and 
avoiding conflict, and the most notable moderate, Vukčević, later explained the essence 
of their conflict as stemming from Babić's refusal to understand that in nationally mixed 
Slavonia different methods were necessary to achieve the same goal.138 A meeting of the 
SDS Regional Committee for Slavonia in February 1991 emphasised that nations, not 
republics, had the right to self-determination, and that 'the Serbian nation wishes to live 
in one state and will oppose anyone who might divide it', and Borba reported at the time 
that the two sides' goals were 'identical', except 'Rašković and Vojislav Vukčević... 
advocate a policy that is based on political means in the hands of intellectuals'.139 A 
Regional Committee meeting held after the Zagreb talks expressed the same 
conclusions as in February.140 Even Vukčević's proposals were expansive: constituent 
status, territorial autonomy for Krajina and the re-drawing of municipal borders for 
'local self-administration' in Slavonia. He believed that Serbs had the right to self-
determination, and his attitude to Krajina's separation is ambiguous, but he did 
ultimately oppose secession in East Slavonia on the grounds that the Serbs were not the 
majority there.141 From spring 1991 onwards some more radical elements in Eastern 
136 ‘Serbian Deputy Dzodan Returns to Assembly’, Tanjug, 21/3/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-058, 26/3/1991.
137 Zoran Daskalović, ‘Becarac s pucanjem’, Danas, 9/4/1991, pp.20-22. Interview Veljko Džakula 
(Zagreb: 30/9/2009). Ivan Lovrenovic and Predrag Lucić, Stenogrami o podjeli Bosne: Knjiga Prva 
(Split: Kultura & Rasvjeta, 2005), p.36. ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Vojislav Vukčević, Borivoje Savić, 
Goran Hadžić.
138 Marijana Milosavljević, ‘Prof Vojislav Vukčević, Advokat: Šepanje do sledećeg rata’, NIN, 20/3/1992, 
p.26.
139 'Serbian Party Wants New Croatian Leaders', Tanjug, 3/2/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-023, 4/2/1991. I. 
Radovanovic & V. Ilic, 'The Dilemmas of Natural Allies', Borba, 8/2/1991, p.4, in FBIS-EEU-91-034, 
20/2/1991.
140 Miškulin, 'Stranka ugroženog naroda...', p.58.
141 Interview Vojislav Vukčević, SDS Vice-President, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 2007). V. Ilić, ‘Nisam ja 
izdajica’, Borba, 22/4/1991. V. Ilić, 'Svakom svoja doslednost', Borba, 3/5/1991, p.5. Marijana 
Milosavljević, ‘Prof Vojislav Vukčević, Advokat: Šepanje do sledećeg rata’, NIN, 20/3/1992, p.26.
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Slavonia began making their presence felt, however, and Vukčević was physically 
threatened and pushed into resigning by April.142
Vukovar SDS President Hadžic, meanwhile, was something of an opportunist, and 
seemingly keeping his options open in this period. He worked on preventing clashes in 
contact with the MUP, who even went so far as to consider him their 'agent'.143 At the 
same time, however, he was involved in a radical, separatist Serbian National Council 
of Eastern Slavonia, founded in January 1991,144 and told JNA security that the HDZ 
was 'in essence an Ustaša movement' which no Serb trusted, a new war 'was on the 
horizon' and the Serbs 'would not wait for it unarmed'.145 Although moderate with regard 
to negotiations, his stance still seems to have been in favour of Serbian self-
determination in the event of Croatian independence. As he testified in his own trial at 
the ICTY: 'It was our position, the position of the party that I belonged to – and this is 
something that Professor Rašković repeated – [that the Serbs would remain in Croatia to 
the same] extent that Croatia is in Yugoslavia... And for those reasons right up until the 
war I kept in contact with Croatia in order to prevent its secession and also to prevent 
possible war.'146 Eventually, as conflicts spread in the region and, in June 1991, Croatia 
declared its full independence from Yugoslavia, the radicals became more influential 
and Hadžic gave full support to armed Serb secession.
Šašić, likewise, was reportedly involved in the formation of Serbian units and supported 
Serb secession in mid-1991.147 Džakula, on the other hand, continued his contact with 
Zagreb and was one of the main figures involved in founding the compromise-seeking 
142 V. Ilić, ‘Nisam ja izdajica’, Borba, 22/4/1991.
143 Josip Boljkovac, Istina mora izaci van (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2009), p.235. Marko Dejanović, 
‘Špijun koji nas je mrzio’, accessed 1/11/2011 from: 
http://markodejanovic.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/Hadžić2.pdf.  Degoricija, pp.212, 301. Davor 
Runtić, ‘Josip Boljkovac i Slavko Degoricija su kroz pregovore s ratnički raspoloženim Srbima 
kupovali vrijeme’, 2011, accessed 1/11/2011 from: http://www.hrvatski-fokus.hr/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=2082:prije-dvadeset-godina-jna-je-naoruavala-svako-selo-u-
kojem-je-bilo-srba-&catid=22:feljtoni&Itemid=46. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić.
144 Ilija Petrović. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić.
145 Ljuban Karan, Bio sam oficir KOS (Belgrade: Blic, 2006), p.80. Similarly: ICTY-Hadžić: T11119.
146 ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić, T10089. And: T9443.
147 ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-060, T12004-5. ICTY-Šešelj: Witness Mladen Kulić, T4425-6. Miškulin, 
'Stranka ugroženog naroda...', pp.63, 66.
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Serbian Democratic Forum (Srpski demokratski forum, SDF, discussed later) in June-
July 1991.148 In August 1991 he initiated the formation of an expansive SAO Western 
Slavonia, which reportedly declared its unification with SAOK and Serbia.149 In talks 
with the SDF, however, the SAO leadership emphasised its desire for 'a peaceful and 
agreed solution of the Croat-Serb conflict' and readiness 'to take part in defining the 
sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia', including both 'its internal system and its 
relationship with other Yugoslav republics.'150 The SDS leadership also opposed starting 
war there, which was initiated instead by rebel hardliners.151 These activities suggest 
that Džakula was open to a solution within Croatian borders, although as nothing came 
of it the region – or, rather, what was left of if (most of its declared territory having been 
occupied by Croatian forces already in late 1991) - ultimately joined the RSK.152
148 Zoran Daskalović, ‘Becarac s pucanjem’, Danas, 9/4/1991, pp.20-22. Interview Veljko Džakula 
(Zagreb: 30/9/2009). Lovrenović and Lučić, p.36.
149 'Autonomous Region of Western Slavonia Formed', Belgrade RTV, 13/8/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-157, 
14/8/1991.
150 ‘West Slavonia Serbs Want Peaceful Solution’, Tanjug, 15/8/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-159, 16/8/1991. 
ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Veljko Džakula, T298-302.
151 Ljuba Stojić, ‘Bio sam i junak i izdajnik’, NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18. ICTY-Martić & ICTY-Hadžić: 
Witness Veljko Džakula. Slavko Degoricija, Nije bilo uzalud (Zagreb: ITG, 2008), p.160. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-D399, P1058 (DB Serbia, reports on situation in Western Slavonia, 12/1991).
152 Suggested by: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1058 (DB Serbia, report on situation in Western Slavonia, 
6/12/1991).
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2.3. Rašković’s Dilemmas: Between Secession and 
Compromise
Rašković the Separatist
In 1991 Rašković was increasingly sidelined by Babić, who controlled SAOK. But he 
was still an influential personality at least into the summer.153 What course of action did 
he advocate, however, and what was his attitude to secession from Croatia?
In most of his speeches and writings from the time, Rašković supported the policy of 
seceding from Croatia. In a January 1991 internal SDS document, for example, he 
supported the creation of a ‘residual Yugoslavia’ without the Slovenes and Croats but 
with ‘the historic and ethnic Serbian territories’ in present Croatia, also noting the 
alternatives of ‘an independent Serbia, a Serbian state of Krajina as part of or an 
autonomous province of Serbia or, finally an ethnic Serbia’, i.e. a ‘Greater Serbia’.154 
The main option which Rašković spoke of, from September 1990, was the creation of a 
Krajina state, including both the Croatian and Bosnian Krajinas. He usually insisted that 
this would not be an ethnic state or a second Serbia, but a citizen’s state with rights for 
all.155 Elsewhere, however, he spoke of it as being part of Serbia, and he most likely 
always intended that it would remain linked with other ‘Serb lands’.156
Although SAO Krajina claimed greater autonomy than Rašković had sought, he 
publicly supported, and took credit for, its formation, emphasising that ‘Serbian 
territorial and political autonomy’ was at the very core of the SDS programme.157 
153 As detailed in Chapter 6.
154 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, p.130. At a rally in March 1991, Rašković outlined the same options, given the 
‘unfortunate’ break-up of Yugoslavia. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64A.461.1 (‘The Serbs Can Only Survive 
Together’, Glas Srpski, 4/3/1991). Similarly: Dragan Pavlović, 'U politiku iz ljubavi prema svome 
narodu', in Ćosić et al, p.201.
155 Rašković, ‘Ja ne želim biti vaš vođa’. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.158.
156 Biserko, p.175.
157 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.317. And: Dušan Momčilović, Novi genocida nad Srbima u HDZ 
Hrvatskoj (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1993), p.24.
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Rašković’s allies in the Krajina participated in and supported Krajina’s 'disassociation' 
from Croatia in February 1991, while Rašković, then in Belgrade, declared that he ‘fully 
supported’ it, maintaining that the Serbian nation in Croatia thereby 'finally acquired... a 
state.' The Bosnian Serbs, he added, must join the ‘Krajina state’, and the Slavonian 
Serbs, Serbia.158 Rašković publicly opposed Babić's April 1991 decision on annexation 
to Serbia, however, arguing that Krajina should instead conduct a referendum on 
remaining in Yugoslavia.159 This would have left more room for compromise, but the 
main reason Rašković gave for this stance was ‘That would in reality be one and the 
same but would sound a little different and better’, and would avoid international 
condemnation, a tactical argument also posited by Milošević and Bosnian SDS leader 
Radovan Karadžić.160
Rašković, however, entirely rejected any idea of exchange of populations or 
abandonment of the Serbs outside territories such as Krajina.161 And as separation 
actually began to be implemented, becoming a hard reality rather than an abstract 
nationalist principle, he became increasingly concerned about the consequences. In 
particular, he worried about the deteriorating position of Serbs inhabiting areas that 
were indisputably Croatian – about half of all Serbs in Croatia. In June 1991 Rašković 
noted that this was ‘one of the biggest reasons because of which Babić and I split’. He 
explained:
The Krajina is now fully strengthened internally, and that will bring about the  
break-up of the block of Serbian nation in Croatia. The Serbian national being 
outside Krajina will be much more endangered than if it shared its fate with  
[the Serbs of Krajina]. That does not mean that we need to renounce Krajina,  
but such a Krajina generates very negative connotations. To the Serbian nation 
158 Biserko, pp.174-5, 366-7. S. Stamatović & Z. Tarle, 'Biće tu još neprijatnosti', Borba, 2-3/3/1991, 
p.15.
159 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.156. Biserko, pp.353-4.
160 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.155-6. Domovina Intercept: C5312 (Karadžić-Grahovac, 24/6/1991). 
ICTY-Martić: E-235e (Meeting of SDS Slavonia Regional Board, 8/5/1991). ICTY-Krajišnik: E-
P64A.212.1 (Minutes, SDS BH parliamentary group, 9/10/1991).
161 For example: Ljuba Stojić, ‘Bio sam i junak i izdajnik’, NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18.
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outside Krajina nothing is left other than to migrate, or to give up and fully  
assimilate.’162
As Rašković recalled in December 1991, he had been confronted with a dilemma: 
‘whether to decide for preservation of Serbian biological strength or territory? That was 
the question – whether to force Serbian territory in Croatia as the dissolution of the 
Serbian question or to force security of the Serbian nation in Croatia, with recognition 
of the Croatian state however it was in that moment.’ He concluded: ‘Most likely the 
truth was somewhere in between – it would be best to conduct politics of preservation 
of Serbian territory as Serbian, but in the same way also preservation of the living 
biological force in the great cities.’163 What this translated into in actual policy terms, 
however, is ambiguous.
Despite his public support for disassociation, Rašković had elsewhere expressed a 
cautious and critical attitude to the rapid development of Krajina’s secession. In an 
interview in May 1991, for example, he argued that ‘we needed first of all to determine 
Krajina as autonomous province in Croatia, with legal, executive and cultural-
educational governance. We needed to insist on that and it seems to me that we in one 
brief period brought a few significant and fundamental things about Krajina.’164 
Secession, he said, should be implemented only when the 'danger for the Serbian nation 
greater manifests' - and never annexation to Serbia.165 He later explained that, despite 
his misgivings, he had ‘tolerated’ Krajina’s policies up to and including secession, as ‘to 
me it is yet more important and dearer even an undemocratic, even communist Krajina 
than Krajina in an Ustashoid state.’166
Rašković did not suggest that the Serbs renounce Krajina, however - ‘I normally do not 
have anything against Krajina, but I am not satisfied with the way and rate of drawing 
162 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.207.
163 Ljuba Stojić, ‘Bio sam i junak i izdajnik’, NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18.
164 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.154.
165 Ibid., p.155. Serbian opposition leader Vuk Drašković espoused a similar stance: Krajina's secession 
was premature, as Croatia was still in Yugoslavia at that point. 'The Decision on Secession is 
Premature', Politika, 23/3/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-060, 28/3/1991.
166 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.230.
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moves’167 – and in his May 1991 interview he also advocated the secession of Slavonia 
and the formation of a united Krajina state.168 He seemed to be arguing for a more 
rounded Serbian policy in Croatia that would also take into account the need to protect 
the Serbs remaining in Croatia, and thus proceed towards secession more cautiously. He 
was also critical of Babić's methods, arguing for democratic elections and the formation 
of proper institutions in the Krajina.169
Rašković the Negotiator
From the start, Rašković favoured negotiations and finding a peaceful resolution of the 
Yugoslav crisis, rather than the use of force. Although, as ever, Rašković’s rhetoric was 
contradictory, it seems clear that he did want to avoid war, eventually even telling the 
Knin crowds in April 1991 that he would not be a war leader, and if they wanted a war 
they must seek another leader.170 He often spoke of the need for dialogue and a peaceful 
resolution, and acted on this rhetoric too.171
Rašković had some contact with Tuđman during the electoral campaign, and upon the 
HDZ’s victory the two party leaders formally met.172 Rašković struck a very positive 
note afterwards, and agreed that an SDS member, Opačić, would be a Sabor vice-
president.173 That spring Rašković also tried to arrange a symbolic visit of Croatian 
political leaders to a place, such as Glina, where the Serbs had indisputably been 
victimised by the Ustaše, in order to reduce Serb-Croat tensions.174 Rašković met 
Tuđman again in July and seems to have genuinely sought good relations - he initially 
167 Ibid., p.205.
168 Ibid., pp.157-8. Similarly: Srđan Radulović, 'Naprsli štit srpstva', NIN, 3/5/1991.
169 Snežana Stamatović, 'Strah i nepoverenje', Borba, 1/2/1991, p.3. S. Stamatović & Z. Tarle, 'Biće tu još 
neprijatnosti', Borba, 2-3/3/1991, p.15. Also: Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.335-40.
170 Ibid., pp.224-5.
171 For example: Ibid., pp.311-12. Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15. Marinko Čulić, ‘Čega se boje Srbi’, 
Danas, 29/5/1990, pp.13-15.
172 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.210.
173 ‘SDP Leader on Free Market, Multiparty System’, Tanjug, 19/6/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-199, 
20/6/1990.
174 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.210-11, 227.
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opposed calling the Srb rally (where the SNV was founded) to avoid complicating their 
talks, and the two agreed to draw up proposals for Serb autonomy in Croatia.175 
By September, Rašković said that he no longer wished to meet Tuđman unless he came 
to Knin, noting that both their meetings ‘had gone wrong’, but he maintained contact 
with Tuđman’s chief advisor Slaven Letica, submitted proposals for Croatia’s 
constitution, and continued to support negotiations through his ally Vukčević.176 He was 
involved in several initiatives for talks in April-May 1991,177 and in the summer joined 
the Zagreb intellectual Milorad Pupovac in founding the compromise-seeking Serbian 
Democratic Forum (SDF). Until Rašković’s death a year later, the two maintained 
regular contact and Rašković helped Pupovac with contacts in Belgrade, promoting him 
as a new Serbian leader.178
Rašković supported the Vance peace plan in late 1991, and took part in new peace 
initiatives immediately afterwards. First, his wing of the SDS announced that they 
would be re-entering Croatian politics, demanding that Croatia cease persecuting its 
leaders to enable their return.179 This did not materialise then, but was apparently due to 
be implemented just before his death.180 And finally, in March 1992, he was involved in 
an initiative of Pupovac for the founding of a Serbian National Assembly in Croatia, to 
include Krajina representatives as well as the wide variety of Serbs who had remained 
politically active in Croatia.181
175 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.7. Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.315, 319, 322. Vjesnik, 26/7/1990, in FBIS-
EEU-90-149, 2/8/1990.
176 Interviews: Slaven Letica, principal advisor to President Tuđman, 1990-91 (Zagreb: 8/10/2009); 
Vojislav Vukčević, SDS Vice-President, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 2007). Jovan Rašković, ‘Mišljenje’, 
29/10/1990 (author’s copy). Rašković, ‘Primjedbe...'.
177 ‘No Results From Croatian-Serbian Talks in Knin’, Tanjug, 15/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-073, 
16/4/1991. Lovrenović and Lucić, p.36. Uroš Komlenović, 'Sačuvati srpski obraz', NIN, 31/5/1991, 
p.12. Miškulin, 'Stranka ugroženog naroda...', p.58.
178 Interview Milorad Pupovac, President of SDF, 1991-95 (Zagreb: 1/10/2009). And: Veselin Golubović, 
'Ne rat – nego mir' in Ćosić et al, p.127.
179 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.344-8.
180 ICTY-Martić: Witness Branko Popović, General-Secretary of SDS, 1990-91, T-8024-5. Rašković, 
Duša i sloboda, p.355.
181 Branko Podgornik, ‘Croatian Serbs Mature’, Vjesnik, 29/3/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-070, 10/4/1992.
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Rašković the Compromiser
What did Rašković hope to achieve through negotiations? Was he, despite his rhetoric, 
prepared to compromise to avoid war, and to accept a solution within independent 
Croatia?
Rašković’s desire to negotiate and to find a peaceful solution, even to cooperate with the 
other side, does not necessarily imply a willingness to abandon or even compromise his 
goals and accept a solution inside the Croatian state. The Serbs in Bosnia, and Croatia 
and Slovenia in Yugoslavia, all participated in common institutions and organs of 
authority until the moment they implemented secession, and took part in countless 
negotiations. The Croatian Serbs could have done the same. Indeed, while Opačić was 
talking about becoming a Sabor vice-president, he was maintaining his stance that a 
confederation would require the redrawing of republican borders.182 Just because 
Serbian self-determination could not, realistically, be achieved through negotiations 
does not mean that Rašković did not hope for that.183 Tuđman’s project was no less 
grand he really did hope, and expect, to achieve it peacefully.184
Rašković's support for Pupovac and the SDF also does not in itself mean that he was 
prepared to compromise along the lines that Pupovac, in his 'personal opinion', 
suggested – territorial autonomy in an independent Croatia.185 The 'Lipik Declaration' of 
13 July 1991, adopted at the initiative meeting for the SDF, did not in itself involve a 
renunciation of SDS goals – it emphasised rights of the Serbian population in Croatia, 
including to possible territorial, cultural and political autonomy, but also the Serb 
people's interest in remaining in a common state together with the Serbs of Serbia, 
Montenegro and Bosnia.186 SDS leaders had a variety of motivations for participating in 
182 ‘SDP Leader on Free Market, Multiparty System’, Tanjug, 19/6/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-199, 
20/6/1990. Miroslav Ivić, 'Komunisti više nigdje nemaju šansi', Borba, 24/5/1990, p.5.
183 See, for example: Milan Jajčinović, ‘Krajina mimo ustava’, Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15.
184 See, for example: 'Dušan Bilandžić: Tuđman mi je rekao - 'Kad podijelimo Bosnu, ja i Sloba bit ćemo 
saveznici'', Nacional, 5/6/2012.
185 Zoran Daskalović, 'Three Serbian Mistakes', Danas, 23/7/1991, in FBIS-EER-91-118, 7/8/1991.
186 Filip Škiljan, 'The Organisation and Political Position of Serbs in Croatia', Serbian Political Thought, 
Chapter 2: Jovan Rašković, the Serbian Democratic Party and the 'Serbian Question' in Croatia
76
Pupovac's initiatives;187 undoubtedly, the desire to negotiate and avoid war was the key 
one – but this does not necessarily imply a willingness to abandon one's program. Some 
of Rašković’s SDS allies were likewise open to negotiations, but definitely hardline.188 
Dušan Zelenbaba, for example, also participated in founding the SDF. He occasionally 
indicated more moderate stances,189 but most often his critiques of the ruling Serbian 
policies actually came from a more extreme position,190 his most common rhetoric being 
about the necessity of buying arms.191 
The destiny of Serbs outside Krajina/Slavonia had become a major concern of 
Rašković, and in 1991 he had attempted several times to initiate the formation of a 
Serbian parliament in Croatia, which would represent all Serbs there and would ‘defend 
the endangered being of the Serbian nation’.192 Even after the RSK was formed, 
Rašković continued to reject division among the Serbs of Croatia, who were ‘all Serbs 
of one region, of one psychological make-up, and a single root’.193 He had rejected 
Babić’s formation of the SDS Krajina, for example, as meaning ‘the splitting of the 
Serbian nation into two parts’194 and, despite the war, continued to argue that the SDS 
must ‘psychologically, politically and factually unite Serbs gathered in SAO Krajina and 
those who will remain outside Yugoslavia, in Croatia’.195 As ‘genocide’196 began to be 
implemented over them, moreover, protecting the Serbs outside Krajina became 
No. 2/2012, Vol. 6 (Belgrade: Institute For Political Studies), p.43.
187 Pupovac, p.96. Lovrenović and Lucić, p.36.
188 For example, Branjo Marijanović and Branko Popović, vice-president and general secretary of the 
SDS respectively. Interview Branko Marijanović 1990-91 (Belgrade: 7/11/2007). ICTY-Martić: 
Witness Branko Popović. Also: 'Talks Without Agreement', Danas, 16/10/1990, pp.22-24 in FBIS-
EEU-90-151, 5/11/1990. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2470 (Official Note, DB Serbia, 30/8/1994).
189 For example: Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.216. ‘Bosnian, Croatian Serbs Opposed’, Tanjug, 5/1/1992, in 
FBIS-EEU-92-003, 6/1/1992.
190 For example: ‘SDS Leaders Air Opposing Views’, Tanjug, 10/1/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-008, 
13/1/1992. G. Katić, ‘Press Conference by Serbian National Council of Bosnian Krajina: Serb 
Republic or Continuation of War’, Borba, 26/8/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-181, 17/9/1992.
191 For example: ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64A.461.1 (‘The Serbs Can Only Survive Together’, Glas Srpski, 
4/3/1991).
192 Biserko, pp.366-67.
193 S.P. Stamatović, ‘The Serbs Are Not a Bogeyman’, Borba, 31/3/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-070, 
10/4/1992.
194 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.209.
195 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.340.
196 Ibid., p.209. And: 'Genocid je počeo', Borba, 8/5/1991, p.8.
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Rašković’s overriding concern, and negotiations were essential to this: ‘That segment of 
the Serbian people in Croatia who have no chance whatsoever to live in any other land 
except Croatia must turn only to Zagreb. Solving the problems of that segment of the 
Serbian people is unthinkable without permanent communication with the Croatian state 
and the Croatian political regime.’ The Krajina Serbs, meanwhile, were essential to 
ensuring that those negotiations took place.197
Rašković always argued that it was for this reason that he was supporting Pupovac’s 
initiatives, and that this did not imply any renunciation of Krajina. In an interview in 
June 1991, for example, Rašković argued that Pupovac ‘is not a great Serb’ but was ‘an 
intelligent Serb’ who could ‘make something in that Croatia’, clearly referring to rump 
Croatia.198 Even Radovan Karadžić agreed that Pupovac could be useful to that end.199
Rašković interpreted the Vance peace plan of late 1991 as ‘a political freeze on current 
relations on keeping existing territories’.200 With the SDS’s return to Croatia (which, 
despite Rašković’s usual ambiguity, seems to have pertained only to rump Croatia),201 
the Serbian Assembly project and other initiatives, Rašković’s promotion of dialogue 
may have been intended just to help the Serbs outside the Krajina, with the issue of 
Krajina’s status being set to one side.202 Indeed, in an interview in April 1992 he said 
that he was 'thinking of one party in Krajina and one outside it, which would have 
different aims.'203
197 S.P. Stamatović, ‘The Serbs Are Not a Bogeyman’, Borba, 31/3/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-070, 
10/4/1992. Also: Ljuba Stojić, ‘Bio sam i junak i izdajnik’, NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18.
198 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.211. Also: NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18. S.P. Stamatović, ‘The Serbs Are Not a 
Bogeyman’, Borba, 31/3/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-070, 10/4/1992.
199 Domovina Intercept: B7077 (Karadžić-Ćosić, 15/2/1992).
200 B. Radivojsa, ‘Dr. Jovan Rašković on Arrival of ‘Blue Helmets’: Preserving Serbian Essence and 
Territory’, Politika, 7/1/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-015, 23/1/1992.
201 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.347, 355.
202 NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18. S.P. Stamatović, ‘The Serbs Are Not a Bogeyman’, Borba, 31/3/1992, in 
FBIS-EEU-92-070, 10/4/1992.
203 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64A.460.1 (Interview Jovan Rašković, Društvo, 22/4/1992).
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Pupovac maintained that SDS leaders Rašković and Dušan Štarević, both involved in 
the SDF and the Serbian Assembly project, accepted the territorial integrity of 
Croatia.204 Some evidence does indicate that Štarević, president of the Serbian cultural 
society Prosvjeta (based in Zagreb) and vice-president of the SAOK government in 
1991, was a moderate.205 But he was also close to Krajina police chief Martić – certainly 
no moderate (although, according to Pupovac, Štarević and others felt that Martić was 
‘more reasonable’ than Babić)206 – and is cited in the minutes of a SAOK government 
session in October 1991 as arguing that the government must constitute organs 
connected with a state of war, as ‘we are in war with Ustaše’.207 When Štarević died in 
1992, the pro-RSK Magazine of Serbian Krajina memorialised him as someone who 
simply saw that ‘the destiny of Serbian nation did not fall only on Krajina, but also on 
that part remaining in the new NDH’.208
Some other evidence does support Pupovac’s argument that Rašković was open to 
autonomy in Croatia, however. SDF founder Svetozar Livada recalls spending six hours 
with Rašković at the SDF’s foundation in summer 1991 persuading him to accept 
minority status in the Croatian state, and that Rašković was eventually convinced, 
speaking to the crowd along those lines.209 He also supported Džakula's efforts to 
negotiate and avoid war, efforts which do seem to have included openness to a status 
within Croatia.210
But Rašković generally did not such a solution. In three documents from late 1991, for 
example – a letter to American supporters, an SDS policy document, and an interview – 
Rašković insisted that it would not occur to him to ‘renounce Serbian Krajina and other 
204 Branko Podgornik, ‘Croatian Serbs Mature’, Vjesnik, 29/3/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-070, 10/4/1992. 
Pupovac, pp.95-6.
205 For example: Gojko Marinković, ‘Između Rodoljublja i Domoljublja’, Danas, 13/3/1990, pp.43-5.
206 Interview Milorad Pupovac, President of SDF, 1991-95 (Zagreb: 1/10/2009).
207 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, p.233.
208 Jovan Radulović, ‘In Memoriam Dušan Štarević (1932-1992)’, in Jovan Radulović (ed), Magazin 
Srpske Krajine (Knin: Srpska Zora, 1993), pp. 389-90.
209 Svetozar Livada and Darko Hudelist, ‘Kordunski Rekvijem’, Erasmus – Časopsis za kulturu 
demokracije, Broj: 13, 1995, p.18, from www.ceeol.com  . 
210 Interview Veljko Džakula (Zagreb: 30/9/2009). NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18.
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autonomous Serbian regions established with liberationary war’, and spoke only of 
Krajina potentially being independent, part of Serbia, or connected with the Bosnian 
Krajina.211 In autumn 1991, in conversation with the American ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, he rejected the idea that the Serbs accept very extensive autonomy in 
Croatia: ‘I said to him that that is [too] late since now a consciousness was created in 
the people that they have already acquired their Serbian territory, and that whoever 
would come now with that idea, and was a Serb, would have to be proclaimed a traitor. 
In some new situation that could perhaps make sense, but in these environments – 
no.’212 He also maintained that with the present Croatian regime - ‘the most monstrous 
regime in history of European civilisation’213 in its attitude towards Serbs - there was 
little or no hope for establishing better relations, placing no faith in their proposals for 
autonomy in late 1991.214
Rašković most often indicated that the compromise he hoped for was over Croatia’s 
relationship with Yugoslavia. In a December 1990 interview with Danas, for example, 
he claimed that he was close to accepting a hybrid model, a Yugoslav confederation that 
would have a common army and foreign policy, in which case the Serbs would then 
have political-territorial autonomies within Croatia and Yugoslavia.215 He may have 
continued to hope for such a compromise.216
We may conclude that by summer 1991 Rašković, the cautious separatist, was 
conflicted, and may, at least at times, have been open to autonomy in Croatia in order to 
avoid war and save the Serbs outside Krajina. If he had had full control over the 
situation, he might have settled for a compromise inside Croatia – though he may have 
needed persuading. But his influence had waned, and - considered by himself and others 
211 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.328, 340. NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18.
212 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.234.
213 Ibid., p.228.
214 Borba, 31/3/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-070, 10/4/1992. Politika, 7/1/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-015, 
23/1/1992. NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.228.
215 Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.273.
216 Tom Džadžić, Svetlana Đurđević, and Zoran Mirković, ‘The Traps in the Vance Plan’, NIN, 27/3/92, 
pp.15-17, in FBIS-EEU-92-072, 14/4/1992. Similarly: Marcus Tanner, ‘Serbs launch new party 
pledged to oust Babić’, The Independent (London), 5/2/1992. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.328.
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more a ‘people’s tribune’ than a politician217 - he was generally not prepared to go 
against ‘his’ people in Krajina and openly advocate such a compromise. He had, after 
all, always believed in the right of the Serbs to determine their own fate, and understood 
their desire to be independent from ‘Ustashoid’ Croatia. His primary concern and the 
main thrust of his political activities thus became assisting the Serbs remaining in 
Croatia, the area neglected by the territory-based politics of Knin and Belgrade, with the 
status of Krajina, at least for now, being set to one side.
The Real Rašković
It is clear that, with his unquestioning support for Krajina’s rapid secession in spring 
1991, Rašković could conceal his misgivings and advocate a programme with which he 
did not actually agree. Is it then possible that, despite his rhetoric, Rašković was always 
open to a compromise such as autonomy within an independent Croatia, and this was 
his true political agenda, as many authors suggest? Did he ever believe in territorial 
autonomy or secession, or was this simply crowd-pleasing populism, adopted to 
reinforce his standing among radicals in the SDS, as suggested by, for example, 
Hislope?218
The available evidence does not support this idea. Rather, it better supports a conclusion 
that it was Rašković’s early, moderate rhetoric that was, in fact, transitional, at a time 
when more radical stances might have won less support.
Rašković had always been ambiguous on whether or when the Serbs might seek 
territorial rather than regional autonomy, or implement their right to secession. Even in 
June-July 1990, for example, he had spoken of the Association as being merely ‘a step 
to [the goal]’ of autonomy, which was in fact ‘political-territorial autonomy’ (something 
which, elsewhere, he denied), and of secession from Croatia in the case of a 
217 Golubović, p.128. Dragan Pavlović, p.198.
218 Hislope, Nationalism, pp.173-4.
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confederation.219 It is possible that he did not have a clear plan from the start and felt 
that this would be determined by the Serbian people. The way that the SDS was 
redrawing municipal boundaries, and the rapidity with which it radicalised its 
programme, however, strongly suggests that, as Rašković argued in October, regional 
autonomy was never intended as ‘a final solution’, but only ‘a transitional form’, ‘proof 
that the Serbian nation exists in Croatia and that the Serbian nation has the right to [self-
determination]’.220 Rašković repeated the same stance in December, explaining that he 
'mentioned cultural autonomy in the phase when he thought that the Croatian state 
[would] have understanding for the Serbian national being', i.e. would recognise Serbian 
sovereignty and autonomy, and advocated territorial autonomy when it was clear that 
such recognition would not be forthcoming.221
This was, after all, certainly the case for the other key leaders of the SDS, with even 
most of the Slavonians supporting self-determination. This was also the position of the 
various Serbian nationalist intellectuals in Belgrade with whom Rašković associated. 
Rašković was particularly close with influential Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić, whom he 
regarded as his ‘spiritual father’, and who helped draft the SDS's programme.222 In the 
later years of his life Ćosić would emphasise his earlier association with Rašković, and 
claim that they - unlike Milošević - had only ever advocated a solution for Serbs within 
Croatia, rather than the 'political nonsense' and 'absurd idea' of breaking-up Croatia.223 
Ćosić was, certainly, an advocate of peaceful and democratic solutions, and his ideal 
option was the preservation of federal Yugoslavia. But all the available evidence – 
including Ćosić's own public statements and published diaries - indicates that, if federal 
219 'Rašković Addresses Party Rally’, Belgrade Domestic Service, 23/6/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-124, 
27/6/1990. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 13, p.38. Danas, 25/3/1990, in FBIS-EER-90-074, 
30/5/1990. Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.311, 264-5.
220 Rašković, ‘Ja ne želim biti vaš vođa’. Also: Radovan Kovačević, ‘Srbi u Hrvatskoj: Idemo dalje’, 
Intervju,  8/6/1990, pp.16-17.
221 I. Tomljanović, 'Tezi i negodvanja', Borba, 1-2/12/1990, p.11.
222 Četnik, pp.228-9. Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.171. Darko Hudelist, Moj beogradski dnevnik: susreti i  
razgovori s Dobricom Ćosićem, 2006.-2011. (Zagreb: Profil, 2012), p.451.
223 Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, pp.450, 138-9, 437, 446. Slobodan Gavrilović, 'Publish when I die 
[Interviews with Dobrica Ćosić]', published on InSerbia, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://inserbia.info/today/2014/06/Ćosić-publish-when-i-die-i-created-Karadžić-but-not-Milošević/. 
Kesar, 'Jovan Rašković', Večernji Novosti, 5/9/2007, accessed 1/8/2014 from: www.krajinaforce.com. 
Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.169.
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Yugoslavia did not survive, he was a convinced advocate of self-determination and all 
Serbs remaining in one state (and it was only later, from early 1992, that he began to 
shift towards accepting a solution for Serbs within Croatia).224
It therefore seems that in 1990 Rašković’s idea of a peaceful solution was for the Croats 
to concede that the Serbs were a sovereign nation with the right to determine their own 
future, ‘to organise itself how it thinks is best for it’,225 including to opt for some form 
of autonomy or secession, the latter being more likely if Croatia rejected federal 
Yugoslavia. Rašković's negotiations with the Croatian leadership actually indicate this. 
In May 1990 he began by requesting from Tuđman constitutional recognition of Serbian 
sovereignty in Croatia and the fact that Croatia was a state of both ‘Croatian and 
Serbian territories’.226 He tried to make this demand more palatable by deliberately 
speaking of the sovereignty of the ‘Serbian national being’ rather than the ‘Serbian 
nation’, and claiming that this was neither state ‘sovereignty’ nor ‘dual-sovereignty’, but 
the essence seems to have been the same.227 In July he expanded on this, presenting his 
three-pronged programme to Tuđman, while also suggesting that in the case of 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration the Serbian region’s status could change, and the Serbs 
could ‘unite in one [Krajina] and be independent, [but also] be part of the Croatian 
state’.228 Whether this represented Rašković’s true intentions is questionable, however, 
as throughout the conversation Rašković was clearly attempting to establish good 
224 See: Dobrica Ćosić, Lična istorija jednog doba, Vol. 3: Vreme raspada 1981-1991. (Belgrade: 
Sluzbeni Glasnik, 2009). Dobrica Ćosić, Lična istorija jednog doba, Vol. 4: Vreme mržnje 1992-1993. 
(Belgrade: Sluzbeni Glasnik, 2009). Dobrica Ćosić, 'Rimska beseda', NIN, 6/12/1990, pp.46-49. 
Domovina Intercepts: C2352 (Karadžić-Ćosić, 11/11/1991); B7077 (Karadžić-Ćosić, 15/2/1992). 
Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, pp.437, 444-6. Sonja Biserko & Seška Stanojlović, Poslednja šansa 
Jugoslavije: Haška konferencija 1991 (Belgrade: Helsinki odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji/Zagorac, 
2002), p.223. Vladislav Jovanović, Rat koji se mogao izbeći: u vrtlogu jugoslovenske krize (Belgrade: 
Kiz Altera, 2008), pp.56-7. Judah, p.197. Borisav Jović, Posljednji dani, pp.171-3, 302. Đukić, 
Lovljenje vetra, p.208. Aleksandar Pavković, 'Yugoslavism's Last Stand: a Utopia of Serb 
Intellectuals', in Dejan Djokić (ed), Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992 (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2003), pp.252-67.
225 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2 - Document 13, p.38.
226 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp. 141, 277. I. Tomljanović, 'Nek svako razvija svoje', Borba, 11/6/1990, 
p.4.
227 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.312, 322. Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, 
pp.16-20.
228 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.314.
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relations and soften the Croats’ attitude towards his programme, sometimes 
disingenuously. He also suggested that through an autonomous Krajina Croatia could 
annex the Bosnian Serbs and thereby Bosnia as a whole, which seems more an attempt 
to soften Croatia’s attitude to Krajina autonomy, and perhaps links between the Croatian 
and Bosnian Krajinas, than a representation of Rašković’s real programme.229 Finally, as 
discussed, Rašković’s proposals in December included territorial autonomies and the 
right to self-determination.230
There is also evidence to suggest that Rašković genuinely supported his more radical 
proposals. For example, he argued for a united Krajina state privately to Milošević, 
Karadžić and Ćosić, and continued to speak in favour of it in even when expressing his 
misgivings concerning Krajina’s rapid secession.231
Rather than simply revealing his underlying views, it seems that in 1991 there was a real 
shift in Rašković's thinking. Livada, after all, describes having to persuade Rašković in 
mid-1991, and it was only in January 1991, after SAOK was formed, that Rašković first 
emphasised the need for the SDS to rally Serbs remaining in Croatia, an issue he had 
previously neglected.232 Rašković’s support for Pupovac and other non-SDS Serbs in 
1991-92 also reflected a significant shift in his attitude, as in 1990 he had denounced 
such people – Sabor vice-president Simo Rajić, for example - as illegitimate, and not 
‘good Serbs’.233
Rašković was not simply acting tactically in 1990, however, attempting to trick Tuđman 
into assisting Serb separatism. He genuinely wanted to resolve these matters peacefully, 
on the basis of agreement, no matter how unlikely that prospect really was. Like 
Tuđman, he sought to avoid war, despite conducting the nationalist politics that helped 
229 Ibid., pp.314-5. Also: Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, pp.16-20.
230 Rašković, ‘Primjedbe...'.
231 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.158. He also advocated Serbian self-determination in London in March 
1991: Dragan Pavlović, p.201.
232 See for example: HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 15, p.41. Momčilović, p.39.
233 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.331. NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18.
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create it. Tuđman sincerely sought a peaceful disintegration of Yugoslavia that would 
end with Croatia at least in its republican borders, if not much larger; Rašković seems to 
have sincerely sought, in the case of federal Yugoslavia’s dissolution, that the Serbs in 
Croatia be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination.
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2.4. Conclusions
The SDS and its leaders were often ambiguous, even contradictory, in their rhetoric and 
proposals. It was precisely this ambiguity that helped the party grow. Nevertheless, 
analysing Rašković's 'verbal acrobatics' and considering sources beyond party leaders' 
public rhetoric, it has been possible to determine clear and coherent proposals and their 
evolution, as well the agendas that lay behind them.
The proposals of the SDS were premised on the idea that the Serbian nation in Croatia 
was a sovereign nation with the right to decide ‘with whom it will live, in what regime 
it will live and how it will connect with other nations in Yugoslavia’.234 The party 
favoured Yugoslav federalism as corresponding to the interests of the Serbian people. 
Ideally, Rašković and others would have preferred the maintenance of federal 
Yugoslavia – a point that is important to remember. In that case, they would only have 
sought rights within the Croatian state, though the rights they sought were fairly 
expansive, and included at least elements of territorial autonomy. Fuller territorial 
autonomy, moreover, was also always an option, and the rapidity with which ‘regional 
autonomy’ was dropped suggests that, to some extent at least, that was only a 
transitional or tactical demand.
The SDS argued that a confederation would divide the Serbian nation between several 
different states, and was thus contrary to its interests. Some in the SDS, such as Opačić 
and Zelenbaba, spoke of secession as the response to confederalisation from a very early 
stage, and initial indications from Rašković and Babić that they would opt for territorial 
autonomy in the case of a confederation, even independence, seem to have been largely 
transitional.
Contrary to the existing emphasis in the literature, there appears to have been little 
difference between the proposals of Rašković and Babić in 1990, the only significant 
234 ICTY-Martić: E-141E (SNV Declaration, 25/7/1990).
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one being that Babić’s proposed territorial autonomy was somewhat more extensive. 
The real difference was over their attitude to negotiations and war, as Rašković, unlike 
Babić, emphasised the need for talks and a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In 1990 he 
hoped, unrealistically, to achieve Serbian sovereignty and self-determination through 
negotiations, although he also displayed some willingness to compromise. In 1991, 
however, Rašković’s thought shifted, as the implementation of secession brought the 
situation closer to war. He began to have doubts about the Serbian project and became 
very concerned about the fate of Serbs outside Krajina, and critical of Krajina’s rapid 
secession under Babić. It seems that – at times, at least - he even became open to 
autonomy in an independent Croatia. But he had no faith that Zagreb would ever agree 
to this and also accepted that this was currently unacceptable for Krajina, and so did not 
stand against their right to self-determination. Rather, he attempted to put the issue to 
one side for the time being and focus on saving the Serbs remaining in Croatia.
Did Rašković represent a missed opportunity for compromise? In some respects, yes. 
He favoured negotiations and a peaceful resolution of the conflict and, when confronted 
with war, partly moderated his stance, opening up to a possible compromise. But his 
political platform and agenda was quite far from the moderate programme of (non-
territorial) cultural autonomy and equality within Croatia often attributed to him. 
Rašković, in fact, was the founder of the SDS policy of Serbian self-determination and 
of unilaterally building a Serbian autonomous region in Croatia as a means of realising 
that. The proposition that Milošević was responsible for creating or promoting these 
ideas among Serbs in Croatia, via support to Milan Babić, is therefore mistaken.
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Chapter 3: The Two Nationalisms Collide
In the April-May 1990 elections in Croatia the nationalist Croatian Democratic 
Community (HDZ) triumphed, acquiring power at the national level, while the SDS 
won control of a few Serb-majority municipalities around Knin. Upon assuming power, 
both parties began implementing their nationalist programmes. By the end of the year 
the stage was set for both political and military confrontation between Zagreb, intent on 
secession from Yugoslavia but retaining Croatia's existing borders, and the Krajina 
Serbs, committed to seceding from Croatia and 'remaining' in Yugoslavia or an enlarged 
Serbian state. With the outbreak of the 'Balvan Revolution' in August 1990, the Knin 
Krajina was also increasingly off-limits to the Croatian authorities, while militarisation 
of the crisis was well underway by the end of the year.
This chapter examines these developments - how the ideas of Rašković and the SDS 
were implemented in practice, and how the Krajina Serbs thereby came into increasing 
conflict with Zagreb. It gives particular consideration to the widespread notion that the 
conflict was provoked by Belgrade-backed Serb hardliners, who sabotaged 
opportunities for compromise as explored by Rašković, and instigated an unprovoked 
armed rebellion. It looks at how the Serbian rebellion in the Krajina unfolded, including 
the extent to which this was planned or orchestrated, and the militarisation of the 
conflict, as well as exploring Milan Babić's testimonies in The Hague blaming the war 
on Belgrade-connected extremists.
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3.1. A New 'Historical Agreement'?
Despite their radically different agendas and perspectives, both Tuđman and Rašković 
saw some benefit in negotiating with each another. Importantly, both seem to have 
genuinely sought a peaceful solution for the question of Croat-Serb relations. The two 
had some contact in the spring, with Tuđman even inviting Rašković to attend the 
HDZ's founding assembly in February 1990.1 Immediately after his election victory, 
Tuđman reiterated his commitment to full civic and national rights for Serbs in Croatia, 
including cultural autonomy. He also decided to offer the SDS, as the 'Serbian' party in 
Croatia, the position of one of the vice-premiers of the Croatian Sabor or Croatian 
Presidency, on the basis that such a post was 'traditionally' held by a Serb.
On 10 May Rašković came to HDZ headquarters and met with Tuđman. Rašković did 
not think that a vice-presidential post, on which Tuđman focused, would solve much, 
but agreed that the SDS would provide a candidate for one of the Sabor vice-presidents.2 
The two discussed a new basis for Croatian-Serbian relations, and Rašković, according 
to his recollections, wanted Tuđman to accept that the 'Croatian state is composed of 
Croatian and Serbian territories' and to constitutionally recognise the 'sovereignty of the 
Serbian national corpus'.3 Rašković deliberately referred to the 'Serbian national corpus' 
or 'being' rather than 'Serbian nation', in order to make the notion more palatable to 
Tuđman. However, as discussed, for Rašković this implied also the Serbs' right to 
autonomy and self-determination. Rašković also argued that, because of the genocide 
experienced in the Second World War, Serbs in Croatia must acquire a 'specific status'.4
Tuđman, however, responded that he would not allow dual sovereignty in Croatia - in 
Croatia only the Croatian nation could be sovereign – and maintained that the Serbs had 
1 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, pp.15-16. Rašković apparently preferred the HDZ to the SKH: Dušan 
Bilandžić, Povijest izbliza, memoarski zapisi 1945-2005 (Zagreb: Prometej, 2006), p.349.
2 V. Saško, 'Potopiti sve mržnje', Vecernji List, 12/5/1990, p.36. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.227.
3 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.227. Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, pp.16-
20. And: Knežević, 'Srpska demokratska stranka', pp.17-18.
4 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.312, 322. Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, 
pp.16-20. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.227.
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already had a privileged position in Croatia, which must be corrected.5 Nevertheless, the 
two agreed in principle that the SDS would propose a Sabor vice-president, and 
Rašković spoke very positively and optimistically of the meeting, even talking of a 
'historic compromise that we have agreed upon in principle', which depended on how 
'the position of the Serbian people will be formulated in the new constitution', and of 
working to calm both Serbophobia and Croatophobia. He also claimed that he and 
Tuđman discussed extinguishing Serbophobia in the HDZ, and putting 'hawks' in both 
parties into the background.6
Tuđman did in many respects put his 'hawks' into the background, publicly rebuking 
HDZ rightist Šime Đodan, for example, but Rašković evidently did not consider this 
enough, and claimed that an 'Ustaša core' in the HDZ was limiting Tuđman's freedom of 
action.7 Rašković's rhetoric varied considerably: at times he seemed highly optimistic 
about reaching an agreement with Zagreb, while elsewhere acknowledging that there 
was 'little' on which they could agree.8 But as the details of his meeting with Tuđman 
show, the two sides' programmes were radically apart, and no compromise had in fact 
been agreed.
This initial attempt at co-operation between the opposing nationalists in Croatia, 
moreover, was soon interrupted, as on 19 May the so-called 'Mlinar case' erupted. 
Miroslav Mlinar, president of the Benkovac branch of the SDS, claimed to have been 
attacked by unknown assailants – presumably Ustaše – who attempted to slit his throat, 
having a small wound on his neck as evidence. In Knin his injuries were proclaimed 
severe, and Rašković, Opačić and others soon all visited Mlinar in hospital, proclaiming 
him the first victim of resurrected Ustashism.9 The following day Rašković announced 
5 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.232-3. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.227.
6 'Historic Compromise', Vjesnik, 11/5/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-097, 18/5/1990. Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i 
hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, pp.16-20. Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.232-3. Marinko Čulić, 'Čega 
se boje Srbi', Danas, 29/5/1990, pp.13-15.
7 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.311. Žarko Domljan, Visoko Podignimo Zastavu: Hrvatska – od negacije do 
priznanja (Zagreb: Profil, 2010), p.113.
8 'Šta je Rašković rekao Cimermanu', Borba, 8/6/1990, p.6.
9 Bennett, p.130. S. Stamatović, 'Asocijacije na ustaštvo', Borba, 23/5/1990, p.3.
Chapter 3: The Two Nationalisms Collide
90
that until it was confirmed what had occurred, the SDS was suspending its relations 
with the Sabor and all 'Croatocentric parties', including the League of Communists of 
Croatia (Savez komunista Hrvatske, SKH).10 SDS deputies therefore declined to attend 
the new Sabor's constitutive session on 30 May, while Opačić, who had been announced 
as the SDS's candidate for Sabor vice-president, froze his candidacy.
Rašković and others capitalised on this event, which he considered an example of 
'triumphalist aggression',11 and which was heavily publicised in the Serbian media.12 The 
HDZ condemned the attack, but it was not long before there were suggestions that this 
was really a 'scenario' staged by the Serbs. It does in fact seem fairly certain that the 
incident was faked. SDS founder Ratko Ličina acknowledges that it was later confirmed 
that Mlinar staged the incident for self-publicity, to be the first victim of the new 
Ustaše.13 Rašković may have felt he had no choice but to go along with the scenario – 
although he did continue to draw on the case later, too.14 His motivation in suspending 
contacts seems to have been to retain control over Serbian reaction: if he was the one to 
suspend contacts, he would then have the power to resume contacts, also.15
The Mlinar incident demonstrated how many in the SDS favoured a more radical stance 
towards the Croatian authorities, and that Rašković's freedom of action was constrained. 
It certainly had a polarising and radicalising effect - but its importance should not be 
exaggerated. Contacts with the Croats resumed after a few weeks, when the situation 
had calmed, and Opačić again said he would take his vice-presidential post.16 Moreover, 
at the end of May there was actually a case of the HDZ and SDS (Tuđman and 
Rašković) having successfully agreed to prevent clashes, in a Orthodox-Catholic row 
10 I.G., 'I nož u politici?', Borba, 22/5/1990, p.14.
11 Mladen Pavković, 'Svaka agresija izaziva kontra udar', Glas Podravine, 15/6/1990, p.7.
12 See, for example: Bennett, p.130. Zoran Marković, 'The Nation: Victims and Vengeance', in Nebojša 
Popov (ed), The Road to War in Serbia: Traumas and Catharsis (Budapest: CEU Press, 2000), p.602.
13 Interview Ratko Ličina, SDS official (Belgrade: 2007). Also: ICTY-Martić: Witness Veljko Džakula, 
T394.
14 For example: V. Vignjević, 'Nećemo kriv', Borba, 6/9/1990.
15 Marinko Čulić, 'Čega se boje Srbi', Danas, 29/5/1990, pp.13-15. Snežana Stamatović, 'Srbi po rodu – 
Hrvatska po domu', Borba, 18/6/1990, p.7. Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.309.
16 Reuf Mirko Kapetanovic, Kronologija zbivanja u Republici Hrvatskoj, 1989.-1995. (Zagreb: 
Informator, 1995), pp.6-7. Jasna Babić, 'Pod zvijezdom razdora', Danas, No.436, 19/6/1990, pp.17-19.
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about a church in the village of Cetina near Knin.17 Importantly, the Mlinar case did not 
undermine the Rašković-Tuđman 'agreement', as there was no real agreement, or 
prospect of an agreement, to undermine.
17 Marinko Čulić, 'Čega se boje Srbi', Danas, 29/5/1990, pp.13-15. Marinko Čulić, 'Osvajači svetog 
spasa', Danas, 29/5/1990, pp.13-15.
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3.2. Collision
The SDS's National Programme and the Croatian Response
Immediately upon assuming power at the end of May 1990, both the HDZ and the SDS 
began implementing their national programmes. In the case of the SDS, this meant the 
creation of the 'Association of Municipalities of North Dalmatia and Lika', which the 
SDS formally decided to form on 20 May.18 As discussed in Chapter 2, this was always 
intended to cover a wider area, and was limited in scope only in order to expedite its 
formation. The SDS wanted to exploit the constitutional opportunity to form such 
Associations while it still existed (it would be harder for Zagreb to ban it when it was 
already formed, Rašković reasoned),19 and by the end of June half the projected 
members had joined – the SDS-run municipalities of Knin, Lapac and Gračac – and its 
formation was declared. By mid-August, eight of the eleven Serb-majority Krajina 
municipalities were members. The SDS also implemented its national programme in 
Knin, passing a decision on the official use of both Cyrillic and Latin scripts in the 
municipality, and ordering the replacement of signs approaching the town, written in 
Latin alone, with bi-scriptual signs with Cyrillic on top. (It was also decided that official 
documents would be issued in Latin only on request, an early sign of ethnic 
exclusivism.)20
The new Croatian leadership was quick to respond to these moves, which it saw as 
challenges to its authority and to Croatian sovereignty. In the Association they saw a 
'path for the creation of a state of Serbs in Croatia', 'separation, overthrowing of the 
territorial integrity of Croatia' and a 'campaign to make impossible, to prevent the 
constitution of normal democratic authorities in Croatia'.21 They therefore quickly 
18 Knežević, 'Srpska demokratska stranka', p.19.
19 Marinko Čulić, 'Pohod udruženih voždova', Danas, 10/7/1990, pp.13-15.
20 S. Stamatović, 'Zajednica povezana ćirilicom', Borba, 7/6/1990, p.4.
21 Sanja Modrić, 'Iracionalni strah za zbunjivanje', Borba, 28-9/7/1990, p.5. Rašković, Luda zemlja, 
pp.311-2.
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moved to ban it, removing the possibility for municipalities to form such regional 
groupings.
The perception of the Croatian side was justified: Rašković did envisage the Association 
as creating the basis for Serbian self-determination, including secession from Croatia. 
At this stage, however, he emphasised that he merely sought cultural/regional autonomy 
via the Association – which had not yet assumed any powers beyond those legal at the 
time - and to many Serbs it seemed that this relatively moderate agenda was being 
suppressed. The Association and municipal autonomy also enabled resistance to the 
imposition of Croatian exclusivism by Zagreb – creating a 'base of resistance in the case 
of anti-Serbian behaviour of the Croatian Sabor’ - and was undoubtedly supported by 
many Serbs for that reason.22
Moreover, although the Croatian leadership in theory had nothing against biscriptualism 
in Serb-majority municipalities, the raising of biscriptual signs in Knin was taken as an 
assertion of the 'Serbian' nature of Knin, requiring response. Such autonomous action 
was also seen as part of the campaign for Serbian autonomy or separation from Croatia. 
As Tuđman told Rašković in July, 'I am for full cultural autonomy, but please, I tell you, 
when that is determined by the constitution and law - we will not allow illegal actions'.23 
The biscriptual signs do not, in fact, seem to have been illegal, but the government 
nevertheless ordered their removal.24 As Knin refused, road-workers from Šibenik 
attempted three times over the following month and a half to remove them, prevented 
each time by Serb crowds. This only served to heighten the tension in the region and 
undermine the credibility of the government's talk of cultural autonomy, and was 
criticised as unnecessary by Croatian liberals.25
22 Milorad Vučelić, ‘Srbi i hrvatski plebisciti’, NIN, 20/5/1990, pp.16-20.
23 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.322.
24 Marinko Čulić, 'Slijeganje tla', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.20-21.
25 For example: Ivo Goldstein, 'What People Are Keeping Quiet About', Danas, 28/8/1990, p.25, in 
FBIS-EER-90-134, 27/9/1990. Marinko Čulić, 'Slijeganje tla', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.20-21.
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HDZ Nation-Building and Constitutional Amendments
A key priority of the HDZ was crafting a new constitution for a post-communist 
independent Croatian nation-state. As this would take some months, the new authorities 
quickly drafted amendments to the existing constitution relating to matters deemed 
immediately relevant. First announced by the Croatian Presidency on 20 June and then, 
after some public discussion and alterations, passed by the Sabor on 25 July, the 
amendments dealt primarily with three areas: de-communisation; Croatian sovereignty 
and nation-building; and preventing the implementation of the SDS's programme.26
The word ‘Socialist’ was dropped from the republic’s name, the office of President was 
created and republican organs were renamed to those of a state (Ministries, 
Government) rather than a socialist republic. Following Slovenia's declaration of 
sovereignty at the beginning of July, the stipulation that ‘The Republic of Croatia is the 
carrier of political and economy sovereignty’ was also added to Article 1 of the 
constitution.
The new authorities aimed to reduce the existing decentralisation and high degree of 
municipal self-government, which, without the centralised communist party machinery 
exercising control, was expansive.27 This would also prevent the utilisation of this 
decentralisation by the SDS. Initially, it was prescribed that a new republican law would 
regulate how municipalities could co-operate in Associations, and a constitutional basis 
would be created to enable republican authorities to issue 'mandatory instructions' to 
municipal bodies.28 Subsequently, 'the intentions of establishing a “Serbian district” or 
even a separate “Serbian state” in Croatia' were deemed 'already so manifest' that later 
26 'Odluka o progašenju Amandmana LXIV. do LXXV. na Ustava Socijalističle Republike Hrvatske', 
Narodne Novine, No.31, 28/7/1990. 'Odluka da se pristupi raspravi o promjeni Ustava Socijalističke 
Republike Hrvatske', Narodne Novine, No.28, 30/6/1990.
27 Marinko Čulić, 'Thank You for the Star', Danas, 17/7/1990, pp.20-22, in FBIS-EER-90-124, 
30/8/1990. Interview Drago Dmitrovic, Secretary of the SKH, 1986-89 (Zagreb: 9/10/2009). Domljan, 
p.118.
28 'Odluka da se pristupi raspravi o promjeni Ustava Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske', Narodne 
Novine, No.28, 30/6/1990. 
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in July the possibility of forming Associations of Municipalities was completely 
removed, in effect from the moment of adoption, with possible inter-municipal co-
operation left to be mandated by future laws.29 It was largely on this basis that Croatia's 
Constitutional Court subsequently proclaimed the SDS's Association illegal.30
In order to give the HDZ fuller freedom to implement its programme, meanwhile, the 
constitutional procedure for nationally sensitive issues to go through the Sabor's Council 
of National Equality - potentially delaying laws and consequently requiring a two-thirds 
majority - was abolished. (The new HDZ-dominated Sabor, in fact, had never even 
constituted this body.)31 Another amendment declared Latin the official script of Croatia, 
a question the Croatian constitution had not previously regulated, and a repudiation of 
the previous principle of equality of Latin and Cyrillic, enshrined in the federal 
constitution.32 This reflected the HDZ's Croatian nationalism, but was also a reaction to 
Knin's decision, which would now be illegal. The initial amendment then continued to 
state that, 'to secure equality', ‘The Cyrillic or any other script used in addition will be 
subject to special legislation.’33 This was subsequently altered to state that ‘In addition 
to the official use of the Latin script, Cyrillic or any other script may be used in 
municipalities where the majority of the population still uses it, subject to legislation.’34 
Though this could be read as implying that Cyrillic would be in official use in Serb-
majority municipalities, the text was now technically more restrictive, as Cyrillic's use 
was limited to ‘municipalities where the majority of the population still uses it’ – which 
probably excluded every municipality in Croatia. More significantly, the official use of 
Cyrillic was contingent on further legislation – which was yet to be passed – and was 
29 Marinko Čulić, 'Thank You for the Star', Danas, 17/7/1990, pp.20-22, in FBIS-EER-90-124, 
30/8/1990. 'Odluka o progašenju Amandmana LXIV. do LXXV. na Ustava Socijalističle Republike 
Hrvatske', Narodne Novine, No.31, 28/7/1990.
30 'Odluka Ustavnog suda Hrvatske broj U/I-214/1990 od 28. kolovoza 1990', Narodne Novine, No.35, 
4/9/1990.
31 S. Vranić, 'Suverenitet je nedjeljiv, ali...', Borba, 3/7/1990, p.5.
32 Although Latin was overwhelmingly dominant in Croatia and Cyrillic in declining use among 
Croatian Serbs, citizens in theory always had the right to, for example, correspond with the state in 
Cyrillic. Interview Mile Dakić, President of Vojnić municipality in the 1970s (Belgade: 5/11/2007).
33 'Odluka da se pristupi raspravi o promjeni Ustava Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske', Narodne 
Novine, No.28, 30/6/1990. 
34 'Odluka o progašenju Amandmana LXIV. do LXXV. na Ustava Socijalističle Republike Hrvatske', 
Narodne Novine, No.31, 28/7/1990.
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thus, for now at least, illegal, and this was something which republican organs insisted 
on enforcing.35 This, of course, could only further undermine the credibility of Zagreb's 
promises of cultural autonomy for Serbs in Croatia.
Finally, and most controversially, the flag and coat-of-arms used by the HDZ were 
adopted as the official state symbols, to be displayed throughout the republic, on 
government buildings and police caps. At the time the HDZ's emblems bore a striking 
similarity to those used by the NDH, including the 'šahovnica' (chessboard) emblem 
beginning with a white rather than red square, as well as its shape and its positioning on 
the flag.36 This move therefore met with particularly widespread opposition from Serbs. 
(In December 1990 the flag and coat-of-arms were altered, and Tuđman subsequently 
opposed use of the earlier design due to its Ustaša associations, but by this point the link 
was already cemented.)37
The most controversial change in 1990 related to the constitutional definition of Croatia, 
which was previously defined as 'the national state of the Croatian nation, the state of 
the Serbian nation in Croatia, and the state of the nationalities which live within her'.38 
From their very inauguration in May 1990 HDZ officials were 'skipping' the Serbs in 
their definitions of Croatia and referring to the Croatian nation alone, including in 
official documents, and it was fairly clear that the Serbs' status was to be downgraded.39 
In late July Tuđman announced the government's first draft constitutional proposals, 
downgrading the Serbs (though still mentioning them, in a list with other minorities).40 
The July amendments did not concern this, however, and no such change was effected 
35 Miškulin, 'Srpska pobuna u općini Pakrac 1990.-1991', pp.368-9.
36 This can be seen in, for example, video footage of the constitutive session of the Croatian Sabor on 30 
May 1990, as well as other HDZ rallies from 1990. For example: 'Proslava dana HRVATSKE 
DRŽAVNOSTI Zagreb 30. svibnja 1990.', YouTube, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9gPDAvRsMXQ.
37 Interview Ivo Banac, Croatian historian, politician and human rights activist (Zagreb: 8/10/2009).
38 Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.88.
39 See: Mirić, p.35. Davor Butković & Dubravko Grakalić, Prilozi za politicku biografiju Dr. Franje 
Tuđmana (Zagreb: Azur Journal, 1991), pp.76-85. ICTY-Milošević: E-D334.16e (Document of the 
Croatian Assembly, 3/7/1990). S. Vranić, 'Suverenitet je nedjeljiv, ali...', Borba, 3/7/1990, p.5. 
Domljan, pp.117-8.
40 Gordana Grbić, 'Mitingom na amandman', Borba, 4-5/8/1990, p.4. Slaven Letica, 'Naputak za Izradu 
Ustava Republike Hrvatkse', 13-14/7/1990 (author's copy).
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until December. The primary reason for changing this constitutional definition was 
certainly ideological, but it is also worth noting that it was partly motivated by a belief 
that the 1974 constitution had inadvertently granted the Serbs in Croatia the right to 
self-determination, which had to be corrected.41
On 25 July the Croatian Sabor passed the amendments by majority vote, despite 
opposition from the SDS and other Serbs, and the former communist (and now 
opposition) SKH-SDP (Savez komunista Hrvatske – Stranka demokratske promjene, 
League of Communists of Croatia – Party of Democratic Change), which refused to 
even vote on the amendments affecting national equality.42 The course was thus set for 
collision with the SDS.
SDS Response: Mobilisation
The SDS reacted strongly to both the announced amendments and the anticipated 
downgrading of the Serbs' constitutional status, as well as potential moves towards the 
HDZ's declared aim of Croatian independence. At a meeting in Knin on 6 July attended 
by the SDS leadership and representatives of a number of Serb-majority municipalities, 
all amendments except the removal of the word 'Socialist' were rejected. The use of the 
new flag and coat-of-arms was particularly opposed, especially in areas where Serbs 
were the majority. The amendments, Rašković argued, again 'treat the Serbian nation as 
a disturbing factor', not accepting the Serbian nation's 'presence in the republic, their 
rights, their Serbian name'.43 The SDS not only exaggerated what the amendments 
entailed, but also confused the question of the definition of Croatia. In his invitation to 
the 6 July meeting, for example, Babić emphasised that the 'central issue about which 
they have to talk relates to the definition of sovereignty, that is to say the proposal 
which emphasises and insists on sovereignty of Croatian nation in Croatia', while in 
41 Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks: Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 1990.-1997 (Zagreb: Globus, 
2000), p.48. Interview Drago Dimitrovic, Secretary of the SKH, 1986-89 (Zagreb: 9/10/2009).
42 'Hrvatska nije više socijalistička', Borba, 27/7/1990, p.6
43 S. Stamatović, 'Amandmani vode u raskol', Borba, 7-8/7/1990, p.4. R. Stević, 'Razum mora 
prevladati', Borba, 23/7/1990, p.14.
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August Babić reportedly complained that 'with the amendments... the Serbian nation in 
Croatia lost its earlier status of a constitutive element of the Croatian state', a claim also 
made in the Serbian press.44 As noted, however, this article was as yet unchanged. In 
essence, the amendments were taken as the trigger for the conflict to begin, the fight for 
Serbdom against Croatcentrism, and for the mobilisation of the Serbian people behind 
that cause, regardless of the fact that the most relevant changes were not yet effected.
Rašković had previously spoken of resorting to extra-parliamentary means in the event 
of Croatcentricism prevailing in the Sabor, including a referendum of the Serbian 
people. With the passing of the amendments imminent, in mid-July Opačić suggested to 
Babić that the Serbs organise a mass rally to proclaim Serbian autonomy. Babić agreed, 
but to the less radical idea of just confirming Serbian sovereignty and adopting a 
Declaration on this.45 The date was set for 25 July, the day that the amendments were 
due to be passed.
Rašković was initially reluctant to convene the rally, feeling it was too early and not 
wanting to complicate his talks with Tuđman. Babić recalled him being 'very suspicious' 
of the need for that rally.46 Nevertheless, Rašković went along with it and was the main 
speaker. It was estimated that about 120,000 Serbs attended the gathering in Srb, Donji 
Lapac, where a Serbian National Council (SNV) was created, consisting of SDS leaders, 
some municipal officials and Sabor deputies. The Declaration on Sovereignty, discussed 
in the previous chapter, was also adopted. On 31 July the SNV met and, on Rašković's 
proposal, Babić was elected its president.47 Although the SNV was dominated by the 
SDS, particularly Babić's allies, a few non-SDS figures, such as Mile Dakić, president 
of a small pro-Yugoslav party, were co-opted into it, Dakić becoming one of two SNV 
44 S. Stamatović, 'Građanski ili etnički suverenitet?', Borba, 6/7/1990. 'Da razum prevlada', Borba, 
14/8/1990, p.1. Julijana Mojsilović, 'Was Yugoslavia on the brink of civil war?', Politika: The 
International Weekly, 25/8/1990, pp.1-2. 'Serbian Interior Minister Views Internal Security', Tanjug, 
22/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-205, 23/10/1990.
45 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, pp.6-7. Mladen Plese, 'The Passions of Conflict', Vjesnik, 13/7/1990, in 
FBIS-EEU-90-140, 20/7/1990. Milardović, p.157.
46 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.7. And: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-043, SDS official. 
Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.315.
47 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 18, p.48.
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Vice-Presidents. Its formally non-party nature enabled the SNV to posit itself as a 
representative organ of all Serbs in Croatia, furthering the leading position of the SDS 
among Serbs in Croatia (or, at least, the Serbs in Krajina).
It was then announced that the SNV would organise a referendum on 'Serbian 
autonomy', from 19 August to 2 September, for all Serbs living or born in Croatia. 
Despite his initial hesitation, Rašković embraced this mobilisation and the referendum 
proposal. The goal, as he explained, was to refute Croatian imputations that the SDS 
only represented a small part of the Serbian population, and demonstrate that its 
programme in fact had wide support. It would also test whether the Serbian population 
in fact supported Serbian autonomy.48
The referendum was irregular in that it simply asked people to vote 'Yes' or 'No' to 
'Serbian autonomy', with no elaboration. There was, therefore, significant confusion and 
suspicion on the Croatian side about the true intentions of the referendum. As Rašković 
and others explained, the referendum was on the ideas of the Declaration and Serbian 
autonomy in general, and subsequent to the referendum the SDS would then, vindicated 
by its popular mandate, draw up proposals as to precisely what forms of autonomy they 
were suggesting, or, as Rašković said elsewhere, implement them themselves.49 In short, 
the referendum was an exercise in mobilising the Serb population behind the SDS's 
programme, demonstrating that they did have popular support and thereby gaining a 
credible mandate for future actions, including the unilateral building of autonomy.
As noted by Croatian intellectual Žarko Puhovski, the referendum, though flawed and 
dubious in many respects, was not illegal. The right to such self-expression was 
guaranteed by both Yugoslav and Croatian constitutions, as the SNV and SDS began to 
point out.50 On 16 August the SNV also renamed the referendum a 'plebiscite', a term 
more clearly in harmony with the law, and noted that official voting papers were not 
48 'Destablizacije ustaštva', Borba, 30/7/1990, p.4. S. Stamatovic, 'Referendum o srpskoj autonomiji', 
Borba, 2/8/1990, p.8. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 18, pp.50-2, 55.
49 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.254-5, 275, 278-9. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 18, p.55.
50 'Pokvareni telefoni', Borba, 16/8/1990, p.5.
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being used, while Rašković and others emphasised that it was only about expressing a 
stand-point on autonomy, not taking a decision on proclaiming autonomy, as Croats 
feared.51
Nevertheless, Zagreb reacted strongly. In the Sabor on 25 July Tuđman claimed that the 
rally in Srb was not justified or provoked by any of their actions, but part of the 
'scenario' directed by Belgrade to destabilise Croatia.52 The referendum was seen as part 
of this scenario, an attempt to implement or justify Serbian separatism, and was 
immediately proclaimed illegal and banned.53 Tuđman said that they 'would not hesitate' 
to use police force if necessary, while Croatian Interior Minister Josip Boljkovac and 
other government officials spoke of arresting the referendum's organisers, threatening 
sentences of up to five years.54 The then Prime Minister Stjepan Mesić has confirmed 
that their intention was to physically prevent the referendum.55 Babić and the SNV, on 
the other hand, insisted that it would be held regardless, while Rašković warned that in 
the event of police repression they would have to call on the JNA for protection.56
Meanwhile, tensions were also increasing between the government and the Association, 
which had been proclaimed illegal. Tuđman argued that these municipalities were 
behaving like 'states within a state', threatening to cut off their funding.57 As soon as the 
Association had been formed there had, in fact, been ideas in Zagreb to 'cut off the 
faucets', and municipalities such as Glina complained of an 'economic blockade' that 
began as soon as they joined it.58 Attempts to remove the biscriptual signs in Knin were 
also ongoing, the third attempt coming on 16 August.59 Thus, tension was rising and 
51 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.254.
52 'Tuđman on 'Kosovoisation', Tanjug, 25/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-144, 26/7/1990.
53 S. Stamatović, 'Glasanje će ipak biti', Borba, 6/8/1990, p.14.
54 Snežana Stamatović, 'Strahovanja i nelagode', Borba, 14/8/1990, p.3. 'Fantomsko izjasnjvanje', Borba, 
16/8/1990, p.5. V. Đorđevic, 'Ne formiramo nikakve garde', Borba, 15/8/1990, p.3. 
55 BBC-DOY: Stipe Mesić, pp.2-5.
56 Dušan Pilić, 'La Croazia teme la guerra civile si riaccende il conflitto con i Serbi', La Repubblica, 
15/8/1990. Snežana Stamatović, 'Strahovanja i nelagode', Borba, 14/8/1990, p.3.
57 'Tuđman: Croat Serbs 'Well-Organized Conspiracy'', Tanjug, 14/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-158, 
15/8/1990. Gordana Gojak, 'Razrađen scenarij za rušenje vlasti', Borba, 15/8/1990, p.1.
58 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.322. 'Croat Government Meets With Serb Municipalities', Tanjug, 
10/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-156, 13/8/1990.
59 Snežana Stamatović, 'Strahovanja i nelagode', Borba, 14/8/1990, p.3. 'Čirilica ostaje na cestama', 
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both sides were heading towards confrontation. And, as we shall see, this was also in the 
context of the beginning of the militarisation of the crisis.
HDZ-SDS Talks
In this period of controversy over the amendments and the referendum, contacts still 
took place between the HDZ and SDS, despite the beginnings of opposition from Serb 
hardliners. Little resulted from such contact, however.
At the Sabor session on 29 June, SDS deputies attended and made some suggestions. 
Opačić, for example, advocated a dual-chamber Sabor, maintaining Cyrillic as an equal 
official script and including Serb symbols in the Croatian flag – proposals which were, 
unsurprisingly, rejected.60 In June all municipal leaders, including Knin's, had attended 
introductory meetings with Prime Minister Mesić in Zagreb, and on 16 July a similar 
meeting was held with Sabor president Žarko Domljan. These were not occasions for 
negotiations, however, and Domljan merely stated that the illegal campaign for 
autonomy would not be tolerated, while Babić polemicised about the amendments and 
Serb rights.61 Various republican officials also had contacts and meetings with municipal 
officials on economic projects,62 while Rašković continued his contact with the Croatian 
leadership. Tuđman advisor Letica gave him the first draft constitutional proposals 
before their announcement, and on 23 July Rašković again met with Tuđman, and 
Letica, for a fairly short, 25-minute meeting. He attempted to persuade Tuđman not to 
ban the Association and to recognise Serbian sovereignty. Although the meeting passed 
amicably and the two agreed to draw up proposals on Serbian cultural autonomy in 
Croatia, there was no suggestion of any shift in their positions.63
Borba, 15/8/1990, p.12. Zvonko Tarle, 'Niko više ne spava', Borba, 18-19/8/1990, p.11.
60 Marinko Čulić, 'Olako uspunjene brzina', Danas,pp.16-17. 
61 G. Gojak, 'Tolerancija umjesto sektastva', Borba, 17/7/1990, p.5. Domljan, pp.118-9. Interview Veljko 
Popović, President of Knin Executive Council, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 8/11/2007). BBC-DOY: Milan 
Babić, pp.3-4.
62 BBC-DOY: Slavko Degoricija. Interview Dušan Vjestica, President of Gračac Executive Council, 
1990-92 (Belgrade: 9/11/2007). Jelena Lovrić, 'We'll Go To Knin, Too...', Danas, 9/4/1991, pp.18-19, 
in FBIS-EER-91-075, 4/6/1991. 
63 See: Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.305-323.
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These talks, and Rašković's interest in negotiating with Tuđman, soon received a blow, 
moreover, when Zagreb leaked a transcript of the talks to the Croatian weekly Danas, 
which published it in full on 31 July. Rašković had distanced himself from his 'hawks', 
emphasised his disagreements with Milošević, and made some statements such as that 
his grandchildren were Croats and, famously, the Serbs were a 'crazy people'. Within 
context, these were understandable in his efforts to win over Tuđman, but it caused a 
crisis within the SDS. Many were angry with him, complaining that he did not consult 
others on the stance he would take in talks,64 and at the party's next main board meeting 
on 7 August Opačić and Zelenbaba sought Rašković's resignation, on the grounds that 
the transcript revealed him to be 'neither Serbian nor democratic'.65 However, Rašković 
was still respected as the popular leader of the party, and Opačić and Zelenbaba lacked 
support within the party to depose him at this time of conflict with the Croatian 
leadership.66
Rašković himself justified most of his statements in the transcripts but also claimed that 
they had been doctored by Zagreb, in an attempt to undermine him. Letica confirms that 
the purpose of the leak was to destroy Rašković's credibility, on the grounds that he had 
been misinforming the public about the content of their talks.67 This is often seen as a 
key moment in Rašković's downfall. In fact, Rašković's reputation among his public 
support base in Croatia apparently remained intact.68 Certain hardliners in the party 
'never forgave him',69 but he still had the support of most, with a great many, including 
some hardliners, believing his version of events.70 Rašković's faith in talks with 
Tuđman, and his willingness to personally engage in such dialogue, was, however, 
damaged.
64 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.7. Interviews: Marko Dobrijević, Organisational Secretary of the SDS, 
1990-91 (Belgrade: 5/8/2007); Petar Štikovac, President of SDS Executive Board, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 
5/8/2007).
65 Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007).
66 Interviews: Marko Dobrijević, Petar Štikovac (Belgrade: 5/8/2007).
67 Interview Slaven Letica (Zagreb: 10/2009). Also: Caplan, p.118. Caspersen, op. cit., p.65.
68 Dejan Jović, 'I Tuđman i Rašković rastu', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.30-33.
69 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Branko Popović, T8090.
70 For example: Interview Branko Marjanović. Vice-President of SDS, 1990-1 (Belgrade: 6/11/2007). 
ICTY-Milošević: Witness Branko Popović, T8090-91.
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Additional talks took place on 9 August. Sabor President Domljan and Justice Minister 
Milan Ramljak invited officials of the Serb-majority municipalities to discuss the 
announced referendum. Both sides simply expressed their viewpoints, however, the 
Croats telling the Serbs that they were equal in Croatia but could not hold the 
referendum. Moreover, from North Dalmatia and Lika representatives of only two 
municipalities, SKH-SDP-run Korenica and the SDS's Lapac, attended, Babić evidently 
having rejected participation. (Though the SDS president of Obrovac came to meet 
Domljan the following day.)71
In this period, there were thus many HDZ-SDS contacts, and channels for 
communication largely remained open, despite the beginnings of opposition from Serb 
hardliners. However, little resulted from such contacts due to the huge discrepancy 
between HDZ and SDS agendas. The very nature of the SDS and HDZ programmes, 
including that advocated by Rašković, had rapidly created sharp political conflict. Part 
of this was certainly a consequence of the 'societal security dilemma' described by 
Roe.72 Though the SDS had an agenda of Serb self-determination, the Association was 
also formed to resist possible Croatcentricism and many Serbs undoubtedly supported it 
for that reason. For the HDZ, however, any hint of autonomous Serb action was seen, 
understandably, as part of a slippery slope towards secession. They therefore decided to 
react firmly, but in doing so turned Serbs further against the authorities and helped 
undermine Zagreb's promises of Serb rights.
At the same time, both the HDZ and SDS had an interest in political conflict in order to 
further ethnicise politics, split the SKH-SDP, and homogenise 'their' nations behind 
them. In this respect, the rhetoric of both Rašković and Tuđman was contributing to the 
creation of a situation which neither, in fact, desired: a Croat-Serb conflict in Croatia.
71 Gordana Gojak, 'Nedvidljivi autonomaši', Borba, 11-12/8/1990, p.11. 'Croat Government Meets With 
Serb Municipalities', Tanjug, 10/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-156, 13/8/1990. Domljan, p.130.
72 Roe, op. cit.
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Some of the SDS's more radical responses, such as the mobilisation behind the SNV, 
were initiated by hardliners against Rašković's wishes – again suggesting Rašković's 
genuine desire to avoid conflict through talks. He subsequently embraced the idea of a 
referendum, however, and his differences with the hardliners were primarily tactical – 
he, too, was strongly opposed to the constitutional amendments and advocated 
unilaterally building Serbian autonomy.
Finally, we can note that the Croatian side was clearly open to talks, despite the 
criticism this drew from some on the HDZ right, whereas in the SDS the opposition of 
hardliners was beginning to become visible. However, although prepared to talk to the 
Serbs, the HDZ showed little visible interest in compromise, and was, in fact, driving 
through its programme without regard to the wishes of the SDS (or other opponents).
Chapter 3: The Two Nationalisms Collide
105
3.3. Background to the 'Balvan Revolution'
On 17 August 1990 Croatia was brought to the brink of armed conflict. Serbs in the 
Knin Krajina region rose in rebellion, seizing arms and throwing up improvised 
barricades, including logs on roads, to prevent access by Croatian forces. Thereafter, 
rhetoric escalated dramatically, both sides began to arm themselves and the Knin 
Krajina increasingly separated from Croatian control, forming SAO Krajina at the end 
of the year. This so-called 'Balvan (Log) Revolution', named after the aforementioned 
logs, was a pivotal moment, and was later celebrated in the RSK as the beginning of the 
war.
The Croatian Security Dilemma
When it came to power in May 1990, the new Croatian leadership faced a very real 
security dilemma. There was a realistic prospect of Croatian Serb unrest or separatist 
politics, armed conflict with Serbia, or a coup or other intervention by the JNA. In 
addition, immediately before the HDZ assumed power the JNA had disarmed the 
Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna odbrana, TO) of Croatia, placing its arms 
(approximately 200,000) under JNA control.73 The JNA did this throughout Yugoslavia 
in order to prevent the possibility of inter-national war, particularly with the election of 
secessionists in Croatia and Slovenia, and – contrary to some claims – Serb areas in 
Croatia and Bosnia were not exempted.74 It was an understandable move – hundreds of 
thousands of arms would otherwise have been easily accessible not just to anti-Yugoslav 
governments, but everyone. But the HDZ now reasonably saw a threat to its goals and 
to Croatia. The Croatian leadership was left with a police force of just 15,000 men, 
capable of quenching some Serbian unrest, but not of fighting the JNA. Moreover, 
almost half of this force consisted of Serbs and Yugoslavs, whose loyalties to the new 
73 Mario Nobilo & Slaven Letica, Rat Protiv Hrvatske (Zagreb: Globus, 1991), p.72.
74 See, for example: ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P526.C.1 (Report of SR-BH TO, 13/9/1990). ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1675 (Report of SR-BH TO, 18/2/1992). Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.152.
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authorities were understandably suspect, as well as many pro-Yugoslav Croats.75 The 
HDZ therefore saw as necessary the creation and arming of a loyal force that could, if 
necessary, resist the JNA or the Serbs in a fight for Croatian independence (which 
would also fulfil the HDZ's political goal of building an army for an independent 
Croatia).76
Although there is convincing evidence that the HDZ right desired a conflict in order to 
expel the Serbs from Croatia,77 it seems that the dominant factions in the party and state 
leadership sought to avoid a war. Tuđman was convinced that Titoist elements in the 
army were still dominant and its alliance with Serbia not yet complete, and thus full-
scale conflict with the JNA and the Serbs could and should be avoided, with Croatian 
independence being won gradually via negotiations and international support.78 Croatian 
75 This over-representation was greatest in the lower ranks, i.e. ordinary militiamen, and considerably 
less in the leading positions. It had been even higher before the 1980s, when there were deliberate 
measures to increase the proportion of Croats in the MUP. Interview Simo Rajić, SRH Assistant 
Minister of Internal Affairs, 1982-86 (Zagreb: 30/9/2009). Zdenko Radelić et al., Stvaranje hrvatske 
države i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), p.82. Ratko Bubalo, 'Zločudna igra 
brojkama', Arkzin, No. 19/20 (5/8/1994). David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p.392. Zdenko Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945.-  
1991., od zajedništva do razlaza (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), pp.573-4. Chapter 'Kratak pregled 
vojnih dejstava' in Ilija T. Radaković, Besmislena Yu-ratovanja 1991-1995 (Belgrade: Društvo za 
istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945, 2003), online version, 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.znaci.net/00001/23.htm  . 
76 See: BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman. Davor Runtić, 'Prije Dvadest Godina – Odabir mladih Hrvata za 
tečaj prvog hrvatskog redarstvenika', Hrvatski Focus (11/2/2011), accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.hrvatski-fokus.hr/index.php/feljtoni/1897-prije-dvadeset-godina-odabir-mladih-hrvata-za-
teaj-prvoga-hrvatskog-redarstvenika. Davor Runtić, 'Prije Dvadest Godina – Predsjednik Franjo 
Tuđman vodio je Hrvatsku na najracionalnji i jedini moguć način', Hrvatski Focus (4//2/2011), 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.hrvatski-fokus.hr/index.php/feljtoni/1833-prije-dvadeset-godina-
predsjednik-franjo-tuman-vodio-je-hrvatsku-na-najracionalniji-i-jedini-mogu-nain-.
77 See, for example: Mirić, pp.18, 63-4. Bilandžić, pp.351, 380-2. Martin Špegelj, Sjecćnja vojnika 
(Zagreb: Znanje, 2001). Boljkovac. R. Stević, 'Naozi na seobu Srba', Borba, 10/9/1990, p.3.
78 See, for example: BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman. Nobilo, pp.49, 54, 66-7, 84, 109, 135, 156, 162. 
Zdravko Tomac, Iza zatvorenih vrata - tako se stvarala Hrvatska država (Zagreb: Organizator, 1992), 
pp.39, 91. Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika. Domljan, pp.107, 301, 323-4, 329-30. Hrvoje Šarinić, Svi moji 
tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševicem (Zagreb: Globus International, 2003), p.24. Mirko 
Valentić, Rat protiv Hrvatske, 1991-1995.: Velikosrpski projekti od ideja do realizacije (Zagreb: 
Hrvatski Memorijalno-Dokumentacijski Centar Domovinskog Rata, 2010), p.154. ICTY-Prlic(et al): 
E-4D1330 (Interview with Franjo Tuđman, Hrvatski Vojnik, 24/4/1992). ICTY-Milošević: Witness 
Imra Agotić, T23262. Vlado Vurusic, 'General Kadijević je s maršalom Jazovim dogovarao puč u 
SSSR-u i Jugoslaviji [Interview with Anton Tus]', Jutarnji List, 4/11/2007. 'Dušan Bilandžić: Tuđman 
mi je rekao - 'Kad podijelimo Bosnu, ja i Sloba bit ćemo saveznici'', Nacional, 5/6/2012. Mladen 
Pleše, 'Tuđman je bio spreman izbjeći u Austriju, tamo oformiti vladu i povesti gerilski rat u 
Hrvatskoj! [Interview with Darko Bekić]', Slobodna Dalmacija, 21/10/2006.
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Interior Minister Boljkovac, who was heavily involved in Croatian militarisation, 
meanwhile, was the foremost advocate in the Croatian leadership of Serbian rights and 
of negotiations, later helping save Serb civilians from liquidation during the war.79 But 
he, Tuđman and others felt the necessity of preparing for defence and war, should their 
opponents not allow them to secure their goals peacefully.
Thus, the Croatian motivation to build a new armed force was primarily defensive. But 
this was not how it seemed to Serbs, and it in fact contributed greatly to creating the 
very conflict that Tuđman and Boljkovac hoped to avoid.
An Army Within the Police
As soon as the HDZ assumed power it took on the task of transforming the ethnic 
balance in the police and forming new, military-type units loyal to the government.80 
This was done primarily through new recruitment. The first batch - of about 1,700 men - 
was recruited in July, and began training in Zagreb on 5 August.81
This recruitment was initially secret until leaked by JNA security to the Belgrade press 
at the end of July.82 The Croatian authorities then insisted this was merely regular 
recruitment of police, and of a new ceremonial guard that would be a tourist attraction. 
In fact, reliable sources now acknowledge that most of the Serbian press allegations 
about this recruitment were at least partially true, and, as Boljkovac later said, 'in fact 
we [were making] in the framework of the police, an army'.83
79 Interview Josip Boljkovac (Zagreb: 10/10/2009). Boljkovac, pp.276-7. Zlatko Crnec, 'Serbs Should 
Be Given Back Status of Constituent Nation', Novi List, 2/5/2005, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.ex-yupress.com/novi/novilist37.html.
80 Sanja Modrić, 'I Weep For My Hawks', Slobodna Dalmacija, 4/8/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-164, 
24/8/1992.
81 Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.78. Davor Runtić, 'Prije Dvadest Godina – Predsjednik Franjo Tuđman vodio 
je Hrvatsku...'.
82 Aleksandar Vasiljević, “Štit” - Akcija vojne bezbednosti (Belgrade: IGAM, 2012), p.22.
83 Davor Runtić, 'Prije Dvadest Godina – Predsjednik Franjo Tuđman vodio je Hrvatsku...'.
Chapter 3: The Two Nationalisms Collide
108
This and subsequent recruitment was not actually conducted by police SUPs, but by 
local HDZ boards themselves, which organised the sending of their members – young 
Croatian nationalists and radicals - on the training course.84 A disproportionate number 
of these recruits came from predominantly Serbian regions. For example, 50 of the first 
batch came from the Croat village of Kijevo in Knin municipality, a village of just 1,261 
people – less than 0.03% of Croatia's population providing 2.5% of its first recruits.85 
Extremists from Hercegovina and abroad, and even some criminals recently amnestied 
from jail, were also included, while recent research by Cody McClain Brown indicates 
that the early volunteers on the Croatian side tended to come from pro-Ustaša and 
NDH-connected familial backgrounds, who were previously excluded from such 
sensitive positions.86 They were, of course, overwhelmingly Croats, and there were 
rumours in Knin that candidates had been rejected for not having 'pure Croat blood'.87 
There were also soon allegations of them singing Ustaša-style songs.88 These recruits 
were given brief military-type training, lasting just one or two months,89 and then 
formed into new special units or sent back to their home areas. This was partly 
orientated towards changing the ethnic structure of police stations, which took place 
84 Davor Runtić, 'Prije Dvadest Godina – Odabir mladih Hrvata za tečaj...'. ICTY-Milošević: Witness 
Aleksandar Vasiljević. BBC-DOY: Aleksandar Vasiljević, pp.21-2. See also: Cody McClain Brown, 
'Who Fights First: Grievances, Community and Collective Action', Croatian Political Science Review, 
Vol. 50, No. 5 (2013), pp.7-28. Marija Kreš (ed), Policija u Domovinskom Ratu 1990.-1991., 
Ministarstvo Unutarnjih Poslova RH (Zagreb), accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.mup.hr/UserDocsImages/Glasilo%20MUP/2010/prilog_42.pdf, pp.6-7. Jasna Babić, 
'Everyone His Own Sheriff', Danas, 23/10/1990, pp.28-29, in FBIS-EER-90-157, 26/11/1990. Silber 
& Litle, pp.107-8.
85 Davor Runtić, 'Prije Dvadest Godina – Odabir mladih Hrvata...'. Snežana Stamatović, 'Strahovanja i 
nelagode', Borba, 14/8/1990, p.3. ICTY-Milošević: E-359.1 (Human Rights Watch Report, 1/1991).
86 Davor Runtić's Prvi Hrvatski Redarstvenik cited in ICTY-Martić: T2596-7. Vasiljević, p.22. Stipe 
Šuvar, 'Osuđeni smo jer mene mrze', Nacional, 30/7/2002, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.nacional.hr. BBC-DOY: Aleksandar Vasiljević, pp.21-2. Marija Kreš, (ed), Policija u  
Domovinskom Ratu, p.10. Mile Babić, Federal Secretariat for National Defence, Security 
Administration, 27/8/1990 (author's copy). Milan Danjanović, Federal Secretariat for National 
Defence, Cabinet, 27/9/1990. (author's copy). McClain Brown.
87 R.D., 'Garda “čistih” hrvata”, Borba, 3/8/1990, p.5. Vladimir Krasić, 'Nacionalna garda kao pretnja', 
Borba, 16/8/1990, p.4. Momir Ilić, 'Plebiscit Srba u Hrvatskoj: plodovi nove vlasti', Intervju, 
31/8/1990, pp.4-7. BBC-DOY: Aleksandar Vasiljević, pp.21-2.
88 ICTY-Milošević: E-D334.18e (Croatian Assembly document, 13/11/1990). BBC-DOY: Andrija 
Rašeta, p.3.
89 'The Truth About the Special Police', Danas, 9/10/1990, pp.24-27, in FBIS-EER-90-160, 4/12/1990. 
ICTY-Milošević: Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević, T16123.
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throughout the second half of 1990,90 and was particularly envisaged for the Krajina 
region - for example, most of the Kijevans were intended to join the Knin SJS, which 
would have made the station about a third Croat.91
While new Croat recruits were being organised and armed, however, Boljkovac and the 
Croatian MUP began talking about disarming the Serbs. On 15 August Boljkovac 
claimed that the old regime had favoured Serbs when granting licenses for private 
firearms, and that this would end: everyone would have to apply for licenses again, or 
have their arms removed.92 Boljkovac was also preparing to partially disarm militia 
stations within Serb-majority municipalities. Given the tradition of arms-bearing in the 
Krajina region, this was another red flag to the Serbian bull.93
Preparations for the Serb Rebellion
These activities on the Croatian side caused a reaction among Serbs in Krajina. As was 
constantly noted, the Ustaše began their campaign in 1941 by requesting that Serbs 
hand in their arms – before killing them.94 The fact that the HDZ was recruiting its own, 
radical members into new units, in large part from Serbian regions, was predictably seen 
as threatening.
Serbs responded with the mounting of guard duty in their villages. Already in the first 
half of 1990, there had been occasional reports of Serbs in Knin and elsewhere holding 
armed or unarmed guard duty, 'sleeping... with guns in [their] hands' and organising for 
90 For example: Marija Žužul & Snimio Ivica Lajtner, 'Bili smo prvi kad je trebalo', accessed 1/8/2014 
from: http://www.uumup-vbdr.hr/files/Mir_ugled_povjerenje.pdf, p.87. Petar Bašić & Ivica Miškulin, 
'Grubišnopoljska Kronika 1990.-1991. (I. dio)', Scrinia Slavonica, Vol.7, No.1 (September 2007), 
pp.364-6. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Djuro Matovina, T11007-8. ICTY-Martić: Witness Veljko 
Džakula.
91 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T14002. 'Knin Commune Head Says Croat Police Not 
Welcome', Belgrade Domestic Service, 1/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-171, 4/9/1990.
92 Gordana Gojak, 'Atmosfera sve napetija', Borba, 16/8/1990, p.3. 
93 Described in: Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, pp.6-7.
94 Julijana Mojsilović, 'Was Yugoslavia on the brink of civil war?', Politika: The International Weekly, 
25/8/1990, pp.1-2. Heni Erceg, Ispodvijesti o ratu u Hrvatskoj (Split: Feral Tribune, 1995), p.22.
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'self-defence'.95 In the summer of 1990, SDS leaders often spoke of of their movement 
as an 'uprising of the Serbian people'. Rašković would add that this was an 'unarmed 
uprising', and that he did not want it to pass the minimal distance required to become an 
armed uprising.96 Others were more radical: Zelenbaba reportedly had a dilemma 
whether to go to the Sabor at all or take to the forests in rebellion, and in early August 
claimed that the SDS was already arming and forming a Dinaric Corps (a Chetnik 
division) to topple the Croatian government, urging Serbs to purchase arms.97
I have not found any evidence of organised arming by Krajina Serbs prior to 17 August. 
Babić did tell the BBC that they had already begun '[organising] activities for gathering 
weapons for the eventual defence from the Croats', however, suggesting that, for 
example, they were at least forming lists of those who had arms. Babić also claimed that 
after the Mlinar incident he had already appointed people to organise unarmed village 
guards in Krajina.98 In the week before 17 August, with the tension over the referendum 
escalating, in many Serb villages in Knin and the surrounding region local SDS boards 
formed village guards to defend against possible attack.99 By 16 August, there were 
reportedly guards throughout the Knin Krajina, unarmed on orders from above, but 
ready to seize their arms and spring into action when necessary.100
95 NIOD, Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ area (Netherlands, Hague: NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, 2002) Volume I: Prologue, The history preceding the conflict: Yugoslavia up till 
1991, p.76, accessed 1/11/2011 from: 
http://www.srebrenica.nl/Pages/OOR/23/379.bGFuZz1OTA.html. Chapter 'O Kninskoj Krajini i 
Tromeđi (1989-1991)' in Ilija T. Radaković, Besmislena Yu-ratovanja 1991-1995 (Belgrade: Društvo 
za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945, 2003), online version, 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.znaci.net/00001/23.htm. Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.211-2. 
Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.101, 152. Dušan Glavaš, pp.20-2. 'Intervention Only After Violence', Borba, 
21/3/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-060, 28/3/1990. Ivo Perić, Hrvatska u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji: kronika  
važnijih zbivanja (Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 2006), p.276.
96 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.306. Zoran Daskalović and Milan Čuruvija, ‘They Have Proclaimed 
Autonomy’, Vjesnik, 26/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-149, 2/8/1990. 
97 Marinko Čulić, 'Olako uspunjene brzina', Danas, 3/7/1990, pp.16-17. Hugh Poulton, The Balkans:  
Minorities and States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1993), p.26. Milardović, 
p.160. ICTY-Tadic: Witness P, T1631. Sanja Modric, 'Dva ljuta začina', Borba, 17/7/1990, p.2.
98 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić p.12. Also: Dušan Glavaš, pp.19-20.
99 Snežana Stamatović, 'Strahovanja i nelagode', Borba, 14/8/1990, p.3. 'Da razum prevlada', Borba, 
14/8/1990, p.1. Dragan Barjaktarević, 'Ko potpaljuje vatre u Hrvatskoj: Odgovor Srba in Srbu', 
Intervju, 3/8/1990, p.10-12.
100 Večeslav Kocijan, 'Krstarenje kroz “srpske štraže”', Vjesnik, 16/8/1990, p.2. Gordana Gojak, 
'Atmosfera sve napetija', Borba, 16/8/1990, p.3. 'Napedti muk iščekivanja', Borba, 17/8/1990, p.1. 
ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.1.10 (Babić Interview), p.24. Also: HMDC-DR: Knjiga 1, Document 19 (Note of 
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Elements within the Knin police were also preparing for 'resistance' to potential 
Croatian efforts to disarm them. Tensions had first appeared over various changes the 
MUP had begun to implement, including intentions to fortify the Knin SJS with new 
Croatian recruits and rumours about uniforms bearing the new Croatian emblems, as 
well as the announced renaming of the milicija (militia) to redarstvo 
(orderlies/constabulary), an old Croatian term famously used by the NDH.101 Since July 
some of the Knin police were falling under the unofficial leadership of inspector Milan 
Martić, who had initiated a petition against the rumoured changes in the MUP, and was 
co-operating with Babić – 'preparing together for defence'.102 On Martić's orders, the 
Serb police were illegally taking their long-arms home with them at night, and were 
constantly watching the reserve arms cache.103 As Babić told the BBC, 'We could in no 
case allow that the Croatian special forces took the weapons from the militia in Serb 
towns. Those stores were to be kept and safeguarded until we might need those 
weapons'.104 Martić's associate and later Krajina DB chief Dušan Orlović also recalls 
that prior to 17 August, in cooperation with the Knin TO, 'reserve soldiers were 
transferred and located in war units of police'.105 Thus, the reserve police unit was 
expanded with more 'appropriate' people. As Martić later recalled, 'The period till 17 
August was a preparatory time for both sides... That was a period of tensions. We were 
trying to keep our arms and Croatia was trying to take [them] from us by all means.'106
SJS Benkovac, 19/9/1990), pp.53-5. Mesić, on the other hand, claimed that these guards were armed 
and stopping traffic: 'Mesić Addresses Gathering', Tanjug, 24/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-165, 
24/8/2990.
101 This change was never actually implemented, the neutral term policija (police) instead being chosen 
that November, though redarstvo entered common parlance. 'We Do Not Want Uniforms Like the 
Ustasha Ones', Politika, 5/7/1990, p.5, in FBIS-EER-90-108, 20/7/1990. Marinko Čulić, 'Redarstvo, 
izađi', Danas, 10/7/1990, p.15. 'Knin bez općinskog SUP', Borba, 1/8/1990, p.4. S.S., 'Najava 
samostalne milicije', Borba, 3/8/1990, p.9. V. Đorđevic, 'Ne formiramo nikakve garde', Borba, 
15/8/1990, p.3. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T14002. 'Sve manje optimizma', Borba, 
11/10/1990, p.1. 'Knin Commune Head Says Croat Police Not Welcome', Belgrade Domestic Service, 
1/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-171, 4/9/1990. Krunoslav Mikulan, Povijest Policije u Hrvatskoj: Od 
začetaka do 1941 (Zagreb: Tonimir, 2003), pp.9-10. Miroslav Krmpotić, Kronologija rata: agresija  
na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu, 1989-1998 (Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centar, 1998), p.25.
102 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.12.
103 BBC-DOY: Milan Martić, p.4. Interview Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina DB, 1991-92 (Belgrade: 
7/2009).
104 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.12.
105 Interview Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina DB, 1991-92 (Belgrade: 7/2009).
106 BBC-DOY: Milan Martić, p.4.
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Fearing Croatian police intervention, on 13 August Babić led an SNV delegation to 
Belgrade for talks with SFRJ (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Socialistička  
Federativna Republika Jugoslavija) President Borisav Jović and federal Interior 
Minister Petar Gračanin, both Milošević allies. Gračanin later claimed to the BBC that 
he had advised the SNV delegation to do everything to avoid confrontation, 'and when it 
is no longer possible then you will have to defend yourself', with patrols and barricades 
- 'I advised them to put up these barricades'.107 However, Babić told the BBC that he had 
been particularly disappointed with Gračanin, as he promised only to appeal to 
Boljkovac, and in the delegation's report at the time they noted only Jović's stand that 
the crisis should be solved peacefully. In The Hague Babić, trying to attribute the 
conflict to Milošević (as discussed later), made use of Gračanin's remarks, but conceded 
that he could not remember any such advice.108 As Gračanin's version remains 
unsupported, it is, I think, unlikely that any comments he made played a significant role 
in the decision to rebel on 17 August.
Thus, before 17 August, the Croatian side was in the process of forming new Croatian 
armed units from HDZ activists, and was intending to prevent the referendum and 
partially disarm the Serbian police in Krajina. The Knin Serbs, meanwhile, were 
adamant that they would hold their referendum, and were preparing for resistance and 
rebellion. As Babić told the BBC, 'We were preparing ourselves to carry out the 
referendum in all possible conditions, even if there would be armed conflicts.'109 The 
stage was thus set for the eruption of the 'Balvan Revolution'.
107 BBC-DOY: Petar Gračanin, p.36.
108 ICTY-Milošević: E-P352.1a (Minutes of SNV, 16/8/1990); Witness Milan Babić, T12917.
109 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.15.
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3.4. 17 August 1990: The 'Balvan Revolution'
The direct trigger for unrest on 16-17 August was a decision of the Croatian MUP to 
remove the arms of the reserve police from police stations in SDS-controlled 
municipalities in North Dalmatia and Lika. Boljkovac relayed this decision to regional 
police chiefs at a meeting in Zagreb on 16 August, characterising the municipalities 
concerned as an area of 'possible rebellion' (it was also said that the arms were needed 
for the new recruits).110 The MUP knew that any removal of arms would cause alarm 
among local Serbs and trigger mass gatherings, as had occurred on 5 July, when 
thousands of Serbs in Knin had rallied to 'defend' the local police during a visit of the 
MUP leadership. It would therefore have to be conducted secretly, and at night. Not 
only were municipal organs not informed, but only a select few policemen in each 
station.111 Although arguably justified by the circumstances, this naturally made the 
whole action highly suspicious for Serbs, and liberal Croats.112
Around midnight on 16/17 August, militiamen from SUP Zadar came to Benkovac and 
removed the reserve arms (70 automatic rifles) from the station to Zadar, reportedly 
surprising the three men on duty.113 Locals heard about what was happening and alarm 
was spread throughout the municipality, with many Serbs angrily gathering in front of 
the police station. In Donji Lapac and Gračac, too, the weapons were taken during the 
night, prompting angry gatherings.114 At some point on the 17th, local Serbs stormed into 
the Gračac police station, though to no effect as the arms were already gone.115 In 
110 Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.78. Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo smjeli, sredili bi barikade čim su 
krenule!', ŠibenikIn, 17/8/2013, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.Šibenik.in/Šibenik/nikola-
vukosic-da-smo-smjeli-sredili-bi-barikade-cim-su-krenule/12977.html. ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-
096. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević, T16131.
111 ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-096. Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo smjeli...'.
112 For example: Ivo Goldstein, 'What People Are Keeping Quiet About', Danas, 28/8/1990, p.25, in 
FBIS-EER-90-134, 27/9/1990.
113 Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.78. Zvonko Tarle, 'Niko više ne spava', Borba, 18-19/8/1990, p.11. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Aco Drača. Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo smjeli...'.
114 Davor Marijan, ‘Djelvoanje JNA i Pobunjenih Srba u Lici 1990. - 1992. Godine’. Review of Senj, No. 
33 (December 2006), p.219. ICTY-Martić: Witness Ratko Ličina.
115 'Ministry Report on Disturbances', Tanjug, 17/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-161, 20/8/1990. Interview 
Ratko Ličina (Belgrade: 2007).
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Obrovac, meanwhile, there had also been gatherings in the early hours, preventing the 
removal of the weapons by the unit that had arrived to do this.116 Later that day, 
following a decision of the municipal leadership, those arms were distributed by the 
Serbs.117 Finally, in Knin several attempts by its police chief to remove its arms to 
Šibenik had to be cancelled, as locals had gathered outside the station having heard 
about events elsewhere.118 At about 3pm Serbs then took and distributed those arms 
themselves.
The second part of the operation that day was the sending of Croatian special forces in 
armoured personnel carriers (APCs) towards the Knin Krajina. Numerous sources 
confirm that forces set off from Zagreb towards Korenica, via Karlovac.119 According to 
Silber and Little, however, there was actually a three-pronged advance (from Zadar, 
Šibenik and Karlovac), utilising seven of the MUP's ten APCs.120 Knin rebel organiser 
Dušan Orlović makes a similar claim, while then Prime Minister Mesić refers to using 
'police from Šibenik and Split'.121 This advance was, however, suspended by midday, as 
Serb crowds gathered in Korenica (and perhaps elsewhere), blocking the APCs.122
The third component to the Croatian operation was the sending of three helicopters of 
about thirty new recruits to Knin, which seems to have happened around lunchtime, 
after the movement of APCs was suspended.123 On the grounds that they had given false 
116 Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.78. Milan Četnik, 'State Terrorism in Croatia', Politika, 18/8/1990, pp.1, 5-6, 
in FBIS-EEU-90-163, 22/8/1990.
117 Ivica Marijačić, 'Prepodavali oružje', Vjesnik, 11/9/1990, p.12. Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.160. ICJ: 
Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Memorial of the Republic of Croatia: Annexes – Regional Files – Balkan 
Battlegrounds Vol.2, Part III: Kordun and Lika and Dalmatia', 1/3/2001, Annex 580 (Report of SJS 
Obrovac, 18/8/1990), p.425.
118 ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-096, Knin police chief, 1990. Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo 
smjeli...'.
119 Barić, Srpska pobuna, pp.78-9. BBC-DOY: Stipe Mesić, p.4; Milan Babić, pp.12, 14. Rašković, Duša 
i sloboda, p.152. ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Ratko Ličina, MM-096.
120 Silber and Little, pp.100-1. Eight of these were recent acquisitions from Slovenia. Davor Runtić, 'Prije 
Dvadest Godina – Predsjednik Franjo Tuđman vodio je Hrvatsku...'.
121 Interview Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina DB, 1991-92 (Belgrade: 7/2009). BBC-DOY: Stipe Mesić, 
pp.2-4; Franjo Tuđman, pp.1-2. Marinko Čulić, 'Slijeganje tla', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.20-21.
122 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.152. ICTY-Martić: Witness Ratko Ličina. BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, 
pp.12, 14.
123 BBC-DOY: Perica Jurić, pp.5-6. BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman, pp.1-2.
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flight co-ordinates, the JNA ordered these helicopters to divert and land, warning that 
they would otherwise be forced to do so or shot down, and the Croats complied. This 
element of the day's events was revealed in the evening.
Serbian Actions
Reports of disarming the police in Benkovac and the attempt in Obrovac aroused the 
Krajina public, with crowds gathering outside police stations and municipal buildings, 
to prevent arms being taken or condemn those that allowed the removals. These crowds 
were reportedly large, several thousand in each town,124 and throughout the day angrily 
shouted for the return of arms, denounced treason, chanted 'We will kill Tuđman', and 
commented that this was like 1941.125 It was rumoured that the Croatian specials had 
conducted this disarmament in Benkovac and the attempt in Obrovac, though it actually 
seems to have been done by regular police from the region.126
Blockading of roads, initially by crowds of people, seems to have begun early on, but 
only became more significant in the evening. For example, reportedly in the early 
morning when large crowds gathered in Benkovac, 'All the approaches to Benkovac 
were blocked', while in Obrovac sirens, church bells, warning shots and even dynamite 
had been used to rouse the population to defence in the early hours.127 Later, around 
midday, the president of Obrovac – a Rašković ally who had initiated a meeting with 
Sabor president Domljan a week earlier - sent a panicked telegram to Babić and the JNA 
Knin Corps, claiming that Croatian APCs had passed over the nearby Velebit mountain 
and were now about to enter Obrovac. He said that they had raised barricades to stop 
124 'Grubi nasrtaj na Hrvatsku', Vjesnik, 18/8/1990, p.1. Milan Četnik, 'State Terrorism in Croatia', 
Politika, 18/8/1990, pp.1, 5-6, in FBIS-EEU-90-163, 22/8/1990. Zvonko Tarle, 'Niko više ne spava', 
Borba, 18-19/8/1990, p.11.
125 'Grubi nasrtaj na Hrvatsku', Vjesnik, 18/8/1990, p.1. 'Jovan Rašković Benkovac 1990', YouTube, 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhkaQdzhm8s. ICTY-Martić: Witness 
MM-096.
126 Zvonko Tarle, 'Niko više ne spava', Borba, 18-19/8/1990, p.11. 'Grubi nasrtaj na Hrvatsku', Vjesnik, 
18/8/1990, p.1.
127 Milan Četnik, 'State Terrorism in Croatia', Politika, 18/8/1990, pp.1, 5-6, in FBIS-EEU-90-163, 
22/8/1990. 'Ministry Report on Disturbances', Tanjug, 17/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-161, 20/8/1990.
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them, and appealed to the Knin corps to intervene to prevent bloodshed.128 It was most 
likely around then that the police arms in Obrovac were also distributed. Babić then 
ordered the head of the TO in Knin to mobilise for defence. This order was refused, 
however, as Babić lacked the constitutional authority to give it.129
Alarm in Obrovac seems to have corresponded with the time when Croatian APCs were 
indeed on the move, though it is unclear if any were nearby, and their advance was soon 
suspended. The news from Obrovac further unnerved people in Knin, however, with 
crowds again gathering outside the station to prevent the arms being taken. Next, false 
reports spread that Croatian APCs had passed through Lika and were on their way to 
Knin. Receiving this information from one of his organisers, Dušan Orlović, that 
afternoon, Babić ordered the raising of barricades to prevent their entry – over the 
objections of Rašković, who suggested that they instead lie down in front of the police 
vehicles. Sirens were sounded and a state of emergency declared. Babić also ordered 
Martić, using the cover of a crowd storming the police station, to take the reserve arms 
(about 100 rifles and 80 pistols) and mobilise the reserve police. A little later Babić 
upgraded the emergency to a 'state of war'.130 Orlović spread Babić's word to block 
roadways: 'I ordered directors of work organisations who had machines, who worked in 
fields, with trucks, etcetera; people who had private transport companies who had trucks 
and lorries, and they all got involved, got together.'131
128 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.11. 'Barikade na prilazima Kninu', Borba, 18-19/8/1990, p.1.
129 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Dragišić, commander of Knin TO, 1990-91, T8589-90. Interview Dušan 
Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
130 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, pp.11-14; Milan Martić. pp.5-6. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.152. Jelena 
Lovrić, 'Jovan Rašković: To se ne može zaustaviti', Danas, 21/8/1990, p.8. Interviews: Dušan Orlović; 
Marko Dobrijević, Organisational Secretary of the SDS, 1990-91; Branko Perić, SDS VP and 
Assistant Commander of SDS War HQ, 1990; Lazar Macura. Knin VP, 1990-93 (Belgrade: 2007, 
2009). ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Lazar Macura, T8157-9; Milan Dragišić, head of Knin Territorial 
Defence, 1990-91; MM-096, Knin police chief, 1990; E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 12/1990). 
Mirko Ćuruvija, 'Oružje jos nije vraćeno', Vjesnik, 13/9/1990, p.3. Božidar Zečević, The uprooting: a 
dossier of the Croatian genocide policy against the Serbs (Belgrade: Velauto International, 1992), 
p.131.
131 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
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With everything reported on Radio Knin, word spread throughout the region quickly, 
and soon everyone was raising barricades. It was thus from the afternoon onwards that 
the 'Balvan Revolution' proper really took place.
Croatian Intentions
What had the Croatian government's intentions been on that day? Croatian sources have 
usually presented the events of 17 August as orchestrated by the Serb side, with some 
alleging JNA plans for a coup. Boljkovac, for example, told the BBC that the 
helicopters were sent as a 'test' to the JNA to expose its plans.132 He failed to explain 
how providing a good pretext for a coup could possibly prevent that coup, however.
It is clear that the reserve arms were to be removed to prevent the Serbs possibly ever 
taking them. The MUP wanted to enforce its control of Knin by reinforcing the station 
there with additional Croat recruits, and Mesić confirms the thinking at the time was to 
physically prevent the SDS referendum.133 In this context, then, the removal of arms 
may have been a precursor to Croatian police operations in the region.
However, although Serbian sources talk of the Croatian operation as planned and 
prepared in advance,134 Croatian sources all describe the sending of APCs and 
helicopters as intended to restore disturbed law and order, with decisions taken only as 
events unfolded. Boljkovac has recalled more recently that he informed Tuđman about 
the rebellion that was underway, and Tuđman ordered him to use special forces to 
remove the barricades and free traffic.135 Tuđman, similarly, recalled that he was 
informed that Martić had taken power in Knin, and therefore ordered action by special 
forces. When they could not gain access via roads, then they tried by helicopter.136 The 
132 BBC-DOY: Josip Boljkovac, pp.6-9. And: BBC-DOY: Perica Jurić, p.6.
133 BBC-DOY: Stipe Mesić, pp.4-5.
134 BBC-DOY: Andrija Rašeta, p.2; Petar Gračanin, p.31; Milan Babić, pp.9-10; Milan Martić, pp.4-5. 
Interview 
135 Boljkovac, pp.204-5. Danko Plevnik, 'VRDOLJAK JE ZAHTIJEVAO: Osvojite Knin s 2000 
policajaca iz Splita', Slobodna Dalmacija, 28/11/2009.
136 BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman, pp.1-2. Mesić put the sequence the other way around: BBC-DOY: Stipe 
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goals of the specials were to include removing barricades, replacing rebel police 
officers, and arresting Babić and Martić.137
It thus seems that although Zagreb was considering, and perhaps preparing, action to 
assert its authority in Knin and prevent the referendum, and the disarmament served as a 
precursor to such action, this was not planned for 17 August, and the sending of forces 
towards Knin on that day was prompted by the beginning of unrest there. However, the 
most significant parts of the Serbian rebellion – the seizing of arms in Knin and Babić's 
orders to raise barricades, which resonated throughout the Krajina - actually only got 
underway after the APCs and helicopters had been sent (the former helping precipitate 
them).138 Zagreb thus reacted to the early signs of rebellion and the blocking of 
disarmament in Obrovac and Knin, ordering police action which ended up precipitating 
a much wider uprising.
On 17 August, the Croatian leadership - Tuđman and Mesić - also had contact with 
Rašković through the mediation of Ivan Zvonimir Čičak, president of the Croatian 
Peasant Party. That morning Tuđman and Mesić asked Čičak to contact Rašković, and 
he went to meet him at his home in Primošten. On their request, he asked Rašković to 
call off the referendum. According to Čičak, Rašković – probably already alarmed at the 
way events were developing – consented, agreeing to go on television later that day 
with Čičak and appeal to Serbs not to hold the referendum. Čičak returned to Tuđman, 
and that afternoon called Rašković again to implement the agreement. Now, however, 
Rašković responded ‘you must be crazy, man, they sent police!'139
Mesić, p.4. Also: Nobilo, p.54. Viro, p.129.
137 BBC-DOY: Perić Jurić, p.5; Stipe Mesić, pp.3-4. Silber and Little, p.104. Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, 
p.99. Marinko Čulić, 'Slijeganje tla', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.20-21.
138 Šibenik police chief Nikola Vukošić explicitly notes this sequencing: Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: 
Da smo smjeli...'.
139 Interview Ivan Zvonimir Čičak (Zagreb: 7/10/2009). Supported by: Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.152. 
'Samo kulturna autonomija', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.1. Tea Božuš, 'Tolerancijom i povjerenjem o rješenja 
sadašnje krize', Borba, 22/8/1990, p.1. Jelena Lovrić, 'Jovan Rašković: To se ne može zaustaviti', 
Danas, 21/8/1990, p.8.
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Thus progressively, over the course of the first half of the day, actions of the Croatian 
MUP contributed to the deterioration of the situation. This was until the operations of 
the APCs were suspended and the helicopters grounded, and, at the end of the day, at a 
meeting of the state leadership Tuđman suggested for the first time that they not to try to 
prevent the referendum by force, but just ignore it.140 Čičak argues that Tuđman and the 
Croatian leadership deliberately engineered this conflict, to start war.141 Most evidence 
tends to contradict this, however. Most of the Croatian leadership was actually on 
holiday at the coast at the time, and Tuđman was apparently shocked by these 
developments.142 Zagreb had embarked on a risky strategy of confronting and 
preventing the Serbian referendum and Serbian rebellion, which back-fired and ended 
up triggering rebellion.
'Spontaneous Self-Organising of the People?'143
Knin and SDS leaders at the time spoke of the 'Balvan Revolution' as a spontaneous 
rising of the Serbian people in self-defence, and tended to deny their own involvement 
in these events.144 Most scholars are closer to the Croatian view that the events of 17 
August were orchestrated and pre-planned by the Serbian side.145 However, although, 
preparations were being laid for armed resistance/rebellion, the available evidence 
points to these events unfolding gradually during the day, in reaction to moves by the 
Croatian MUP. There was also a strong spontaneous, unorganised element to the day's 
events, with, for example, large crowds gathering and some barricades being raised 
before Babić's decision on mobilisation.
140 BBC-DOY: Stipe Mesić, p.4.
141 Interview Ivan Zvonimir Čičak (Zagreb: 7/10/2009).
142 Davorin Rudolf, Rat koji nismo htjeli: Hrvatska 1991 (Zagreb: Globus, 1999), p.66.
143 'Oružje ostaje u Kninu', Borba, 10/9/1990, p.1.
144 For example: 'Jedni drugima na nišanu', Borba, 23/8/1990, p.3. 'Oružje ostaje u Kninu', Borba, 
10/9/1990, p.1. Ivan Radovanović, 'Pioni padaju najbrže', Borba, 1-2/9/1990, p.3. Marinko Čulić, 
'Slijeganje tla', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.20-21. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 19 (Session of Knin IV, 
18/8/1990), pp.56-8.
145 For example: Gagnon, p.94. Lukić, p.54. Cigar, p.60. Bennett, p.130. Meier, pp.154-5.
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Rumours and misinformation did play a role in the uprising. For example, there were 
rumours in Knin on 17 August of an assassination plot against Opačić, while Belgrade 
TV falsely reported that morning that there were clashes and even deaths in Glina in 
Banija.146 The news that Croatian forces were about to enter Knin that afternoon was 
also false. SDS officials were clearly complicit in the spread of unverified information 
and rumours which suited their viewpoints, and Babić deliberately waited several hours 
after learning that Croatian police were not, in fact, approaching Knin before issuing a 
denial, in order to allow the first information to have effect and for Serbs to mobilise.147 
At the same time, however, Zagreb was taking very real measures to impose its control 
on the region – the removals of arms, movements of special forces, and intention to 
repress the referendum were not misinformation.
Essentially, the Knin leadership was given the trigger to mobilise in rebellion to block 
such actions from Zagreb, either then or in the future. Although preparations for 
resistance were being laid, the decision(s) to rebel appears to have been taken on the 
day, and the uprising unfurled in a fairly disorganised and partly spontaneous manner. 
As Orlović recalls, Babić 'gave the order and after that everything happened 
spontaneously' and 'there was a big mess, no organisation behind it. All the government 
institutions were trying to convince people to organise themselves, not to do that 
chaotically, but the raising of barricades wasn’t organised, it was complete chaos.' Local 
officials recall that barricades were all over the place, raised between Serb villages as 
well as on the outskirts - 'Everyone made a barricade towards everyone' - severely 
hampering transport and communication.148 Even for SDS leaders themselves, journeys 
took several times longer than usual, as they constantly had to stop and identify 
146 Zvonko Tarle, 'Niko više ne spava', Borba, 18-19/8/1990, p.11. Jelena Lovrić, 'Jovan Rašković: To se 
ne može zaustaviti', Danas, 21/8/1990, p.8. Dušan Pilić, 'L' esercito federale interviene in Croazia', La 
Repubblica, 18/8/1990.
147 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.14.
148 Interview Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina DB, 1991-92 (Belgrade: 7/2009). And: Interviews: Branko 
Perić, SDS VP and Assistant Commander of SDS War HQ, 1990; Lazar Macura. Knin VP, 1990-93; 
Dušan Vjestica, secretary of the SNV, 1990-91; Ratko Ličina (Belgrade: 2007). ICTY-Martić: 
Witnesses Lazar Macura, T8157-9; Milan Dragišić, head of Knin Territorial Defence, 1990-91; MM-
096, Knin police chief, 1990; E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 12/1990). I.R., 'Ranjena dva 
milicionara', Borba, 4/10/1990, p.2.
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themselves.149 Villagers would often raise barricades in fear, out of control from above - 
'one day someone says 100,000 Ustaše are coming and people raise barricades there'.150
Efforts to impose organisation on this chaotic situation began the next day, on 18 
August. At a meeting chaired by Rašković in the village of Pađene, Knin, the SDS 
leadership elected a party 'War Staff', which was to be based in Golubić, Knin, and 
organise the barricades. The following day Babić visited this group and assigned their 
tasks. Members included SDS VP Branko Perić, named 'Assistant Commander for 
Logistics', Opačić, in charge of propaganda, and Zelenbaba, in charge of medicine (the 
latter two had only minor roles).151 The Staff attempted to impose some organisation on 
the barricades and village guards, organising shifts and forming lists of people who had 
arms.152 As Rašković later recalled, 'we introduced into all this elements of order and 
some kind of control so that there would not be conflict.'153
The confused manner in which this organisation was subsequently attempted further 
evidences that the 'Balvan Revolution' was not directed in advance. After 17 August, 
Babić disappeared from Knin for several days, not informing even municipal officials 
where he was (he was in hiding, in fear of the Croatian police).154 In his absence Knin 
Vice-President Macura took charge, and, as he recalls, was in charge of the barricades 
149 Interview Dušan Vjestica, secretary of the SNV, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 9/11/2007). I. Radovanović, 
'Proglašena autonomija!', Borba, 2/10/1990, p.1. Stefan Grubač, 'Nećemo da budemo naivni', NIN, 
5/10/1990, pp.10-13. 
150 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). Also: Momir Ilić, 'Plebiscit Srba u Hrvatskoj: plodovi 
nove vlasti', Intervju, No.241, 31/8/1990, pp.4-7. Julijana Mojsilović, 'Was Yugoslavia on the brink of 
civil war?', Politika: The International Weekly, 25/8/1990, pp.1-2.
151 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, pp.14-15. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T14001-3. 'Ničega nije ni 
bilo', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.2. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-043, SDS and SNO activist. 
ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 12/1990); Witness MM-003, Martić associate, 
1990-95. Interviews: Dušan Orlović; Branko Perić; Veljko Popović (Belgrade: 2007, 2009).
152 Interview Branko Perić, SDS VP and Assistant Commander of SDS War HQ, 1990 (Belgrade: 
5/11/2007).
153 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.130.
154 ICTY-Martić: Witness Lazar Macura, T8159-60. Interviews: Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007); 
Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.20 (Babić Interview), p.11. Zvonko Tarle, I. 
Radovanović & Snježana Stamatović, 'Potpredsednik “pretekao” helikoptere', Borba, 21/8/1990, p.3. 
'Jedni drugima na nišanu', Borba, 23/8/1990, p.3. 'Babić ideolog pobune, Martić samo marioneta', 
Novi List, 20/11/2003, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.veritas.org.rs/wp-
content/bilteni/Bilten_62.pdf. 
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for several days, working non-stop. In the meantime, the SDS leadership had formed its 
Staff. But when Perić arrived in Golubić he was surprised to see Martić and other 
'communists' there, as they had not been allocated positions at the meeting. Martić 
subsequently assumed the main role, and after a few days Babić called Macura to tell 
him that he was dismissed and Martić was taking over.155
Martić was the de facto commander of the reserve police unit and the most important 
rebel organiser. He had initially a hundred men, and probably a few hundred later in the 
year. His police fanned out across the municipality to cover all the territory, and after a 
few days he made sure that there was a policeman at each barricade.156 He and his 
associates, such as Orlović, also worked on issues such as setting up a unified network 
of communications and a system of alerting. According to JNA intelligence reports, they 
succeeded in doing this, and by the start of 1991 there were communications, a unified 
system of reporting, and groups organising the barricades and ready to mobilise, with 
Martić and others having lists of those with arms.157
However, organisation was never fully imposed on the barricades and guards, and the 
situation varied between municipalities: the SDS Staff operated for Knin, as it seems did 
Martić's police, although contacts existed and were apparently developed on a regional 
basis, centred on Knin. Around late August Babić and Martić formed a secretive 
'Council of National Resistance' (Savjet narodnog otpora, SNO), but this seems to have 
operated more as a loose co-ordinating body of those involved in the rebellion, 
primarily those in Knin itself, and as a means of issuing anonymous statements to the 
public, than as a cohesive, centralised organisation.158 Barricades also were not 
permanently present, and Croatian officials themselves continued to visit the region. For 
155 ICTY-Martić: Witness Lazar Macura. Interviews: Lazar Macura; Branko Perić (Belgrade: 11/2007). 
'Pravo bez oružja', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.1.
156 ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003, Martić associate, 1990-95.
157 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.216-9. ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 12/1990). 
Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
158 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: DST-043, SDS and SNO activist. Interview Ratko Ličina (Belgrade: 2007). 
ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). S.I.B., 'Ni u šumu, ni na drum, Borba, 
3/10/1990, p.4. Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo smjeli...'.
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example, on 18 August Šibenik SUP secretary Ante Bujas and a number of other 
Šibenik militiamen were in the Knin station again, armed and in uniform, while in early 
September Defence Miniser Špegelj secretly visited the region to scout his plan of 
attack. On 18 August a secret 100-man Croat police unit was even formed in Knin, and 
armed over the following days.159
It is also important to note that one reason why SDS leaders attempted to establish 
organisation after 17 August was, as Rašković recalled, to avoid conflict.160 Although 
regularly guilty of spreading alarmist reports and misinformation, at the time the 
dominant factions in the SDS did still want to avoid unnecessary clashes and deaths. At 
the Pađene meeting Rašković declared that they should resist only if forced, only react 
if attacked and not cause conflict. He proposed Perić for the 'War Staff' on the grounds 
that as an elderly man, he would be calmer and not favour the use of arms.161 Babić's 
deputy Macura was also trying to prevent armed clashes from breaking out, instructing 
guards only to fire if fired upon, while Martić reportedly posted police to each barricade 
in part to prevent thefts, drunken behaviour and other incidents.162
Silber and Little describe Rašković's opposition to raising barricades on 17 August, and 
his pacifist inclinations have been fairly widely noted in the literature.163 However, 
Rašković also understood what he saw as the desire of the Krajina Serbs for defence 
from Croatian aggression: 'One cannot send tanks against the people, people who 
perhaps are armed with a hunting gun or some keepsake weapons from the [Second 
159 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T14002. Interviews: Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009); 
Veljko Popović, President of Knin Executive Council, 1990 (Belgrade: 8/11/2007). Špegelj, Sjecanje 
vojnika, pp.99-100. 'Babić ideolog pobune, Martić samo marioneta', Novi List, 20/11/2003, published 
in Veritas Bilten, no.62., 11/2003, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.veritas.org.rs/wp-
content/bilteni/Bilten_62.pdf. Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo smjeli...'.
160 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.130.
161 Interview Branko Perić, SDS VP and Assistant Commander of SDS War HQ, 1990 (Belgrade: 
5/11/2007). Also: 'Samo kulturna autonomija', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.1. Marinko Čulić, 'Slijeganje tla', 
Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.20-21.
162 'Pravo bez oružja', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.1. 'Kako su “hapšeni” Rašković i Babić', Borba, 23/8/1990, 
p.3. ICTY-Martić: Witness Lazar Macura, T8161-2. ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003. Also: ''Tension' 
as 'Civilian Sentries' on Guard', Belgrade Domestic Service, 18/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-161, 
20/8/1990.
163 Silber & Little, p.102.
Chapter 3: The Two Nationalisms Collide
124
World War]... This, in fact, is a declaration of war against a people.'164 He was involved 
in appointing people to manage the barricades, and does not seem to have tried to 
impose his pacifistic ideas on others in the SDS, for whom the idea of defence 
dominated. In spring 1991 he would even publicly call for the Serbs to be armed (as 
explored in Chapter 5). Rašković's attitude to and role in these developments was thus 
mixed.
Finally, it is worth noting that the police in the Knin Krajina were not entirely in 
rebellion at this stage. Although there were clearly elements of open insubordination, 
most notably from Martić's circle and the Knin reserves, the regular police, including in 
Knin itself, had not formally separated and was still functioning within the Croatian 
system. Local police chiefs had all been appointed by Zagreb and still reported to their 
superiors as normal. People's loyalties were mixed and Croatian services estimated in 
October that in a conflict they could still count on about half of the local Serbian 
police.165 In late November some stations announced their desire to separate, but it was 
not until January 1991 that a separate Krajina SUP was established, headed by Martić. 
Even then, the appointment of new police chiefs and cutting of ties with the MUP was a 
gradual process over the following months.166
164 'Rašković To Ask for Federal 'Intervention'', Ljubljana Domestic Service, 18/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-
90-161, 20/8/1990.
165 Marijan, ‘Djelvoanje JNA i Pobunjenih Srba u Lici', p.221. See: ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-096. 
ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-043. Erceg, pp.24-8. 
166 See, for example: Snježana Stamatović, 'Narod skuplja pare za miliciju', Borba, 9-10/2/1991, p.13. 
Srđan Španović, 'Čudo u Kijevu', Danas, 12/3/1991, pp.18-20. 'Benkovac, Obrovac Police Face 
Dismissal', Zagreb Domestic Service, 15/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-073 16/4/1991. Barić, Srpska 
pobuna, pp.104-6. Lučić & Lovrenović, pp.36-7. Krmpotić, pp.32-3.
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3.5. Militarisation Entrenched
Croatia and the Knin Rebellion
The eruption of the 'Balvan Revolution' on 17 August 1990 was something of a turning 
point in the descent into war in Croatia. This was the start of open Serbian rebellion 
against the authorities in Zagreb, and the beginning of the Knin Krajina's physical 
separation from Croatia. On both sides, it was after 17 August that the organising and 
arming of the population really got underway, with both Croatia and the Krajina Serbs 
seeking and acquiring external sources of arms.
With the eruption of the 'Balvan Revolution', Tuđman decided to abandon the idea of 
physically preventing the SDS's referendum. Soon, the opinion also prevailed that 
Zagreb should not attempt to intervene and re-impose its authority in Knin. The main 
argument for this was that there was a high chance, or certainty, of bloodshed and a 
wider confrontation in which the JNA would get involved, resulting in an even worse 
situation for Croatia, which was not yet ready to confront the JNA. Tuđman was also 
genuinely optimistic that Yugoslavia could be dissolved peacefully in agreement with 
Serbia, and thus the problems in Croatia settled by talks. He also felt that the 'peaceful' 
stance best suited Croatia tactically, allowing it to buy time while it armed itself and 
built international support.167
This view did not immediately dominate, however, and there were differences of 
opinion in the Croatian leadership, and different options on the table. On the night of 
20-21 August, for example, it seems that Croatian MUP again had plans to re-take Knin 
by force. Policemen in Drniš, along with some special forces, were gathered and 
ordered to advance on the barricades with the goal of occupying Knin and arresting 
Babić and Rašković. They were told to use tear gas and force, while from the direction 
of Sinj special forces would also advance. The latter did advance, exchanging fire with 
167 See: Bilandžić, pp.369-70. And: footnote 78.
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Serb guards,168 but the Drniš police – the majority of them Serbs, but also some Croats – 
refused their orders. The station was thereafter disbanded, and the incident was revealed 
and heavily publicised in Knin afterwards (and though completely denied by the MUP 
at the time, several Croatian sources now acknowledge it).169 
Ten days later there was another proposal for police intervention to re-assert Zagreb's 
authority over Knin. With the end of the European Athletics in Split at the beginning of 
September, 2,000 police in Split for security had to be transferred back to their native 
stations. Croatian Vice-President Antun Vrdoljak suggested that under the cover of this 
return, these police sneak into Knin and re-establish Croatian control. As Serb guards 
were no longer constantly on the roads, it was argued, this would be possible. Tuđman 
approved the idea and ordered its implementation. Boljkovac and even his hardline 
deputy Perica Jurić, however, felt that the plan was unrealistic – 'suicidal' - and would 
likely end in bloodshed and JNA involvement. To Tuđman's anger, they therefore 
refused to implement it.170
Shortly afterwards, on 10 September, Tuđman ordered his new Defence Minister, 
General Martin Špegelj, to come up with a new plan for restoring Croatian authority in 
Knin. Špegelj discreetly visited Knin to scout it out, and in mid-September proposed 
168 Ante Nazor, 'Chronology of the Homeland War (With the Review of Certain Events 1945.-1990)', 
Centar Domovinskog Rata, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://centardomovinskograta.hr/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Domovinski-Rat-Kronologija-eng.pdf, p.11. ICTY-Martić: Witness Dragan 
Knezevic. Tea Božuš, 'Pucnji u Civljanima', Borba, 22/8/1990, p.1. 'Feljton – Stvaranje hrvatske 
države i ratni put 113. brigade', 29/10/2010, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.novi-
tjednik.hr/aktualnosti/aktualnosti/5638-feljton-stvaranje-hrvatske-drave-i-ratni-put-113-brigade.pdf.
169 For example: 'Feljton – Stvaranje hrvatske države i ratni put 113. brigade', 29/10/2010, accessed 
1/8/2014 from: http://www.novi-tjednik.hr/aktualnosti/aktualnosti/5638-feljton-stvaranje-hrvatske-
drave-i-ratni-put-113-brigade.pdf, p.2. Ante Čavka, Kronoloska Zbivanja u Drinskoj Krajini od  
Pocetka 1941 do Kraja 1991 Godine (Split: Grada Za Suvremenu Povijest Drniške Krajine, 1995). 
Also documented by: 'Kako su “hapšeni” Rašković i Babić', Borba, 23/8/1990, p.3. ICTY-Martić: E-
899 (Statement of Drniš police officers, 8/1990). ICTY-Martić: Witnesses MM-096; MM-116, Drniš 
policeman. Jasna Babić, 'Čije je oružje', Danas, 18/9/1990, pp.13-15. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, 
Document 16 (Daily report of JNA 9th Corps, 22/8/1990), pp.48-50.
170 Boljkovac, pp.206-7. Danko Plevnik, 'VRDOLJAK JE ZAHTIJEVAO: Osvojite Knin s 2000 
policajaca iz Splita', Slobodna Dalmacija, 28/11/2009, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Spektar/tabid/94/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/80962/Default.as
px. 
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intervention by police disguised as holiday-goers.171 However, Tuđman ultimately 
decided to shelve the plan, perhaps in part because of the negotiations that had begun 
with Knin (discussed later).172 In early October and November Špegelj drew up another 
two plans for taking Knin, on Tuđman's instructions. On both occasions, however, they 
were shelved, with Špegelj now also agreeing that, thanks to a strengthening of the Knin 
rebels, the plans could not be implemented without bloodshed, and that the danger of 
JNA intervention made them unwise.173 Finally, in December Špegelj drew up a fourth 
plan, again on Tuđman's request. This time, however, Špegelj proposed operations 
against the JNA in order to seize their arms. Croatian forces prepared to spring into 
action, but when the state leadership discussed the proposal, it was resoundingly 
rejected by all except Mesić and Špegelj: the loss of life predicted was too high, and 
they would be condemned the world over as violent separatists.174 
Thus, after early September at least, the peaceful option with regard to Knin prevailed in 
the Croatian leadership, while operations against the JNA were eschewed - but other 
options were also on the table and under consideration. Some in the leadership were 
more supportive of such ideas, and Croatian officials repeatedly said that they would, if 
necessary, re-take Knin and re-establish law and order when the time suited them.175 The 
arming on the Croatian side, discussed next, gave real weight to these statements.
To Serbs in Knin, the sense of threat was thus maintained. Although local SDS officials 
were often responsible for the spread of misinformation on alleged Croatian operations, 
the idea that Knin could again be 'attacked' as on 17 August, and occupied, was not 
171 Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, pp.99-102.
172 Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, p.101. Boljkovac, p.208.
173 Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, pp.103-4, 110-11.
174 BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman, p.6. Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, pp.121-4. Boljkovac, pp.210-2. Vasiljević, 
pp.103-4. Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo smjeli...'. Ivo Jelić, Čovket i rat 90/92 (Split: DES, 
2005), Chapter 1, p.22. 'Throwing Bombs, Killing...', Politika, 27/1/1991, pp.6-7, in FBIS-EER-91-
018, 11/2/1991. 
175 For example: 'Croat Assembly Head: Rebellion 'Will Be Crushed'', Tanjug, 6/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-
90-195, 9/10/1990. 'Croatian Presidency Discusses Security Situation', Zagreb Domestic Service, 
3/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-193, 4/10/1990. Boljkovac, p.255. Ernest Schmiederer, 'Miscarriage 
Yugoslavia', Profil (Vienna), 15/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-201, 17/10/1990. Jelena Lovrić, 'We'll Go 
To Knin, Too...', Danas, 9/4/1991, pp.18-19, in FBIS-EER-91-075, 4/6/1991.
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simply paranoia or misinformation – it was something repeatedly talked about in public 
by the Croatian leadership, and privately considered.
The Arming of the Croatian Side
In autumn and winter 1990 the Croatian authorities undertook a large-scale campaign of 
arming and organising Croatian armed forces from the HDZ, with a particular focus on 
the Knin Krajina region. Although partly a reaction to the appearance of an armed 
rebellion in Knin, this was, to Serbs, alarming, and a spur to their own arming.
Aside from the new police units, there were apparently some HDZ armed groups 
formed even before the 'Balvan Revolution'.176 Immediately after 17 August applications 
for arms permits, for Croats as well as Serbs, shot up, while some Croatian - mainly 
HDZ - groups began to arm themselves in the municipalities and villages in the Knin 
region, using arms from police and TO depots. For example, on 17 August itself up to 
50 short arms were distributed to Croats in the mixed village of Vrlika, bordering 
Knin,177 while in Šibenik the following day half of the reserve police force was 
activitated and 500 automatic rifles and 200 pistols of the reserve police were removed 
from a JNA hangar and then distributed to Croats, including Croat settlements within 
Knin, such as Potkonje, a suburb of Knin town, which received 50 rifles.178 A reserve 
Croat formation of 100 police was also formed in Knin, and armed in the following 
176 Milorad Bibić Mosor, 'Vitomir Brzović Vito: Moja Šesta je u ratu bila – prva!', Slobodna Dalmacija, 
21/6/2009, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.dugirat.com/novosti/arhiva/9523.html. Beata Huszka, 
The Discursive Construction of the Slovenian and Croatian Independence Movement (Budapest: 
Public Foundation for European Comparative Minority Research, 2009), p.69. Slavica Kleva, 
'Osnivać HDZ'a Rijeke držao arsenal oružja', Glas Istre, 21/9/2010, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.glasistre.hr/hrvatska/vijest/262909  . 
177 Toni Paštar, 'Otvoreno Ante Tonći Turudić', Ferata, 36/5/2011, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.ferata.hr/arhiva/teme/2622-otvoreno-ante-toni-turudi. 'Ante Turudić, Predsjednik 
Gradskog Vijeće', 2008, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.vrlika.hr/index.php/adresar/item/289-int-
ante-turudic-12-200/289-int-ante-turudic-12-200.
178 See: 'Feljton – Stvaranje hrvatske države i ratni put 113. brigade', 29/10/2010, accessed 1/8/2014 
from: http://www.novi-tjednik.hr/aktualnosti/aktualnosti/5638-feljton-stvaranje-hrvatske-drave-i-ratni-
put-113-brigade.pdf. 'Daljni ustroj postrojbi 113. brigade, ustroj policije do osnivanja ZNG-a i prvi 
veći oružani sukob', 1/1/2011, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.novi-
tjednik.hr/aktualnosti/aktualnosti/6013-daljni-ustroj-postrojbi-113-brigade-ustroj-policije-do-
osnivanja-zng-a-i-prvi-vei-oruani-sukob.pdf.
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days.179 Croat settlements within many of the affected Serb municipalities had formed 
guards themselves on 17-18 August, armed with whatever weapons they had (hunting 
rifles and pistols), and soon these were turned into new 'police stations', reinforced by 
Zagreb with further arms and men.180
On 18 August the MUP seems to have ordered the activation of 50% of the reserve 
police throughout Croatia. However, in Osijek at least, it was actually the HDZ that was 
mobilised, as the existing reserves were mistrusted as disproportionately Serbian.181 
Similar things took place in other municipalities, particularly those near the Krajina, 
with small quantities of arms (hundreds), including hunting rifles, distributed to newly 
formed HDZ armed groups.182 Even in completely peaceful places, such as eastern 
Slavonia, the HDZ was arming itself with arms and explosives.183
Shortly after the 'Balvan Revolution' the Croatian leadership began looking for arms to 
import, and already on 10 September three lorries of arms and munitions arrived from 
Slovenia.184 The government began submitting requests to foreign countries, finding 
their greatest success in Hungary, which offered to sell Zagreb kalashnikovs at a very 
179 Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo smjeli, sredili bi barikade čim su krenule!'. And: Špegelj, 
Sjećanje Vojnika, p.100.
180 See for example: Goran Miletić, 'Zločin u Lovincu, Izvještaj sa praćenje suđenje', Centar za Mir,  
Nenasilje i Ljudska Prava, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.centar-za-mir.hr/. Božo Mihaljević, 
'Ratni put JNP Lovinac', Hazud, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.hazud.hr/ratni-put-jnp-lovinac/. 
'Daljni ustroj postrojbi 113. brigade, ustroj policije do osnivanja ZNG-a i prvi veći oružani sukob', 
1/1/2011, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.novi-tjednik.hr/aktualnosti/aktualnosti/6013-daljni-
ustroj-postrojbi-113-brigade-ustroj-policije-do-osnivanja-zng-a-i-prvi-vei-oruani-sukob.pdf.
181 Branimir Glavaš, 'Iskaz Branimira Glavaša', 9/7/2006, retrieved 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.branimirglavas.com, p.2. 'Daljni ustroj postrojbi 113. brigade, ustroj policije do osnivanja 
ZNG-a i prvi veći oružani sukob', 1/1/2011, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.novi-
tjednik.hr/aktualnosti/aktualnosti/6013-daljni-ustroj-postrojbi-113-brigade-ustroj-policije-do-
osnivanja-zng-a-i-prvi-vei-oruani-sukob.pdf. Jelić. 'Odlučni u odbranu suvereniteta Republike 
Hrvatske', Vinkovački List, 24/8/1990, p.1.
182 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević, T16130-3. ICTY-Martić: Witness Borislav Đukić, 
T6698-9; E-1005 (Open letter of the Zadar SUP, 5/11/1990).Vladimir Krasić, 'Arsenali za priručnu 
upotreba', Borba, 12-13/1/1991, p.2.
183 Drago Hedl, 'Danube Carries Something', Feral Tribune (Split), 5/12/2002, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.ex-yupress.com. Interview Miloš Vasić, Vreme journalist (Belgrade: 12/7/2007).
184 Šaša Leković, 'Neispravne puške za odbranu Hrvatsku', E-Novine, 18/10/2011.
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low price. A deal was agreed on 5 October, and shipments of thousands of kalashnikovs, 
along with some other arms, began a few days later.185
The precise number of arms imported remains somewhat unclear. Špegelj, who 
negotiated the deal with Hungary, has always claimed to have imported more than 
30,000 automatic rifles, and the vast majority of other sources also repeat this number, 
including Špegelj's later critics and opponents.186 At the time, some reports suggested a 
far higher number of about 80,000, but this was a consequence of deliberate 
exaggerations by Špegelj and his team, intended to intimidate the JNA, and probably 
also the JNA's desire to discredit the Croats as much as possible.187 However, some 
sources also suggest that the quantity of arms was lower, as only some of the agreed 
arms were actually delivered. JNA security chief Aleksandar Vasiljević has spoken of 
18,000 kalashnikovs, while other information suggests that only ten of the thirty 
thousand agreed were actually delivered.188
These arms were distributed throughout Croatia, particularly to Croats within and 
around the Krajina region.189 As before, units were formed mainly through the HDZ. As 
the HDZ rightist Branimir Glavaš has acknowledged, a 'paramilitary party militia' was 
created which, legally, had the status of a 'paramilitary formation'.190 According to 
Špegelj, Tuđman insisted that everything be done through the HDZ, mistrusting the 
185 Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, pp.104-5, 111-2.
186 Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, p.136. Branimir Glavaš, 'Iskaz Branimira Glavaša', 9/7/2006, retrieved 
1/8/2014 from: http://www.branimirglavas.com, p.5. Ivo Jelić, Čovket i rat 90/92 (Split: DES, 2005).
187 Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, p.143. Ante Nazor, 'Istina o naoružanju teroristčkih formacija HDZ u 
Hrvatskoj', Hrvatski Vojnik, No. 433 (10/2013), accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.hrvatski-
vojnik.hr/hrvatski-vojnik/4332013/domovinskirat.asp. Nobilo & Letica, pp.17, 27-8. Borisav Jović, 
op. cit., p.229.
188 Svetislav Spasojević, 'Kadijević zaustavlja akciju “Štit” [Interview with Aleksandar Vasiljević]', NIN, 
17/7/1992, p.56. Svetislav Spasojević, 'Špegelj obala brbljivost [Interview with Aleksandar 
Vasiljević]', NIN, 7/10/1992, p.56. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, pp.53-4. Also: ICTY-Milošević: 
Witness Imra Agotić, T23262. 'Stane Brovet: Uvozi se i teško naoružanje', Borba, 14/6/1991, p.2.
189 'Lovas Case', Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević (Belgrade: 21/6/2010), accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Transkripti/lovas.html, p.4. Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.216-9. HMDC-DR: 
Knjiga 1, Document 47 (Order of JNA 9th Corps, 5/4/1991), pp.108-9.
190 Branimir Glavaš, 'Iskaz Branimira Glavaša', 9/7/2006, retrieved 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.branimirglavas.com/, p.7. Petar Bašić, Petar & Ivica Miškulin, 'Grubišnopoljska Kronika 
1990.-1991. (I. Dio)', pp.366-7.
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existing territorial defence as well as police structures, and wanting to be assured of 
people's 'loyalty to the party' – or, as Špegelj more negatively frames it: 'He wanted 
mercenaries who [would] be under his political control'.191 When the JNA exposed this 
in January 1991, the Croatian MUP then distributed thousands of IDs to these armed 
HDZ members 'legalising' them as members of the reserve police.192 As Glavaš notes, 
however, 'Apart from IDs, 99% of those members had only kalashnikovs. None of those 
members had any kind of uniform, nor markings of members of the reserve composition 
of the MUP.'193
Moreover, it was generally the extreme wing of the HDZ that was taking up arms, 
people who not only sought to defend Croatia, but also saw the conflict as an 
opportunity to rid Croatia of its Serbian minority. Glavaš, for example, was named 
Secretary of National Defence for Osijek by Špegelj himself, even though he was an 
extremist who even clashed with Tuđman and Boljkovac.194 This naturally gave 
credence to Serb fears of the 'Ustaše'.
After 17 August, Serbs in Knin Krajina also sought and acquired arms. Applications for 
arms permits rocketed, and by January 1991 at least 1,300 hunting rifles and 400 pistols 
191 Codly Mclain, 'Who Fights First: Grievances, Community and Collective Action', Croatian Political  
Science Review, Vol. 50, No. 5 (2013), pp.23-4. Also: BBC-DOY: Aleksandar Vasiljević, p.18.
192 Branimir Glavaš, 'Iskaz Branimira Glavaša', 9/7/2006, retrieved 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.branimirglavas.com/, p.3. Also: HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 34 (JNA report, 
24/1/1991), p.83. BBC-DOY: Aleksandar Vasiljević, p.25. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Aleksandar 
Vasiljević. 'Daljni ustroj postrojbi 113. brigade, ustroj policije do osnivanja ZNG-a i prvi veći oružani 
sukob', 1/1/2011, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.novi-tjednik.hr/aktualnosti/aktualnosti/6013-
daljni-ustroj-postrojbi-113-brigade-ustroj-policije-do-osnivanja-zng-a-i-prvi-vei-oruani-sukob.pdf. 
'Throwing Bombs, Killing...', Politika, 27/1/1991, pp.6-7, in FBIS-EER-91-018, 11/2/1991.
193 Branimir Glavaš, 'Iskaz Branimira Glavaša', 9/7/2006, retrieved 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.branimirglavas.com/, pp.3, 13.
194 Momčilović, p.9. Vasiljević, p.104. On Glavaš see: R. Stević, 'Naozi na seobu Srba', Borba, 
10/9/1990, p.3. Mirić, pp.18, 63-4. Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its  
Destroyers (New York: Times Books, 1999), p.152. See also: Cody McClain Brown, 'Who Fights 
First: Grievances, Community and Collective Action', Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 50, No. 
5 (2013), pp.7-28.
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had been acquired.195 I believe that the evidence indicates that more significant arming 
only began in spring 1991, however. This issue is explored in Chapter 5.
The Serbs in Knin Krajina region and elsewhere were aware that members of the HDZ, 
in many cases their own neighbours, were arming on a significant scale, and this 
encouraged their own fears and their own arming.196 The fear of Croatian police 
intervention, meanwhile, though often fuelled by rumours and misinformation, had a 
very real basis. The way that arming was conducted illegally, through HDZ channels, 
was unsettling for Serbs. At the same time, the question could be asked how else the 
government could have done this. It was to a certain extent inevitable that enthusiastic 
nationalists of the HDZ, particularly their most extreme members, would be the first to 
enrol in such units, and it seems that Zagreb did not have full control over this 
process.197 The Croatian authorities were not intentionally acting provocatively, and had, 
for example, decided to refrain from purges of Serbs to 'Croatianise' the police force 
(though dismissals did still occur).198 Measures such as the stationing of new Croat 
recruits did help ensure Zagreb's control of contested areas, and the strengthening of 
Croatian defence had a very logical rationale.
A genuine security dilemma was in play. The Croatian side had logical reasons for 
arming – and it was probably a great help to Croatia in the 1991 war – but this, 
especially the way it was conducted, was extremely alarming to Serbs in Croatia. Serbs 
had some faith that the JNA and Serbia would protect them, but this was by no means 
guaranteed at the time (as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). They thus also had a rational 
reason to arm to protect themselves from Croatian incursions and attempts to reassert 
195 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.216-9. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević. Predrag Popović, 
'Trebalo je da slušamo Tuđmana [Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 13/3/1995, pp.52-3. ICTY-
Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990).
196 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.130. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). ICTY-Martić: E-1005 
(Open letter of Zadar SUP, 5/11/1990). ICTY-Babić: E-PS-7-2-4 (Babić Interview), p.26. 'Talks 
Without Agreement', Danas, 16/10/1990, pp.22-24 in FBIS-EEU-90-151, 5/11/1990.
197 On the other hand, Špegelj has argued that the TO structure could and should have been used, while 
Boljkovac believed that it should have been done through the police. See: Cody McClain Brown, 
'Who Fights First: Grievances, Community and Collective Action', Croatian Political Science Review, 
Vol. 50, No. 5 (2013), pp.23-4. Vasiljević, pp.38, 104.
198 Boljkovac, pp.186-8. Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.104.
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Croatian authority – and, indeed, it was partly Serbian arming and organising that 
enabled the Serbs to carry out their referendum, and discouraged Zagreb from police 
operations in the region.199
Moreover, it is notable that Croatian and Serbian organising and arming occurred 
concurrently, with the Croatian side conducting this on a considerably larger scale at 
first. The very day, or next days, that Serbs had taken arms in Knin and Obrovac, similar 
or larger quantities of arms were being distributed to HDZ-based units nearby, including 
within or next to Knin municipality itself, while new 'special units' were also being 
formed. This also helps explain and put into context the reluctance of Serbs in Knin to 
return those arms to the police station, which was a central question in the following 
month.
199 As noted by: CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.1, pp.83-4.
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3.6. Negotiations Over the Security Situation
Despite the outbreak of armed rebellion on 17 August, in the following month a number 
of contacts and negotiations were held, with the declared aim of restoring trust and 
mutual ties, reducing tension, and improving the security situation. However, little was 
achieved, and the 'Balvan Revolution' instead became further entrenched. This section 
will consider why this was the case. This issue is of particular importance because at 
The Hague, Milan Babić claimed that a Belgrade-connected 'parallel structure' had 
thwarted his efforts at a peaceful resolution of the crisis, for which Serb extremists in 
Knin and Belgrade were thus responsible. The available evidence, however, presents a 
much more mixed picture, with the decisive turning point in entrenching the rebellion 
coming from renewed actions by the Croatian MUP.
The Aftermath of 17 August
The 'Balvan Revolution' was accompanied by a great escalation of rhetoric on both 
sides. The Croatian side saw this as confirmation of the Great Serbian 'scenario' to 
destabilise Croatia, and the work of rabbles and terrorists. Top officials even spoke of 
banning the SDS, as a 'terrorist organisation'.200 At the same time, Zagreb insisted that 
most Serbs were 'loyal', and a moderate SDP Serb, Simo Rajić, who gave a speech in 
Croatian Assembly condemning the SDS and Milošević, was given the Sabor vice-
president post which the SDS had declined to fill. As Ivana Durić and Vladimir Zorić 
observe, however, such divisions between 'good' and 'bad' Serbs (and, alternately, 
between 'good' and 'bad' Croats) inevitably 'upheld the initial biased attitude against the 
‘bad them’ and further hardened the us–them division'.201 For the SDS and many Serbs, 
200 Roksanda Ninčić, 'The Dangerous Plebiscite', Vreme News Digest Agency, 28/10/1991. Mirjana 
Tomić, 'Un referéndum en Yugoslavia agudiza la tensión entre serbios y croatas', El Pais, 19/8/1990. 
Gordana Gojak, 'Krizu riješiti bez nasilja', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.3. Josip Manolić, Intervjui i javni  
nastupi 1989-1995 (Zagreb: Politeia, 1995), p.38.
201 Ivana Durić & Vladimir Zorić, 'Foreclosing the Other, Building the War: A Comparative Analysis of 
Croatian and Serbian Press Discourses During the Conflict in Croatia', in Pål Kolstø (ed), Media 
Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts: Representations of Self and Other (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 
p.69.
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meanwhile, Croatia was implementing, as Rašković and Babić put it, 'state terrorism' 
against the Serbian people in Croatia.202 The passing of the constitutional amendments, 
the ban on the referendum and the police operations on 17 August, Rašković argued, 
showed that Ustashism was triumphing, and he now largely abandoned his previous 
optimism about an agreement.203
There were, however, still contacts and talks between the conflicting sides – for 
example, Rašković with Mesić and Tuđman on 17 August, while on 18 August the chief 
of the Šibenik SUP was in Knin for talks with Babić.204 The Croatian side demanded the 
return of arms and dismantling of the barricades, initially setting a deadline of 19 
August. Babić, however, publicly rejected this, claiming that he did not have the moral 
right to call on his people to disarm while they faced 'state terrorism'.205
The SDS decided not to participate in an extraordinary Sabor session of 24 August, 
sending just one representative to present their stance. But they did unaninmously 
approve negotiations with the HDZ, which the latter initiated with a request to Vukčević 
to present SDS demands for reducing tension. At an SDS-HDZ meeting on 30 August 
he put forward seven demands, some quite substantial – new elections in Serb regions, 
recognising the plebiscite as legal – and others more minor – upgrading the Knin police 
station to a SUP, ceasing calling the SDS leaders 'terrorists' and 'Chetniks', and peaceful 
life and work for the SDS leaders, including Rašković, who lived in Šibenik. As 
Vukčević emphasises, however, none of these requests was met.206
202 'Najveća želja - sprečiti krvopriliće', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.3. 'Rašković To Ask for Federal 
'Intervention'', Ljubljana Domestic Service, 18/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-161, 20/8/1990.
203 Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.264, 274, 277. V. Vignjević, 'Nećemo kriv', Borba, 6/9/1990, p.3.
204 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T14002. Interviews: Dušan Orlović; Veljko Popović, President 
of Knin Executive Council, 1990 (Belgrade: 2007). Ante Pancirov, 'Nikola Vukošić: Da smo smjeli...'. 
'Babić ideolog pobune, Martić samo marioneta', Novi List, 20/11/2003, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.veritas.org.rs/wp-content/bilteni/Bilten_62.pdf.
205 Grandits & Leutloff, p.34.
206 Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007). Vojislav Vukčević, ‘Predloge’, 30/8/1990 (author's 
copy). I. R., 'Prestati sa uvredama', Borba, 8-9/9/1990, p.10.
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While the Croatian authorities sought the return of arms Serbs took from stations, Serb 
municipalities demanded, among other things, the return of arms the MUP had taken, as 
well as the withdrawal from the region of special forces (whose presence Zagreb usually 
denied).207 Despite shootings from Sinj on 20 August and various plans to re-take the 
region, however, there was some progress in this respect. In the days immediately 
following 17 August, all the arms Serbs had distributed in Obrovac were returned to the 
station, while on 19 August SUP Gospic also returned the arms taken from Lapac.208 The 
MUP did not return the arms taken from Benkovac or Gračac, however, while in Knin 
the Serbs likewise refused.
Rašković claimed that he favoured the return of the Knin arms, but not 'capitulation' - a 
one-sided call to return those arms would 'bring into question the entire party'.209 On 24 
August he had a meeting with Boljkovac in Zagreb, where he proposed that the Serbs in 
Knin return arms, and dismantle the barricades, in exchange for Knin becoming a SUP, 
as had been demanded previously.210 This meeting was again controversial as it was 
initially secret but then published in the press prematurely, Rašković complaining that 
he had again been framed.211 Nevertheless, contacts between the MUP and Knin 
authorities were also taking place, with Knin demanding a SUP, while Babić also met 
several times with Jerko Vukas, the HDZ President of neighbouring Sinj municipality – 
the two knew each other privately and Vukas came to Knin on a 'peace mission', with 
later endorsement from above. They even made some agreements, with Babić appealing 
to Serbs not to place barricades towards Sinj, and Vukas appealing to the MUP to 
withdraw militia from the region.212
207 S. S., 'Razgovor Babića i Vukosa', Borba, 31/8/1990, p.4
208 Marijan, ‘Djelvoanje JNA i Pobunjenih Srba u Lici'. Ivica Marijačić, 'Prepodavali oružje', Vjesnik, 
11/9/1990, p.12. Miloš Rajković & Kosta Krajinčanić, 'Knin Veterans Predict Ustasha To Take Power', 
Belgrade Domestic Service, 23/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-165, 24/8/2990.
209 'Mali rat kao opereta', Borba, 24/8/1990. Momir Ilić, 'Plebiscit Srba u Hrvatskoj: plodovi nove vlasti', 
Intervju, 31/8/1990, pp.4-7.
210 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.323-8.
211 Ibid, pp.350-4.
212 S. S., 'Razgovor Babića i Vukosa', Borba, 31/8/1990, p.4. S. Stamatović, 'Pregovori na Plitvicama?', 
Borba, 5/9/1990, p.3. Čavka.
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From early September onwards the peaceful option with regard to Knin prevailed in the 
Croatian leadership. However, though favouring talks, the ruling HDZ showed little 
willingness to alter its stances, escalating its rhetoric and, for example, not granting any 
of Vukčević's demands. In Šibenik a petition against the presence of Rašković and other 
prominent local SDS leaders was started, orchestrated by the local HDZ authorities, 
with accompanying pressures and threats against the individuals named, as well as 
dismissals from work.213 Newly elected Croatian Prime Minister Josip Manolić spoke 
against the petition, but no action appears to have been taken, and other leading officials 
seemed to endorse the sentiment behind it, with Mesić saying in October that SDS 
leaders must 'respect Croatian laws, or they will not be here [in Croatia]'.214 
Discrimination against Serbs, such as dismissals from work, also escalated with the 
rebellion.
Meanwhile, the Croatian government was also implementing a progressive 'economic 
blockade' of the 'rebel' municipalities. Already when the Association was formed there 
were proposals for this, and complaints from Serb municipalities that they were being 
cut off.215 This escalated after 17 August, when the authorities resolved to stop financing 
those allegedly participating in the 'scenario' against Croatia.216 The main factory in 
Knin, Tvik, for example, was ordered to repay all its debts, threatening it with 
bankruptcy. It was later saved by a deal with companies in Belgrade, after Babić 
appealed to Milošević.217 Pay for teachers and other municipal employees began to be 
cut off.218 Agreed economic projects were also renounced: on the one hand, hardline 
213 'Traže iseljavanje Raškovića', Borba, 23/8/1990, p.3. S. Stamatović, 'Dr Jovan Rašković dobio otkaz', 
Borba, 29/8/1990, p.1. S. Stamatović, 'Izgon', Borba, 5/9/1990, p.3. ICTY-Martić: Witness Branko 
Popović; E-939 (Politika, 23/8/1990). 'Serb Leader in Knin Region Indicates Little Hope', Belgrade 
Domestic Service, 23/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-165, 24/8/2990. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.331.
214 M. Krmpotić, 'Skupovi na sve strane', Borba, 8/10/1990, p.3. Manolić, p.39.
215 'Croat Government Meets With Serb Municipalities', Tanjug, 10/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-156, 
13/8/1990. Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.322. Gordana Gojak, 'Razrađen scenarij za rušenje vlasti', Borba, 
15/8/1990, p.1.
216 Gordana Gojak, 'Krizu riješiti bez nasilja', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.3. Interview Veljko Popović, President 
of Knin Executive Council, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 8/11/2007).
217 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.4 (Babić Interview), p.20.
218 I. Radovanović, 'Blokada TVIK-a', Borba, 24/8/1990, p.3. Momir Ilić, 'Plebiscit Srba u Hrvatskoj: 
plodovi nove vlasti', Intervju, No.241, 31/8/1990, pp.4-7. 'Deblokada pa dijalog', Borba, 11/10/1990, 
p.1. Barić, Srpska pobuna, p.128-9.
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Serbs around Babić insisted the Croats recognise and talk with the Association; on the 
other hand, Croat officials said the projects could only go ahead if they left the 
Association.219 As Mesić said at the time, 'while they stand on barricades, it would be 
stupid of us to give them money for them to buy arms'.220 This policy produced the 
opposite of that intended, however, increasing the separation and decreasing the links 
between the Krajina and Croatia, encouraging the Krajina Serbs to build economic and 
other links with Serbia, and also punishing municipalities that were more moderately 
inclined, such as those in Banija-Kordun.221
The HDZ leadership does seem to have been interested in a negotiated solution with the 
Serbs based on minority rights within Croatia.222 However, due to its own actions, 
rhetoric and policies, and the stance of Serb hardliners with no interest or faith in 
negotiations, opportunities for talks were shrinking. Thus, ordinary Serbs really had no 
idea what Croatia might offer, only the word of Croatian leaders, which was 
undermined by actions that seemed threatening and contrary to their promises.
In the SDS, meanwhile, there were differing opinions on how to proceed. Rašković 
oscillated between pacifist rhetoric and supporting the people's right to defend 
themselves from 'state terrorism'. He did not advocate 'capitulation', but sought to reach 
some compromise that would help alleviate tensions.223 Opačić and Zelenbaba opposed 
talks with the Croatian side, and advocated further arming and barricades.224 Babić was 
219 'Sve manje optimizma', Borba, 11/10/1990, p.1. BBC-DOY: Slavko Degoricija. Interview Dušan 
Vjestica, President of Gračac Executive Council, 1990-92 (Belgrade: 9/11/2007). Jelena Lovrić, 'We'll 
Go To Knin, Too...', Danas, 9/4/1991, pp.18-19, in FBIS-EER-91-075, 4/6/1991.
220 Stela Bogdanić, 'Zašto idem u Beograd', Borba, 31/8/1990.
221 Prime Minister Manolić seemed to recognise this in January 1991: Marinko Čulić, 'Everything 
According to Law', Danas, 15/1/1991, pp.18-19, in FBIS-EER-91-027, 4/3/1991.
222 See, for example: Degoricija, pp.23-30. Tomac, pp.156-71. Nobilo, pp.104-5, 220-23. Sarinic, pp.16, 
219. Croatian Presidential Transcript, 4/3/1992, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.slobodanpraljak.com/MATERIJALI/SVJEDOCI/MiomirZuzul/42.pdf  .  Zvonko Lerotic, 
'Finska kao putkoaz', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.22-24. Slavko Ćuruvija, 'Lančana samoubojstva', Borba, 
3-4/11/1990, p.5. 'Odluka o proglašenju Ustavnog zakona...', Narodne Novine, No.65, 4/12/91. 
'Ustavni zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Ustavnog zakona...', Narodne Novine, No.27, 8/5/1992.
223 'Samo kulturna autonomija', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.1. 'Mali rat kao opereta', Borba, 24/8/1990, p.8. 
Momir Ilić, 'Plebiscit Srba u Hrvatskoj: plodovi nove vlasti', Intervju, 31/8/1990, pp.4-7.
224 'Sedmorica za linč', Borba, 22/8/1990, p.3. V. Vignjević, 'Nećemo kriv', Borba, 6/9/1990. Momir Ilić, 
'Plebiscit Srba u Hrvatskoj: plodovi nove vlasti', Intervju, 31/8/1990, pp.4-7. Jelena Lovrić, 'Smjene i 
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somewhere inbetween. He blocked, for example, talks with a proposed Sabor delegation 
headed by Mesić, which was to visit the Serb municipalities for talks, yet attended other 
talks.225
The 10 September Agreement
On 7 September, following the rejection of the visit of Mesić's commission, the 
Croatian MUP issued a new ultimatum to Knin: they must return the arms by 11 
September, or ‘all appropriate legal measures, including criminal and other repressive 
measures’ would be taken.226 Local SDS and municipal officials strongly rejected this 
demand.227 This and the aforementioned contacts led to a meeting in Donji Lapac 
between a Croatian delegation (MUP chief Boljkovac, Degoricija, Vukas and others) 
and an SNV delegation led by Babić.
The Lapac talks took place mainly because both sides wished to avoid a direct 
confrontation. They therefore ended up proclaiming an agreement, even though key 
issues remained unresolved. As one participant in the talks, an SDS moderate who later 
became the leader of 'Tuđman's Serbs', has recalled, the talks finished 'without result'.228 
The two sides signed a statement supporting the formation of a Knin SUP, the return of 
arms in Knin, delaying the deadline for that return, and resolving future issues through 
dialogue.229 It was also said that people returning arms would not be prosecuted, and 
krizna vremena', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.9-12. Marinko Čulić, 'Slijeganje tla', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.20-
21. Milan Jajčinović, 'Barikade u glavama', Danas, 28/8/1990, pp.26-27. ICTY-Milošević: Witness 
Milan Babić, T13563. I. Radovanović, 'Dve struje', Borba, 24/8/1990, p.3. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, 
Document 16 (Daily Report of JNA 9th Corps, 22/8/1990), p.48, Document 55 (Official Note about 
connections between Arkan and Milan Babić, 31/5/1991), pp.138-9.
225 Miroslav Ivić, 'Nema razloga za strah', Vjesnik, 10/9/1990, pp.1-2. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Stjepan 
Mesić, T10523-4. 'We Will See What We Have in Common', Politika, 31/3/1991, pp.9-11, in FBIS-
EER-91-051, 22/4/1991.
226 'Croatia Orders Return of 'Unauthorized' Weapons', Tanjug, 7/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-175, 
10/9/1990.
227 Mirko Ćuruvija & Miroslav Ivić, 'Glavna tema oružje', Vjesnik, 9/9/1990, p.1. 'Oružje ostaje u Kninu', 
Borba, 10/9/1990, p.1. Očić, Hronika Republike Srpske Krajine 1989-1991, p.27. M.C., 'Oružje se ne 
vraća?', Vjesnik, 10/9/1990, p.14.
228 Milan Đukić, Ugašena ognjišta širom svijetle (Zagreb: Srpska narodna stranka, 2008), p.49.
229 ICTY-Martić: E-180 (Lapac Announcement, 10/9/1990).
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that the arms would remain in Knin.230 The Serbs sought that the Knin SUP would cover 
all the municipalities of their Association, but the MUP rejected this and envisaged only 
a single separate unit. This fundamental issue was not resolved in the talks, and Babić 
and Boljkovac openly clashed over it at the subsequent press conference.231 The MUP 
also only undertook to advocate for the formation of a Knin SUP in the Croatian Sabor, 
about which the Sabor would decide, while no new deadline was set for the return of the 
Knin arms.232 Both moves were presumably to be undertaken simultaneously, but it soon 
became clear that neither side was willing to move first.
Babić apparently agreed to begin the return of arms, but even at the press conference 
after the meeting he was calling this into question, promising only to 'appeal' to people 
'who really got [arms] illegally' to begin their return, and saying that this return would 
occur in so much as people had faith in the initiative regarding the SUP.233 On Knin 
Radio the following evening Babić then noted that the Serb people had 'lost trust in the 
Croatian government and MUP' and that he could 'appeal... for the people to return 
arms' only when that faith was restored. He also insisted that this required, first, the 
creation of a Knin SUP and the withdrawal of special forces from the region, and 
maintained that he was not, in fact, calling for the return of arms yet.234 On 16 
September two rifles were returned in Knin, as an announced 'expression of good will' 
in the hope that the formation of a SUP would follow, before any further returns. No 
Knin SUP was formed, however, and nor were any more arms returned.235
230 S. Modrić, 'Krčenje staza za buduće pregovore', Borba, 12/9/1990, p.3. S. Stamatović, 'Iyvjesno 
opuštanje poslije napetosti', Borba, 12/9/1990, p.3. Mirko Ćuruvija, 'Postignut dogovor o vraćanju 
oružja', Vjesnik, 11/9/1990, p.1.
231 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 26, Stenogram of Donji Lapac Press Conference, 10/9/1990, pp.67-
8. Milan Đukić, p.50. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). S.S., 'Najava samostalne milicije', 
Borba, 3/8/1990, p.9. Dragan Barjaktarević, 'Hrvatske paralele: Ustaše i Tuđman', Intervju, 17/8/1990, 
pp.12-14. Šimun Penava, Hrvatski domovinski rat: kronologija rata u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1995 (Zagreb: 
Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1995), p.4. 
232 'Scenarij je doživio krah', Vjesnik,12/9/1990, p.2.
233 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 26, Stenogram of Donji Lapac Press Conference, 10/9/1990, pp.67-
8. Degoricija, p.214.
234 S. Stamatović, 'Teško vraćanje izgubljenog povjerenja', Borba, 13/9/1990, p.3. Mirko Ćuruvija, 
'Oružje jos nije vraćeno', Vjesnik, 13/9/1990, p.3. Dragan Durić, 'Ministrove muke', Vjesnik, 
14/9/1990, p.2. Sanja Modrić, 'Babićev kopernikanski obrat', Borba, 17/9/1990, p.5. Jasna Babić, 'Čije 
je oružje', Danas, 18/9/1990, pp.13-15. Očić, Hronika Republike Srpske Krajine 1989-1991, pp.28-9.
235 ICTY-Martić: E-503 (Draft Decision on Establishment of SUP Knin, 7/11/1990).
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Opposition from more hardline elements may partly explain Babić's shift, but any 
promise to begin the return of arms was also a very brief diversion from Babić's usual 
position, and at least partly tactical. The Serbs had actually plied the Croats with rakija, 
plum brandy, whilst drinking water themselves, seemingly to some effect.236 As Babić 
noted, what was most important was that they had ended the use of ultimatums, leading 
to a basis for dialogue.237 
From the Croatian perspective, Boljkovac and others saw no prospect of success in the 
police action they were threatening and hoped for a negotiated solution. They therefore 
proclaimed this agreement a success despite the unresolved issues, even citing the return 
of arms in Obrovac as a result, though this had occurred weeks earlier.238 As one SDS 
official noted, these talks merely served for both sides to avoid a confrontation – but 
neither side was willing to move first and although it reduced tension for the moment, 
nothing concrete resulted.239
Escalation and Entrenchment
For the SDS, the key result of the Lapac meeting  was the agreement that issues would 
be resolved by dialogue, not ultimatums. Babić claimed to be optimistic about such 
dialogue, which the SDS continued to approve, SDS negotiator Vukčević being 
promoted to party vice-president.240 Two weeks later, however, action by Zagreb again 
236 Srđan Radulović, Sudbina krajine (Belgrade: Dan Graf, 1996), p..22. Interview Marko Dobrijević, 
Organisational Secretary of SDS, 1990-1 (Belgrade: 5/8/2007). '[Balvan revolucija] - Sastanak Josipa 
Boljkovca i Milana Babića u Donjem Lapcu (10.09.1990.)', YouTube, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3o6V2Tr74k.
237 Mirko Ćuruvija, 'Nisu porušeni mostović, Vjesnik, 11/9/1990, p.12. Stefan Grubač, 'Red poteza u 
cajtnotu', NIN, 14/9/1990, p.16. S. Stamatović, 'Iyvjesno opuštanje poslije napetosti', Borba, 
12/9/1990, p.3.
238 'Scenarij je doživio krah', Vjesnik,12/9/1990, p.2. Jasna Babić, 'Čije je oružje', Danas, 18/9/1990, 
pp.13-15. Vlado Rajić, 'Hrvatska predlaže – savez država', Vjesnik, 11/9/1990, pp.1-2. Ivica Marijačić, 
'Prepodavali oružje', Vjesnik, 11/9/1990, p.12.
239 S. Modrić, 'Dobivanje na vremenu', Borba, 12/9/1990, p.3.
240 Stefan Grubač, 'Red poteza u cajtnotu', NIN, 14/9/1990, p.16. Očić, Hronika Republike Srpske Krajine  
1989-1991, p.30. Interview Dušan Vjestica (Belgrade: 9/11/2007).
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undermined prospects for talks, reinforced hardline stances on the Serbian side, and 
radicalised the situation, in Banija now as well as the Knin Krajina.
On 24 September the MUP decided to remove 60% of reserve police arms from SJSs, 
obstensibly in order to arm new recruits.241 This decision again seems to have been 
targetted at Serb-populated municipalities – at the same time that arms were already 
being distributed to the HDZ. On the night of 27-28 of September, again secretly, arms 
were withdrawn from some of the Serb-majority municipalities, including Obrovac 
(where the Serbs had previously returned the arms to the station), Dvor and perhaps 
Glina, the latter two in the previously peaceful Banija region. In Petrinja, a mixed 
municipality in Banija, however, SDS activists had found out about the arms' removal 
and forced their return to Petrinja SJS. Word then spread throughout Banija, as it had 
through Knin Krajina on 17 August, and large numbers of Serbs, some armed, gathered 
and protested outside the SJSs in these and other municipalities, demanding the arms’ 
return or trying to prevent their removal, and blockading town centres. Municipal 
bodies also demanded the return of arms, but were ignored.242
In the afternoon of 28 September the Serbs broke into Petrinja SJS and took some police 
weapons – 45 pistols and 9 rifles – following which Croatian special forces entered the 
town.243 They dispersed the gathered Serbs with truncheons, tear gas and water cannon, 
took control of the town centre, and began searching for the seized arms. Alarmed, 
Serbs then broke into the Glina SJS, after which specials entered there, too. The same 
sequence then occurred in Dvor. Serbs also seized arms in Obrovac and Lapac and a 
complete road and rail blockade was declared in the Knin Krajina. The whole Knin 
region was mobilised again, with barricades up everywhere and warnings of an Ustaša 
invasion. Babić even called Knin Radio and told them that special forces were 
approaching Knin (which was, apparently, again being considered).244
241 ICTY-Martić: E-613 (Collection of military documents), pp.22-3.
242 Account constructed from reports in FBIS-EEU-90-190-193, 1-3/10/1990, and Borba articles from the 
period.
243 ICTY-Martić: E-613 (Collection of military documents), pp.23-4.
244 S. Stamatović & I. Radovanović, 'Otpor “do poslednje kapi”', Borba, 1/10/1990, p.3. I. Radovanović, 
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The Croatian MUP called these events a planned ‘terrorist uprising’, but they seem to 
have unfolded, rather, as a reaction to the MUP's latest moves to remove arms from 
predominantly Serb police stations. The Serbs only seized a relatively small quantity of 
arms: about 250 rifles, 150 pistols, and 25 machine-guns.245 SDS activists generally led 
the seizures, and in Obrovac and Lapac the municipal presidents certainly authorised 
these.246 All the municipal authorities in Banija-Kordun (where the SDS was not yet 
dominant), however, condemned them and appealed for the weapons’ return. Despite a 
later MUP promise of immunity, however, only one man complied.247
Many Serbs seem to have viewed the intervention of the special forces as a form of 
occupation and ‘state terror’, which was compared to 1941. Rašković, for example, 
spoke of 'violent attacks on the innocent people of Banija' which 'border on genocide': 
'People are fleeing from their homes, as in 1941... The ethnically pure Croatian police, 
armed to the teeth and reminiscent of the infamous SS troops, are exerting pressure on 
the Serbian people'.248 After forcefully dispersing Serb crowds the Croatian specials, 
many of whom had been recruited from that very region, apparently mistreated the 
population during weapons searches, entering homes without warrants, arresting and 
beating people, and even, local officials claimed, searching school children at gun 
point.249 The Serbian newspaper Politika reported 360 arrested in Banija. Zagreb 
claimed that the figure was more than ten times fewer, and most were released in a 
week, but prominent figures, including the two main Serb leaders in Petrinja and the 
'“Dva rata” u mesec dana', Borba, 2/10/1990, p.2.
245 D. Pušonjić, 'Svakom svoja istina', Borba, 4/10/1990, p.3.
246 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). Milan Jajčinović, 'Pobuna u krajini', Danas, 9/10/1990, 
pp.12-13.
247 'Tensions Ease Slightly; Dvor na Uni Arms Returned', Tanjug, 3/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-193, 
4/10/1990. 'Petrinja People Said in Hiding; Arms Not Returned', Belgrade Domestic Service, 
5/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-195, 9/10/1990. M. Krmpotić, 'Specijalci “čuvaju” mir', Borba, 
1/10/1991, p.1. V. Ilić, 'Sramota nacionalnog aršina', Borba, 3/10/1990, p.1.
248 Jovan Rašković, 'What DANAS Does Not Dare To Publish', NIN, 28/12/1990, pp.28-29, in FBIS-
EER-91-018, 11/2/1991. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.130. Also: Snježana Stamatović, 'Autonomija 
nije pala s neba', Borba, 12-13/1/1991, p.5.
249 See, for example: M. Krmpotić, 'Specijalci “čuvaju” mir', Borba, 1/10/1991, p.1.'Specijalci i djecu 
pretresaju!', Borba, 2/1/1990, p.2. ICTY-Milošević: E359.1 (Human Rights Watch Report, 1/1991). 
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heads of Petrinja and Glina SJS, remained imprisoned.250 Schools were shut down and 
economic life stopped, villagers fled to the forests with arms, and several hundred 
people gathered by a JNA barracks seeking protection.251 As Boljkovac himself later 
said, Banija was solved with 'beatings/truncheons'.252
Municipal organs demanded that Croatian forces withdraw, which they did in early 
October, after the SFRJ Presidency requested this. As well as the arrests of police chiefs, 
some other Serb policemen in these municipalities resigned or were forced out, and new 
Croat recruits soon arrived. Village watches, war staffs and arming of the people now 
escalated in Banija, too, but traffic was still free and the region's police stations 
remained more fully under Zagreb's control.253
These conflicts caused a serious deterioration of relations in Croatia. Knin Krajina was 
completely blockaded, and Banija was now involved in clashes. Tensions also spread 
elsewhere, including in Slavonia.254 The SNV condemned ‘Ustaša terror’ and supported 
resistance by 'all means'; the SDS decided to suspend all relations with the HDZ.255 In 
the Sabor the SDS’s delegate was hit with a briefcase and forced off the rostrum, while 
HDZ extremists spoke of banishing Serbs from Croatia.256 Babić accused the MUP of 
250 Snježana Mulić, 'Samo sloga Hrvatsku spašava', Deno Novo, 12/10/1990, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
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breaking their agreement not to use force, and certainly now – if there had been before – 
there was no question of the Serbs in Knin and elsewhere returning their arms.257
Federal Yugoslav organs attempted to calm the situation and promote dialogue. In the 
first half of October, three federal delegations toured the relevant municipalities in 
Croatia alongside a Croatian delegation (Boljkovac, Degoricija). In Knin, Babić and 
others objected to the presence of Boljkovac while Serbs were still imprisoned, but all 
these meetings went ahead, both sides emphasising the need for further dialogue.258 
There were no concrete results, however, and although contacts and some meetings 
continued, there were no more serious talks on resolving the problem of the barricades 
in Knin Krajina.259 With these events, the talk of dialogue in September was completely 
superseded, and Babić now proclaimed the barricades 'the greatest guarantee of security 
here in Knin'.260 Both sides were now fully convinced of the need to prepare for conflict, 
with the main arming taking place from October onwards. Militarisation was 
entrenched.
5/11/1990.
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3.7. Milan Babić: From Rebel to Witness
In 2001, after being named as a co-conspirator in the ICTY indictment of Milošević for 
crimes in Croatia, Milan Babić began talking to Hague investigators. The following year 
he testified against Milošević, providing key 'insider' testimony for the OTP. Babić 
seems to have been at least partly motivated by a desire to avoid prosecution himself, 
but he was indicted anyway the following year.261 He negotiated a deal for a lighter 
sentence and subsequently testified at several more trials, before committing suicide in 
March 2006, part-way into his testimony against Martić. His testimony was essential to 
a number of OTP cases, and continued to be employed after his death.
In The Hague Babić claimed that a secretive, Belgrade-connected 'parallel structure' was 
behind the descent into conflict in Croatia from autumn 1990 onwards, including the 
events of 17 August and later. He generally tried to present himself as a moderate at 
heart who – despite being famous for the number of executive posts he accumulated - 
unfortunately held no real power, and blamed almost the entire conflict on this 'parallel 
structure' directed by Milošević through the Serbian DB. He named most other Krajina 
Serb leaders and officials as part of this ‘structure’ - including some of his own close 
allies, and people he had removed because of their moderation.262 He almost always 
denied his own agency, at times to the point of absurdity. His campaign against 
Rašković (discussed in Chapter 6) does not appear at all in his accounts, and he often 
tried to shift responsibility for his own decisions and statements onto others, such as his 
advisor, Boro Rašuo. Claiming to have realised later that Rašuo had been part of the 
‘parallel structure’ all along, Babić even argued that many of his actions in 1991-92 
which Milošević had strongly opposed263 were actually orchestrated by Milošević in 
order to discredit him. (‘God help me... you are engaging in science fiction now’, was 
Milošević’s response.)264
261 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T12861, 13597.
262 Such as Dušan Štarević, discussed in Chapter 6.
263 Discussed in Chapter 6.
264 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13509-18. ICTY investigators themselves seemed highly 
sceptical of Babić's claims in this area, asking if him for evidence, something they did not do for many 
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Babić also tended to downplay Croatian actions to which the Serbs claimed they were 
responding, bringing his account in line with the OTP's. For example, he insisted that 
the 'Balvan Revolution' showed that the Serbian side was the first to use force – though 
Croatian sources themselves acknowledge that they had sent special forces towards 
Knin.265
A detailed analysis of Babić's account, cross-checked against numerous other sources, 
shows that it was self-serving, misleading, and strongly marked by paranoia (a trait 
Babić exhibited already in 1990, as noted in Chapter 6). When used critically and in 
conjunction with other sources, however, even testimonies as problematic as Babić's can 
be revelatory. His accounts were characterised more by misrepresentation and self-
justification than outright fabrication, and much in them appears to be true. His 
revelations about the Karađorđevo talks, which he first made in 1992, for example, are 
confirmed by a number of Croatian sources.266 Through their employment in the ICTY 
Babić's testimonies are also in the process of being written into the history of the war in 
Croatia and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It is for these reasons that I generally 
engage with Babić's versions of events, rather than simply dismissing them due to their 
problematic nature.
The 'Council of National Resistance'
A core part of Babić's Hague testimony was his claim that in autumn and winter 1990 
Belgrade's 'parallel structure' was represented by the 'Council of National Resistance' 
(SNO), which was led by Martić and blocked Babić's efforts to find a peaceful solution. 
Babić claimed, for example, that he had agreed the return of the Knin arms on 10 
other topics, and it is notable that they did not lead any evidence on this issue. ICTY-Babić: E-PS.2.14 
(Babić Interview), pp.23-24.
265 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1778-82.
266 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13111-2. Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who 
“Disappeared”', NIN, 18/12/1992, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 15/1/1993. Svetislav Spasojević, 'Milan 
Babić: Battle for Krajina (2): Tailors of Destiny', NIN, 25/12/1992, in FBIS-EEU-93-014, 25/1/1993. 
Confirmed by, among others: ICTY-Milošević: Witnesses Stjepan Kljuić, HDZ-BH President, 1990-
92, T24393; Stjepan Mesić, T10657.
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September, but the SNO refused to implement the agreement, and that evening or the 
following day one of its members even threatened to kill him.267 
However, the overwhelming majority of evidence clearly shows that Babić supported 
the arming and organising of the Krajina Serbs from mid-1990 onwards, and refutes his 
Hague testimonies. For example, Babić claimed that on 17 August he was 'tricked' by 
the 'parallel structure' into believing Croatian forces were advancing, and that Martić 
independently distributed the police arms. But in his own interview with the BBC Babić 
had described how he ordered Martić to distribute those arms and deliberately waited 
hours after learning the Croats were not advancing before relaying this.268 Two sources 
report that earlier that day Babić had also tried to order the Knin TO to mobilise, while 
media reports show that in early October Babić personally called Knin Radio to warn 
that the specials were again advancing.269
Investigation of different aspects of the 'Balvan Revolution' continually brings one back 
to Babić. Indeed, the vast majority of sources, including all five sources I have found 
that acknowledge involvement in the SNO itself,270 indicate that Babić was himself in 
charge of the SNO, a loose co-ordinating body of those involved in the uprising, and of 
'resistance' activities in Knin – as Babić himself had previously described to the BBC.271 
The only contemporary 'insider' source on this issue, a statement by an SNO member to 
JNA security organs in December 1990, for example, describes in detail how Babić had 
267 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T12934-6.
268 During which time the 'war state' was reported over Knin Radio 'more than a dozen times'. 'Grubi 
nasrtaj na Hrvatsku', Vjesnik, 18/8/1990, p.1. Numerous sources confirm Babić's order for 
mobilisation: see footnote 130.
269 I. Radovanović, '“Dva rata” u mesec dana', Borba, 2/10/1990, p.2. ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan 
Dragišić, commander of Knin TO, 1990-91, T8589-90. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). 
270 Milan Martić, Simo Dubajić, Ognjen Biserko, MM-003/JF-039 and DST-043: Predrag Popović, 
'Trebalo je da slušamo Tuđmana [Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 13/3/1995, pp.52-3. ICTY-
Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-978 (Statement of MM-003); Witnesses JF-039, DST-043. ICTY-Karadžić: 
Witness Milan Martić; Submission of Statement of Milan Martić (8/5/2013), paras 44-5.
271 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić. ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Dragišić. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness 
Mile Bosnić. Interviews: Dušan Orlović; Mile Bosnić; Branko Perić; Ratko Ličina (Belgrade: 2007, 
2009). HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 55 (Official Note about connections between Arkan and 
Milan Babić, 31/5/1991), pp.138-9.
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the authority to include and exclude people from the SNO.272 Based on several such 
statements and other contacts, JNA security reported that Babić was the 'commander' of 
the SNO, and Martić 'his deputy'.273 Informed journalists at the time thought similarly: 
the anonymous SNO was simply a cover for Babić and others to avoid political and 
legal responsibility for public statements advocating 'resistance' to Zagreb.274 I have 
found only one source that confirms Babić's account on this issue: Drago Kovačević, a 
key deputy of Babić in 1993-95 and his sole witness in his trial.275 However, Kovačević 
played no role in events in 1990-91, being an opposition deputy in Knin at the time, and 
himself confirmed to me that he then had very little contact with Babić.276 His claimed 
knowledge of secretive, behind-the-scenes developments from this period is evidently 
simply derived from Babić, whose account he repeats almost identically, and is thus of 
little evidentiary value.
There is some evidence of disagreements in Knin over the Lapac talks. The Croatian 
delegation claimed that Babić became uncooperative part way through the meeting, 
after a phone call from hardliners announcing a decision to assasinate the Croats.277 
Members of the Serbian delegation, including Babić himself, have not supported this 
claim,278 but a poll at the time did show that 60% of SDS members opposed the 
agreement, as did many in the SNV, such as Opačić and Zelenbaba.279 Babić's freedom 
of action was undoubtedly constrained, just as Rašković's was. But his agreement to 
272 ICTY-Martić: E872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). Details confirmed by: ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-043, SDS and SNO activist, and Vasiljević, p.94.
273 Vasiljević, p.94.
274 Jasna Babić, 'Čije je oružje', Danas, 18/9/1990, pp.13-15. I. Radovanović, '“Dva rata” u mesec dana', 
Borba, 2/10/1990, p.2. I.R., 'Ranjena dva milicionara', Borba, 4/10/1990, p.2. Interview Filip Švarm, 
Vreme journalist (Belgrade: 17/7/2007). S. Stamatović & I. Radovanović, 'Otpor “do poslednje kapi”', 
Borba, 1/10/1990, p.3.
275 See Kovačević, op. cit., and ICTY-Babić: Witness Drago Kovačević.
276 Interview Drago Kovačević (Belgrade: 25/7/2007).
277 Degoricija, pp.147-9, 152-3, 214. Boljkovac, pp.199-201. 
278 Đukić, pp.49-50. Interview Dušan Vjestica (Belgrade: 9/11/2007). ICTY-Babić: Defence Motion 
Annex 2 (Witness Statements), p.18. Also: ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003.
279 Dejan Jović, 'Jastrebovi nize lete', Danas, 2/10/1990, pp.16-19. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan 
Babić, T1773. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.2 (Babić Interview), p.14. Mirko Ćuruvija & Miroslav Ivić, 
'Glavna tema oružje', Vjesnik, 9/9/1990, p.1. S. Stamatović, 'Teško vraćanje izgubljenog povjerenja', 
Borba, 13/9/1990, p.3. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). S.I.B., 'Ni u šumu, ni na drum, 
Borba, 3/10/1990, p.4. 
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begin the return of arms was at least partly tactical and very temporary, lasting a day at 
most, and it seems very unlikely that he ever actually ordered the return of arms, some 
of which were held by his own security detail.280 The SNO's statement on this 
controversy came on 12 September, after Babić had already reverted to his normal 
position, and actually defended Babić, repeating his own stances.281 As already shown, 
moreover, any question of returning arms in Knin or disagreement on this issue was 
soon entirely superseded by renewed action by the Croatian MUP.
Babić presented only very flimsy evidence that the SNO was connected with Belgrade, 
claiming that in late August 1990 Martić introduced him to Serbian DB official Jovica 
Stanišić near Knin. However, Babić also said that he attached no importance to this at 
the time and forgot he had even met Stanišić, only realising that he was a significant 
person the following spring.282 Thus, according to Babić's own testimony, it was only 
after autumn and winter 1990 that he could have concluded that Martić and the SNO in 
that period were working with Belgrade, extrapolating from this one introduction that 
this was the case. The overwhelming majority of evidence points to Babić's close 
involvement in this sector in autumn and winter 1990, his co-operation with Martić and 
his authoritative position in the SNO, and this, in my opinion, strongly suggests that any 
role by the Serbian DB in this period must have been fairly minimal. Otherwise, Babić 
would have known about it, and would have provided stronger evidence of it, rather 
than relying on such weak evidence for such a pivotal part of his Hague thesis. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, it does seem likely that individuals from the Serbian DB visited 
the Knin Krajina in autumn and winter 1990, establishing contact with people such as 
Martić, and probably also sending some minor material assistance. But large quantities 
of such assistance, or the DB having a major role in controlling or directing 
developments in this period, can, I think, be ruled out. The 'Balvan Revolution' was 
280 ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness 
DST-043, SDS activist and SNO member. Interview Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina DB, 1991-92 
(Belgrade: 7/2009). Mirko Ćuruvija, 'Čekaju “službene instrukcije”', 12/9/1990, p.1. Glenny, op. cit., 
pp.10-11.
281 S. Stamatović, 'Apel', Borba, 13/9/1990, p.3.
282 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.5 (Babić Interview), pp.23-6. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T12932-3.
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instigated and led by locals, Babić and Martić first among them, not a 'parallel structure' 
controlled by Belgrade.
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3.8. Polarisation Entrenched
In the last months of 1990 political polarisation between the HDZ and SDS was further 
entrenched and cemented, culminating with the passing of the new Croatian constitution 
and the formation of SAOK in December 1990, which set the stage for the coming 
conflict.
In mid-September the most radical faction in the SDS, Opačić and Zelenbaba, had quit 
the party in protest against Rašković's approach, in particular his support for the rise of 
Babić at their expense. At the time, Vukčević was elected an SDS Vice-President, and 
reported that the party had endorsed continued talks. Nothing had resulted from his 
previous talks, however, so, as Vukčević recalls, hardliners were able to argue that they 
only benefited the HDZ.283
With the escalation in late September the SDS announced that it was, again, suspending 
all contacts with the Croats. The SNV also declared autonomy in Serb territories, 
tasking itself with forming autonomous institutions, although this was not actually done. 
With Babić's people insisting on talks only with the SNV which he headed, and conflicts 
over municipalities' membership of the Association, talks between Croatian negotiators 
such as Degoricija and the Serb-majority municipalities were increasingly refused, or 
brought no results.284 At a meeting of the SDS Executive Board on 20 October the SDS 
then formally adopted its more radical programme, certainly a sign of how the situation 
had escalated.
In October there were still several initiatives for talks, though. On 18 October Vladimir 
Ivković, an SDS vice-president from Zagreb, attended a meeting of all political parties 
in Croatia, which formed a group, to be led by him, which would visit the affected 
283 Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007). Očić, Hronika Republike Srpske Krajine 1989-1991, 
p.30.
284 'Sve manje optimizma', Borba, 11/10/1990, p.1.
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municipalities.285 Babić's faction rejected this on the grounds that HDZ-SDS contacts 
were suspended, and there were reports that Ivković had been dismissed from his post 
(though he was not - presumably because Rašković backed him).286 On 20 October, 
meanwhile, the SDS authorised resumed contacts with the HDZ, with Vukčević 
remaining in post as designated negotiator. On 24 October, he met again with the HDZ, 
represented by Degoricija. These talks, were, however, denounced by Babić's faction, 
which claimed that Vukčević had been endorsed only to begin contacts with the HDZ, 
not full talks, and that only the SNV headed by Babić could negotiate on behalf of the 
Serb nation.287 Rašković wrote a letter of support for Vukčević, and he maintained his 
post, but the hardliners soon began a campaign against him.288
At his meeting with Vukčević, Degoricija had announced a concession: as the Serbs 
objected so much to the proposed definition of Croatia which downgraded their status, 
then this would be moved to the preamble, and Article 1 of the constitution would 
simply define Croatia as a state of its citizens.289 (This had also been sought by the main 
opposition party, the former communist SDP, Stranka demokratske promjene.)290 
Gagnon claims that this compromise satisfied Vukčević, who endorsed the new 
constitution passed in December 1990.291 In fact, both he and Rašković strongly 
opposed that constitution, arguing that with it the Serbs lost their status as a constituent 
nation, and Vukčević considers it the prime cause of the war.292 Rašković and Vukčević's 
stance was outlined in their proposals submitted in December 1990, upon Letica's 
285 'Croatian Political Parties Meet, Issue Statement', Tanjug, 18/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-203, 
19/101990.
286 Marinko Čulić, 'Vladimir Ivković: Još sam potpredsjednik', Danas, 6/11/1990, p.11.
287 Interviews: Marko Dobrijević, Petar Štikovac (Belgrade: 5/8/2007).
288 Jovan Rašković, ‘Mišljenje’, 29/10/1990 (author's copy). Petar Štikovac & Marko Dobrijević, 'I na 
nebu, i na zemlju', Borba, 17/12/1990, p.2. Velimir Ilić, 'Nervi za grešnu strepnju', Borba, 9-
10/2/1991, p.5. V. Ilić, ‘Nisam ja izdajica’, Borba, 22/4/1991.
289 Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007).
290 Tomac, p.70. Željko Sabol, Proglašenje Božićnog Ustava i slika o tom događaju (Zagreb: Hrvatski 
sabor, 2003), pp.66-7.
291 Gagnon, p.145. 
292 Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007). ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Vojislav Vukčević, T11078-9. 
Velimir Ilić, 'Nervi za grešnu strepnju', Borba, 9-10/2/1991, p.5. ‘Croatian Serbs Reject New 
Constitution’, Tanjug, 23/12/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-247, 24/12/1990. Momčilović, p.24. Others in the 
Slavonian SDS expressed the same stance: Miškulin, 'Srpska pobuna u općini Pakrac...', p.366. 
Miškulin, 'Stranka ugroženog naroda...', pp.27-8.
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request. As discussed in Chapter 2, they demanded a bi-national state, territorial 
autonomy and federal Yugoslavia, with the prospect of self-determination hinted at 
too.293 Babić, meanwhile, submitted his proposals for more expansive territorial 
autonomy, which were rejected out of hand as creating a 'state within a state'. The 
differences between the HDZ and SDS were simply too vast to be bridged, and none of 
the SDS proposals were accepted.
At the end of October the Croatian Presidency had created a mixed commission to draft 
proposals for cultural autonomy, which included some prominent Serbian and Croatian 
intellectuals in Croatia.294 The SDS, however, strongly rejected this project, which 
Rašković called a 'farce'.295 At the end of November Rašković even attended a public 
tribune with Degoricija where he denounced the whole cultural autonomy project, 
insisting this was something they considered only in an earlier phase - now, they 
favoured territorial autonomy and self-determination.296 Džakula felt similarly.297 SDS 
leaders simply were not interested in negotiating cultural autonomy within an 
independent Croatia, as the Croatian leadership offered – or, at this stage, such non-
territorial cultural autonomy even if Croatia remained in Yugoslavia.298
Nor did the Croatian leadership itself demonstrate much willingness to implement its 
promises of cultural autonomy. When the new Croatian constitution was finally passed 
on 22 December 1990, Croatia was defined as a citizens' state as Degoricija had 
promised, but there was also a long, nationalist preamble about the Croatian nation. This 
ended by defining Croatia as 'the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of 
members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, 
Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality 
293 Jovan Rašković, ‘Primjedbe na nacrt Ustava Repbulike Hrvatske’, 11/12/1990 (author’s copy).
294 Milan Jajčinović, 'Creation of a West Serbia', Danas, 30/10//1990, pp.26-27 in FBIS-EEU-90-165, 
17/12/1990.
295 Očić, Hronika Republike Srpske Krajine 1989-1991, pp.41-42.
296 I. Tomljanović, 'Tezi i negodvanja', Borba, 1-2/12/1990, p.11. Also: Milan Jajčinović, ‘Krajina mimo 
ustava’, Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15.
297 Miškulin, 'Stranka ugroženog naroda...', p.54.
298 Milan Jajčinović, ‘Krajina mimo ustava’, Danas, 25/12/1990, pp.14-15.
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with citizens of Croatian nationality and the realization of ethnic rights in accordance 
with the democratic norms of the United Nations and countries of free world.'299 Lofty 
promises of equality aside, Serbs, although mentioned, were downgraded to the status of 
a minority like all others, and no longer afforded any special recognition. In addition, 
Latin was declared the official script and Croatian the official language; provisions on 
cultural autonomy and other rights were left to future laws, which were not passed for 
another year.300 Detailed provisions on cultural autonomy and proportional 
representation for Serbs had been prepared by a member of the Croatian Presidency's 
commission, moderate SDP Serb Simo Rajić, but he was 'tricked' and his provisions 
rejected at the last moment, prompting him to resign shortly afterwards.301 The question 
of Serbian rights in Croatia was clearly a sensitive one for the HDZ, and such rights 
were something to be granted only in a Croat-Serb agreement. There was little 
willingness to grant such rights unilaterally, or in alliance with a minority of Serb 
moderates - let alone to concede a Serbian right to territorial autonomy and self-
determination as sought by Rašković and others in the SDS.
With the passing of the new constitution and the formation of SAO Krajina at the end of 
December 1990, the dye was cast for the coming conflict. The Knin Krajina region was 
off limits to Croatian police, and militarisation well underway, with the Croatian side in 
particular having imported and distributed large quantities of arms. Most Serbs were 
alienated by the new constitution, and most Serbian deputies stopped attending the 
Croatian Sabor.302 SAOK was formed and led by hardliners who rejected talks with 
Zagreb, and was on its way to secession from Croatia. Thereafter,  few Croat-Serb talks 
would take place.
299 'Ustav Republike Hrvatske', Narodne Novine, No. 56, 22/12/1990.
300 'Odluka o proglašenju Ustavnog zakona o Ijudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravima etničkih i 
nacionalnih, zajednica ili manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj', Narodne Novine, No.65, 4/12/91.
301 Interviews: Simo Rajić (Zagreb: 30/9/2009); Milorad Pupovac, President of SDF, 1991-95 (Zagreb: 
1/10/2009). For the content of the proposals, see: Drago Roksandić, ‘Ljudska i građanska prava i 
otvorena pitanja personalne i kulturne autonomije Srba u Hrvatskoj’, Scientia Yugoslavica, 16, br. 3-4 
(1990), pp.217-228. Sabol, pp.29-31.
302 'Serbian Deputies Boycott Croatian Assembly', Tanjug, 31/1/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-022, 1/2/1991. 
Zoran Daskalović, 'Zašto su otišili', Danas, 12/2/1991, pp.21-22.
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3.9. Conclusions
The gradual descent into conflict in 1990 seems, in many respects, to have been an 
inevitable result of the gulf between the programmes of the key protagonists of the 
conflict, the HDZ and the SDS. Rašković was always slightly out of step in this process. 
He never had full control of the SDS, which contained strong hardline factions from the 
start, pushing for more radical courses of action, from the suspending of talks in May 
1990 to the SNV and the 'Balvan Revolution'. But the mobilisation of Serbs in Croatia 
behind a platform of unilaterally building Serbian autonomy, and preparing the ground 
for secession from Croatia, was very much Rašković's own policy, and the gulf between 
his own ideas and those in Zagreb was far too large for any compromise to emerge. In 
this sense, the idea of Rašković representing a 'missed opportunity' sabotaged by Serb 
hardliners and Belgrade, and perhaps Zagreb too, is somewhat off the mark. The 
significance of Serb hardliners, and their blocking of Croat-Serb talks, as opposed to 
Rašković and SDS moderates, has also been overstated by some authors in this respect. 
Moreover, although Zagreb supported negotiations it displayed little willingness to 
actually change its core programme or policies as a result, and on the contrary, did much 
to contribute to the radicalisation of the situation.
Each side reacted to the other, in what was in many respects a security dilemma, 
particularly in the security sphere itself. Arming and organising of military forces began 
roughly concurrently on both sides, and was, in this period, conducted on a larger scale 
on the Croatian side, while the Serbian rebellion in the Knin Krajina appears to have 
been triggered by actions of the Croatian MUP, contrary to the usual focus on 
orchestrated Serbian arming and rebelling. The gap between the two sides on this issue 
was also too wide for negotiations to succeed. Although after 17 August Zagreb 
ultimately eschewed further police operations in Knin, these were constantly under 
consideration, and this, along with operations in Banija and the arming of the HDZ, 
helped maintain the Serb sense of being under threat. 
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Contrary to Milan Babić's Hague testimonies, the 'Balvan Revolution' appears to have 
been organised and led by locals, Babić (and Martić) foremost among them, rather than 
a secret structure controlled by Belgrade. His 10 September agreement with Zagreb 
seems to have been more a means for both sides to avoid direct confrontation than a 
concrete agreement as such, and it was soon superseded by renewed MUP activities two 
weeks later. Rašković himself understood the rebellion as being motivated by a desire 
for defence from Croatian attack and did not advocate 'capitulation', despite his pacifist 
inclinations. Overall, the descent into conflict in Croatia during this period can be 
explained well by the escalating interactions between Croats and Serbs within Croatia, 
the HDZ and the SDS, Zagreb and Knin, leaving little need for 'Belgrade' as a direct 
explanatory factor triggering or directing developments. In the following chapters I will 
examine the precise role that Belgrade played in these developments, as well as 
developments in 1991. First, however, I will step sideways, to consider Belgrade's plans 
and policies towards Croatia in this period.
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Chapter 4: The 'External National Homeland': Serbia 
and the Descent into War in Croatia
This chapter considers the policies of Serbia – the 'external national homeland', to use 
Brubaker's terminology - towards Croatia, from the first significant expressions of 
Serbian nationalism towards Croatia in the late 1980s to the beginning of the war proper 
in summer/autumn 1991. The dominant tendency is to view Belgrade as orchestrating a 
Greater Serbian attack on Croatia, consciously interfering and manipulating 
developments there to provoke the descent into war and, moreover, actually destroying 
rather than defending Yugoslavia. The evidence considered here, however, suggests that 
a much more nuanced understanding of Serbian policy is necessary, taking into greater 
account the perceptions and assessments of Serbian leaders at the time, no matter how 
misguided they were.
This chapter examines Serbia's thinking on the future of Yugoslavia and the Serbs in 
Croatia, Serbia's proposals and strategies for realising its goals, and the 'advice' Serbia 
gave to the Serbs in Croatia, as well as the JNA's attitude towards developments in 
Croatia. A range of primary sources are used to determine Serbian policy; the diary of 
Serbia's then representative on the Yugoslav Presidency, Borisav Jović, which is widely 
cited in the existing literature, however, remains an absolutely key source. Although 
obviously only his version of events, Jović's diary does appear to be a contemporary 
record, and in The Hague Milošević himself confirmed much of its contents.1 As such, it 
therefore offers unrivalled access to the private thoughts of Milošević and Jović at the 
time.
1 ICTY- Milošević: Witness Borisav Jovic.
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4.1. Serbian Policy Towards Croatia, 1989-90
Background: the Rise of Milošević and the 'Anti-Bureaucratic 
Revolution'
In late 1987 Serbian party leader Slobodan Milošević ousted his former patron, Serbian 
president Ivan Stambolić, and secured his dominant position in Serbia. Over the course 
of the following two years he entered into increasing confrontation with the other 
republics and Serbia's autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, in his pursuit of 
Serbian political objectives, aimed at reducing the autonomy of those provinces and 
strengthening the Yugoslav federation. Milošević was aided by an alliance with a protest 
movement, started by Kosovo Serbs but soon expanding into Serbia and Vojvodina, 
which pressured Serbia's opponents and developed into the so-called 'anti-bureaucratic 
revolution'. In late 1988 and early 1989 the leaderships of both Vojvodina and Kosovo, 
and the republic of Montenegro, were replaced by allies of Milošević, and in March 
1989 amendments to Serbia's constitution, strengthening the republic, finally passed. 
Milošević then turned his attention to the Yugoslav party and federation, urging reforms 
to increase the power of the federal state and reverse tendencies towards the 
confederalisation of Yugoslavia.2
A notable precursor to these developments was the drafting of the 'Memorandum' of the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, SANU), 
leaked to the press in late 1986, which revealed the thinking of much of Serbia's 
intellectual elite.3 The Memorandum advocated a re-federalisation of Yugoslavia, 
identifying the confederal tendencies of the 1974 constitution as resulting from an anti-
Serbian policy. It also attacked Croatia as anti-Serbian, because of the lack of Serbian 
cultural autonomy and declining use of Cyrillic among Serbs in that republic.4 Serbian 
2 For these proposals, see, for example: Sell, pp.96-8. Dejan Jović, Yugoslavia, pp.283-5, 340-1.
3 See: Kosta Mihailović &Vasilije Krestić, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences:  
Answers to Criticisms (Belgrade: SANU, 1995).
4 Ibid, p.133.
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communists initially attacked the Memorandum as nationalist, but by the end of the 
1980s Milošević was effectively allying with its authors.5 Ever-widening Serbian 
nationalism became a new legitimising force for Milošević and the Serbian communist 
party, as was an effective alliance with parts of the SANU elite, who endorsed 
Milošević's national politics and were in turn given wide latitude in the media and 
society. A few of the SANU intellectuals would even join Milošević's new Socialist 
Party (Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS), formed in July 1990; others affiliated with or 
helped form the Serbian opposition, being anti-communist or concerned with full 
democratisation as well as national issues.6
Milošević's rise to power and political strategies and goals, the protest movement of 
Kosovo Serbs and the anti-bureaucratic revolution are often seen as part of a grand, 
nationalist plan of Milošević (and, sometimes, the SANU elite), with the protests 
directed from Belgrade.7 However, Nebojša Vladisavljević has convincingly 
demonstrated that, although Milošević did exploit an alliance with the protesters, their 
movement arose and operated autonomously.8 Indeed, the protests that led to the fall of 
the leadership of Vojvodina in October 1988 and its replacement by pro-Milošević 
figures had actually initially been opposed by Milošević.9 Moreover, although 
Milošević's tactics, and his later fuller embrace of Serbian nationalism, did differ from 
his predecessors in Serbia, his actual policy proposals and ideas were very similar to 
those advocated by Stambolić and others before him, developed since the early and mid-
1980s.10 Milošević, initially at least, was thus more a bombastic advocate of already 
existing Serbian party policy than a radical convert to Serbian nationalism.
5 Jasna Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation?: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of  
Nationalism (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), pp.220-2. Gordy, The Culture of  
Power, p.27. It has also been argued that Milošević deliberately avoided public participation in the 
campaign against the Memorandum, though Jović argues that this was because he did not think the 
party should waste time debating dissidents. Jovic, Yugoslavia, pp.252-3. See also: Sell, pp.46-7. 
Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureacratic Revolution, pp.66-7.
6 Sell, p.111. Dragović-Soso, pp.238-44. 'Šta razlikuje republiku srpsku od Srbije [Interview with 
Mihailo Marković]', Intervju, 16/9/1994.
7 For example: Sell, pp.54-63, 80-8, 100-1. Silber & Little, pp.37-69. Tanner, pp.215-20. Gagnon, 
pp.67-71. LeBor, pp.107-9. Judah, p.163.
8 Vladisavljević, op. cit..
9 Ibid, pp.124-5, 135, 158.
10 Ibid, pp.69-77. Also noted by: Dejan Jović, op. cit., p.30. Dragović-Soso, pp.212-3.
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The Man At the Top
In order to fully understand Milošević's policies towards Croatia, it is necessary to 
briefly consider the nature of the regime he led, and his modus operandi. Due to a 
comparative lack of sources for the period 1990-91, this requires a less temporally 
restricted examination, looking at the first half of the 1990s as a whole.
Milošević is often seen as a master manipulator and orchestrator of events (Ramet 
likens him to Shakespeare's Richard III),11 and – although some attention has been given 
to civil-military relations under Milošević12 - the literature, and the ICTY Prosecution, 
have usually treated his regime, 'Belgrade', as a single, homogeneous and monolithic 
power centre, with Milošević at its pinnacle. The actions of certain components of his 
regime – most notably the Serbian MUP/DB and hardliners like Mihalj Kertes who 
associated with them,13 as well as the Serbian media – are therefore used to read 
Milošević's own politics, on the assumption that they were operating on his instructions.
Much evidence, however, points instead to the fragmented and factional nature of 
Milošević's regime in the 1990s. There was, for example, a perennial rivalry between 
the army of Serbia/Montenegro (known from 1992 as the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia) and the Serbian police – 'mafiosi', as Yugoslav army (Vojska Jugoslavije, 
VJ) chief Momčilo Perišić called them in 1995.14 This conflict dated back to socialist 
times, and was accentuated by Milošević's preference for the police as an institution 
more closely connected to his personal rule. Both institutions competed for Milošević's 
support and resources, and their rivalry was also exported to the RSK and RS 
(Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb republic), where each independently strove to 
11 Ramet, Balkan Babel, p.72.
12 For example: Gow, The Serbian Project, pp.64-79.
13 An ethnic Hungarian, Mihalj Kertes rose to prominence in the 'Yoghurt Revolution' in Vojvodina in 
October 1988. He was subsequently a member of the Presidency of Serbia, and in 1992 deputy federal 
Interior Minister. He was closely associated with the MUP/DB and other hardliners - though, as 
Vladisavljević shows, he does not appear to have been working for Belgrade before the Vojvodina 
upheaval. Vladisavljević, op. cit., pp.157-9.
14 ICTY-Tolimir: E-P1427.E (Mladić Diary, 28/8/1995-15/1/1996), pp.23-4.
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strengthen their counterparts and weaken their rivals. As a Yugoslav army official told 
RS military chief Ratko Mladić in 1994, for example, the Serbian MUP was 'involved in 
a lot of dirty business' and trying to '[push] the military into the background': 'the MUP 
in the Krajina and RS wants to take over everything', and 'Many things start here [in 
Belgrade] and go via the Krajina and the RS'.15
Such power struggles were possible because different individuals and institutions in 
Milošević's regime could operate with a considerable degree of autonomy. Vladislav 
Jovanović, Serbian Foreign Minister from 1991 to 1995, for example, recalls how when 
he was appointed he was not given any instructions from Milošević or written document 
on strategic aims, which indeed never existed throughout his time as minister.16 From an 
early stage Jovanović formulated key proposals completely independently.17 Particularly 
as the 1990s went on, Milošević also increasingly conducted key state affairs by 
himself, and visitors were often surprised to see that he appeared to be isolated, with no 
functioning staff around him. He generally met Croatian negotiator Hrvoje Šarinić 
alone, for example, with even Jovanović left to speculate privately about their 
discussions.18
A key reason for this isolation was that in 1994-95, as well as the increasing split 
between Belgrade and Serb hardliners in Bosnia and Croatia, which authors such as 
Barić and Caspersen have described, there was also an increasing split between 
Milošević and Serb hardliners in 'official Belgrade' itself. The MUP/DB, the army, and 
key parts of the government and the SPS (such as foreign minister Jovanović, and party 
stalwarts Jović, Kertes, Mihailo Marković, Brana Crnčević and Milorad Vučelić, who 
was also director of RTV Serbia) were all, to varying degrees, dissatisfied with 
15 ICTY-Tolimir: E-P1423.E (Mladić Diary, 9/1/1994-21/3/1994), pp.113-5. See also: Perišić OTP 
Interviews and VSO transcripts, available in ICTY-Perišić, and various Mladić diary entries in ICTY-
Tolimir, such as E-P1424 (Mladić diary, 31/3/1994-3/9/1994), pp.278, 285-6. And: Mihajlo Knežević, 
Rat u Hrvatskoj iz pera obavještajaca (Krajiski-Patrioiti.com & KrajinaForce.com: 2009). Veljko 
Miladinović, 'Vodio DB, a radio za CIA', PressOnline, 11/11/2001. ICTY-Milošević: E-P677a (Report 
of Mladen Karan on MUP Serbia preventing work of the OB, autumn 1995).
16 Vladislav Jovanović, pp.30-31.
17 Ibid, p.58.
18 Ibid, pp.115, 214, 237.
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Milošević's increasing moderation and distancing from the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 
and even willing to openly oppose and subvert it.19 Milošević could speak much more 
freely without them, hence his preference to meet internationals and Šarinić alone.20
Looking at this split in 1994-95 sheds essential light on Milošević's relationship with his 
supposed subordinates. Perišić told Mladić in September 1995 that 'Slobo does not have 
any kind of standing in the Serbian people' and 'does not like military men'; the police 
were 'mafiosi' and 'Slobo is even a bigger one'.21 He also noted that DB chief Jovica 
Stanišić 'does not like Slobo'; hardline RSK President Milan Martić had, similarly, 
described Stanišić that May as 'disappointed' and 'depressed' with Milošević, and the 
DB, whose power had grown exponentially in the 1990s, was especially emboldened in 
opposing the man who was technically its boss.22 In Eastern Slavonia, for example, 
where – as discussed in Chapter 8 - the DB was very influential, I have found three 
instances in 1995 of the DB and its associates directly opposing and subverting explicit 
instructions from Milošević himself, each over fundamental issues, including 
Milošević's orders to agree the region's reintegration with Croatia in November 1995. In 
each case, moreover, this obstruction was concealed from Milošević.23 This disconnect 
was also found in some of the most fundamental aspects of Belgrade-RSK relations. For 
19 See: Ibid. Šarinić. Borisav Jović, Knjiga o Miloševiću (Belgrade: Nikola Pasic, 2001. English 
translation by the ICTY: ICTY-Milošević: E-P596.3a). Robert Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: 
The Modern Library, 1999), pp.157-8. ICTY-Perišić: E-P801-P817 (OTP Interviews Momčilo Perišić, 
2003-2004). ICTY-Tolimir: E-P1425.E (Mladić Diary, 4/9/1994-28/1/1995), p.99; E-P1407.E (Mladić 
Diary, 27/1/1995-5/9/1995), p.208. ICTY-Gotovina(et al): E-P499.E (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 
18/8/1995), p.8. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1276 (Minutes of a meeting between RSK and RS, 
20/8/1994); Witness Ivor Roberts. Nenad Lj. Stefanović, 'Marković vs. Marković', Vreme, 10/10/1994, 
pp.16-18, in FBIS-EEU-94-209, 28/10/1994. Bahri Cani, 'Big Cadre Purge in SPS', Nasa Borba, 
1/12/1995, in FBIS-EEU-95-233, 5/12/1995. Dragan Bujosević, 'Following Čičak's List', NIN, 
1/12/1995, in FBIS-EEU-95-235, 17/5/1995.
20 ICTY-Perišić: E-805.E (OTP Interview Momčilo Perišić, 18/12/2003), p.2. Holbrooke, pp.157-8.
21 ICTY-Tolimir: E-P1427.E (Mladić Diary, 28/8/1995-15/1/1996), pp.23-4.
22 Slobodan Jarčević, Republika Srpska Krajina: državna dokumenta (Belgrade: Miroslav, 2006), p.586. 
In addition to the following footnotes, see: ICTY-Stanišić-Simatović: D293 (DB Serbia, Official Note, 
18/8/1995). 'Milošević i Stanišić', NIN, 20/6/2002. Marko Lopušina, 'Ključni svedok Haga', Večernje 
Novosti online, 15/9/2010. 'Perišić i Stanišić povezuju Mladića sa Amerikancima', Politika Online, 
1/6/2010.
23 ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of Milan Milanović); E-P677a (Report of Mladen Karan on MUP 
Serbia preventing work of the OB, autumn 1995); E-P967a (OB report on situation in East Slavonia). 
ICTY-Perišić: E-P1370, P1309, P1344, P1357 (Intercepts involving Milošević, Perišić and Stanišić, 
5/1995). Jarčević, p.583.
Chapter 4: The 'External National Homeland': Serbia and the Descent into War in Croatia
164
example, in 1995 Stanišić encouraged Martić to remove Milošević's main ally in the 
Krajina, the compromise-promoting Prime Minister Borislav Mikelić, urging Martić to 
persist in his hardline politics.24 There is even evidence that Stanišić was behind 
Martić's rejection of the international community's 'Z-4 Plan' for Serb autonomy in 
Croatia in January 1995, which helped kill the negotiation process which Milošević had 
been promoting.25
Much of this was probably hidden from Milošević (even though Stanišić's own phone 
was reportedly bugged).26 He was certainly aware, however, of his hardliners' 
dissatisfaction with his shifting politics (though their positions were still usually closer 
to Milošević's than the Serb hardliners' in Bosnia and Croatia were). At the time 
Milošević was promoting a more ostensibly left-wing and anti-nationalist faction in his 
regime, the 'Yugoslav United Left' (Jugoslovenska udružena levica, JUL). He was 
moving gradually, however, and was not so powerful that he could purge large parts of 
his own regime without shaking its very foundations and threatening his own domestic 
position, as well as losing even further his capacity to influence the Croatian and 
Bosnian Serbs.
Because Milošević tended to favour the police as a key bastion of his rule in the 1990s, 
it has widely been assumed that he was particularly close with the MUP/DB apparatus.27 
Their relations in 1994-95 shows that this was not necessarily the case – and there is 
actually some convincing evidence suggesting that even in 1990-91 Stanišić and his 
associates were critical of Milošević and actively trying to get him to adopt a more 
hardline stance. In 1990 Stanišić was twice passed over for promotion to head of the 
DB, with Milošević instead appointing a party functionary, Zoran Janaćković. Stanišić 
24 Ibid, pp.581-2, 588. E.V.N., 'Sve odlučila “mama”', Večernje Novosti online, 5/4/2003.
25 Interview and email correspondence with Petar Ajdinović, RSK Assistant Defence Minister in 1995 
(2011-12). Supported by: Interviews Borislav Mikelić, Slobodan Jarčević (Belgrade: 2007, 2011). 
ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Rade Rašeta; Mile Dakić. Mihajlo Knežević, p.195. ICTY-Milošević: 
Witness Milan Babić, T13783-4. ICTY-Perišić: E-P1342 (Intercept Milošević-Mikelić, 25/2/1995). 
Šarinić, p.219. Vlado Vurušić, 'Rusija je bila na strani Hrvatske', Jutarnji List, 17/2/2007.
26 Jarčević, p.586.
27 Gow, for example, gives considerable attention to differences between Milošević and the military, but 
regards the MUP/DB simply as his loyal 'Praetorian Guard'. Gow, The Serbian Project, pp.64-89.
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clashed with Janaćković and in spring 1991 the latter even formed a commission to 
investigate him, following allegations that he was leaking state secrets to a journalist to, 
as the journalist reported, 'prepare a situation to overthrow Milošević'. It was only in 
December 1991 that Stanišić was finally promoted to chief of the DB.28 Leading DB 
official Dragan Filipović “Fića” has also recalled that in autumn 1990 Stanišić told him 
that there were still too many moderates 'in the Serbian political top and in our service', 
who gave Milošević 'wrong information' that 'the Krajina Serbs rebelled' in order to 
'destabilise Serbia' and help the West, 'although to any fool it is clear that those people 
rose up against the political programme of the Croatian nationalist government'. In order 
to 'preserve the service from possible abuse', Stanišić emphasised, 'we must ourselves 
self-organise while Milošević and [our superiors] do not come to reason'.29 Filipović 
explains the decision to form a permanent DB mission to the Krajina in spring 1991 as 
being because Milošević was being fed 'contradictory, imprecise information' which 
accused the Krajina Serbs of being 'anti-communists connected with extreme 
nationalists in Belgrade', information Milošević's party allies then confirmed. The DB 
aimed to correct this impression.30 In addition, a series of intercepted conversations 
between Stanišić and Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić in December 1991-January 199231 
show that both then felt that recent developments meant that, as Stanišić said, 'now the 
entire strategy should be changed... completely'. Milošević's failure to realistically 
assess the situation was, Stanišić said, 'killing me'. Stanišić urged Karadžić to 'raise the 
people' and to 'convince [Milošević] of the things we discussed' – but 'in a way so that I 
am not shown as a part of the initiative'.32 Stanišić and influential former interior 
28 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: D285-6, 288 (Reports of DB Commission investigating Stanišić, 1991); 
Witness Milorad Leković. Predrag Jeremić, 'Jovica Stanišić - Od izdajnika do ledenog spasioca', 
Večernje Novosti online, 25/2/2013.
29 Dragan Filipović, Anatomija Globalističkog Smrada (Belgrade: Printmedia, 2008), p.36.
30 Filipović, pp.48-9. Supported by: M. Šašić, 'Separatist Ideas from Croatia and Slovenia Cannot Hinder 
Yugoslavism', Politika, 23/8/1990, p.8, in FBIS-EEU-90-173, 6/9/1990.
31 Domovina Intercepts: B6967 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 21/12/1991); B6507 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 5/1/1992); 
B6510 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 6/1/1992); B6511 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 6/1/1992); B9112 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 
12/1/1992). ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P689, 690, 692 (Intercepts Karadžić-Stanišić, 22/1/1992, 
28/1/1992). 'SDS Leader Calls For Serbian Federation', Belgrade Radio, 22/1/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-
015, 23/1/1992.
32 Domovina Intercepts: B9112 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 12/1/1992); B6967 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 21/12/1991).
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minister Radmilo Bogdanović were also sympathetic to Babić's demands to alter the 
Vance peace plan, rather than to accept it unconditionally as Milošević insisted.33
Rather than being Milošević's puppets and the executors of his plans, the Serbian 
MUP/DB and their allies should more accurately be seen as a hardline faction within his 
regime which actively lobbied for an expansion of their role and for support to the Serbs 
in Croatia and Bosnia. They probably operated under broad mandates with a large 
degree of autonomy,34 and even in 1990-91 may have worked to some degree contrary 
to, or without, Milošević's instructions.35 The MUP/DB therefore cannot necessarily be 
assumed to have been operating on Milošević's orders, nor their actions necessarily used 
to determine his policy. This also applies to other components of Milošević's regime, 
such as the state media. Although Milošević formally and informally had a significant 
degree of control over such sectors of his regime, its various components seem to have 
operated fairly autonomously, and were capable of influencing Milošević as well as 
being influenced by him.
The distance between Milošević and Stanišić in 1990-91 also makes it highly unlikely 
that in autumn 1990 Milošević had in the DB a loyal apparatus that he was willing to 
order to conduct criminal and terrorist acts to destabilise Croatia, as alleged by Babić 
and the OTP, and Dragan Tanasić (discussed later). Finally, Milošević's relationship 
with the DB and other sectors of his own regime, particularly in 1994-95, clearly 
indicates the limits of Milošević's knowledge, perceptions, powers and political 
abilities. It should encourage us to move away from the view of Milošević as a master 
manipulator and strategist, and towards a much more measured assessment of 
33 Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo (Belgrade: Srpska Radikalna Stranka, 2010), pp.260-1, 364-5. 
ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Mile Bosnić. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P404 (Interview with 
Radmilo Bogdanović, Duga, 12/2/1993). Domovina Intercept: B9112 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 12/1/1992).
34 Suggested by, for example: ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.18 (Babić Interview), pp.37-41. Domovina 
Intercept: B6570 (Karadžić-Kertes, 24/6/1991).
35 Filipović himself describes several occasions, beginning already in mid-1991, of him deliberately 
misinforming Belgrade on what was going on in Croatia and Bosnia, in line with his sympathies for 
the Serb nationalists there. Filipović, pp.52-3, 58-9.
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Milošević's goals, strategies and capacity to influence developments in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
The Serbian 'Attack' on Croatia
In early 1989, after the main goals of the Serbian protest movement had been met, some 
of its supporters, including Kertes, made aggressive statements that they would now be 
targeting Croatia, Slovenia and others, and overthrowing their governments too.36 And 
in 1989 the first Serbian nationalist protests did take place in Knin, Croatia, with a small 
group of radicals from Serbia playing a prominent role in disturbances in July 1989. 
Many authors connect these developments, seeing them as the next step in Milošević's 
anti-bureaucratic revolution.37
It is certainly true that these early Serbian nationalist activities in Croatia met with the 
sympathy or support of the Serbian authorities, particularly through the media (as 
explored in Chapter 6). In the late 1980s the official Serbian media adopted an 
increasingly nationalist and critical perspective towards Croatia (the 'Memorandum' 
perspective), and was opened up to Serbian nationalists, including those from Croatia. 
There were also signs of the Serbian leadership opening the question of the Serbs over 
the Drina,38 and in late 1989 some leading Serbian officials even suggested that an 
autonomous province of Serbs could be formed in Croatia (partly as a response to 
complaints that the existence of Serbia's provinces gave Serbia extra votes on the 
federal level).39 Milošević, in this period, was probably counting on Croatian (and 
36 Vlado Rajic, 'Novi stari ljudi', Danas, 28/3/1989, pp.20-21.
37 For example: Tanner, pp.218-9. Gagnon, pp.80-3. Bennett, p.125. Cviic, p.208. Miloš Vasić & Filip 
Švarm, 'Paramilitary Formations in Serbia: 1990-2000', in Helsinki Files: In the Triangle of the State 
Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units, (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee, 2001), p.43.
38 See: Dejan Jović, op. cit., p.339. Nita Luci & Predrag Marković, 'Events and Sites of Difference: 
Mark-ing Self and Other in Kosovo', in Kolstø (ed), p.90. D. Vucinic et al, 'Discussion of Inter-Ethnic 
Relations', Borba, 31/7/1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-151, 8/8/1989. 'Further on Meeting', Tanjug, 
12/1/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-030, 13/2/1990. Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani (ICTY translation), p.48.
39 Marinko Čulić, 'Nešto između', Danas, 12/12/1989, pp.22-3. 'Pokrajine', Danas, 19/12/1989, pp.30-
31. 'Vojvodina President on Provinces' Position', Belgrade Domestic Service, 19/11/1989, in FBIS-
EEU-89-218, 14/11/1989.
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Bosnian) Serbs to help secure him a majority at the Yugoslav level for his proposed 
reforms of Yugoslavia, and splitting them off from Zagreb and Sarajevo would aid this.40 
But evidence is lacking for more radical and far-reaching plans: to overthrow the 
Croatian government, deliberately stoke Croat-Serb conflict, or support 'Greater 
Serbian' aims with regard to Croatia. Serbian nationalist activists in Croatia in 1989 
developed autonomously from official Belgrade (as detailed in Chapter 6), and Serbia's 
nationalist stance towards Croatia can be at least partly explained by Milošević's 
confrontational political style and domestic political motivations.41 Milošević's strategy 
at the time was 'full democracy for the Serbian intelligentsia, in nonpartisan pluralism. 
So that they do not attack us too much', and the status of Serbs outside Serbia was a 
theme of the intelligentsia that went back years.42
As a parallel, Bosnia and Sandžak (a Muslim-inhabited region within Serbia and 
Montenegro) received similar treatment in the Serbian media to Croatia at the time (and 
the Bosnian leadership also had to contend with Milošević's arrogant and belligerent 
behaviour),43 such that in July 1990 even Karadžić was disassociating himself from the 
Belgrade media's anti-Muslim coverage.44 But as late as a year after this, Milošević was 
counting on a Serb-Muslim alliance in favour of Yugoslavia, not war with the Muslims 
or a partition of Bosnia (let alone Sandžak), and was urging Karadžić to ally with pro-
Yugoslav Muslims accordingly.45 It seems, then, that Milošević's exploitation of Serbian 
40 See, for example: Andjelic, p.103-13. Dejan Jović, op. cit., p.349.
41 On Milošević's political style see: Borisav Jović, Knjiga o Miloševiću (ICTY translation), p.8.
42 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani (ICTY translation), p.54. See, for example: 'Predlog za upostavljanje 
stvarne ravnopravnosti naroda Jugoslavije', Belgrade, 12/2/1988, in Aleksa Đilas (ed), Srpsko pitanje 
(Belgrade: Politika, 1991), pp.275-81.
43 See: Andjelic, pp.103-13. Donia, Karadžić, pp.46-7. Milan Andrejevich, 'The Sandzak: A Perspective 
of Serb-Muslim Relations' in Hugh Poulton & Suha Taji-Farouki (eds), Muslim Identity and the  
Balkan State (London: Hurst. & Company, 1997), pp.178-81.'Together We Are Strong, Divided We 
Don't Have a Chance', Borba, 20/7/1989, p.4, in FBIS-EEU-89-142, 26/7/1989. E.D. 'Are We 
Disconnected With POLITIKA's Policy?', Borba, 24/11/1989, p.5, in FBIS-EEU-89-231, 24/11/1989. 
Željko Vuković, 'The Logic of National Colours', Borba, 18/11/1989, p.4, in FBIS-EEU-89-227, 
28/11/1989. So did the Macedonians: Ramet, Balkan Babel, pp.43-4.
44 Milorad Vučelić, 'Serbs in Bosnia', NIN, 20/7/1990, pp.24-6, in FBIS-EER-90-129, 17/9/1990.
45 Domovina Intercepts: B6518/B6520 (Karadžić-Milošević, 29/5/1991); B6628 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
31/7/1991); B6846 (Karadžić-Milošević, 24/10/1991). Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.302.
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nationalism for domestic purposes may have run counter to his actual political 
objectives concerning Yugoslavia.
In addition, the mushrooming of nationalism in the media and society seems to have had 
a momentum of its own, capable of leading and influencing as much as following 
official Serbian politics. To mix some popular metaphors, this was a tiger that the 
Serbian leadership had agreed to ride, rather than a tap that they could turn on and off at 
will.46 Milošević in the late 1980s had built his popularity and key bases of his political 
support on his role as a defender of Serbs and Serbian national interests – at first as 
defined by the Serbian communist party, but later as widely conceived by the Serbian 
intelligentsia, the media and society in general. It was only logical that this position 
should then evolve into a perceived defence of Serbian interests not just in 
Kosovo/Serbia but also Yugoslavia as a whole, including in Croatia and Bosnia. Rather 
than there being a conscious decision to open the question of the Serbs over the Drina, 
then, this was just the logical continuation of Milošević's policy of defending Serbian 
national interests, interests which Milošević himself played only a limited role in 
defining.47
Yugoslavia or a 'Reduced' Yugoslavia?
From an early stage the Serbian leadership saw the status of Serbs, and 'Serbian lands', 
outside Serbia as a key issue in a potential disintegration of Yugoslavia. In July 1989, 
for example, Jović wrote that if Yugoslavia fell apart 'a large part of the Serb population 
could end up beyond the borders of Serbia, unless they opted for another solution 
46 EC negotiator David Owen 'often likened [Milošević] to someone who has jumped on to the tiger of 
nationalism and is finding it difficult to get off again without the tiger eating him.' David Owen, 
Balkan Odyssey (London: Indigo, 1996), p.137.
47 Serbian intellectuals' understandings of Serbian national interests in the 1980s can be found in, among 
others: Dragović-Soso. Aleksandar Pavković, 'Yugoslavism's Last Stand'. Mihailović & Krestić. 
Conceptions of Serbian national interests in earlier times can be found in, among others: Ivo Banac, 
The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (London: Cornell University Press, 
1984). Nicholas J. Miller, Between Nation and State: Serbian Politics in Croatia Before the First  
World War (Pittsburgh, P.A.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997). Dejan Djokić, Elusive 
Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia (London: C Hurst & Co, 2007)
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through the use of force.' He feared 'genocide against the Serbs if they become national 
minorities, especially in Croatia', noting that 'The Serb question is not an easy one. 
There is an enormous risk of civil war over a reallocation of territory.'48 A confederation 
was, from the start, rejected for this reason, as it would divide Serbs between a number 
of different independent states.49
At the time, however, Jović concluded that this was why the preservation of federal 
Yugoslavia was in the fundamental interest of the Serbs, and the available evidence 
suggests that this was then the Serbian leadership's favoured option (along with a 
strengthening of the federal centre).50 For example, whereas in 1990-91 the Serbian 
leadership acknowledged Slovenia's right to secede and even advocated that it 
implement that right, in 1989 Serbia was actively opposing such moves, including in 
September 1989 advocating JNA intervention to prevent Slovene amendments asserting 
its sovereignty.51 Milošević placed his hopes on winning majority support for his 
platform at the 14th party congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), 
scheduled for January 1990.52 Jović noted that the goal was 'to preserve the integrity of 
the SKJ and democratic centralism,' and 'to isolate the Slovenes, to keep Croatia and 
Macedonia and possibly Bosnia-Herzegovina as well from joining them.'53 Milošević, 
indeed, lobbied the Croats to stay at the Congress after the Slovenes walked out.54
Serbia's plans at this Congress failed, as the Croats joined the Slovenes in departing. As 
Sell and Dejan Jović have noted, and Milošević himself confirmed in The Hague, it was 
over the following months that Serbia's policy shifted, recognising the increased desire 
for a confederation or independence in Slovenia and Croatia, and resolving not to insist 
48 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.24.
49 Ibid, p.74.
50 See, for example: 'Together We Are Strong, Divided We Don't Have a Chance', Borba, 20/7/1989, p.4, 
in FBIS-EEU-89-142, 26/7/1989. 
51 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.40-51, 121. Momir Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja (Belgrade: Zograf, 2005), 
p.44.
52 Dejan Jović, op. cit., pp.332-3, 339-41.
53 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.79. Also: Ibid, p.121. Borisav Jović, Knjiga o Miloševiću (ICTY translation), 
pp.58-60.
54 LeBor, p.134.
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on preserving Yugoslavia as a whole, but to allow others to secede if they wished - so 
long as 'Serbian territories' in Croatia and Bosnia had the right to decide on their fate.55 
When Dobrica Ćosić first met Milošević in March 1990, he found him a firm advocate 
of a Yugoslav federation 'as the vital interest of the Serbian nation', rejecting any 
separation and arguing that 'Yugoslav nations are together, they have the same language, 
they are inter-mixed, those nations are the same'.56 On 21 March Milošević was talking 
about forming a 'Yugoslav United Socialist Democratic Party' with pro-Yugoslav 
communists from Croatia and Macedonia, and he and Jović both noted their strong 
disagreement with Ćosić's idea that it was 'not worth fighting for [Yugoslavia's] 
survival'.57 On 26 March, however, the 'coordinating committee' of Serbia's state 
leadership assessed that Yugoslavia's disintegration appeared 'unstoppable', and thus 
'Serbia will pursue a sincere policy aimed at the survival of a federal Yugoslavia but will 
also prepare to live without Yugoslavia'. Serbia would 'not agree to a confederation' – it 
would only be acceptable if there was 'a contractual guarantee of the rights of the 
Serbian nation in other Yugoslav states', which was 'unfeasible' and would only be 
granted as a trick. Beyond the Drina, therefore, 'war will be unavoidable', including a 
bloody 'struggle for territory' in Bosnia, 'as a result of the refusal of the Serb nation in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina to agree to... its separation from the motherland and 
transformation into a national minority'.58 Rights for Serbs in other republics within a 
confederation was thus firmly rejected, in favour of acceptance of 'inevitable' conflict.
The victory of pro-independence parties in the elections in Slovenia and Croatia was the 
final nail in the coffin of any Serbian expectations of preserving Yugoslavia as a 
whole.59 In late June 1990 Milošević publicly stated that 'a confederation is not a state, 
but a union of independent states, so there can be no confederation... with the existing 
administratively established borders' – in that case, 'the question of Serbian borders is an 
55 Sell, pp.108-10. Dejan Jović, op. cit., pp.358-60. ICTY-Milošević: T29388.
56 Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, p.142.
57 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani (ICTY translation), pp.111-2.
58 Ibid, p.117. ICTY-Milošević: T29377.
59 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.127-8, 130, 134.
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open political question'.60 At the same time, Jović wrote that 'Slovenia and Croatia are 
working very intensively on creating independent states', and would soon make concrete 
steps in that direction. He therefore noted that:
my preference would be to forcibly expel them from Yugoslavia, by simply  
drawing borders and declaring that they have brought this upon themselves  
through their decisions, but I do not know what we should do with the Serbs in  
Croatia. I am not for the use of force; rather, I would like to present to them a  
fait accompli. We should come up with a course of action in this direction, with a  
variant of holding a referendum before the final expulsion, on the basis of which  
it would be decided where to place the borders.61
Milošević agreed, and thereafter both he and Jović advocated a number of times that the 
JNA withdraw from Slovenia and Croatia, to the borders of 'Serbian' territories in 
Croatia.
'Greater Serbia'
There is no single definition for the term 'Greater Serbia'. The most famous concrete 
proposals for a 'Greater Serbia', as advocated by, for example, Serbian radical Vojislav 
Šešelj in the 1990s, claimed everything east of the line Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag – 
thus, the whole of Bosnia and two-thirds of Croatia.62 However, the term 'Greater 
Serbia' is also generally used to refer to any expansion of Serbia beyond its 1945 
borders, as the term 'Greater Croatia' is commonly used to refer to any expansion of 
Croatian borders, rather than just the most famous 'Greater Croatian' project, 
incorporating the whole of Bosnia into Croatia.
Technically, Milošević did not advocate any 'Greater Serbia', as he did not support 
changing Serbia's borders, but rather the establishment of a Serbian entity in Croatia 
60 'Milošević on New Constitution', Belgrade Domestic Service, 25/6/1990, in, FBIS-EEU-90-123, 
26/6/1990.
61 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.143-4.
62 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Vojislav Šešelj. Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks: War and Revolution in  
Yugoslavia, 1941-1945 (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1975),pp.167-171. For nineteenth 
century concepts see: Banac, op. cit., pp.79-85.
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which would 'remain' in a Yugoslav federation. Even if only 'Serbian' entities (Serbia, 
Montenegro, and the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs) remained in that 'Yugoslavia', 
Milošević still preferred to retain the Yugoslav name, and the form of a federation, 
rather than an enlarged Serbian state. As, for example, then Federal Prime Minister Ante 
Marković recalls: Milošević never advocated 'a Great Serbia. Never. He always 
advocated Yugoslavia.'63 The only time Milošević used the term 'Greater Serbia', indeed, 
was when he was rejecting that concept or denying that he supported it.64
Of course, the project of Serbian secession from Croatia was still fundamentally about 
determining what were 'Serb lands' outside of Serbia and securing their remaining in a 
wider state with other 'Serb lands'. In this sense, it is not unreasonable to characterise 
Milošević's goals as 'Greater Serbian' - but it is more terminologically accurate to 
describe his goal as a 'reduced' or 'residual' Yugoslavia.
'Yugoslavia Exists'
From the spring/summer of 1990 onwards, the Serbian leadership was no longer an 
advocate or defender of Yugoslavia in its existing international borders, but instead 
envisaged a 'reduced' Yugoslavia, excluding the Croats and Slovenes, and perhaps 
others. In some respects, the Serbs would have preferred the Croats and Slovenes to 
simply declare their secession – the crisis would be expedited, they would be viewed as 
separatists, and the Serbs and the JNA could then quickly determine the new borders 
and form their new, 'reduced' Yugoslavia.65 At the same time, however, the Serbs 
strongly opposed and condemned unconstitutional actions by Slovenia and Croatia in 
their moves to separation. This is sometimes pictured as deceptive posturing, given what 
we know about Serbian intentions.66
63 Ante Marković, 'Moja istina o smrti Jugoslavije, razgovori s Gordanom Malićem', Danas (Belgrade), 
13-28/11/2003, accessed 1/8/2014 from: www.cpi.hr/download/links/en/7917.doc  . 
64 The only exception to this, as pointed to by Prelec, was when Milošević was touting the merits of 
various peace plans for Bosnia, and quoted favourably foreign criticisms that they meant the creation 
of a 'Great Serbia', i.e. that the plans were favourable to Serbs. Marko Prelec, p.372.
65 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.142-4, 229.
66 For example: Sell, p.127. Gagnon, pp.92-3.
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However, even though Serbia did not expect Yugoslavia to survive intact it was 
nevertheless trying to prevent the wider, complete disintegration of the state. A key 
Serbian slogan in this period was that 'Yugoslavia exists', and the Serbian leadership 
was trying to oppose the republicanisation of the crisis.67 If Yugoslavia de facto became 
(and was viewed internationally as) simply a set of separate republics without any 
functioning federal centre, then the confederal argument would have won, and any 
move to then change the republican borders would have seemed more problematic. It 
was also essential to the Serbs that they were not seen to be breaking up Yugoslavia or 
striving for any 'Greater Serbia', but rather the Slovenes and Croats, and anyone else 
who wanted independence, was separatist, with the Serbs merely opting to oppose 
secession and 'remain' in the existing common state.68 This would also enable the 
legitimate deployment of the JNA to achieve these goals, and for Serbia to inherit this 
army.69 It was thus, the Serbian leaders believed, absolutely essential to maintain 
continuity between the internationally recognised state of Yugoslavia, and whatever 
'reduced' Yugoslavia they ended up creating.
The Serbs therefore always insisted that secession had to be implemented in a 
constitutional manner, and through federal bodies.70 This was also because they wanted 
to thereby ensure that their understanding of the right to self-determination – that it 
belonged to nations, not republics – be accepted, rather than the republics, such as 
Croatia, seceding and presenting republican borders as a fait accompli.71
67 ICTY-Milošević: E-P469.5 (Tanjug, 15/1/1991); E-P397.1 (Diary of the Vance Mission to Yugoslavia, 
#1, 11/10-1991-18/10/1991), pp.69-70. Zimmerman, p.249.
68 See, for example: Domovina Intercepts: B6580 (Karadžić-Milošević, 1/7/1991); B6984 (Karadžić-
Milošević, 30/12/1991). ICTY-Milošević: E-P393 ('By God, We Shall Fight', NIN, 12/4/1991).
69 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.344, 346. Domovina Intercepts: B6584 (Karadžić-Brdanin, 2/7/1991); 
B6957 (Milošević-Karadžić, 9/7/1991). ICTY-Milošević: Witness Borisav Jović, T29279.
70 From summer 1990, indeed, the Serbs repeatedly told the Slovenes they could secede if they wished – 
but in a constitutional manner. Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.154, 289, 298, 315. Janez Drnovšek, Escape  
from Hell: The Truth of a President (Ljubljana: Delo, 1996), p.205. Zimmerman, p.145. ICTY-
Milošević: E-P397.1 (Diary of the Vance Mission to Yugoslavia, #1, 11/10-1991-18/10/1991), p.50; 
Witness Milan Kučan, T20894. BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman, p.10. Silber & Little, pp.113-4. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1102.E (Intercept Karadžić-Milošević, 22/11/1991); E-1424.E (SFRJ 
Presidency minutes, 12/7/1991), pp.44-5, 145. 'Milošević's Address to Serbian Assembly', Belgrade 
Radio, 5/6/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-109, 6/6/1991. 
71 For debates on rights to self-determination in Yugoslav constitutions see: Audrey Budding, 
‘Nation/People/Republic: Self-Determination in Socialist Yugoslavia’, in Cohen & Dragović-Soso 
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Of course, Serbia did take many actions in 1990-91, and earlier, that contributed to the 
republicanisation of Yugoslavia, most notably its economic boycott of Slovenia and 
sustained campaign against Marković's federal government. Serbia's leaders were 
nationalist and narrow-minded, intolerant of opposition and not prone to compromise, 
all of which was unconducive to the survival of the fragile multinational state of 
Yugoslavia. But it is important to understand actors' intentions at the time, and the 
Serbian leadership was, however hypocritically, trying to preserve Yugoslavia as a legal 
and functioning state, despite anticipating the final outcome as a 'reduced' Yugoslavia.
(eds), pp.91-130.
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4.2. Serbian Strategy Towards Croatia, 1990-91
Imposing a Solution: The Secession of 'Serbian Territories' from 
Croatia
Serbia supported a hardline policy towards Croatia: if Croatia did not agree to remain in 
a (somewhat strengthened) federation, then it should be allowed to secede, with the 
condition that Serbs in Croatia have the same right. The Serbian leadership completely 
rejected the idea of a confederation, which it equated (as, in fact, did its architects) with 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia into separate independent states.72 Milošević and Jović 
never showed much interest in finding a compromise between the confederal and 
federal proposals, preferring to impose their solutions from a position of strength - by 
out-voting in Yugoslav institutions and getting the support of the JNA.
Tuđman and his colleagues were viewed in Belgrade as anti-Serb and pro-Ustaša.73 
Belgrade showed no interest in exploring a solution for Serbs within an independent 
Croatia – an option explicitly rejected in the leadership's conclusions of March 1990 – 
and also had little faith that Croatia would ever agree to Serb self-determination. It was 
not felt, therefore, that there was much point negotiating with the Croats. For example, 
in August and October 1990, after the major instances of Serb unrest in Croatia, 
Tuđman had proposed talks with Milošević. On the second occasion Milošević does 
seem to have been interested, but both times he declined on the advice of Jović, who 
argued that such talks would only be exploited to the detriment of Serbs in Croatia, and 
that talks must be held in Yugoslav institutions.74
Numerous sources confirm that Milošević advocated dealing with the Croats from a 
position of strength, even if that meant war. For example, in a discussion with a large 
72 Interview Slaven Letica, principal advisor to President Tuđman, 1990-1 (Zagreb: 7-8/10/2009). Dejan 
Jović, ‘The Slovenian-Croatian Confederal Proposal'.
73 For example: Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.164, 181.
74 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.164, 181.
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group of Serbian intellectuals and politicians with Milošević in late 1990, Rašković had 
advocated his idea of a pacifist and anti-war approach, including a mass, peaceful Serb 
march on Zagreb. Everyone except Ćosić rejected the idea as impractical: 'the others 
believed that whoever is stronger determines the borders. And since we are stronger 
than the Croats, we will determine the borders.'75 Rašković's daughter also recalls him 
telling Milošević that war would bring no good and borders were always settled in 
negotiations, to which Milošević responded that borders were always drawn by military 
boots.76 And as Jović noted in January 1991, '[Milošević] does not believe that any 
agreement can be reached' in talks with the Croats and 'has more faith in actions that 
will force them into settling with us.'77 As Milošević famously told Serbian mayors in 
March 1991: 'borders are always decided upon by the strong, never the weak', and 
although he hoped the Croats 'will not be insane enough to fight us', 'if we need to fight, 
by God we shall fight'.78
The proposal to 'cut off' Croatia and Slovenia, discussed by Milošević and Jović a 
number of times from June 1990 onwards, was hardline, precluded negotiations, and 
would undoubtedly have led to some conflict, as Milošević himself predicted.79 At the 
same time, however, it should be acknowledged that this proposal was not to conquer 
and defeat Croatia, but merely to withdraw the JNA to certain areas and hold those 
lines. Like the proposal of Croatian Defence Minister Martin Špegelj to storm JNA 
garrisons in Croatia, the withdrawal proposal actually aimed at avoiding a larger and 
more substantial war - and avoiding defeat - by striking early. However, these proposals 
were not implemented: they depended on the JNA carrying them out, and the JNA 
rejected them.
75 Đukić, op. cit., p.171. Ćosić himself recalled the idea as 'naïve'. Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, p.140.
76 Jovan Kesar, 'Jovan Rašković', Večernji Novosti, 5/9/2007, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
www.krajinaforce.com, p.4.
77 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.234.
78 ICTY-Milošević: E-P393 ('By God, We Shall Fight', NIN, 12/4/1991).
79 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.195.
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Negotiating Serb Secession
Although Milošević and Jović felt that there was little chance of the Croats willingly 
accepting Serbian self-determination, often advocating that the JNA impose this 
solution militarily, it is worth noting that they were also simultaneously pursuing a 
political approach to resolve the situation in Croatia - for example, by advocating laws 
that would regulate the self-determination of each nation, both Croatian and Serbian.80 
Internal comments and assessments by both Milošević and Jović reveal that they had 
not, in fact, decided on war as the only way to resolve matters but, on the contrary, often 
had some faith in the success of this political course.
A diary entry by Jović in January 1991 sheds particular light on this. With the Croats 
now much better armed and organised, Jović concluded that the proposal to 'cut off' 
Croatia and Slovenia was no longer feasible: the JNA had not 'withdrawn to new 
positions in time', and thus war would result if it was attempted. This war could 'last a 
very long time, and its outcome cannot be predicted in advance.' On the other hand, 
Jović was 'less afraid of the 'labyrinth' of a peaceful course of events', and felt that the 
Serbs should strive for a peaceful and favourable solution to the Yugoslav crisis, using 
their alliance with the army and their support for democratic referenda. If the Croats 
imposed war, however, as appeared likely, then they would 'defend [themselves]' and 
the 'Serb nation' in Croatia 'which does not want to leave Yugoslavia by force.'81
At this stage, Milošević and Jović were in disagreement on this point, with Milošević 
still advocating withdrawal to new borders, but it is interesting to note Jović's 
conclusions. They indicate that he felt that force was not, in fact, the only way to 
80 See, for example: Ibid, pp.127-8, 130, 134. ICTY-Milošević: E-P352.1a (Minutes of SNV, 16/8/1990). 
'Presidency Proposes Formal Secession Law', Belgrade Domestic Service, 23/6/1990, in FBIS-EEU-
90-122, 25/6/1990. 'SFRY Presidency Issues Statement', Tanjug, 6/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-131, 
9/7/1990. 'Federal, Serbian Presidencies Meet', Belgrade Domestic Service, 9/7/1990, in FBIS-EEU-
90-132, 10/7/1990. 'Serbian Presidency's Letter to Federal Presidency', Belgrade Domestic Service, 
19/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-161, 20/8/1991. Aleksandar Milošević, 'Jović's Recipe', Vjesnik, 
13/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-182, 19/9/1990. 'Milošević Proposes Plan for Crisis Resolution', Tanjug, 
30/5/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-104, 30/5/1991. 
81 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.234-5.
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impose the solution of Serbian territorial self-determination on the Croats, and that a 
major conflict could still be avoided. Such a scenario was not completely inconceivable: 
Zagreb could, for example, have de facto lost authority over Serbian regions but 
declined to launch military operations to regain them, due to the threat of JNA 
intervention and/or international condemnation.
It is important to understand how the actors viewed the situation at the time. Even if we 
assess that their hardline politics would definitely have led to a major war, it does not 
necessarily follow that those actors had 'decided on war',82 or considered it the only way 
in which they could achieve their goals. Indeed, intercepted conversations show that as 
late as the end of June 1991 Milošević was still talking about getting the Croats and 
Slovenes to return to the federal assembly and agree a procedure for peaceful secession, 
while in September 1991 he thought that the Americans would accept a 'reduced' 
Yugoslavia including the Serbs in Croatia.83
In addition, in summer and autumn 1991 there was a shift in Belgrade's thinking 
towards Croatia that increased the perceived likelihood that others – the international 
community, and perhaps even, begrudgingly, Zagreb - could accept Serbia's proposals. 
In mid-1991 Milošević advisor Smilja Avramov, a member of Serbia's 'expert team' for 
discussions with Zagreb (discussed later), formulated a compromise proposal of sorts 
with regard to the Croatian Serbs. As well as full self-determination and remaining in a 
'reduced' Yugoslavia, this document mentioned a second option: a transitional period in 
which the Krajinas would be 'granted the status of independent territories retaining 
certain ties with Croatia on the one hand and Yugoslavia on the other', guaranteed by the 
international community (the EC). These territories would be autonomous and self-
governing, with their own police force, and demilitarised. As Croatia progressively left 
Yugoslavia and suspended those ties, so these territories would progressively suspend 
their ties with Croatia. It was noted that most likely only some economic links would 
82 LeBor, p.139.
83 Domovina Intercepts: B6558 (Karadžić-Milošević, 17/6/1991); B6672/B6959 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
6/9/1991). ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P395.B.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Milošević, 28/6/1991); E-P64.A.150.1 
(Intercept Karadžić-Cvjetkovic, 19/6/1991). Also see: Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.159.
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remain, where the laws of both Croatia and Yugoslavia would still apply. A mixed 
Krajina/Croatia/Yugoslavia/international community commission would deal with areas 
of dispute. In areas where the territories had not passed their own legislation, Yugoslav 
legislation would apply, and as Croatia left Yugoslavia the territories would 'become 
increasingly institutionalised federal units of Yugoslavia'.84
This idea was revived on 29 September 1991, when the EC's Conference on Yugoslavia 
was getting underway and Milošević proposed to EC negotiator Henry Wijnaendts that 
the Serbs in Croatia acquire a 'special status'.85 Wijnaendts liked the idea and it was 
thence adopted by EC negotiators. The version of 'special status' that the EC developed 
over the following weeks was for Serbian autonomy and minority rights within Croatia. 
Serbia's was for de facto independence, and Belgrade seems to have envisaged this 
'special status' as technically being on Yugoslav territory, sometimes also mentioning the 
right of the local population to have the final say on their fate. There was also major 
disagreement about what territory was involved. Ultimately, the EC did not accept 
Serbia's concept of 'special status', and this was one reason for Serbia's rejection of the 
EC's Hague proposals of 18 October 1991.86
84 ICTY-Milošević: E-D243a ('Options for Serbs the Future Status of the Present Serbian Territories in 
Croatia'). The date of this document is somewhat unclear – Avramov said June 1991; the document is 
actually dated July; and it refers to the 'Belgrade Initiative', placing it after 14 August 1991. Perhaps it 
went through several drafts.
85 Henry Wijnaendts, Joegoslavische kroniek, juli 1991 – augustus 1992 (Amsterdam: Rap, 1993), 
pp.124-5. Caplan, pp.33-4.
86 See: Wijnaendts, 137-8. Avramov, pp.272, 277. Domovina Intercepts: B6854 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
29/10/1991); C2397 (Karadžić-Milošević, 1/11/1991). Stipe Mesić, The Demise of Yugoslavia: A 
Political Memoir (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), p.372. Avramov, pp.273-81. 
Živko Juzbašić, Srpsko pitanje i hrvatska politika – svjedočanstva i dokumenti 1990-2000 (Zagreb: 
VBZ, 2009), pp.115-6. Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic  
Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Press, 2007), p.127. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Geert Ahrens, T7663. ICTY-Krajišnik: 
E-P356.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Vukić, 10/1991). ICTY-Milošević: E-P777-9, 812 (Official Reports on 
Conference on Yugoslavia); E-P397.1 (Diary of the Vance Mission to Yugoslavia, #1, 11/10-1991-
18/10/1991), pp.23-5. 38-9, 43, 46, 65, 69-71; E-676.1a (Assembly of Serbia, 12/12/1991), p.41. 
'Jovanović Interviewed on Talks', Belgrade RTV, 9/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-197, 10/10/1991. 
'Presidency Accepts Special Status for Croat Serbs', Tanjug, 1/11/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-213, 
4/11/1991.
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However, Serbia had hoped that its ideas would be accepted by the EC, and until the 
final rejection of the agreement tried to adopt a co-operative approach to their proposals. 
As Jović noted in mid-September 1991, at the very beginning of the war proper in 
Croatia, 'negotiations and preparing for war are parallel processes',87 while Milošević 
said privately at the time that 'of course, co-operation with Europe is crucial, and 
whenever they are well intended we will accept their offer'.88 Indeed, immediately 
before the EC's final proposals were unveiled Milošević and Jović had discussed with 
the Montenegrin leadership making a radical peace proposal and solving the Serbs in 
Croatia via international protection, and this was conveyed to Croatian Serb leaders and 
Zagreb, too.89 These ideas ultimately led to the Vance plan at the end of 1991, whereby 
the JNA withdrew from the Krajinas, which came under UN protection, were self-
governing and, in theory, had an undetermined status.
There is a tendency to view Serbia as fighting against Croatia and the whole world in 
pursuit of its extreme objectives. Yet Serbia was pursuing a political course at the same 
time as advocating military solutions, and actually developing concrete proposals in this 
respect. Ultimately, Milošević and Jović had little faith that Zagreb would ever willingly 
agree to their proposals, but war was not seen as the only way in which Croatia could be 
induced to accept them, and it is, I believe, important to recognise this.
The Karađorđevo Myth
In early 1991 Milošević had agreed to a third proposal from Zagreb for Serbia-Croatia 
negotiations, and on 25 March 1991 Tuđman and Milošević had their famous, closed 
meeting in Karađorđevo, Serbia. This was followed by a second meeting in Tikveš, 
Croatia, on 15 April 1991, and the establishing of Croatian and Serbian expert teams, 
which met three times in April.
87 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.342.
88 Domovina Intercept: C2352/B8409 (Karadžić-Milošević, 10/9/1991).
89 Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja, p.68. Tomac, p.327. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić, T9701-3. 
ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13195-7.
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There is considerable mythology surrounding the meeting in Karađorđevo and its 
follow-ups. Here, I will focus on the idea, promoted by a number of Tuđman's former 
colleagues (including Šarinić, Mesić, Boljkovac and Špegelj) and wholly or partially 
supported by authors such as Minić, Kovačević and Viro, that at Karađorđevo Milošević 
made some grand promises to Tuđman, revealing either that Milošević was cynically 
using Krajina to start a war, intending to abandon it all along, or Milošević's duplicity 
and aggressive intentions.
Tuđman never told colleagues precisely what he discussed with Milošević at 
Karađorđevo.90 But he was 'highly optimistic' after the meeting, saying that he and 
Milošević had agreed 'in principle' about the problems between Croatia and Serbia, 
which would partly be resolved through Bosnia, and that 'I think we will find a common 
language with Milošević and solve the problems'.91 Three days later, however, he and 
Milošević openly clashed at a summit of republican presidents in Split, as Tuđman 
directly challenged Milošević about the 'terrorists' in Knin, demanding to know, 'to clear 
the air here with the present Mr. Milošević, and also with the army... do they stand 
behind them?'.92 Milošević, however, denied that they were 'terrorists' and supported 
Krajina's right to a referendum (on self-determination), the two then quarrelling over 
this. On 31 March, meanwhile, the first deaths of the war occurred in clashes in Plitvice, 
Korenica, when Croatian forces ejected Krajina units sent there by Babić, following 
which Babić declared Krajina's unification with Serbia. At a meeting of the Croatian 
leadership on 1 April Tuđman then spoke 'very sharply' about Milošević: 'Milošević 
one-to-one was for a peaceful solution, but then in Split he postured as the leader of all 
Serbs in Yugoslavia and activated them, and now we have strengthened activity of Serbs 
in the whole of Yugoslavia!'93
90 Manolić, p.317.
91 ICTY-Prlić(et al): Witness Josip Manolić, T4673. ICTY-Milošević: P641.2a (Statement of Hrvoje 
Šarinić). Bilandžić, pp.372, 376.
92 Momir Bulatović, Neizgovorena odbrana: ICTY vs Slobodan Milošević (Nis: Zograf, 2006), p.68.
93 ICTY-Milošević: E-P641.2a (Statement of Hrvoje Šarinić).
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According to Tuđman's chief of staff Hrvoje Šarinić, Karađorđevo's follow-up in Tikveš 
on 15 April was supposed to focus on more concrete problems, with Tuđman planning 
to insist on resolving Croatia first, before any discussions on Bosnia. Tuđman, Šarinić 
recalls, was 'far less optimistic' and 'more realistic' after that meeting.94 The meetings of 
experts also brought no results, and were suspended at the end of the April.95 After 
clashes in Borovo Selo in early May, Tuđman then officially suspended dialogue with 
Serbia, although expressing hope that 'the Serbs will finally be forced to open dialogue 
and seek a solution that suits everybody'.96 In June further talks were held, including two 
trilateral meetings with Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović, and there were some 
further contacts between Croatian and Serbian experts. Again, however, they ended 
without agreement.97
Nevertheless, Tuđman continued to argue that the solution to Croat-Serb relations lay in 
a negotiated settlement with Serbia at the expense of Bosnia, advocating this to 
internationals as well as the Serbs and Izetbegović.98 Although often harshly critical of 
Milošević,99 he also regularly seemed to naively discern in minor concessions a 
willingness to compromise, and expressed great optimism that a solution would be 
reached.100 This has led some to suspect that Milošević was making secret (and false) 
promises to Tuđman regarding Krajina.
94 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Hrvoje Šarinić, T31266; E-P641.2a (Statement of Hrvoje Šarinić); 
95 Bilandžić, pp.372-7. Avramov, pp.140-1. ICTY-Milošević: Witnesses Kosta Mihajlovic, T34764-6; 
Ratko Marković, T35380-6.
96 Florence Hartmann, 'Croatian President on Internal Conflict', Le Monde, 11/5/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-
093, 14/5/1991. 'Croatian President Tuđman's Statement', Zagreb Domestic Service, 3/5/1991, in 
FBIS-EEU-91-086, 3/5/1991.
97 ICTY-Milošević: E-P641.3a (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 8/1/1992), p.15. ICTY-Milošević: 
Witness Smilja Avramov, T32435.
98 Hudelist, Tuđman, p.700-3. Konrad Kolšek, 1991. Prvi pucnji u SFRJ (Belgrade: Dah Graf Danas, 
2005), pp.122-3. Bilandžić, pp.378-9. ICTY-Milošević: E-P397.1 (Diary of the Vance Mission to 
Yugoslavia, #1, 11/10/1991-18/10/1991), pp.58-60. Ivica Dinkić, Domovinski obrat - politička 
biografija Stipe Mesića (Zagreb: V.B.Z, 2004), pp.68, 134.
99 Compare, for example: ICTY-Milošević: E-P397.1 (Diary of the Vance Mission to Yugoslavia, #1, 
11/10/1991-18/10/1991), pp.58-60. Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja, p.68.
100 For example: Lučić & Lovrenović, pp.10-12, 27-30, 86-7. Nenad Ivanković, Bonn: Druga hrvatska 
fronta (Zagreb: Mladost, 1993), p.70. Erceg, p.184. Croatian Presidential Transcript, 4/3/1992, 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.slobodanpraljak.com/MATER  IJALI/SVJEDOCI/MiomirZuzul/42.pdf  . ICTY-Milošević: 
E-P397.6 (Diary of the Vance Mission to Yugoslavia, #6, 22/1/1992-9/3/1992), p.47. Zimmerman, 
pp.181-4.
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Substantial evidence stands against such a conclusion, however. The Karađorđevo 
meeting did not happen in isolation, and was not the first contact between the two 
presidents. Tuđman and Milošević had already met at expanded meetings of the SFRJ 
Presidency in mid-1990,101 and throughout 1991 such meetings, including the summits 
of presidents and, later, international negotiations, were common. In the month that 
Karađorđevo and Tikveš took place alone, Tuđman and Milošević met a further six 
times at multilateral meetings, lasting more than fifty hours. Partial or complete minutes 
are available for many of these meetings, in addition to reports on joint press 
conferences afterwards.102 They make absolutely clear that Milošević was maintaining 
his support for Croatian Serb self-determination and was in major disagreement with 
Tuđman on this and many other issues. As Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov has 
recalled, Milošević and Tuđman always had 'the most polarised stands'.103 The members 
of Serbia's expert team also took the same stances in their meetings with their Croatian 
counterparts in April, such that the Croatian experts asked Tuđman what the point of the 
meetings were, as the Serbs refused to recognise Croatian borders.104 This is all 
completely inconsistent with the idea that Milošević was trying to trick Tuđman with 
promises of recognising Croatian authority over the Krajina.
It seems clear that at Karađorđevo Milošević and Tuđman discussed the idea of dividing 
Bosnia.105 In Tikveš Milošević also gave Tuđman a paper from his security services 
101 Their first multilateral meeting was reportedly on 12 June 1990, and already on 20 July Croatian 
presidency representative Stipe Šuvar brokered a private chat between them. Borisav Jović, op. cit., 
pp.137-8. Misha Glenny, The Balkans, 1904-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (London: 
Granta Books, 1999), p.630. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p.139. 
102 For minutes of republican summits and presidency sessions see: Bulatović, Neizgovorena odbrana, 
pp.64-108. Kosta Nikolić & Vladimir Petrović, Od mira do rata: dokumenta Predsedništva SFRJ, I:  
januar - mart 1991 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, Fond za humanitarno pravo, 2011). 
Kosta Nikolić & Vladimir Petrović, Rat u Sloveniji: dokumenta Predsedništva SFRJ, II: jun - jul 1991 
(Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, Fond za humanitarno pravo, 2012). Public comments can be 
found in FBIS, and details on other meetings in: Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.231-5. ICTY-Milošević: E-
P641.2a (Statement of Hrvoje Šarinić); E-P397.1 (Diary of the Vance Mission to Yugoslavia, #1, 
11/10/1991-18/10/1991), pp.58-60. Domljan. Nobilo. Drnovšek, pp.206-7.
103 RFE, Svjedoci Raspada: Kiro Gligorov.
104 Bilandžić, pp.372-7. Avramov, pp.140-1.
105 Confirmed by: BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman. ICTY-Milošević: Witnesses Hrvoje Šarinić; Milan Babić; 
Ante Marković. ICTY-Prlić(et al): Witness Josip Manolić. Ante Marković, 'Moja istina...'. Zvonimir 
Trajković, 'Bošnjaci su nam nudili Tuzlu', Slobodna Bosna, 5/6/2002. Kolšek, pp.122-3. Alija 
Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions: Autobiographical Notes (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 
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warning about the alleged ill-intentions of the Bosnian Muslim leadership towards both 
Serbs and Croats.106 Šarinić regards this as an attempt to 'hook' Tuđman onto the 
division of Bosnia.107 It is, however, well documented that Tuđman had, for years, 
argued that Bosnia should either be annexed to Croatia or divided in agreement with the 
Serbs, and he had continued to speak about this, both publicly and privately, throughout 
the year preceding Karađorđevo.108 This was, clearly, far more Tuđman's project than 
Milošević's, and Milošević advisor Zvonimir Trajković explicitly recalls this as 
'Tuđman's offer' and proposal, not Milošević's – which, although considered, was soon 
rejected.109 Instead, throughout 1991 the dominant option for Milošević was to retain the 
whole of Bosnia within Yugoslavia. As Milošević told Karadžić in May 1991: 'Your 
position should be that you are against secession and that you want Bosnia to stay in 
Yugoslavia', a position 'a great number of Muslims' would support.110
In July 1991 Tuđman's open support for the partition of Bosnia actually almost helped 
scare the Bosnian Muslims into making a deal with the Serbs.111 Milošević and Karadžić 
were certainly aware of this dynamic and exploited it – '[the Muslims] need to know 
that in fifteen minutes we could also make a deal with Franjo' (Karadžić).112 But their 
ambition to retain Bosnia as a whole in Yugoslavia was very public, and Milošević even 
2002), p.93.
106 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Hrvoje Šarinić. Also: Kolšek, pp.122-3.
107 ICTY-Milošević: P641.2a (Statement of Hrvoje Šarinić).
108 See: Franjo Tuđman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (New York: East European Monographs, 
1981), pp.112-5. Marinko Čulić, Tuđman i poslije Tuđmana (Zagreb: Novi Live, 2014), pp.70-7. 
Hudelist, Tuđman, pp.693-9. Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan  
Wars (London: Cornell University Press, 2003). Izetbegović, pp.83-4. Zimmerman, pp.74, 181-4. 
ICTY-Milošević: Witnesses Stjepan Mesić, T10657; Petar Kriste, T14843, 4966. Andjelic, pp.137-8, 
164. Nobilo, p.50. Tomac, pp.39-40. Domljan, p.21. Josip Šentija, Ako Hrvatkse bude (Zagreb: 
Školska knjiga, 2005), p.159. Interviews: Slaven Letica, Ivo Banac (Zagreb: 2009). Ian Traynor, 
'Croatian militia ready to resist Yugoslavian army', The Guardian (London), 21/1/1991. Samo 
Kobenter, 'Open Border Question on the Balkans', Der Standard (Vienna), 26/2/1991, in FBIS-EEU-
91-039, 26/2/1991. Zoran Odić, 'Kucan Ready Even To Resign', Osolobdjenje, 19/12/1990, in FBIS-
EEU-90-245, 20/12/1990. 
109 Zvonimir Trajković, 'Bošnjaci su nam nudili Tuzlu', Slobodna Bosna, 5/6/2002.
110 Domovina Intercept: B6518/B6520 (Karadžić-Milošević, 29/5/1991). Also: B6588 (Karadžić-
Milošević, 26/7/1991). B6628 (Karadžić-Milošević, 31/7/1991). B6672/B6959 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
6/9/1991). B6712 (Karadžić-Milošević, 13/9/1991). ICTY-Milošević: E-P393 ('By God, We Shall 
Fight', NIN, 124/1991). Donia, Karadžić, pp.85-9. Judah, p.197.
111 Duško Doder, 'Muslims, in shift of allegiance, seek pact with Serbs', Baltimore Sun, 26/7/19991.
112 Domovina Intercept: B6619 (Karadžić-Brdanin, 28/7/1991). Also see: B6588 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
26/7/1991).
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expressed it to Tuđman directly (at, for example, a trilateral meeting with Izbetegovic 
on 12 June 1991), belying the notion that Milošević was simultaneously making secret 
promises to Tuđman on Bosnia, or that Tuđman could have believed he had an 
agreement with Milošević on this.113 Throughout 1991 Milošević and Karadžić in fact 
repeatedly expressed their suspicion that it was Izetbegović who had an agreement with 
Tuđman, further confirming that, as Karadžić said in July, 'we [have] made no 
agreement with the Croats', either genuine or fraudulent.114 
Concerning the Croatian Serbs, Tuđman told the BBC that at the time Milošević 
accepted 'the idea of the necessity of normalisation of Croatian-Serbian relations, how it 
is necessary to resolve the Knin rebellion and the Serbian question in Croatia gradually, 
with the creation of trust, opening of traffic, and then also some political solution, which 
would be acceptable for Serbs in Croatia. He repeated that.'115 According to Viro, 
Milošević promised that as a show of goodwill, he would pressure Knin to free the 
communication path Zagreb-Knin-Split.116 Milošević also indicated a willingness to 
make some concessions on Krajina. At their 12 June 1991 meeting, for example, 
Milošević spoke about the Croatian Serbs' right to self-determination, but Tuđman 
insisted with the aid of a map that for geographic and strategic reasons Croatia could 
never accept the separation of Knin, as it would divide Croatia in two. Milošević 
conceded that 'Objectively it is so.'117 At Karađorđevo and subsequently, Milošević also 
reportedly accepted the idea of humane resettlement of the population, of those 
individuals who did not want to end up in the 'wrong' state.118 Several sources also 
indicate that Milošević agreed that, in a prospective division of Bosnia, Tuđman could 
have the Muslim-inhabited Cazin Krajina region in western Bosnia.119 
113 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.302. Domovina Intercept: B6553 (Karadžić-Milošević, 12/6/1991). ICTY-
Milošević: P503.2a (Chart of intercepts reviewed by Stjepan Kljuić), p.1.
114 Domovina Intercept: B6588 (Karadžić-Milošević, 26/7/1991). See: B6725 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
19/9/1991). ICTY-Milošević: E-P613.5a (Intercept Karadžić-Koljević-Milošević, 4/6/1991).
115 BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman, pp.9, 11-14.
116 Viro, p.151.
117 BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman, p.9. Nobilo, p.142.
118 Nobilo, p.66. BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman, p.13. ICTY-Milošević: E-P641.3a (Croatian Presidential 
Transcript, 8/1/1992), p.49.
119 ICTY-Milošević: Witnesses Milan Babić, T13111-2; Stjepan Kljuić, T24393-5; Stjepan Mesić, 
T10657; E-P641.2a (Statement of Hrvoje Šarinić), p.3. Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who 
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Tuđman would tell the BBC in 1994 that Milošević conducted 'Byzantine' politics - 
'agreeing in principle, but in practice wanting to create a Greater Serbia'.120 However, it 
is significant that Tuđman never actually claimed, to the BBC or his colleagues, that 
Milošević had conceded Croatian authority over the Krajina, and, in fact, all Milošević's 
concessions were still consistent with his support for Croatian Serb self-determination – 
something which, as noted, Milošević was consistently advocating. Milošević always 
emphasised Serbia's lack of territorial pretensions, and particularly with the promotion 
of the idea of 'special status' in autumn 1991, the focus of his rhetoric shifted away from 
'all Serbs in one state', non-recognition of 'administrative' republican borders and 
'remaining in Yugoslavia' towards the rights of the Serbian people of Croatia. As 
Milošević said on 25 October 1991, for example, 'the key question is... how to resolve 
the position of the Serbian people in Croatia... we are not talking about any territorial 
pretensions, but about the freedom and rights of these people. This is all.'121 Milošević 
and Jović also emphasised that they had no intention of forcing the Croatian Serbs to 
reject Croatia – 'We are ready to agree to anything the Serbs in Croatia opt for', as 
Serbia's Foreign Minister said.122 The key phrase in Tuđman's recollection of 
Milošević's stance is, however, without doubt, finding a solution 'which would be 
acceptable for Serbs in Croatia' – as the Krajina Serbs would never accept a solution 
within Croatia, while the 'rights' that Milošević spoke of included the right to be de 
facto independent from Croatia.
Milošević always emphasised his support for a peaceful solution – the problem was that 
his and Tuđman's ideas of a peaceful solution were very different.123 As already 
discussed, Milošević did not generally share Tuđman's optimism that a peaceful solution 
Disappeared', NIN, 18/12/1992, pp.18-21, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 15/1/1993. He may even have said 
Tuđman could take all the Muslims if he wanted: Hudelist, Tuđman, p.696. ICTY-Tolimir: E-P1421.E 
(Mladić Diary, 2/4/1993-24/10/1993), p.241.
120 BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman.
121 'Milošević Rejects Territorial Pretensions', Sarajevo Radio, 25/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-208, 
28/10/1991
122 'The Army Has Made Many Mistakes', Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 7/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-195, 
8/10/1991. ICTY-Milošević: E-P393 ('By God, We Shall Fight', NIN, 12/4/1991). ICTY-Prlić(et al): E-
P80.E (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 18/11/1991), pp.56-7.
123 See, for example: 'Milošević Comments on Federal Presidency Decisions', Belgrade Domestic  
Service, 9/5/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-091, 10/5/1991.
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would be found. But there is, in fact, some evidence that Milošević was trying to get the 
Croatian Serbs to take a more moderate approach at this time (detailed later), while the 
development of the idea of 'special status' showed some willingness to find a solution, 
consistent with Croatian Serb self-determination, that Zagreb might be able to accept. 
And indeed, there were apparently some renewed Croat-Serb 'expert' discussions around 
June 1991, probably involving Avramov and Tuđman advisor Zvonko Lerotić.124 
Avramov testified that Croatian representatives were involved in the discussions that led 
to her condominium proposal, and it is notable that it was Lerotić who developed a July 
1991 proposal from Zagreb for Serbian territorial autonomies within Croatia.125 There 
was a significant gap between these two ideas, however, and this was undoubtedly why 
no agreement was reached.126
Milošević's concession over Knin, meanwhile, probably only actually pertained to those 
territories near Knin whose inclusion in Krajina would have cut Croatia in two. Already 
in February 1991 Milošević told the Bosnian Serbs that the dividing line between Serbs 
and Croats would not be Knin railway, as Croatia could never accept losing control of 
the coast, though the Serbs there would find this very hard to accept.127 The 
recollections of Milan Babić support this conclusion: shortly after Karađorđevo, Babić 
has asserted, he saw Milošević examining a map of Yugoslavia and discussing how 
'Tuđman needs Bihać [i.e. the Cazin Krajina]' and also a road from Benkovac to Drniš, 
cutting off the territories Krajina claimed nearest the Croatian coast.128 The concession 
of minor territories near the coast clearly implied that the larger part of Krajina would 
indeed be separate from Croatia, or such concessions would have no meaning. And as 
Tuđman advisor Mario Nobilo recalls, Milošević's concession was 'implicitly seeking 
territorial deals elsewhere'.129
124 ICTY-Milošević: E-P641.3a (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 8/1/1992), p.14. Domovina Intercept: 
B6518/B6520 (Karadžić-Milošević, 29/5/1991).
125 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Smilja Avramov, T32435. 'Tuđman Adviser Advocates Serb Autonomy', 
Tanjug, 31/7/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-148, 1/8/1991.
126 ICTY-Milošević: E-P641.3a (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 8/1/1992), p.15.
127 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-D38 (Statement of Dragan Đokanović), p.5; Witness Dragan Đokanović, T10454.
128 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13111-2. Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who Disappeared', 
NIN, 18/12/1992, pp.18-21, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 15/1/1993.
129 Nobilo, p.142. Members of the Serbian expert commission also reportedly proposed, as an example of 
Chapter 4: The 'External National Homeland': Serbia and the Descent into War in Croatia
189
Agreement in principle on population resettlement, meanwhile, did not resolve the 
question of the assignment of territories, and it seems that Milošević's thinking on 
territories was like Tuđman's but in reverse: Croatian appetites could be satisfied in 
Bosnia, as a pay-off for losing, with some territorial concessions or exchanges, Serb 
territories in Croatia. In March 1994, for example, he told the Bosnian and Croatian 
Serbs that Tuđman would eventually be forced to at least accept negotiations on 
Croatia's territory and to give up Krajina - with all encompassing Serb-Croat 
negotiations, 'Tuđman would have the possibility to defend concessions before his 
public as an historic Serbian-Croatian compromise'.130 Although it was considered, and 
remained an option, however, this idea was clearly not dominant for Milošević in 1991, 
as his policy towards Bosnia indicates.
Rather than Milošević attempting to deceive Tuđman with false promises, Tuđman may, 
at times, have misread parts of Milošević's approach – which was, after all, significantly 
different from the Croatian allegation that he was trying to build a Greater Serbia - as 
revealing an openness to even more significant concessions. After meetings in October 
1991 and January 1992, for example, Tuđman publicly expressed his satisfaction that 
Milošević had acknowledged that the issue was one of 'rights of minority nations', not 
territory, and Serbia had no territorial pretensions, as if this meant a solution within 
Croatia. Milošević meant by this the right to independent autonomies and self-
determination, however.131
Tuđman commented in July 1991 that 'Milošević is crazy, but he is still not so crazy that 
it would not be possible to agree with him',132 and he would later tell the BBC that, in 
spite of Milošević's 'Byzantine' politics, 'I still think that from the very beginning in 
Milošević's approach there was to a certain extent also present a realisation about the 
a possible exchange of populations, that the Muslims in Cazin could be exchanged for the Serbs in 
Knin, though at the same time they sought for Krajina to have access to the sea in Dalmatia, by 
Obrovac. Bilandžić, pp.372-7.
130 Nikola Koljević, Stvaranje Republike Srpske, Dnevnik 1993-1995: Knjiga 1 (Belgrade: Službeni 
glasnik, 2008), pp.459-60. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2540 (Mladić Diary, 15/3/1994).
131 Avramov, pp.164, 279, 284.
132 Ivanković, p.70.
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necessity of a Croatian-Serbian agreement because of the future international order in 
this part of the world.'133 It could be argued that Tuđman was right in this assessment, 
given that Milošević does, later, seem to have renounced the RSK, was more moderate 
than many of the people around him, and was even at this stage giving some thought to 
finding a compromise.134 It cannot be completely ruled out that Milošević, like 
Rašković, had moments of doubt about the Serbian project in 1991, as both Babić and 
Tuđman apparently suspected.135 Exploring a solution within Croatia would have 
opened up a whole new set of challenges, however, and cost Milošević a great deal 
politically, and thus, with the JNA increasingly on side, the already set course could 
have seemed a wiser, and less politically risky, choice. Perhaps Tuđman was right when 
he assessed, in late 1992, that 'Milošević understands our argument' but 'does not give 
up Greater Serbia because he feels he cannot be hurt'.136
Most evidence, however, points to Milošević's commitment to Serb secession in this 
time period, and Tuđman's misplaced optimism and misreadings of Milošević are 
undeniable. Rather than secret promises from Milošević, however, their fundamental 
source lies, I think, in Tuđman's fixation on a Croatian-Serbian agreement as the 
solution to problems in the Balkans, as well as his policy of negotiating and avoiding 
war. Tuđman had a long-standing interest in the Croatian-Serbian Sporazum 
(Agreement) of 1939, which partitioned Bosnia, and was absolutely convinced of the 
necessity of a new Croatian-Serbian agreement, satisfying Serb expansionism with an 
agreed division of Bosnia – a 'smaller Greater Serbia', as Šarinić put it.137 He did not 
133 BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman.
134 It is likely that in 1993-95 Milošević was genuinely prepared to accept a solution within Croatian 
borders, as he was then telling both Zagreb and international negotiators. See, for example: Šarinić. 
Vladislav Jovanović. ICTY-Milošević: Witnesses Charles Kirduja; David Owen. Various documents 
from David Owen's 'Balkan Odyssey' Digital Archive, available online at: http://sca-
arch.liv.ac.uk/ead/html/gb141boda-p1.shtml#boda. Interview Borislav Mikelić (Belgrade: 2007). 
Bilandžić, pp.437, 444, 452. ICTY-Gotovina(et al): E-P499.E (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 
18/8/1995), pp.10, 18-19.
135 Suggested by: Vladislav Jovanović. pp.58-60.
136 ICTY-Milošević: E-P398.5 (Diary of the ICFY, #5, 28/11/1992-31/12/1992), pp.4-5.
137 Branko Tudjen, 'The Superpowers Will Force A Compromise', Vecernji List, 27/8/1994, pp.10-11, in 
FBIS-EEU-94-172, 6/9/1994. Also: ICTY-Prlić(et al): P-5090 (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 
15/9/1993), pp.18-19. Nobilo, p.50. ICTY-Gotovina(et al): E-P499.E (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 
18/8/1995). Seada Vranić, 'The Pretzel Given a Natural Shape', Borba, 25-26/1/1992, p.3, in FBIS-
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advocate the total defeat of Serbia, but instead a negotiated compromise, as, 'as a 
historian, I know that before we normalise relations with our chief opponent, Serbia, we 
will have no peace', a thesis he 'constantly repeated'.138 After the division of Bosnia, 
however, 'relations between Serbia and Croatia would be like those between France and 
Germany [today]'.139 An agreement with Belgrade also implied a peaceful resolution of 
the status of Serbs in Croatia – and tantalisingly, carried the possibility of an agreed 
exchange of populations, with all or some of Croatia's Serbs leaving for Serbia (instead 
of, or in conjunction with, minority rights for those remaining), which was for Tuđman 
a logical and ideal solution.140 Tuđman regarded much of this as an historical necessity 
and inevitability, and was never interested in explaining or discussing it with 
colleagues.141 In addition, Tuđman had numerous other reasons to continue his policy of 
negotiations, however meagre the results – to buy time, win international support and 
avoid a full war with the JNA/Serbia – and optimism could justify the continuation of 
this peaceful strategy, when many of his colleagues sought all-out war.142
Karađorđevo and the contacts connected with it can reveal much about the thinking in 
Zagreb and Belgrade with regard to both Bosnia and Croatia. However, this episode 
represents just one failed attempt to explore possible compromise solutions which 
would avoid war. Given how far apart the thinking of Tuđman and Milošević was, there 
EEU-92-031, 14/2/1992.
138 ICTY-Prlić(et al): E-P7856.E (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 13/2/1994), p.6. Dinkić, p.134. 
Similarly: ICTY-Prlić(et al): E-P3195.E (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 5/7/1993), pp.36, 54; E-
P5080.E (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 15/9/1993), p.22.
139 'Dušan Bilandžić: Tuđman mi je rekao - 'Kad podijelimo Bosnu, ja i Sloba bit ćemo saveznici'', 
Nacional, 5/6/2012. Also: Nobilo, p.50, 55, 67, 178, 188.
140 See, for example: Mirić. Hudelist, Tuđman, pp.709-17. Milan Đukić. Juzbašić. Zoran Odic, 'Kucan 
Ready Even To Resign', Osolobdjenje, 19/12/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-245, 20/12/1990. Franjo 
Tuđman, 'Why we will never give in to the Serbs', The European (London), 16-18/8/1991, p.8. Boris 
Pavelić, 'Slavko Goldstein: Franjo Tuđman je strastveno želio da u Hrvatskoj bude što manje Srba', 
Novi List, 30/4/2011. ICTY-Milošević: P596.7a (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 2/3/1992); Witness 
Stjepan Mesić, T10656. ICTY-Kordic(et al): E-P1 (Statement of Stjepan Mesić), p.2. ICTY-Brđanin: 
E-P34 (SDS BH Deputies Club meeting, 28/2/1992). Croatian Presidential Transcript, 4/3/1992, 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.slobodanpraljak.com/MATERIJALI/SVJEDOCI/MiomirZuzul/42.pdf. ICTY-Gotovina: E-
P457.E (Croatian Presidential Transcript, 17/1/1995) p.18.
141 'Dušan Bilandžić: Tuđman mi je rekao - 'Kad podijelimo Bosnu, ja i Sloba bit ćemo saveznici'', 
Nacional, 5/6/2012. Domljan, p.301.
142 See Chapter 3, footnote 78.
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was little prospect for such talks to succeed. They were, moreover, quickly overtaken by 
events.
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4.3. The Role of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)
The JNA and 'Reducing' Yugoslavia 
Serbia's proposals for imposing Serb secession on Croatia were premised on the JNA 
agreeing to implement this, withdrawing from rump Croatia (and Slovenia) and 
deploying to defend 'Serb borders' in Croatia. But what was the JNA's attitude to these 
proposals, to the idea of creating a 'reduced' Yugoslavia, and to the Serbian rebellion in 
Croatia?
Yugoslav Defence Secretary Veljko Kadijević was the man ultimately in charge of the 
JNA in 1990-91, along with chief of staff Blagoje Adžić and deputy defence secretary 
Stane Brovet. Kadijević considered himself a Yugoslav at the time, and came from a 
mixed Serb-Croat background in Croatia. Adžić was a Bosnian Serb, and Brovet a 
Slovenian. This triumvirate would rule the JNA until Kadijević's resignation in January 
1992.
In his account of the break-up, published in 1993, Kadijević presented the army as 
having decisively and consistently conducted the pro-Serb line he eventually took. He 
claimed that in April 1990 the JNA leadership decided not to oppose separatism, and the 
only question from then on was forming a new, reduced Yugoslavia of those nations 
who wanted it – Serbia's stance. Moreover, the JNA never advocated a coup to 'save' 
Yugoslavia and opposed such adventurist ideas.143 Many other sources, such as Jović's 
diary and the memoirs of Kadijević's predecessor Branko Mamula, however, starkly 
contradict Kadijević's account.144 Kadijević's book seems, essentially, to be an attempt to 
justify the course the army eventually took by claiming it was planned all along; and 
that the army had not made any mistakes in 'losing' large parts of Yugoslavia, because it 
143 Veljko Kadijević, Moje Viđenje Raspada (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), p.110.
144 Borisav Jović, op. cit. Branko Mamula, Slucaj Jugoslavija (Podgorica: CID, 2000). And: Dragan 
Vukšić, JNA i raspad SFR Jugoslavije: od čuvara do grobara svoke države (Stara Pazova: Tekomgraf, 
2006).
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had always favoured that solution. In fact, the army, particularly Kadijević, was 
extremely indecisive, constantly vacillating between the different options it advocated.
It is true that the JNA leadership agreed with Serbia that the Serbs in Croatia had the 
right to self-determination. In June 1990, and on several occasions thereafter, Kadijević 
even agreed in principle with the idea of withdrawing to Serb borders in Croatia. But it 
was not carried out, and, on the contrary, even in spring 1991 the army was moving 
more forces into Croat and Slovene areas.145
As Jović observed at the time, the evidence suggests that the JNA leadership still hoped 
to maintain a united Yugoslavia. By autumn 1990 Kadijević may have been willing to 
allow Slovenia to secede, but, as he told both Slovene representative Janez Drnovšek 
and Tuđman in January 1991, Croatia needed to remain within a Yugoslav federation, as 
its exit would lead to civil war in Croatia and Bosnia.146 He and others in the army 
would ideally have liked to retain Slovenia, also, and this seems to have been the goal of 
the JNA's operations there in June-July 1991, telling the Serbs at the time that 
Yugoslavia could be saved with the support of the international community.147 Adžić 
even told the Serbian leadership openly – and JNA officers publicly - as late as 
June/July 1991 that the idea of 'all Serbs in one state' was unrealisable and would mean 
a 'civil war of extermination', while 'protecting' the Serbs in Croatia was unreasonable, 
as the JNA had to protect all Yugoslav nations.148 Branko Mamula was also in contact 
with Kadijević, Adžić and Aleksandar Vasiljević, the chief of JNA security (Organi  
bezbednosti, OB), at that time, and recalls their unanimity on the goal of preserving 
Yugoslavia as a whole, with various plans being formulated to that end.149
145 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.236.
146 Drnovšek, p.214. BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman, p.10. Šarinić, p.24.
147 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.303. Kolšek, p.261. 'Interview: General Aleksandar Vasiljević: Rumors of An 
All Powerful Service', Transitions Online, 10/1/1998, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.tol.org/client/article/18035-interview-general-aleksandar-Vasiljević-rumors-of-an-all-
powerful-service.html.
148 ICTY-Milošević: E-P405Aa (Statement of Milosav Đorđević), p.8. Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.303-4. 
Also: Mamula, pp.210-23, 236-7.
149 Mamula, pp.177-8, 210-23.
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Kadijević often advocated a coup or state of emergency to impose a solution to the 
Yugoslav crisis, and told the Serbs that this would include referendums and the right to 
self-determination for those who wanted it, and then the formation of a Yugoslavia of 
those remaining. The Serbs, however, doubted - probably rightly - whether Kadijević 
and others in the army leadership would really fight to overthrow the Croatian and 
Slovenian governments, and then after a brief period simply let those republics secede. 
As Jović noted in early 1991, the military had still not 'swallowed' the idea of 
withdrawing to new borders or allowing the Croats and Slovenes to secede, a prospect it 
viewed with inherent displeasure.150 Kadijević does appear to have been reluctant to 
force nations to remain in Yugoslavia against their will,151 but the JNA leadership seems, 
at least to some extent, to have deluded itself into thinking that once the nationalist 
leaderships were removed, the peoples would return to the Yugoslav (and socialist) 
fold.152
The JNA leadership, though often critical of the Serbs, viewed the governments of 
Serbia and Montenegro as the only fundamentally pro-Yugoslav (and socialist) 
governments remaining, and in a potential coup does not seem to have envisaged 
toppling Milošević – as Kadijević said at the time, 'He is the only one who is fighting 
for Yugoslavia'.153 They shared support for a somewhat more centralised federal 
Yugoslavia, and hostility to the 'separatists' in Slovenia and Croatia, particularly the 
Croatian leadership, whom they saw as pro-Ustaša.154 Kadijević also often shared 
Serbia's criticisms of federal Prime Minister Ante Marković.
However, the alliance between the JNA and Serbia was not at all complete in 1990-91. 
Serbia did not control the JNA, and Kadijević did not really agree with Serbia's ideas on 
establishing Serb borders in Croatia, but rather, for a long time, strove to preserve 
150 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.236. And: pp.290, 307.
151 Mamula, p.159.
152 See, for example: Nobilo & Letica, pp.10-1. Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.228, 247, 290. Dinkić, p.133. 
'Kadrovska baza [Interview with Zoran Čičak]', Vreme, 11/10/2001.
153 Ante Marković, 'Moja istina...'. Similarly: Dinkić, p.133. On the other hand: 'Kadrovska baza 
[Interview with Zoran Čičak]', Vreme, 11/10/2001.
154 BBC-DOY: Franjo Tuđman. Kadijević, pp.92, 112, 125. Dinkić, p.133
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Yugoslavia and avoid civil war. He was also very indecisive and unsure about which 
course of action to take, perhaps as a consequence of different interests in the JNA and 
Kadijević's over-riding desire to maintain unity in the army. In July 1991, after the 
failed operation in Slovenia, the JNA accepted its withdrawal from that republic, and 
thereafter Kadijević moved closer to Serbia's stance, on 30 July telling Milošević and 
Jović that he 'no longer believes in any variant for the survival of an integral 
Yugoslavia'.155 Even then, though, there were continual disagreements between Serbia 
and the JNA leadership, which continued to operate fairly independently of Serbia, and 
as late as September 1991 Jović still felt that the military was 'intoxicated with 
Yugoslavia, even though we have discussed the fact that that is no longer realistic a 
hundred times'.156
There was a fairly widespread perception at the time that although Kadijević was pro-
Yugoslav, JNA chief of staff Adžić was a hardline Serb nationalist.157 Adžić does seem 
to have been more decisive, conservative and hardline than Kadijević, but no more 'pro-
Serb'. In fact, Jović's diary shows Adžić was more explicitly pro-Yugoslav and 
confrontational with the Serbian leadership than Kadijević, openly criticising them for 
their nationalism.158 When the Serbs refused to elect Mesić as Yugoslav President in a 
regular rotation in May 1991 Adžić even threatened Jović and Milošević with arrest.159
There were, certainly, conflicting agendas in the JNA. Although the officer corps was 
disproportionately Serbian, this was not true of the high ranks, and there were many 
Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and others in leading positions.160 Some were hardline 
pro-Yugoslav conservatives who supported a coup to save Yugoslavia, or even endorsed 
155 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.326, 342-6. And: Kadijević, p.93. Vukšić, pp.226-32.
156 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.343. See also: Wijnaendts, pp.102-3.
157 Mesić, p.117. Izetbegović, p.87. Vukšić, p.236. Vladan Marjanovic, 'The Variation of Military 
Rhetoric', Borba, 11/7/1991, p.9, in FBIS-EER-91-111, 30/7/1991. Carol J. Williams, 'Profile: On 
Carrying a Fierce Grudge for Half a Century', LA Times, 16/7/1991.
158 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.106-7.
159 Ibid, p.291.
160 For the national composition of the JNA see: James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav 
Crisis (London: Pinter Publisher, 1992). Mile Bjelajac, Die jugoslawische Erfahrung mit der  
multietnischen Armee 1918-1991 (Institutes für neuere Geschichte Serbiens, 2002), accessed 1/8/2014 
from: www.udi.rs/articles/MBJ_jug_erfahrung_mit_multietnischen_armee.pdf  . 
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the later war to defend Serbs from Croatian 'fascists'; others were sympathetic to their 
national leaderships. For example, the Croat Anton Tus, head of the air force until May 
1991, was connecting with the Croatian government, and later in 1991 served as chief of 
staff of Croatia's armed forces, while his successor, Zvonko Jurjević, in office until 
January 1992 and active during the war, was also Croatian.
JNA Intervention in Croatia
The JNA leadership was hostile to Tuđman's Croatian authorities and the actions of their 
new police units, which were perceived as provoking civil war and bloodshed. Such 
actions could also serve as justification for the JNA's intervention in Yugoslavia, to save 
it from inter-national conflict and civil war. At the same time, however, the JNA 
leadership also attempted to be neutral and to avoid siding with the Serbs.
On 17 August 1990, for example, JNA jets had prevented the sending of three 
helicopters of Croatian special forces to Knin, citing incorrect flight co-ordinates, while 
Adžić warned Mesić over the phone that if any blood was shed, the JNA would 
intervene.161 There is also some information that JNA units in Knin went out of their 
barracks, unarmed, into the town centre, as a possible sign of intervention, which in the 
end did not materialise.162 Kadijević was on holiday in Croatia at the time, and told 
Jović he was 'upset' by these developments, noting that 'We are in a difficult position if 
they call on the military to defend the people.'163 He subsequently rejected a proposal 
from Anton Tus for action against the Serb guards in Knin – 'do you want the Serbs to 
say that the JNA is against it?'164 - but he also insisted on investigating and disarming 
Krajina Serb as well as Croat formations, and in January 1991 still rejected Serbian 
161 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.160. BBC-DOY: Josip Boljkovac, p.8.
162 BBC-DOY: Babić, p.15. Interviews: Lazar Macura, Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 11/2007, 7/2009). 
Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.160.
163 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.161.
164 Vlado Vurusic, 'General Kadijević je s maršalom Jazovim dogovarao puč u SSSR-u i Jugoslaviji 
[Interview with Anton Tus]', Jutarnji List, 4/11/2007, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.jutarnji.hr/general-Kadijević-je-s-marsalom-jazovim-dogovarao-puc-u-sssr-u-i-
jugoslaviji/274885/.
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requests to protect Serbs in Croatia, not wanting the army to be seen as 'Serb'.165 In 
March 1991, however, he himself proposed the JNA's first unilateral intervention, over 
clashes in Pakrac, authorised by Jović without a vote by the Presidency.166
The JNA thereafter got involved in several other incidents, usually with Presidency 
authorisation, acting, it claimed, to prevent conflict by positioning itself as a 'buffer' 
between the two sides. This is often seen as part of a pro-Serb plan to cover 'Serbian' 
territory in Croatia.167 Certainly, by the summer or autumn the JNA's thinking had 
shifted more towards Serbia's, and its role as a 'buffer' did have the effect, by then, of 
being deployed to secure/defend Serbian self-determination. It was principally for this 
reason that Serbia supported JNA deployment in Croatia.
However, the initial motivation for the JNA does indeed seem to have been to prevent 
clashes and civil war, and in May 1991 the SFRJ Presidency, including Croatia's 
representative, unanimously authorised the JNA to perform this role.168 In the most 
famous early incidents – Pakrac, Plitvice and Borovo Selo – JNA deployment did not 
affect which side controlled the area in question, which in the cases of Pakrac and 
Plitvice was the Croatian MUP. In key Serb campaigns, such as the conquest of Banija 
in late July 1991, the JNA declined to get involved (the local JNA commander, in that 
case, saying that this was a battle between Chetniks and Ustaše, and not for them).169 
And even as JNA thinking shifted, as the authors of Balkan Battlegrounds note, until the 
start of the war proper in Croatia in mid-September 1991 the JNA does indeed still 
appear to have been trying to act neutrally and prevent conflicts.170 A recorded telephone 
conversation on 13 September between Adžić and Ratko Mladić, then chief of staff of 
165 Vasiljević, pp.89-90, 92-7. Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.231.
166 Borisav Jović, op. cit. Nikolic & Petrović, Od mira do rata, pp.325-7.
167 For example: Silber and Little, pp.135, 170. Judah, pp.174.-7. Tanner, pp.241-7, 253-5. LeBor, p.150. 
Meier, p.175. Cviic, p.208.
168 'Presidency Statement on Ending Conflict', Tanjug, 9/5/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-090, 9/5/1991.
169 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković. Marina Pjevalica, 'I Will Gladly Return to Krajina', 
Srpski Glas, 23/3/1992, p.6, in FBIS-EER-92-055, 4/5/1992.
170 CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.1, p.92. See, for example: ICTY-Milošević: Witness B-050, T19186. 
'Knin Corps Commander Launches Peace Initiative', Tanjug, 15/8/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-159, 
16/8/1991.
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the Knin corps, clearly shows this, with Adžić angrily remonstrating with Mladić for a 
pro-Serbian action he had ordered and emphasising that the JNA's mission was not to 
support Krajina or expand the territory under its control – which was 'expressly 
forbidden' - but to prevent 'mutual extinction' and 'reach an agreement [to] not spill any 
blood'.171 Similarly, Adžić told Karadžić at the time that the army's operations were 
'strictly prescribed': it only fought back when directly attacked, and when there were 
Croat-Serb clashes, the army 'separates those forces' and 'acting together, restore[s] 
peace.'172
This is not to say that the JNA was fully neutral and never biased - unsurprising given 
that Croat forces saw them as their enemy and Serbs their ally – and elements in the 
JNA were more actively pro-Serb, something with which the leadership was to some 
degree complicit.173 The JNA leadership does seem to have seen its mission in Croatia in 
these terms, however.
As detailed in the following chapter, by summer 1991 the JNA had begun arming 
Serbian units within Croatia, though often secretly and without the knowledge of 
regular command structures. This was certainly one sign of the JNA's shift to a pro-
Serbian orientation. However, Croatian arming in autumn and winter 1990 seems to 
have had primarily defensive motivations, with Tuđman even apparently convinced that 
war would not occur, and the same could apply to the arming of the Serbs - one source, 
indeed, suggests that Mamula had persuaded Kadijević to arm the Serbs 'to avoid a 
genocide'.174 Moreover, regardless of what type of war occurred – including, for 
example, a war to defeat separatists and preserve Yugoslavia – Serbian forces in Croatia 
would definitely be the JNA's allies, and Mamula himself describes the goal of arming 
171 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1513 (Recorded conversation, Mladić-Adžić, 13/9/1991), pp.3-4.
172 Domovina Intercept: B6690 (Karadžić-Adžić, 7/9/1991).
173 See, for example: ICTY-Milošević: E-P350.3a (Letter from Col. Dušan Smiljanic, 16/10/1994). 
HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 79 (Krajina DB report, Korenica, 19/7/1991), pp.180-1.
174 ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Memorial of the Republic of Croatia: Annexes – General Annexes – 
Volume 4', 1/3/2001, Annex 146D ('What to do with the Serbs of Gorski Kotar', 17/4/1994), pp.293-4. 
Also: Kadijević, pp.125, 127-8.
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as the creation of a united Serb-Croat front for Yugoslavia.175 (In summer and autumn 
1991 the JNA also began forming and arming Bosnian Serb units, although the Serbian 
leadership and the JNA was, at that time, still hoping to retain the whole of Bosnia 
within Yugoslavia, rather than to fight the Muslims there.)176
Thus, although closer to Serbia than to the other republics or the federal government, in 
1990-91 the JNA leadership still hoped to preserve Yugoslavia as a whole and to avoid 
civil war, and it was only at a late stage, in summer or autumn 1991, that it fully 
accepted Serbia's concept of a 'reduced Yugoslavia' including Serbian territories in 
Croatia. Its interventions in Croatia from spring 1991 onwards were not part of a grand 
conspiracy to cover 'Serbian territories' in Croatia, but, initially at least, part of a 
relatively neutral effort to prevent Croat-Serb civil war. Eventually, the JNA leadership 
did side with Serbia, but there were constant disagreements while Kadijević remained at 
the helm, as he did throughout the war in Croatia.177
175 Mamula, pp.237-8.
176 See Chapter 5, footnote 95.
177 See both Jović, op. cit., and Vukšić.
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4.4. Belgrade's 'Advice' to the Serbs in Croatia
Until at least mid-1991, the JNA rejected Serbia's proposals to 'withdraw' to Serbian 
borders in Croatia. Did Serbia, then, have an alternative strategy with regard to securing 
its goals in Croatia that was being pursued in the meantime? What advice or instructions 
did the Serbian leadership communicate to Serbs in Croatia? The traditional view is that 
Serbia was constantly pushing radicalisation among Serbs in Croatia, supporting 
hardliners, opposing negotiations, and helping instigate violence. The various Croat-
Serb clashes that began to erupt in Croatia, in particular, have been seen as part of a 
Serbian conspiracy to bring about civil war and JNA intervention to 'cover' Serbian 
territories. This section examines whether the available evidence supports such a radical 
interpretation of Serbian policy.
'Recursive' Secession
From June 1990 onwards Milošević and Jović advocated JNA withdrawal from the bulk 
of Croatia towards 'Serbian' territories, whose precise borders would then be determined 
by local referendums. This would be presented as recursive secession – Serbs in Croatia 
voting to remain in Yugoslavia, which Croatia had left. In the absence of the JNA 
carrying out the 'cutting off' of Croatia, Serbia's thinking for the Croatian Serbs seems to 
have been along the same lines, supporting or endorsing their secession from Croatia in 
response to Croatia's moves towards secession from Yugoslavia. This hardline stance in 
support of self-determination of nations, and rejection of a confederation, was conveyed 
publicly from May 1990 onwards, with Serbia advocating the adoption of a law on self-
determination to regulate this.178 The SPS program of July 1990 also gave implicit 
support to the right of Serbs in Croatia to territorial autonomy, even in a federation.179
178 See footnote 80.
179 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Mihailo Marković, T3350-1. Slobodan Vučetić, 'Mirno presabiranje', NIN, 
28/9/1990, pp.28-30.
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Although at first Belgrade's stance was more hardline than that of most Serbs in Croatia, 
however, the latter soon caught up, and Belgrade ended up more often advocating 
caution. Sources are more available for the Bosnian Serbs, thanks to the intercepted 
communications between Karadžić and Milošević, and there Milošević was very clear 
that moves towards separation should only be taken in response to corresponding moves 
by the other side. As Milošević said, Yugoslavia 'does exist' and 'the Serbian stance [is] 
that it will not make or accept any illegal moves that do not respect the constitution'.180 
When the Bosnian Serbs created a Serbian Assembly on 24 October 1991 in response to 
the Bosnian Assembly's declaration on sovereignty/independence, Milošević therefore 
urged Karadžić to 'hold back a little on that' and instead form a 'deputies' club' 
requesting the declaration's revocation. Forming such an assembly, Milošević 
maintained, would 'be just as illegal' as the declaration.181 Milošević felt similarly about 
the formation of Republika Srpska on 9 January 1992, which he considered 'not very 
smart' and, he argued, 'had nothing to do with legality'.182
For Milošević, it was essential that the Serbs be seen as defenders of the existing order, 
voting simply to remain in Yugoslavia. As Milošević said to Karadžić, 'Take care, it's 
dangerous if they think that something new is being created'.183 Milošević explained this 
policy to Serbian mayors in March 1991: Yugoslavia was an internationally recognised 
country, and preserving 'its legal and national continuity' would prevent foreign 
intervention in support of the separatists, while those seceding would be 'small state[s]' 
which would have 'to ask to be recognised all over the world', unlike those remaining in 
Yugoslavia.184 Equally significantly, this would enable the largest armed force by far, the 
180  'Republican Presidents Comments Following Meeting', Tanjug, 11/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-072, 
15/4/1991.
181 Domovina Intercept: B6846 (Karadžić-Milošević, 24/10/1991).
182 Domovina Intercept: B7016 (Karadžić-Milošević, 10/1/1992). Also: Domovina Intercept: B6957 
(Milošević-Karadžić, 9/7/1991).
183 Domovina Intercept: B6984 (Karadžić-Milošević, 30/12/1991). See also: Mihalj Ramač, 'Bilo je to 
1991. (17): Kasapnica trećeg svetskog rata', Danas (Belgrade), 12/12/2011, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
www.danas.rs. Dragan Bisenić and Dragiša Pusonjić, 'Let There Be a 'Peaceful Bosnia' in the End', 
Borba, 12/11/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-223, 19/11/1990. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64A.212.1 (Minutes of 
SDS BH meeting, 9/10/1991).
184 ICTY-Milošević: E-P393 ('By God, We Shall Fight', NIN, 124/1991). Karadžić also argued that those 
remaining, rather than seceding, would do better territorially - 'different criteria apply to the one that 
secedes': ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P154.15.A.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Vukić-Grahovac-Sendić, 16/10/1991). 
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JNA, to fall into Serbia's hands, as leader of the rump Yugoslavia - the creation of a 
Serbian army, by contrast, would imply the JNA's disintegration and a division of its 
assets, and operations of that army in Croatia and Bosnia would be seen as inter-
republic aggression.185 Ideologically, too, Milošević never advocated forming an 
expanded Greater Serbian state, but rather a 'reduced' Yugoslav federation, even if all its 
constituent units were Serbian.
For this reason, Belgrade often found itself advocating caution to the Croatian and 
Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, the only direct evidence I have seen regarding Belgrade's 
attitude to the proclamation of SAO Krajina is that it advocated waiting until after 
Croatia passed its new constitution, a major move towards independence.186 Milošević 
expressly disagreed with Rašković, and later Babić, over the idea of forming a united 
Krajina state, of the Croatian and Bosnian Krajinas, largely because it would lose the 
Serbs their advantage of posing as defenders of the existing order.187 Milošević also 
opposed Babić's policy, from April 1991 onwards, of annexing Krajina to Serbia, for 
similar reasons.188
Babić's strategy of recursive secession of Krajina from Croatia, pursued from late 1990 
to spring 1991, however, evidently matched sentiments in Belgrade, and was certainly 
not met with opposition. The secession of Krajina in response to moves towards 
secession by Croatia, framed as a reaction and as 'remaining' in Yugoslavia, seems to 
have been supported by Serbia.
Domovina Intercept: C2375 (Karadžić-Grkovic-Brdanin, 16/10/1991).
185 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.344, 346. Domovina Intercepts: B6584 (Karadžić-Brdanin, 2/7/1991); 
B6957 (Milošević-Karadžić, 9/7/1991). ICTY-Milošević: Witness Borisav Jović, T29279.
186 Marijana Milosavljević, ‘Prof Vojislav Vukčević, Advokat: Šepanje do sledećeg rata’, NIN, 20/3/1992, 
p.26.
187 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.158. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64A.460.1 (Interview Jovan Rašković, Društvo, 
22/4/1992).
188 See Chapter 6.
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Croat-Serb Negotiations/Violence
One major piece of evidence supports the argument that Belgrade was deliberately 
instigating conflict in Croatia, which is worth considering even though it is yet to be 
cited in the secondary literature. The 'Forgotten Testament of Jovan Rašković', 
published in 2004, is an account by a friend of Rašković's, Serbian journalist Dragan 
Tanasić, about Rašković's thinking, and interactions with Milošević, in 1990-91.189 It 
appears to provide direct evidence of Belgrade orchestrating the conflict in Croatia. 
Tanasić describes, for example, Milošević hearing of Rašković's idea of a Gandhi 
march, and immediately calling him to a meeting where he denounced the idea and 
instructed Rašković to instead destroy Croatian tourism and arrange the murder of 
uniformed Serbs to blame the Croats.
Much about the 'Testament', however, makes it a very dubious source. At its core it 
presents a series of events as taking place in close succession, a day or two apart, with 
direct causal connections between them, connections which are pivotal to its argument 
that Milošević was orchestrating everything. But the events it describes actually 
occurred as much as ten months apart, and Tanasić often has them in completely the 
wrong chronological order, making many of the linkages literally impossible. Tanasić's 
description of Rašković's allegedly suspicious death, meanwhile, is directly contradicted 
by Rašković's own daughter, while both she, and Rašković himself, have given accounts 
of his discussions with Milošević, including over the Gandhi march and the use of 
force, which lack the highly sensational claims of Tanasić.190 Milošević had a highly 
reserved and cautious attitude towards sensitive issues, avoiding written records and 
even sometimes falsely denying knowledge or involvement to his closest colleagues, so 
it seems improbable that he would openly and directly advocate criminal and terrorist 
acts to Rašković, someone with whom, as discussed in Chapter 6, he never had a very 
189 Dragan Tanasić, 'Zaboravljeni testament Jovana Raškovića', Profil, No. 47 (Belgrade: 15/4/2004), 
pp.4-6, accessed 1/8/2014 from www.krajinaforce.com.
190 Jovan Kesar, 'Jovan Rašković', Večernji Novosti, 5/9/2007, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
www.krajinaforce.com, pp.3-4. Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.171.
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good relationship.191 It is also unlikely that Milošević even had people capable of 
carrying out such orders at the time.
Tanasić's claims cannot be completely ruled out, and there were some rumours of such 
staged attacks, like the Mlinar incident, at the time (from which his claims perhaps 
derive).192 But given the very questionable nature of this document, I do not consider it 
satisfactory evidence for such a pivotal issue - particularly as there is much more 
reliable, contemporary evidence supporting contrary interpretations of Serbian policy.
Milošević did favour an imposed solution and was thus not generally an advocate of 
negotiations or seeking a compromise with the Croats. In Belgrade the perception of 
developments in Croatia was also fairly radical. Serbian officials, and the leading people 
in Serbian state media, typically supported and justified 'Serbian resistance' to Croatian 
'state terror', rather than, for example, viewing this 'resistance' as being also part of the 
problem.193 In a television interview on 11 September 1990 Jović even justified the Knin 
Serbs' refusal to return arms and said it was logical that they would not do so until 'the 
causes of the revolt have been eliminated'.194 Many Serbs in Croatia, including some 
more moderate parts of the SDS, would in fact have endorsed the return of weapons at 
that time.195 In this sense, Jović's position supporting the Serbs in Knin, who in Serbia 
were generally equated with the Serbs throughout Croatia, was in effect support for a 
particularly hardline faction of Serbs in Croatia. This was a fairly constant feature of the 
period.
191 See Chapter 1, footnote 128.
192 See, for example: Krmpotić, pp.33, 37. Milan Jajčinović, 'Zabava s pucanje', Danas, 8/1/1991, pp.10-
11. ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Memorial of the Republic of Croatia: Annexes – General Annexes – 
Volume 4', 1/3/2001, Annex 55 (JNA report, 10/12/1990), pp.141-2. Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.217-8. 
ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P01646 (DB Serbia, report on Arkan, 1/1991).
193 For example: 'Državni teror', Borba, 2/10/1990, p.3. Milorad Vučelić, 'Ponovo ustaše', NIN, 
5/10/1990, pp.8-9. Zečević, p.31. Dragan Barjaktarević, 'Hrvatske paralele: Ustaše i Tuđman', 
Intervju, 17/8/1990, pp.12-14. 'Vojvodina Assembly Assails Croatian 'Terrorism'', Tanjug, 9/5/1991, in 
FBIS-EEU-91-091, 10/5/1991. 'Serbia Lists Demands in Letter to FEC', Tanjug, 8/5/1991, in FBIS-
EEU-91-090, 9/5/1991. See also Thompson, Forging War, pp.65-8.
194 Aleksandar Milošević, 'Jović's Recipe', Vjesnik, 13/9/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-182, 19/9/1990.
195 All municipal leaderships in Banija-Kordun, for example, opposed such arms seizures later in the 
month, as discussed in Chapter 3.
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Milošević's hardline stance was also conveyed in direct contacts with Croatian Serb 
leaders – for example, in his already described contacts with Rašković, where the idea 
of a pacifist march was rejected and Milošević argued that borders were drawn by 
military boots.196 SNV Vice-President Mile Dakić similarly recalls how in January 1991 
Milošević assured him and Babić that 'The Croats are not going to slaughter you any 
more', and if necessary Serbia would 'send a million volunteers' and the Croats would 
regret starting a war. Milošević, Dakić recalls, did not advocate negotiations, but 
'always thought that some military option is best'.197
Serbia's stance was thus clear to the Croatian Serbs, and this must have had some 
influence in encouraging Croatian Serbs to adopt a similarly hardline approach. But 
aside from Milošević's major clash with Rašković (detailed in Chapter 6), the Serbian 
leadership does not seem to have been particularly involved in the minutia of Croatian 
Serb politics, and some evidence directly contradicts the notion of a deliberate attempt 
by Belgrade to interfere in Croatia.
For example, the hardline attitude of the official Serbian media meant that critics of 
negotiations generally received plenty of coverage. When in April 1991 hardliners 
announced SDS moderate Vukčević's dismissal following negotiations in Zagreb, the 
announcement was read on Belgrade Radio, which was actually how Vukčević heard of 
it.198 But, at the same time, in May 1991 Milošević directly told Džakula (who had taken 
part in those same negotiations) that talks with the Croats should continue, 'for in this 
way we at least have a direct insight into their thinking',199 while Jović even arranged a 
meeting of Babić and Mesić, in response to the latter's complaints that the Serbian 
leadership was meeting him without Croatian representatives.200 This suggests that the 
196 Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.171. Kesar, 'Jovan Rašković'.
197 Interview Mile Dakić (Belgrade: 5/11/2007).
198 ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Vojislav Vukčević.
199 ICTY-Martić: E-235a (SDS Slavonia meeting, 8/5/1991).
200 BBC-DOY: Babić, p.4. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Stjepan Mesić, T10524-5. RFE, Svjedoci Raspada: 
Stipe Mesić. S. Stamatović & Z. Tarle, 'Izjava Babića na izjavu Mesića', Borba, 3/5/1991, p.2. Dinkić, 
pp.131-2.
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Serbian media's hardline coverage was not necessarily a reflection of a deliberate policy 
to sabotage negotiations.
Contrary to the usual view of Milošević as master manipulator, he and others in 
Belgrade do not seem to have been particularly involved in Croatian Serb politics, nor 
directing the day-to-day reporting of the media. In January 1992, for example, then 
federal defence secretary Adžić complained that the Belgrade media was giving 
disproportionate coverage to Krajina statements against the Vance plan, a plan which 
Milošević was then vigorously struggling to get the Krajinas to approve.201 Milosevic 
himself publicly criticised the Serbian media at times - accusing it, for example, of 
'systematically [poisoning]' the people with 'intolerance and hatred... towards the other 
Yugoslav peoples'.202 Although Milošević certainly had some degree of control over the 
state media,203 Serbia was not a totalitarian state, and nationalist media coverage 
evidently had a momentum of its own, capable of influencing the state leadership as 
well as being influenced by it, even pushing the situation in directions the leadership 
might not favour.
Moreover, advocacy of a hardline stance does not mean that Serbia was always a 
protagonist of radicalisation. There were limits and constraints to Serbia's policies. The 
main limits were international public opinion and the opinion of the JNA, both of which 
Serbia sought to keep on side. Even while advocating territorial self-determination, 
certain moves could still be seen as counter-productive, and far from orchestrating every 
incident in Croatia, there is convincing evidence indicating that key developments in 
Croatia in 1990 and 1991 took place autonomously of Belgrade and that Serbia was 
often, in fact, trying to rein in the Serb nationalists in Croatia.
For example, on 17 August 1990, in addition to events in the Knin Krajina, Serbian 
opposition radicals in Nova Pazova, Serbia, along with SDS leader Dušan Zelenbaba, 
201 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1431.E (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 21/1/1992), p.4.
202 Rade Brajević and Miloš Miljković, 'Serbia Wants Peace', Vecčrnji Novosti, 30/12/1991, pp.2-4, in 
FBIS-EEU-92-020, 30/1/1992.
203 See, for example: Borisav Jović, Knjiga o Miloševiću (ICTY translation), p.15.
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rallied in protest at events in Croatia, wearing Chetnik emblems and saying they would 
go to Knin, reportedly even preparing for departure. Milošević and his allies appear to 
have been surprised and alarmed by the dramatic escalation of events on 17 August, 
including these gatherings in Serbia. Milošević, then on holiday in Kupari, Croatia, was 
in telephone contact with his ally Federal Interior Minister Petar Gračanin. Gračanin 
appealed to Croatian Interior Minister Josip Boljkovac by phone to call off his operation 
against Knin and 'do something to prevent the bloodshed' - 'Listen Josip, brotherhood 
and unity is brotherhood and unity' - and promised to stop volunteers from setting off.204 
Jović (also on holiday at the time) subsequently called Gračanin and Serbian Interior 
Minister Radmilo Bogdanović to have the Chetnik rally disbanded and its participants 
arrested, or at least to prevent them from leaving for Croatia, as 'we already have too 
many complications even without them'.205 Two weeks later, meanwhile, Serbian radical 
Vojislav Šešelj visited Knin and met with Babić, who requested volunteers to help man 
the barricades. Šešelj tried to enrol volunteers in Belgrade, but was arrested and 
imprisoned by the Serbian authorities.206
On 1 March 1991, the day before the Pakrac clash, the first major incident in 1991, 
representatives of the SNV of Eastern Slavonia met with Serbia's Minister for Serbs 
Outside Serbia, Stanko Cvijan, along with retired general Dušan Pekić, who had good 
contacts with the Serbian authorities and the Croatian Serbs. The content of this 
meeting, as recorded by a member of the SNV delegation (and published by him in 
1994), provides a real insight into Serbian policy.207 Pekić explained that it was 'vital 
that the Serbs do not provoke conflict', as 'armed conflict [ie. Croat-Serb clashes] is the 
last thing the Army could accept', but the army would defend the Serbs if the HDZ 
attacked. Serbia could not get involved and support the Serbs in Croatia, even through 
204 BBC-DOY: Josip Boljkovac, p.7. ICTY-Milošević: T31324. Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani (ICTY 
translation), p.161.
205 Ibid, pp.160-1. The rallies were broken up, and also harshly condemned by the Serbian leadership and 
state media: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1159 (Article in 'Great Serbia', 9/1997). Đurić & Zorić, 
'Foreclosing the Other, Building the War', p.70. M. Šašić, 'Separatist Ideas from Croatia and Slovenia 
Cannot Hinder Yugoslavism', Politika, 23/8/1990, p.8, in FBIS-EEU-90-173, 6/9/1990.
206 BBC-DOY: Vojislav Šešelj, p.6. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1159 (Article in 'Great Serbia', 9/1997).
207 Petrović, p.52.
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the MUP or any sympathetic Serb generals in the army, because the JNA leadership of 
Kadijević and Brovet would find out and everything would fail as Serbia had meddled – 
i.e., the army would not side with the Serbs as a result. The Serbs should just prepare for 
resistance and, insomuch as was possible, arm themselves (something advocated by 
Pekić already in 1990, and thus not something that was necessarily Serbia's policy, as 
opposed to Pekić's).208
Pekić had also advised Džakula to reject talks with Zagreb, directing them instead to 
negotiate with Krajina, and there is evidence that Džakula believed that he had 'agreed 
with somebody in Belgrade' that the Pakrac Serbs would rebel and, when the Croats 
reacted, the JNA would intervene as a buffer.209 The fact that Džakula was evidently in 
contact with Pekić, and following his advice, suggests that this was agreed with him. 
Their estimate of the JNA, however, was clearly wrong, and it is also possible that this 
was merely how Džakula justified the rebellion to colleagues (at the aforementioned 
meeting, Pekić apparently described Pakrac as the 'most endangered' area, without 
reference to any such plan).210
Regardless, the picture of Serbian policy which Pekić presented - cautious about, rather 
than instigating or directing, any Serbian provocations in Croatia - is supported by a 
number of other sources. In an interview in 1992, for example, Babić explained how 
Milošević/Serbia, as well as the JNA, had opposed provocative Krajina police actions 
he had ordered, in late March 1991 (Plitvice), early May (Bratiskovci) and early June 
(Udbina).211 And indeed, immediately before the Plitvice clash Milošević's office had 
been urgently trying to arrange a meeting with Tuđman, the follow-up to 
Karađorđevo.212 Babić indicated that it was precisely his suspicion of these Belgrade-
208 Petrović, pp.13-14.
209 Savić claims that the idea was that the JNA would then occupy the whole region, splitting it off from 
Croatia. ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Goran Hadžić, T9401; Borivoje Savić, T674-6; Vojislav Vukčević, 
T11086.
210 ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić, T9401. Petrović, p.52.
211 Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who Disappeared', NIN, 18/12/1992, pp.18-21, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 
15/1/1993.
212 ICTY-Milošević: E-P641.2a (Statement of Hrvoje Šarinić), p.2.
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Zagreb negotiations that prompted him to order deployment to Plitvice, leading to the 
clashes there and the first official deaths of the conflict.213 At the beginning of May 
Babić then arranged that the Krajina Serbs would rally and march on Plitvice. The 
Croats saw this as a Krajina Serb effort to re-occupy Plitvice, while the JNA also 
considered it provocative. Milošević urged Babić to hold the rally on May Day, and as a 
peaceful picnic instead of a march on Plitvice. (Babić did arrange it for the suggested 
day, but as a march, along with Šešelj, forcing their way through JNA blockades.)214 
And when Krajina forces held a demonstrative parade across the Bosnian border in 
early June, Milošević condemned it privately as ‘a stupidity which makes a lot of 
problems to me and to [us all]'.215 
In a meeting with Džakula in early May 1991, meanwhile, Milošević's main demand, as 
recorded in a contemporary SDS document, was that 'we do not get involved in clashes 
with the MUP anymore, but let them clash with the army, which can deal with the NDH 
without any problems.'216 Džakula confirmed to me that this was, indeed, an explicit and 
firm demand.217 Milošević also reportedly claimed that America could even agree to 
JNA intervention 'but not civil war', clearly showing how Milošević distinguished 
between Croat-Serb clashes and JNA intervention to secure Serbian goals, contrary to 
the standard interpretation that these were two aspects of the same policy, and also how 
he was taking into account the views of the international community. Milošević, on this 
occasion, also advocated that talks with the Croats continue, 'for in this way we at least 
have a direct insight into their thinking'.218 This meeting took place just days after the 
third major incident of 1991: Borovo Selo.
213 Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who Disappeared', NIN, 18/12/1992, pp.18-21, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 
15/1/1993.
214 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13825. BBC-DOY: Vojislav Šešelj, pp.12-13. 'SDS To 
Proceed With May Day 'Peace' March', Tanjug, 30/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-084, 1/5/1991. 'Plitvice 
Army Blockade Breached by 5,000', Belgrade Domestic Service, 2/5/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-086, 
3/5/1991. Mihajlo Knežević, pp.42-3.
215 Domovina Intercept: B6549 (Karadžić-Milošević, 11/6/1991).
216 ICTY-Martić: E-235a (SDS Slavonia meeting, 8/5/1991).
217 Interview Veljko Džakula (Zagreb: 30/9/2009).
218 ICTY-Martić: E-235a (SDS Slavonia meeting, 8/5/1991).
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Borovo Selo, Šešelj's Chetniks and Frenki's 'Red Berets'
Borovo Selo was a Serbian village near Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia. After a series of 
incidents, on 2 May 1991 a large contingent of Croatian police entered the village. Serbs 
fought back, and in the ensuing fight twelve Croats and three Serbs died. The first such 
mass incident, this had a major polarising effect in Croatia. It has been widely claimed 
that Serbia stood behind this clash. 
A small number of nationalist volunteers from Serbia - just over a dozen - had taken 
part in the fighting in Borovo Selo, 'Chetniks' sent by Šešelj in agreement with local 
Serbs. The main allegation of Serbian involvement is based on Šešelj's claims in the 
mid-1990s that he had sent his volunteers in agreement with the Serbian MUP/DB. It is 
also suggested that this collaboration continued in the spring and summer of 1991, with 
armed Chetnik paramilitaries being sent by Serbia to provoke the descent into war.219
However, Šešelj has since denied his previous claims, maintaining that he had been 
trying to blacken Milošević's reputation with the West. Šešelj is a highly unreliable 
source, and this unreliability does seem to extend to his earlier accounts. The Serbs of 
Borovo Selo had probably received some arms from Serbia in April 1991, and the 
Chetnik volunteers, arriving unarmed, acquired some of those arms when they joined 
the local defence.220 But far from Belgrade directing the deployment of these volunteers, 
contemporary, confidential DB documents show that shortly after the clash Šešelj and 
his associate Ljubiša Petković initiated contact with the Serbian MUP/DB, who not only 
refused their requests to give their volunteers arms, but warned them that their activities 
were extremely counter-productive for the Serbs in Croatia. Convinced, Petković called 
off the planned sending of further volunteers. The DB then set about investigating their 
activities.221 In a conversation with Karadžić later that month, meanwhile, Milošević 
219 See, for example: Štitkovac, p.157. O'Shea, p.9. Judah, pp.177, 185-9. Pribičević, p.197. Sell, pp.137-
8. Tanner, p.245.
220 Vojislav Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Drugi deo (Belgrade: Srpska Radikalna Stranka, 2010), pp.217, 229-
30. See also: Chapter 5, footnote 80.
221 Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Drugi deo, pp.213-4. Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, pp.92-8. ICTY-
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referred to the exaggerated boasts of Šešelj about Chetnik fighters in Borovo Selo as 
only harming Serbia - 'He's lying. There was no one [from Serbia there]', just 'three of 
their men... [who] were the first to run for shelter' - while two months later Milošević 
referred to Šešelj as an American puppet and Serb opposition volunteers as 'fools' and 
'jerks'.222
Shortly after Borovo Selo the Serbian MUP for the first time established checkpoints 
along the border with Croatia, and there is evidence that in the months that followed 
nationalist volunteers only managed to get into Eastern Slavonia by crossing secretly, 
unarmed and avoiding the Serbian police.223 These volunteers were small in number and 
simply joined local defence structures, not playing any notable role in provoking 
conflict. It appears that it was only from July 1991 that the stance of the Serbian 
government – and the JNA - shifted in favour of allowing volunteers, providing they 
enrolled legally in the police, TO or JNA. An updated defence law was then adopted to 
that effect.224 Even in Šešelj's earlier accounts it was actually only in July 1991 that he 
claimed contact with the Serbian state was established, with all the alleged earlier 
collaboration being indirect, in that his volunteers acquired arms from locals, who had 
in turn acquired them from Serbia.225 And, as Petković, the Šešelj Prosecution's key 
'insider' witness, testified in some detail, their contacts in autumn and winter 1991 were 
mostly with the JNA, rather than officials of Serbia, evidence that is supported by DB 
Stanišić/Simatović: E-P3241 (DB Serbia, Official Note relating to Vojislav Šešelj, 10/5/1991). ICTY-
Stanišić-Simatović: E-D488 (DB Serbia report, 15/5/1991).
222 Domovina Intercepts: B6518/B6520 (Karadžić-Milošević, 29/5/1991); B6587 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
8/7/1991); B6588 (Karadžić-Milošević, 26/7/1991).
223 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-074, Serbian MUP employee; E-P1344a (Interview with 
Vojislav Šešelj and Nikola Poplasen), p.4. Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, p.134.
224 It was also around July 1991 that Arkan started his paramilitary unit, with state support. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses DST-074; Radoslav Maksic; E-P1344 (Interview with Vojislav Šešelj 
and Nikola Poplasen), p.4; E-D1336 (Official Note, Information on Dušan Pekić, DB Serbia, 
9/8/1991); E-D1216 (Decree on Registration of Volunteers in TO, R. Serbia, 14/8/1991); E-D67 
(Information about Paramilitary Formations, DB Serbia, 1/8/1991); E-P404 (Interview with Radmilo 
Bogdanović, Duga, 12/2/1993). BBC-DOY: Zivota Panić. Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Drugi deo, p.257.
225 BBC-DOY: Vojislav Šešelj, p.15.
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documentation from the time.226 The popular version of regime-backed volunteers thus 
seems to be almost an inversion of the real situation.
Another allegation of Serbian involvement in Borovo Selo, made by influential Vreme 
journalist Miloš Vasić, is that people from, or connected to, the Serbian MUP/DB 
actually took part in the fighting.227 There is some evidence of contemporary (1991-92) 
boasts from a few people who were later in the Serbian DB's 'Red Berets', that they had 
taken part in the fighting in Borovo Selo.228 However, it seems highly unlikely that these 
boasts were truthful.
We have a great deal of detailed information on the volunteers who took part in those 
clashes, and sources on what happened, including contemporary DB documents and 
Hague witnesses involved in contacts with the Serbian DB in Borovo and elsewhere, 
and there is no information that Serbian MUP/DB men participated in the clash.229 
These sources even include a 'strictly confidential, return upon reading' report of the 
Serbian DB on Borovo Selo, from the day after the clash, and a similar report from the 
Vojvodina DB. The latter details precisely how they heard about what was unfolding 
there, from various local Serbs making calls to the Vojvodina police, showing that they 
did not have people on the ground there at the time.230 The aforementioned May 1991 
226 Statement of Ljubiša Petković, and other evidence, in: ICTY-Šešelj: OTP Closing Brief (5/2/2012), 
pp.34-6, 71-2. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P3222 (DB Serbia, Official note on interview with Ljubiša 
Petković, 18/9/1991); E-D67 (Information about Paramilitary Formations, DB Serbia, 1/8/1991). 
Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, p.144. BBC-DOY: Vojislav Šešelj, p.13.
227 Interview Miloš Vasić (Belgrade: 12/7/1991). Filip Švarm, 'Jedinica' (B92 & Vreme, 2003), transcript 
of Episode 1, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.b92.net/specijal/jedinica-eng/1_epizoda.php  .  Miloš 
Vasić & Filip Švarm, 'Paramilitary Formations in Serbia: 1990-2000', in Helsinki Files: In the  
Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units, (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee, 
2001), p.46.
228 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P3152.E, P3008 (DB Serbia documents concerning Predrag Baklajić). 
ICTY-Krajišnik: Witness Milan Babić, T3379. ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1869; E-625 
(JNA reports, Knin, 1991). ICTY-Milošević: C-047, T22029-30.
229 Witness Borivoje Savić, who made many fantastic claims about DB involvement, also did not claim 
that the DB was involved in the clash, while OTP military expert Reynard Theunens testified that 'I 
haven't seen any material linking the Serbian MUP... to the incident in Borovo Selo.' ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses Borivoje Savić; Reynard Theunens, T8374; JF-035; JF-032; Borislav 
Bogunović; Milomir Kovačević; E-D488 (DB Serbia report, 15/5/1991); E-P1158 (Velika Srbija 
article); E-P2449 (DB Serbia, report on paramilitaries, 7/4/1995). ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement 
of Milan Milanović). Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, pp.92-8. 
230 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D303 (DB Serbia, Report on Borovo Selo, 3/5/1991). ICTY-
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conversation between Karadžić and Milošević also indicates that Milošević did not 
believe Serbia had played any role in Borovo Selo.
As discussed in Chapter 7, in a 1997 ceremony Frenki gave a grand speech on the 
history of the 'Red Berets', vastly inflating their role in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, 
listing and exaggerating all their contributions. And yet he made no mention of any role 
in Borovo Selo.231 And, despite his allegations - some demonstratively false - against the 
Serbian DB in the mid-1990s, Šešelj never alleged their participation in this clash.232 
This evidence, and evidence by omission, reminds us of the need to be cautious with 
rumours and boasts by supposed war heroes.
There is thus convincing evidence that throughout the period of the first major incidents 
in Croatia in spring 1991 (Pakrac, Plitvice and Borovo Selo), Milošević had a highly 
cautious attitude towards any Serbian provocations in Croatia. Considering Milošević's 
'firm demand' that the Serbs abstain from clashes with the Croats, his opposition even to 
a peaceful Serb protest march on Plitvice, and Pekić's explanation that it was 'vital that 
the Serbs do not provoke conflict', it seems highly unlikely that Milošević was, in fact, 
orchestrating Serb provocations in Croatia in aid of provoking a descent into war.
Of course, Milošević did not really see Serbian violence in Croatia as a problem, 
considering it to be essentially self-defence.233 However, he did apparently advise at 
least in this period against provocations or clashing with the MUP. One reason for this 
was surely that the Croatian Serbs were weaker and thus the Croats were usually 
victorious in such clashes. The main reason, however, appears to have been that 
provocative Serbian behaviour in Croatia risked alienating both the JNA and the 
international community, potentially threatening the vital alliance of the army and 
Stanišić/Simatović: Submission: Public Versions of Confidential Exhibits Part 2 (2/4/2013), pp.1172-
5.
231 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P61.E (Kula Camp Video, 1997).
232 Šešelj claimed, for example, based on incorrect information, that the Red Berets led the attack on 
Zvornik in 1992; they were not even involved.
233 See, for example: Domovina Intercept: B6588 (Karadžić-Milošević, 26/7/1991).
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Serbia. Rather than any Serbian rebels or paramilitaries, Milošević counted principally 
on the legal (and, of course, strongest) armed force of Yugoslavia, the JNA, to secure 
Serbian objectives. This would still mean an essentially military solution, and an 
imposed one. But Milošević was not directing developments in Croatia, rather just 
responding to them, and events often in fact developed in ways which he did not 
support.
Serbian policy does seem to have shifted somewhat over the course of 1991, and by the 
summer it  is likely that Serbia supported some Croatian Serb military efforts, such as 
the conquest of the Serb-majority Banija region in late July 1991.234 In the summer 
Serbian policy also shifted in favour of allowing volunteers, and some regime-
connected paramilitaries were even established with official support – most notably, 
Arkan's Tigers in Eastern Slavonia (though, technically, Arkan declared himself part of 
the territorial defence, and under the JNA).235 But the clashes that increasingly erupted 
in Croatia from autumn 1990 and spring 1991 onwards seem to have had their origins 
precisely in Croatia, not Belgrade, with Serbia and the JNA following, and reacting to, 
rather than instigating, these developments.
234 See, for example: ICTY-Martić: E-622 (Agreement on Further Work, Golubić, 14/6/1991).
235 See, for example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-074; E-P404 (Interview with Radmilo 
Bogdanović, Duga, 12/2/1993). BBC-DOY: Zivota Panić.
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4.5. Conclusions
'Orthodox' narratives on Serbia's role in the descent into war in Croatia place great 
emphasis on there being a conscious, deliberate and formulated strategy from Belgrade 
to orchestrate conflict in Croatia and JNA intervention in fulfilment of Serbian goals. 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests a different interpretation. From spring 
1990 onwards Serbia did have a fundamentally hardline stance towards Croatia, 
supporting territorial self-determination, a solution it realised would almost certainly 
have to be imposed on the Croats, probably involving some conflict. Belgrade's public 
and private espousal of this stance undoubtedly encouraged its adoption by the Croatian 
Serbs, and Serbia clearly supported the 'recursive' secession of Serbs from Croatia in 
1990-91. But Serbia's thinking was based overwhelmingly on an alliance with the JNA 
to secure this solution, and this alliance was far from complete in 1990-91, with the JNA 
still hoping to maintain Yugoslavia as a whole and genuinely trying to prevent civil war. 
And beyond this, Serbia seems to have lacked a conscious, deliberate or formulated 
strategy towards Croatia. In fact, far from orchestrating the descent into violence, Serbia 
often advocated caution, precisely because radical moves might alienate the JNA (and 
the international community) and thus be counter-productive to Serbian goals. The 
popular image of Milošević as the master manipulator of developments seems 
misplaced; he did not even have a firm control over many parts of his own regime, let 
alone the eruption of various incidents in Croatia.
Other common interpretations of Serbia's role – for example, destroying Yugoslavia or 
'attacking' Croatia as early as 1989 – also seem to be inaccurate. From the late 1980s 
Serbia adopted an increasingly nationalist stance towards other republics, including 
Croatia. But Serbia's sympathies for Serb nationalist attacks on Croatia were probably at 
least partly a consequence of the snowballing of nationalism in Serbia, rather than a 
conscious strategy to provoke unrest in Croatia. Moreover, Serbia was, however 
hypocritically, trying to prevent the complete disintegration of Yugoslavia, even after it 
abandoned the goal of maintaining the state as a whole, in the first half of 1990. 
Chapter 4: The 'External National Homeland': Serbia and the Descent into War in Croatia
217
Although Milošević viewed war as very likely, it would be misleading to say that he had 
conclusively 'decided' in favour of war to the exclusion of other options. Peaceful 
solutions were simultaneously being pursued, including a genuine engagement with 
Tuđman in spring 1991, and there were hopes of international acceptance of Serbian 
goals, particularly with the development of the idea of 'special status'. JNA intervention 
to 'cover' Serbian territories remained Milošević's dominant proposal in 1990-91, but 
strategies of force and negotiations always ran in parallel, and the latter were never 
completely excluded.
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Chapter 5: The Arming of the Serbs in Croatia
A popular view is that Serbia organised and armed, en masse, the Serbian rebels in 
Croatia, perhaps as early as summer 1990, through an organised operation of the 
Serbian police, who, in part through their provision of resources, exercised decisive 
control over the Serbian rebels (a point particularly argued at the ICTY).1 This is often 
highlighted as a key component of Belgrade's 'aggression' against Croatia. Serbian 
arming is seen as the ultimate proof of Serbia's commitment to war, and the chronology 
of it, before or concurrent with Croatian arming, supports the notion of Serbian 
'aggression' and Croatian 'defence'. The role of the Serbian MUP/DB in this, from the 
start, is key to the claim that Serbia was directing Croatian Serb armed formations. The 
actions of these Croatian Serb armed formations are then used - for example, at the 
ICTY - to evidence a Belgrade-directed aggression. This interpretation also has 
profound implications for our understanding of Krajina-Belgrade relations throughout 
the period of the RSK's existence, particularly as the main Krajina rebel leader in 1990-
91, Milan Martić, was a key personality in the RSK and its President from 1994 to its 
fall.
A key challenge in examining the arming of the Serbs in Croatia is that this whole issue 
was rather secretive, and we still lack decisive evidence. A detailed examination, with 
an open discussion of the sources and an assessment of their reliability, is therefore 
necessary.
In this chapter I first look at evidence suggesting that the Serbian police was involved in 
the Krajina, and providing arms there, from an early stage. In particular, I examine the 
ICTY Prosecution's key witnesses on this issue: protected witness MM-003 and Milan 
Babić. I then proceed to a largely chronological examination of arming on the Croatian 
Serb side, before examining the extent to which arming was an organised and centrally 
1 See: OTP Briefs in Milošević, Martić, Hadžić, Stanišić/Simatović cases, and, for example: Cviic, 
p.207. Judah, pp.170-3. Tanner, pp.234-5. Gagnon, pp.101, 144. Meier, p.155. LeBor p.149. Silber & 
Little, p.97.
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directed operation; considering Western Slavonia as a case study for a detailed 
examination of arming on the Serbian side; and looking at Croatian Serb attitudes to 
arms acquisitions, including the extent to which this was initiated externally, by 
Belgrade, or internally, by Serbs in Croatia. Considering the available evidence on this 
issue points to quite different conclusions on Serbia's arming of the Serbs in Croatia 
from those usually made.
Chapter 5: The Arming of the Serbs in Croatia
220
5.1. 'Frankie and Badger Go To War'2
Numerous sources confirm that from around April or May 1991 the Serbian DB had a 
permanent mission in the Krajina, led by Franko “Frenki” Simatović, something which 
his defence in The Hague itself acknowledged (and is discussed in Chapter 7), and that 
in autumn 1991 Serbian MUP special forces commander Radovan Stojičić “Badža” 
went to East Slavonia and took command of local Serb forces there (as detailed in 
Chapter 8). A number of authors assert, however, that already in June 1990 both Frenki 
and Badža (or Frankie and Badger, as Tim Judah calls them, anglicising their 
nicknames) were sent to Knin to direct the organising and arming of Serbian rebel 
forces.3 Vreme journalist Miloš Vasić appears to be the original source for this claim. 
But he actually told me that arming began around February or March 1991.4 And I have 
not seen any evidence to support Vasić's claim that Badža was ever in the Knin Krajina. 
This particular claim seems to be a myth.
There is, however, some convincing evidence of the Serbian MUP/DB being involved 
in Krajina from an early stage. Then Serbian Minister of the Interior Radmilo 
Bogdanović has recalled that 'we had ties with Martić, who was first the commander of 
the [Krajina] police and then Minister for Internal Affairs. We extended help to enable 
them to... begin from nothing'.5 This was 'help in expertise to Milan Martić to organise 
the police in Krajina, because they wanted to protect themselves from Boljkovac's 
police', as well as 'material help'.6 Bogdanović has also allegedly 'said that the service 
began to enter into Krajina in 1990 and that they then, besides others, won over Martić 
2 Title of a chapter in Tim Judah's 'The Serbs'.
3 Among others: Judah, pp.170-1. Vasić, p.123. LeBor, pp.141-2. CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, 
pp.25-33. Valentić, p.169.
4 Interview Miloš Vasić, Vreme journalist (Belgrade: 12/7/2007). Similarly: Miloš Vasić, 'Podmazivanje 
rata', Vreme, 8/12/2005.
5 Nenad Stefanovic, 'Logistika službe za volju naroda', Duga, 7-20 January 1995, p. 23, quoted in Paul 
Williams and Norman Cigar, War Crimes and Individual Responsibility: A Prima Facie Case for the  
Indictment of Slobodan Milošević (Washington, D.C.: The Balkan Institute, 1997), footnote 201.
6 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P404 (Interview with Radmilo Bogdanović, Duga, 12/2/1993).
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for their plans'.7 In a 1998 report DB official Milan Prodanić, meanwhile, included 
among his work achievements that: 
From September 1990, I was actively involved in helping the Serbian people in  
the territory of the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Apart  
from performing my regular work duties, I daily dispatched various types of aid  
and spent time throughout the area from Knin to Beli Manastir.8
Former JNA security chief Aleksandar Vasiljević has also testified that they first had 
information on Frenki being active in Krajina in around August 1990. Frenki, he has 
claimed, 'was staying in Krajina', 'monitoring the situation' and 'in contact with Martić... 
involved in the organisation of Serbs'. This was the only Serbian MUP/DB official that 
the JNA recorded there that year, however, and elsewhere Vasiljević has noted that 
locals (Babić, Martić and the SDS) were in charge of rebel organising in the region.9 
Vasiljević's testimony about Frenki is certainly true from about April 1991 onwards, but 
other evidence strongly suggests that Frenki was actually operating in Kosovo in this 
earlier period. In December 1990 he was assigned to Belgrade, and documents show 
that he was active in intelligence work there, suggesting that he could at most have 
visited the Krajina, rather than being permanently based there then.10
The most detailed evidence on an early Serbian MUP/DB role, and arming, comes from 
OTP witness MM-003, a former associate of Martić, as well as the testimonies of 
Babić.11 MM-003 was a key witness in the case against Martić and Serbian DB officials 
Stanišić and Simatović, and along with Babić the Prosecution's only witness testifying 
7 Kovačević, pp.117-8.
8 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2669.E (Letter by M. Prodanić, 9/12/1998). Also, see: Kolšek, p.56. 
Mihajlo Knežević, pp.125-6.
9 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević, T15789, 16040-1, 16048. ICTY-Karadžić: Statement 
of Aleksandar Vasiljević, para 71. Vasiljević, p.95.
10 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2384, E-P2403, E-P2393, E-P2487, E-P2723 (DB Employment Files); 
Judgement, footnote 2287. ICTY-Milutinovic(et al): E-P2922.E (Statement of Zoran Mijatović), pp.2-
3. Filipović, pp.36-7, 48-9.
11 MM-003's function was minor and he did not play an active role in these events (as, for example, a 
deputy or assistant of Martić). He was, however, constantly around Martić, so it is possible he had the 
information he testified about.
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to the pivotal issue of an early Serbian DB role in Krajina. It is therefore worth giving 
his testimony full consideration.
MM-003 testified that Martić was in contact with leading DB official Jovica Stanišić, 
and that secret arms shipments from the Serbian MUP began in September 1990, with 
Martić collecting them from across the Bosnian border in a 'Lada Niva' car, from the 
house of the brother of a Serbian MUP official. (As this was a small car, the shipments 
cannot have been that large.) Around late November 1990 Frenki then arrived, bringing 
money and some arms (the first of a number of visits), and in January 1991 regular 
deliveries in trucks direct to Knin began. That month Martić also went to Belgrade and 
met with Bogdanović and Stanišić, agreeing various assistance including the 
deployment of the famous 'Captain Dragan' to train Krajina forces.12
There are a number of problems with MM-003's account, however. The OTP helped 
MM-003 relocate outside the former Yugoslavia, and the Trial Chamber in Martić's case 
itself ruled that his evidence would only be accepted if corroborated by other sources.13 
MM-003 had a clear incentive to give an account the OTP would appreciate, and 
displayed evident biases. For example, he claimed to know of a common goal of Martić 
and the JNA to ethnically cleanse Croatian villages in Krajina, but denied all knowledge 
of those villages containing Croatian armed forces, something not even contested by the 
OTP. He then contradicted himself, on cross-examination by Martić's defence, by 
confirming that Martić bore no ill-will towards Croats or ethnic hatred, and sought to 
defend them from attacks.14 In addition, numerous sources on arming in autumn and 
winter 1990, discussed later, do not report the shipments MM-003 detailed, but do talk 
12 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-978 (Statement of MM-003).
13 ICTY-Martić: Judgement (12/6/2007), p.17.
14 ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003, T2022-3 2102-6, 2189-91. MM-003 brings to mind the Kosovo 
Albanian victim witnesses against Milošević, who, ICTY Prosecutor Del Ponte and others have now 
acknowledged, 'disastrously damaged their credibility' by denying any knowledge of the existence of 
Kosovo Albanian rebels. See: Carla Del Ponte, 'Difficulties for the Participants: Indictment Correct, 
Trial Impossible', in Timothy William Waters (ed), The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), p.143. Veton Surroi, 'Conversations with Milošević: Two Meetings, Bloody 
Hands', in Timothy William Waters (ed), The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp.226-7.
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of arms deliveries from Kragujevac, Serbia - which some even report MM-003 as being 
involved in.15 Yet the witness reported knowledge only of these alleged secret deliveries 
from Serbia.
One of the most important aspects of MM-003's testimony, meanwhile, was the dates he 
gave, suggesting an integral Serbian role from a fairly early stage. But the details of 
much of the developments he described suggest that they could only have taken place 
months later, making them far less remarkable. Martić meeting Bogdanović and 
discussing 'Captain Dragan', for example, could not possibly have taken place in 
January 1991, as it was only in April 1991 that Dragan established contact with Serbian 
officials.16
Milan Babić strove in his testimony to connect everything to Serbia, but actually gave 
convincing evidence that any DB role before spring 1991 was minor. MM-003 was 
clear that Babić met Frenki when he first arrived, and his and Babić's accounts of 
Frenki's first appearance correspond. But Babić placed this arrival in April 1991, as do 
most Krajina sources, not mid or late 1990. As noted in Chapter 3, evidence indicates 
that Babić was, contrary to his testimony, working closely with Martić in late 1990 and 
in overall charge of 'resistance' activities. Although he claimed to have seen Stanišić 
with Martić in late August 1990 - which does seem plausible - the absence of any 
evidence from him on Frenki having a role prior to April 1991, or of any arms 
shipments in that period, strongly suggests that any DB role or assistance then was 
minor.
This conclusion is also supported by Babić's description of a meeting with Milošević 
and Serbian MUP officials in mid-March 1991 concerning arming. In response to the 
Krajina officials' complaints that they had received nothing, Bogdanović allegedly 
responded that he had already sent 500 pieces to Banija. Around May-June 1991, 
15 ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness 
DST-043, SDS official.
16 ICTY-Stanišić-Simatović: Judgement (20/5/2013), pp.465-7.
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meanwhile, Babić claimed he was shown a warehouse of weapons in Knin and told that 
weapons were indeed flowing from Serbia.17 Babić tried to imply that arms shipments to 
the Knin Krajina may have already been taking place before this meeting, without his 
knowledge, just as 500 pieces had apparently been sent to Banija. But the Krajina 
officials accompanying Babić to this meeting had been integrally involved in arming in 
the Knin Krajina, and also knew nothing of any arms from the Serbian MUP. And, as 
the Stanišić and Simatović defence pointed out in The Hague, it does not really make 
sense that, when Babić came seeking arms, Belgrade officials did not simply tell him 
'Stop wasting our time, Mr. Babić. We have been assisting you for seven months' - if 
that had indeed been the case.18
It seems likely that Serbian MUP/DB agents began visiting the region in autumn or 
winter 1990, established contact with people such as Martić and gave some assistance in 
arms - but also that any such shipments were likely small (which MM-003 himself 
reported, concerning the Lada). As these sources are somewhat questionable and this 
conclusion far from solid, however, it is necessary to consider further sources on the 
arming of the Serbs in Croatia, and whether there is any significant evidence supporting 
or refuting this initial conclusion.
17 A diary entry by Ratko Mladić partly confirms some of Babić's claims about arms deliveries in mid-
1991. ICTY-Tolimir: E-P1425 (Mladic Diary, 4/9/1994-28/1/1995), p.103. ICTY-Milošević: Witness 
Milan Babić, T13106.
18 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: T20277-8.
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5.2. The Arming of the Krajina Serbs (Autumn-Winter 1990)
In July-August 1990 Croatia had begun forming new paramilitary special units from 
HDZ activists. Immediately after the 'Balvan Revolution' some arms were distributed to 
Croats in and around the Krajina, and elsewhere, and from October 1990 to the end of 
the year between ten and thirty thousand kalashnikovs, and other weapons, were 
imported and distributed to the HDZ. At the same time, there was the very real prospect 
of Croatian police intervention and repression in Knin and elsewhere.
In this context and, indeed, from the start of the rise of tensions in Croatia in early 1990, 
many Serbs in the Krajina felt under threat, and, particularly from autumn 1990 
onwards, there was an evident hunger in the Knin Krajina for arms.19 The question, 
however, is whether that demand was actually met.
Arming in Krajina (Autumn-Winter 1990)
While there were some preparations for rebellion before 17 August, most organising, 
and arming, seems to have taken place after that day. Aside from private hunting and 
trophy arms that Serbs in Krajina already possessed, the main military-type arms the 
Krajina rebels had in late 1990 were a few hundred police weapons, taken from Knin 
and other local police stations from 17 August 1990 onwards. By spring 1991, with the 
formation of the Krajina SUP, this included all police arms still present in the Knin 
Krajina. The total number of weapons was only in the hundreds, rather than thousands. 
The Krajina Serbs vigorously defended these weapons from attempts of the Croatian 
MUP to withdraw them from the region that autumn, which suggests that such arms 
were not in plentiful supply.
19 This section looks at the Krajina Serbs, particularly in the Knin region, rather than the Serbs in Croatia 
as a whole, because sources point to these activities taking place there in this period, but only later 
elsewhere.
Chapter 5: The Arming of the Serbs in Croatia
226
Croatian officials have claimed that the JNA Knin corps had given arms to the Serbs in 
autumn 1990,20 but most of the evidence I have seen contradicts this.21 The commander 
and chief of staff of the Knin corps were actually a Macedonian and a Slovene in this 
period,22 and in an incident where local Serbs stole JNA arms from a train the JNA 
investigated and the weapons were soon returned.23 The army was actually monitoring 
the Serbs' arming with their future disarmament in mind, and in January 1991 leading 
JNA security official Vasiljević came to Knin to persuade the Serbs to hand in their 
arms.24 Kadijević personally insisted on investigating Serb arming, and on the 
disarmament of both sides. The initial plan was to arrest both Martić and Babić, and 
Kadijević even disbelieved Martić's promise that arms would be returned, telling 
Vasiljević that 'They will cheat you'.25 It is possible, though, that some Serbs had 
succeeded in persuading some in the JNA to give them some arms illegally, or that 
individuals inside the JNA were stealing arms in order to sell them for a profit. JNA 
security officer Mihajlo Knezevic recalls that from early 1991 'Individuals exerted 
pressure on me to get arms from the warehouses of the JNA', which he refused, but he 
found out that others already were doing so, that 'armaments [were] being stolen en 
masse from military warehouses and divided on the ground. The territory of western 
20 BBC-DOY: Martin Špegelj, p.1; Stipe Mesić, p.5; Josip Boljkovac, p.1. Boljkovac, p.202. Branimir 
Glavaš,, 'Iskaz Branimira Glavaša', 9/7/2006, retrieved 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.branimirglavas.com/, p.5. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Imra Agotić, T23296-8.
21 Vasić, for example, says that the JNA was not arming the Serbs in this period, as do the key 'insiders' 
involved in Serb arming, who even complained about this fact, while key JNA security figures later 
involved in arming the Serbs were then reporting on the illegal military organising of the SDS. See: 
Miloš Vasić & Filip Švarm, 'Paramilitary Formations in Serbia: 1990-2000', in Helsinki Files: In the 
Triangle of the State Power - Army, Police, Paramilitary Units, (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee, 
2001), p.44. BBC-DOY: Milan Martić, pp.6-7. Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da slušamo Tuđmana 
[Interview with Simo Dubajić]', Intervju, 13/3/1995, pp.52-3. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-978 
(Statement of MM-003). HMDC-DR: Knjiga 1, Document 21 (JNA report, 3/10/1990), pp.57-8. The 
recollections of former JNA commander Konrad Kolšek are, though somewhat ambiguous on this 
question: Kolšek, pp.56, 86, 126, 142. Kolšek cited in Boljkovac, p.340. 
22 Hoare, p.33. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, p.114.
23 ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-096, Knin police chief, 1990. Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.218. V. B., 'Pljačka 
oružja', Borba, 18/10/1990. Interview Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina DB, 1991-92 (Belgrade: 
7/2009). 'Stolen Weapons Reportedly Returned', Belgrade Domestic Service, 19/10/1990, in FBIS-
EEU-90-204, 22/10/1990.
24 See: ICTY-Martić: E.872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.216-9. 
Vasiljević, pp.82, 89-90, 92-7. BBC-DOY: Milan Martić, pp.6-7. Svetislav Spasojević, 'Kadijević 
zaustavlja akciju 'Štit' [Interview with Aleksandar Vasiljević]', NIN, 17/7/1992, p.56. Svetislav 
Spasojević, 'Špegelj obala brbljivost [Interview with Aleksandar Vasiljević]', NIN, 7/10/1992, p.56.
25 Vasiljević, pp.89-90, 92-7.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina [had become] an enormous market of every kind of 
armament... [and] in that time prices reached astronomical heights.'26
A number of different highly informed sources, including Babić in his interview with 
the BBC in 1994, Vasiljević and others, report that the main source of new weaponry in 
the region in autumn and winter 1990 was via some deliveries from the Crvena Zastava  
(Red Star) factory in Kragujevac, Serbia.27 1,300 hunting rifles and 400 pistols were 
imported up to early December 1990, and this continued in spring 1991.28
These weapons were all bought individually by local Serbs. SDS leaders such as Dušan 
Zelenbaba publicly advocated that Serbs should sell their cattle to purchase arms - 'If 
someone has two cows, then he should sell one and buy a Serbian weapon, and sanctify 
it in the Serbian church!' - and people were reportedly doing this.29 All sorts of arms 
were being acquired from all sorts of sources, and weapons were selling for extortionate 
prices in the region.30 In late August 1990 Serbs from Banija brought Martić some 
26 Mihajlo Knežević, p.41. Vasiljević also recalls that in the case of the Serb rebellion in Pakrac in 
February 1991, a local JNA lieutenant-colonel had given the Serbs a 'small quantity' of arms, though 
he only found this out much later. Vasiljević, p.94.
27 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.216-9. BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, pp.16-7. Vasiljević, p.93. ICTY-Milošević: 
Witnesses Aleksandar Vasiljević; Milan Babić, T13948. ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen 
Biserko, 2/12/1990). Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da slušamo Tuđmana [Interview with Simo 
Dubajić]', Intervju, 13/3/1995, pp.52-3. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-043, SDS and SNO 
activist; E-D315 (Mile Bosnić comments on exhibits). ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-096. Interviews: 
Veljko Popović; Lazar Macura; Ratko Ličina; Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 2007, 2009). Also mentioned 
in: Vasić & Švarm, 'Paramilitary Formations in Serbia: 1990-2000', pp.44-45.
28 ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da 
slušamo Tuđmana [Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 13/3/1995, pp.52-3. Snježana Stamatović, 
'Narod skuplja pare za miliciju', Borba, 9-10/2/1991, p.13. Miloš Vasić et al, 'Dosije Arkan', Vreme, 
22/1/2000.
29 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64A.12.1 (Founding of SNV, Banja Luka, 13/10/1990), p.26. ICTY-Milošević: 
Witness Milan Babić, T12920-1. Vasiljević, p.93. BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.16; Milan Martić, p.6; 
Aleksandar Vasiljević, p.28. Dušan Glavaš, pp.19-22. ICTY-Martić: Witness Mile Dakić, T10012. 
Mirjana Tomić, 'El referéndum serbio en Croacia radicaliza la tensión entre Belgrado y Zagreb', El  
Pais, 21/8/1990. Snježana Stamatović, 'Narod skuplja pare za miliciju', Borba, 9-10/2/1991, p.13. 
Petrović, p.14.
30 Mihajlo Knežević, pp.24, 41. Tea Božuš, 'Ekonomska blokada Knina?', Borba, 22/8/1990, p.1. ICTY-
Martić: Witness MM-096; E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). Interviews: Veljko 
Popović; Lazar Macura; Branko Marijanović (Belgrade: 11/2007). Also: HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, 
Document 42 (JNA report, 1/4/1991), pp.101-2; Document 55 (Official Note about connections 
between Arkan and Milan Babić, 31/5/1991), pp.138-9. ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Memorial of the 
Republic of Croatia: Annexes – General Annexes – Volume 4', 1/3/2001, Annex 147 (Extracts from 
Narodna Armija, 1990), pp.303-4. Jasna Babić, 'Everyone His Own Sheriff', Danas, 23/10/1990, 
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Second World War arms from a museum, for example, and in Knin's main factory, Tvik, 
they even began manufacturing makeshift guns out of plumbing installations and 
metalware, based on the memories of elderly Serbs about similar efforts in 1941.31 Other 
weapons were also being bought 'illegally through various channels... sold by different 
Yugoslav smugglers who would obtain the weapons abroad'.32 Criminals were even 
buying up old trophy weapons in Serbia and reselling them in Knin for an enormous 
profit.33
The Serbs were seeking arms from any source, and, indeed, paying for them. All this 
strongly indicates that any assistance from the Serbian MUP/DB fell far short of Krajina 
desires, and, indeed, in late 1990 Martić reportedly 'complained of the problems of how 
to secure the defence of Knin, and of the shortage of arms and weaponry'. As one 
journalist noted, 'there was a prevalent hunger for guns among the Serbs' which 
'criminals wanted to use'.34
Serbia's Role in Arming (Autumn-Winter 1990)
One criminal who began to involve himself in this field was the future Serbian 
paramilitary leader Željko Ražnatović “Arkan”, who visited Knin in November 1990 to 
offer his services, and who may have been involved in some weapons smuggling. Arkan 
was a career criminal who had previously been engaged by the federal security service 
to murder 'hostile' émigrés. Serbian Interior Minister Bogdanović knew him from their 
mutual involvement in Belgrade's 'Red Star' football club (and in mid-1991 supported 
the establishment of his paramilitary 'Tigers'), and there is evidence that Bogdanović 
pp.28-29, in FBIS-EER-90-157, 26/11/1990.
31 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, pp.16-17. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.20 (Babić Interview), pp.34-5. Zečević, 
The uprooting, p.131. Mate Piskor', 'Journalists in the Service of Politika and Disinformation: Paid to 
Lie', Večernji List, 2/10/1990, p.5, in FBIS-EEU-90-196,10/10/1990. Also: Kapetanovic, Kronologija  
zbivanja u Republici Hrvatskoj, pp.14-15.
32 ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990).
33 Miloš Vasić et al, 'Dosije Arkan', Vreme, 22/1/2000.
34 Quoted in Davor Runtić, Prvi Hrvatski Redarstvenik (Zagreb: Udruga Prvi Hrvatski Redarstvenik, 
2003).
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approved Arkan's engagement in Knin.35 However, a highly detailed, confidential 
contemporary account shows that the assistance Arkan discussed with Knin all involved 
his own (criminal) resources and Knin's money, apparently without any reference to the 
Serbian MUP, suggesting that Bogdanović at most permitted or approved Arkan's 
engagement, rather than standing officially behind him (which, also, suggests that this 
was not necessarily something approved or ordered by Milošević).36 Regardless, Arkan 
was arrested by the Croatian police at the end of November 1990 and thus his offer, for 
now, came to nothing.
SDS figures had, however, established contact with leading members of the Serbian 
government in autumn/winter 1990, from Milošević to Bogdanović.37 All of the hunting 
arms from Kragujevac mentioned above were delivered thanks to arrangements with 
Serbian officials made by Simo Dubajić. The details of these arrangements indicate that 
Milošević's policy was based on an alliance with the JNA to 'protect' the Krajina Serbs, 
not the formation or arming of paramilitary units.
Simo Dubajić was a famous partisan from Knin who later became a Serb nationalist 
dissident and, immediately after the 'Balvan Revolution', offered his services to local 
Serbs to help organise and arm the rebels. Babić accepted, and Dubajić became a 
military adviser to the 'Council of National Resistance' (SNO).38
35 Jovica Stanišić interview with ICTY investigators, in: Vojislav Šešelj, Đavolov segrt zločinački rimski  
papa Jovan Pavle Drugi (Belgrade: Srpska Radikalna Stranka, 2004), pp.468-9. On Arkan and 
Bogdanović see, for example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-074; E-P404 (Interview with 
Radmilo Bogdanović, Duga, 12/2/1993). 
36 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 55 (Official Note about connections between Arkan and Milan 
Babić, 31/5/1991), pp.138-9.
37 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.3 (Babić Interview), pp.14-15. Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da slušamo 
Tuđmana [Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 13/3/1995, pp.52-3.
38 Interview Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina DB, 1991-92 (Belgrade: 7/2009). Supported by: Interview 
Lazar Macura. Knin VP, 1990-93 (Belgrade: 11/2007). Simo Dubajić, 'Otvoreno pismo Slobodanu 
Miloševiću', 17/3/1991, in Ilija T. Radaković, Besmislena Yu-ratovanja 1991-1995 (Belgrade: Društvo 
za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945, 2003), online version, 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.znaci.net/00001/23.htm.. Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da slušamo 
Tuđmana [Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 13/3/1995, pp.52-3. Milan Jajčinović, 'Zabava s 
pucanje', Danas, 8/1/1991, pp.10-11. Jasna Babić, 'Iz mraka u mrak', Danas, 9/10/1990, pp.14-15.
Chapter 5: The Arming of the Serbs in Croatia
230
Dubajić later explained in detail how he arranged these shipments with Serbia. As he 
recalled, 'When I understood that the Serbs will not acquire any armaments from the 
JNA, I turned to the Serbian leadership in Belgrade for help'. Sometime between late 
August and early October 1990 Bogoljub Popović, head of the SDS Security committee 
and part of the SNO, put him in contact with Bogdanović, and Dubajić first worked on 
arms with Boro Tomić, then an Assistant Interior Minister of Serbia, who was originally 
from the Bosnian Krajina. 'Later Kertes, Jovica Stanišić and others entered into the 
game' - but 'Apart from Boro [Tomić], there was little understanding' and 'We had 
problems even to acquire hunting carbines', which they had to purchase from Zastava 
'under pure market conditions' – in fact, at a greatly inflated price. To Dubajić's repeated 
requests for more substantial armaments (for which the Krajina Serbs were even 
prepared to pay), to whomever he managed to contact, including the Serbian Prime 
Minister (from February 1991) Dragutin Zelenović, the response was always given: 'the 
JNA protects you, you do not need arms.'39
From late 1990 Dubajić was sidelined and by mid-March 1991 he found out that 
'professional smugglers' had replaced him.40 Thus, some deliveries were continuing, but 
as far as Dubajić was concerned, it was not enough: as he complained in an open letter 
to Milošević on 17 March 1991, 'the defence [of Krajina] was reduced to the fluttering 
of Yugoslav flags and the hope that the army will defend the Serbian nation'.41
Dubajić's understanding of Serbian policy at the time – a reliance on the JNA, rather 
than any serious arming, to protect the Krajina Serbs – and his detailing of his 
interactions with Serbian officials are revelatory. This is particularly as a great deal of 
39 Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da slušamo Tuđmana [Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 
13/3/1995, pp.52-3. Dubajić, 'Otvoreno pismo Slobodanu Miloševiću', 17/3/1991, in Radaković.
40 Dubajić recalled that in December 1990 Stanišić told him to 'get out of the game'. However, he 
considered this an 'intrigue from Knin' and ignored him. Dubajić always blamed Knin, and Babić, for 
his sidelining, and numerous sources confirm their falling out. See: Dubajić, 'Otvoreno pismo 
Slobodanu Miloševiću', 17/3/1991, in Radaković. Simo Dubajić, Život, greh i kajanje : ispovedna 
autobiografska hronika (Belgrade: Vesti, 2006), pp.392-3. ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Memorial of 
the Republic of Croatia: Annexes – General Annexes – Volume 4', 1/3/2001, Annex 55 (JNA report, 
10/12/1990), pp.141-2. Interviews: Petar Štikovac, President of SDS Executive Board, 1990-91 
(Belgrade: 5/8/2007); Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
41 Dubajić, 'Otvoreno pismo Slobodanu Miloševiću', 17/3/1991, in Radaković.
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other evidence supports his account – for example, that the key arms shipments in the 
region, which he arranged, were actually paid for by the Krajina Serbs at inflated 
prices.42 Babić himself testified that whenever he met Milošević and expressed his 
concern over Krajina's security, Milošević always repeated the same stance, from at 
least January 1991 if not earlier: they need not worry, as the JNA would protect them if 
the Croats attacked, and would guarantee their rights. Goran Hadžić has, similarly, 
recalled that at a large meeting of Croatian Serbs with Milošević in early 1991, 
Milošević assured them that there was no need for 'exodus' or 'panic', as 'the JNA could 
protect [them]'. Jović had given the same advice to Babić's SNV delegation in August 
1990, and the implication was clear: the Serbs did not need to arm or form their own 
forces, as they could count on the JNA.43 Several sources confirm that Babić thought 
similarly at the time – although he endorsed the desire of people to acquire arms for 
defence, he did not advocate the creation of a full Krajina military organisation, on the 
grounds that the JNA would defend them (as JNA activities on 17 August had seemed to 
confirm).44
Robert Donia has recently reached the same conclusion on Belgrade's policy: 'Sometime 
before 1991, Milošević had decided to support a unified JNA and to oppose formation 
of separate Serb forces.'45 SPS Vice-President Mihajlo Marković explained part of the 
rationale for this during the war in 1991: 'It is in our vital interest that the defence of the 
Serbian nation in Croatia is conducted by the [JNA]', as it was 'its responsibility 
according to both our laws and international standards', and this would prevent 
accusations that Serbia 'participates in an aggression against the republic of Croatia', 
42 Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da slušamo Tuđmana [Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 
13/3/1995, pp.52-3. See footnote 27. Contrast with: Špegelj, Sjecanje vojnika, pp.104-5.
43 ICTY-Babić: E-PS.2.12 (Babić Interview), pp.3-7; E-PS.2.14 (Babić Interview), p.54. ICTY-
Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T1505-6. Filip Švarm et al, 'Put bez povratka', Vreme, 18/10/2001. 
ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić, T9700.
44 Očić, Hronika Republike Srpske Krajine 1989-1995 (Belgrade: Sava Mrkalj & Zora, 1996), retrieved 
1/11/2011 from www.krajinaforce.com, p.4. Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da slušamo Tuđmana 
[Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 13/3/1995, pp.52-3. Dubajić, 'Otvoreno pismo Slobodanu 
Miloševiću', 17/3/1991, in Radaković. Interviews of SDS officials Marko Dobrijević, Petar Štikovac 
and Veljko Popović (Belgrade: 2007), and Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). ICTY-Martić: E-872 
(Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). 'Neodgovorni ministar', Borba, 8-9/12/1990, p.14.
45 Donia, p.93.
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which the formation of a separate Serbian army would bring.46 Karadžić was close to 
Milošević in 1991,47 and he clearly explained this policy at a meeting of the Bosnian 
SDS leadership in February 1991: 'Replying to a question whether we could trust the 
army, Karadžić said he trusted it. The SDS should not take any step that would provoke 
the army. That is why paramilitary organisations cannot be formed.'48
This is not to say that the Serbian leadership viewed the acquisition of arms by Krajina 
Serbs particularly negatively. As early as July 1990, in fact, Jović had urged Kadijević 
to accede to Krajina Serb requests to arm them (a proposal Kadijević rejected).49 Serbia 
advocated that the JNA 'protect' the Krajina Serbs, and the JNA providing them with 
arms could be part of that. However, bypassing the JNA, the legal armed forces of the 
country, to illegally arm new Krajina Serb units, could risk alienating the JNA, and thus 
run significantly counter to Serbian objectives. And if the JNA would in fact protect the 
Krajina Serbs and their right to self-determination, then such illegal arming would be 
unnecessary.
Thus, in autumn and winter 1990 there was a hunger in Krajina for arms, but assistance 
from Serbia in this respect was minor, mainly involving the selling of some hunting 
weapons. Serbia assured the Krajina Serbs that they would be protected by the JNA, and 
therefore did not need their own military organisation, and these assurances were in 
large part accepted, though weapons were still sought for defence (as the Krajina Serbs 
saw it). In this period, in which Croatia imported and distributed at least ten thousand, 
and possibly several tens of thousands, of automatic weapons, the Krajina Serbs 
acquired just a few thousand hunting weapons, something which is worth bearing in 
mind when considering 'Serbian aggression' and Croatian 'defence'.
46 Mihalj Ramač, 'Bilo je to 1991. (17): Kasapnica trećeg svetskog rata', Danas (Belgrade), 12/12/2011, 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: www.danas.rs. See also: Domovina Intercept: B6584 (Karadžić-Brdanin, 
2/7/1991). ICTY-Milošević: Witness Borisav Jović, T29279.
47 See Chapter 6.
48 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64a.183.1 (Notebook of Vojislav Maksimović, Bosnian SDS official), p.8. 
49 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.152-3.
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5.3. The Shift to Arming (Spring 1991)
A number of sources support the idea that in spring 1991 there was a shift in Serbian 
policy, that increasing demands from Krajina for arms finally met with a positive 
response, and that assistance then followed. Key to this shift appears to have been the 
JNA's public revelation, in January 1991, of the full extent of Croatian arming, followed 
by the failure of the JNA to secure the disarmament of Croatian formations. It was, 
apparently, after the last serious attempt to disarm the Croats failed in mid-March 1991 
that large-scale arming of the Serbs in Croatia began.
Although we lack any 'smoking gun' evidence on this secretive issue, there are a large 
number of different, independently corresponding sources which support the conclusion 
that mass arming only took place from spring 1991 onwards and which are inconsistent 
with the idea of an earlier mass arming operation.
The Failure of Disarmament
In January 1991 the JNA handed a report on illegal arming and paramilitary organising 
in Yugoslavia to the Yugoslav Presidency, proposing the paramilitaries' disarmament 
and dissolution. The JNA also released a propaganda film, based on secret recordings of 
Croatian officials, showing the full extent of Croatian paramilitary organising and 
arming and their allegedly hostile intentions towards Serbs in Croatia and the JNA.50
The Yugoslav Presidency then adopted a decision on disarming such formations. The 
focus of the JNA's effort was on Croatian formations, but its report also detailed the 
situation in Krajina, and Vasiljević came to Knin to persuade Martić to hand in at least 
some of his weapons, threatening Martić with arrest if he refused. Most of the arms of 
the Knin police were indeed returned to the station and then handed to the JNA (though 
50 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.216-9. 'Throwing Bombs, Killing...', Politika, 27/1/1991, pp.6-7, in FBIS-
EER-91-018, 11/2/1991.
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the arms Serbs had bought, and others, were not).51 Babić and the Krajina leadership 
declared their support for the initiative, and emphasised that the Serbs were placing their 
faith in the JNA to disarm Croatian forces and/or protect the Serbs.52
The Croatian side refused to disarm, however. Soon the JNA backed down and the 
whole initiative was largely abandoned. Krajina Serb leaders consequently expressed 
ever increasing dissatisfaction with the situation and, as the Croats had not been 
disarmed, began to advocate publicly that the Serbs be armed by the JNA. In January 
1991 Babić's Krajina SDS had emphasised that 'The Serbian nation in Croatia does not 
need parallel armed formations, nor has the SDS armed, nor will arm, members of its 
party'.53 Subsequently, however, in February and March there were repeated public calls 
by Babić and others for either Croat formations to be disarmed or the Serbs of Krajina 
to be armed by the JNA.54 The return of the Knin police arms from the JNA was also 
requested, but until April 1991 no response was received.55 By March Martić noted that 
'the people have to a certain extent lost their faith in the army' because 'the taking of 
arms of the Serbs was not followed by an identical action' taking arms from the HDZ, 
and they had been 'tricked', while Babić complained that they were 'ignored' and 
'deceived' by federal organs 'whose constitutional duty it is to protect us as citizens and 
as a nation of this country'.56
51 Drago Hedl, 'Zašto nismo uhapsili Špegelja', Feral Tribune, 24/3/2006, pp.8-11. Svetislav Spasojević, 
'Kadijević zaustavlja akciju 'Štit' [Interview with Aleksandar Vasiljević]', NIN, 17/7/1992, p.56. BBC-
DOY: Milan Martić, pp.6-7. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). 'Oružje predato vojsci', 
Borba, 19-20/1/1991, p.15. Reuf Mirko Kapetanovic, Kronologija zbivanja u Republici Hrvatskoj,  
1989.-1995. (Zagreb: Informator, 1995), p.15. 'Defense Secretariat on Arms Handed in by Deadline', 
Tanjug, 5/2/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-025, 6/2/1991.
52 S. Stamatović, 'Zbunjenost u Kninu', Borba, 21/1/1991, p.5. S. Stamatović ,'Čeka se potez 
Predsedništva SRFJ', Borba, 23/1/1991, p.5. S. Stamatović, 'Neizvesnost ništa manja', Borba, 
30/1/1991, p.2.
53 S. Stamatović, 'Prvi miran san', Borba, 11/1/1991, p.2.
54 Snežana Stamatović, 'Strah i nepoverenje', Borba, 1/2/1991, p.3. S. Stamatović, 'Srbi u jednoj državi', 
Borba, 4/2/1991, p.2. S. Stamatović & Z. Tarle, 'Knin ne može pasti', Borba, 6/3/1991, p.2. Barić, 
Srpska pobuna, p.106. Also: Nobilo & Letica, p.111.
55 Stefan Grubač & Luka Mičeta, 'Srpska država – imperativ', NIN, 22/3/1991, pp.17-18. Svetislav 
Spasojević, 'Kadijević zaustavlja akciju 'Štit' [Interview with Aleksandar Vasiljević]', NIN, 17/7/1992, 
p.56. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
56 Stefan Grubač & Luka Mičeta, 'Srpska država – imperativ', NIN, 22/3/1991, pp.17-18.
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In mid-March 1991 the JNA then made a final attempt to force Yugoslav-wide 
disarmament. Its failure, through deadlock in the Yugoslav Presidency, seems to have 
brought further disappointment, and, for the Krajina Serbs, cast doubt on Milošević's 
promises of JNA protection: 'we had already seen what the situation was, his guarantee 
that it would be the JNA that would protect us was no good' (Babić).57 In mid-March 
1991 Dragan Vasiljkovic, later famous as Krajina special forces instructor 'Captain 
Dragan' (see Chapter 7), visited Krajina and met with Martić. According to Dragan, 
Martić complained that 'We need money. We need equipment. We need political 
support. We need everything. We are endangered here, and also we are encircled'.58 As 
Dragan reported in an (intercepted) telephone conversation on 29 March, 'They are in 
very difficult situation because they did not receive the assistance that they expected. 
There seems to be a very tense relationship between themselves and Milošević, and they 
feel that Milošević and the Serbian opposition have turned their backs on them.'59 
Reports of both the Croatian police and the JNA also show that at the time of the 
Plitvice clash on 31 March 1991, the Krajina Serbs were still lacking serious 
armaments.60 As Dubajić complained in his open letter to Milošević at the time, 
Krajina's defence had been reduced to 'the hope that the army will defend the Serbian 
nation when it surrenders arms, which you and Jović recommended'.61
Belgrade's Promise
Around 20 March 1991, Babić requested a meeting with Milošević. In light of the 
arming of Croatia, the fact that Croatia and Krajina were 'on the brink of a conflict' in 
which the Krajina Serbs 'would be the weaker party', and the recent failure of the 
57 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1810. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.12 (Babić Interview), pp.5-6.
58 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković, T16467.
59 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: T15647.
60 'Sudski dokumenti – Srpski zlocini u Hrvatskoj – Korenica KA 0017', retrieved 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.lijepanasadomovinahrvatska.com/dokumenti-mainmenu-70/srpski-zlocini-u-
hrvatskoj/3703-korenica-ka-0017. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1155 (Analysis of Croatian MUP 
operations in Plitvice, 31/3/1991). HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 42 (JNA report, 1/4/1991), 
pp.101-2. Also: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1181 ('The Confession of Chetnik Duke Rade Cubrilo', 
Velika Srbija, 20/3/1996), p.4.
61 Simo Dubajić, 'Otvoreno pismo Slobodanu Miloševiću', 17/3/1991, in Radaković.
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Yugoslav Presidency to pass a decision on the engagement of the JNA, he wanted an 
answer as to how, concretely, Milošević would help or protect the Krajina Serbs. And 
according to Babić, Milošević at this meeting for the first time stated that he would arm 
the Krajina Serbs.62
There were actually open indications at the time of a Serbian promise or decision to arm 
the Serbs in Croatia. Jović opened a session of the Yugoslav Presidency on 15 March 
1991 with a warning that, if the Presidency did not approve the JNA's engagement, then 
Serbia concluded that it would 'come to mass demands for a Serbian army, for arming of 
the Serbian nation and [it would come] to the creation of a Serbian army', which they 
'will not be able to stand in the way of.' The leadership of Serbia, Jović warned, had to 
stand with the Serbian nation, and 'has to secure its defence, if the army is not in a 
position to defend it'.63 On 19 March, meanwhile, Milošević openly told Belgrade 
students: 'I informed the Presidency members that if the paramilitary formations in 
Croatia are not disarmed, we shall not arm the Serbs illegally but quite legally because 
we have no right to wait to see defenceless people experience once again the same fate 
[as in the NDH]'.64
Statements of Krajina officials immediately after the Plitvice clash of 31 March 1991 
indicate an understanding that Belgrade had now promised them armaments, and that 
this 'promise' was yet to be fulfilled. For example, on 1 April SAOK publicly called on 
the forces of the Serbian MUP to assist the Krajina SUP, with 'technical and personnel 
assistance', and an open letter to this effect was sent.65 As Babić later recalled, his 
purpose with this letter was to remind Milošević to implement his promise: to arm the 
Krajina.66 On the same day, about 2,000 people gathered in Knin seeking arms.67 The 
62 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.18 (Babić Interview), pp.37-41. ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1526, 
1809-10.
63 Nikolić & Petrović, Od mira do rata, p.384.
64 'Serbian President Milošević's Political Views', Tanjug, 19/3/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-054, 20/3/1991. 
Also: ICTY-Milošević: E-P393 ('By God, We Shall Fight', NIN, 124/1991).
65 ICTY-Martić: E-29 (SAOK Letter to Serbia, 1/4/1991).
66 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1526, 1808-9. British journalist Marcus Tanner noted this at the 
time: Marcus Tanner, 'Croatia rebels declare unity with Serbia', The Independent (London), 2/4/1991. 
67 'Knin Residents Protest Army 'Delay'', Tanjug, 1/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-062, 1/4/1991.
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crowd was told to disperse 'because there was no-one to give them arms at the 
moment,'68 but Martić asked them to make a list of everyone who wanted arms and 
assured them they would receive them, as Milošević 'has promised that he would send 
arms to the Krajina'.69 
As far as Krajina officials were concerned, Serbia's promise had not yet been 
implemented - as Martić said, 'now it is up to Milošević to keep his promise and supply 
us with arms'.70 As Babić testified, weapons did arrive thereafter, which would explain 
why public demands for arms abated. Indeed, from April 1991 onwards Krajina set 
about organising its military forces, and by July 1991 had formed new special police 
units and a Krajina territorial defence. By this point, Martić and others were boasting of 
Krajina forces' strength, and demonstrating this in some successful attacks on Croatian 
forces. As Martić said in early July 1991, 'We are not short of weapons', and 'The 
situation [with regard to weaponry] changed significantly over the last few months'.71
The Shift in Belgrade
In March 1991, with the failure of the last real attempt of the JNA to assert control over 
the whole country, Serbia publicly raised the issue of arming the Serbs in Croatia, and 
Milošević for the first time spoke about this with Babić, rather than promising 
protection from the JNA. (The March 1991 mass demonstrations against Milošević in 
Belgrade may also have influenced the leadership to act more decisively in favour of the 
Serbs in Croatia, as authors such as Gordy suggest, as the Serbian leadership clearly 
pushed for the focus to be on events in Croatia, and the need for unity, rather than 
democratisation, in Serbia.)72
68 'Official Promises To Arm Civilians', Tanjug, 1/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-063, 2/4/1991.
69 'Serbs Volunteer To Bear Arms in Krajina', Tanjug, 2/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-064, 3/4/1991.
70 Dessa Trevisan & Tim Judah, 'More troops deployed in Croatia', The Times, 4/4/1991. Also: Dessa 
Trevisan, 'Croat police given army ultimatum', The Times, 3/4/1991. Marcus Tanner, 'Fear of spies 
haunts a Balkan fortress', The Observer, 14/4/1991. 'Krajina Official on Expelling Croatian Police', 
Tanjug, 3/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-065, 4/41991.
71 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D312 (Martić Interview in Pobjeda, 7/7/1991).
72 Gordy, The Culture of Power, pp.37, 43-4. Caplan, p.119. See for example: S. Kljakic et al, 'Let's Be 
Reasonable, Brother Deputies', Politika, 13/3/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-058, 26/3/1991. ICTY-
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Despite Milošević and Jović's promises, 'protection' from the JNA had always been 
somewhat uncertain, as the JNA did not wish to be seen as pro-Serb. On 5 April 1991, 
Milošević and Jović again sought an answer from JNA leaders on whether they would 
defend Knin in an attack, as '[the Serbian nation] has not armed itself but is instead 
counting on protection by the JNA, while Croatia has armed its own pro-Ustasha 
secessionist units'.73 JNA leaders finally promised that they would defend the Serbs in 
Croatia without waiting for Presidency authorisation. Jović was still doubtful – and, 
indeed, as late as June 1991 Adžić was still disputing the idea of 'protecting' the Serbs in 
Croatia - but he did feel that they had 'crossed the Rubicon'.74
This promise from the JNA leadership partly superseded Milošević and Jović's public 
statements about the need to arm the Serbs, and, according to Babić, Milošević soon 
returned to his promises of JNA protection.75 Relying on the JNA remained the core 
Serbian policy. As Jović noted in March 1991, 'Defending the Serb nation's right to self-
determination is realistically impossible without the JNA, because the Serb nation is not 
armed.'76 However, Jović later acknowledged to the BBC that he and Milošević had, 
then, decided 'to close our eyes as far as the arming of the Serbs was concerned', and it 
does seem that Serbia decided to give more substantial assistance to the arming and 
military organising of the Serbs in Croatia.77
Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13109. ICTY-Milošević: E-P393 ('By God, We Shall Fight', NIN, 
12/4/1991).
73 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.283.
74 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.303-4.
75 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T1505-6. 
76 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.279.
77 Silber & Little, p.145. Also see: 'Meets Press on Crisis', Tanjug, 8/7/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-131, 
9/7/1991.
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5.4. The Arming of the Croatian Serbs (Spring-Autumn 1991)
Following the final failure to disarm Croatian forces and the shift in policy in Belgrade 
in spring 1991, more significant arming of the Serbs in Croatia took place. It seems, 
however, that arming from the JNA soon far outstripped that from the Serbian 
MUP/DB. Evidence on arming in this period further reinforces the conclusion that 
large-scale arming had not happened prior to that point.
It is clear that Serbia supported Krajina efforts to improve their forces from April 1991 
onwards (discussed in Chapter 7), and most concrete evidence on arming from Serbia 
concerns spring 1991 onwards, as Babić's own testimony indicated. A document of the 
Serbian MUP dated 12 April 1991 records two deliveries totaling 1,450 weapons to 
Knin in the previous ten days, a very significant quantity,78 and a number of sources 
indicate that such deliveries to Krajina took place that spring and summer.79 Numerous 
'insider' sources place the first arming from Serbia in Eastern Slavonia as being in 
March or April 1991, and serial numbers on some of those arms were traced to TO and 
police stocks in Serbia.80 Serbia's Defence Minister in 1991 has confirmed that arms 
from Serbian TO stocks – old weapons taken out of commission by the JNA, such as 
Thompsons and Spagins - were sent to Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at some point,81 and 
various sources report, for example, the Serbian police giving Serbs in East Slavonia 
78 It is interesting that the details of this delivery correspond fairly well with MM-003's description of 
the first major delivery, though he placed this months earlier. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2290 
(Official Note, DB Serbia, 12/4/1991).
79 ICTY-Martić: E-44E (SAOK DB report, 11/6/1991); E-620 (Captain Dragan report, 1991); E-499 
(Report by Frenki, 28/7/1991); E-537 (Report of Association of Serbs from Croatia, 8/8/1991). ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-D273 (DB Serbia report, 18/7/1991); E-D312 (Martić Interview in Pobjeda, 
7/7/1991). ICTY-Milošević: E-P600 (Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronjić). Domovina Intercepts: 
B6575 (Karadžić-Kertes, 24/7/1991); B6570, B6567 (Karadžić-Kertes, 24/6/1991).
80 BBC-DOY: Vojislav Šešelj, pp.12, 14, 40. ICTY-Milošević: Witnesses C-013; C-020; C-025, T14119; 
Aleksandar Vasiljević, T15778, 16038. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses JF-035; Borislav 
Bogunović, T6018-25; JF-032; JF-035. Drago Hedl, 'Zašto nismo uhapsili Špegelja [Interview with 
Aleksandar Vasiljević]', Feral Tribune, 24/3/2006, pp.8-11. Also: Silber and Little, p.142. Miloš Vasić 
and Filip Švarm, 'The Chetniks' Watergate', Vreme News Digest Agency, 15/11/1993. Miloš Vasić, 
'Podmazivanje rata', Vreme, 8/12/2005. Jovica Stanišić interview with OTP, in: Šešelj, Đavolov segrt, 
p.680.
81 ICTY-Strugar: Witness Miodrag Jokić, Serbian Defence Minister in 1991, T4352-3.
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arms in summer 1991.82 Communications equipment was also given to the Krajina SUP, 
and, in late April 1991, four Landrovers.83
In his interview with the BBC in 1994 Milan Martić recalled that Milošević 'in a certain 
way gave us support to a defence with weapons', as JNA and police circles 'got signals 
to get ready for war', which 'meant we would be getting weapons, and other logistic and 
material needs'. The weapons, he claimed, 'came from JNA garrisons nearby... not from 
Serbia', via 'JNA officers that were either Serbs or Yugoslavs'.84 Martić's account seems 
to be reasonably accurate, and there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that local 
JNA depots were the main source of arms for the Krajina Serbs.85
In a private account written in 1994 JNA security officer Dušan Smiljanić claimed that 
in late April 1991 he began arming the Krajina from JNA depots, distributing 'about 
15,000 assorted infantry weapons, mortars, anti-aircraft weapons and a large quantity of 
ammunition' by early June 1991, 'which we judged was decisive in the defence of Lika, 
Kordun and Banija'. In July 1991 he organised 'the transport of over 20,000 weapons' 
from Ogulin, Croatia, to the Bosnian Krajina, and from August to October 1991 
'distributed or withdrew... about 20,000 assorted weapons' from parts of Croatia.86 Other 
sources, including Milan Babić and JNA commander Konrad Kolšek, confirm 
Smiljanić's activities, and that this was part of a JNA security team mandated from the 
top, although operating in secret and without the knowledge of much of the JNA 
(including Kolšek).87
82 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P553 (Statement of Borislav Bogunović, SAO-SBZS Interior Minister, 
1991); Witnesses JF-032, JF-030, Milomir Kovačević. ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-013. ICJ: Croatia 
v. Yugoslavia: 'Reply of the Republic of Croatia, Vol.2: Annexes 1-41', 20/12/2010, Annex 8 (Witness 
Statement of Ž. Č.), pp.27-8. Also: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D273 (DB Serbia report, 18/7/1991).
83 ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Radoslav Maksić; MM-003. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P3004 (Request for 
Interview with Uroš Pokrajac, BH MUP, 17/6/1991); E-P2615 (Statement of Milenko Sučević, 
7/5/1992). Also: Degoricija, p.48.
84 BBC-DOY: Milan Martić, pp.7-8.
85 Former JNA 5th military district commander Kolšek quotes Martić's statement, seemingly confirming 
its accuracy, and it corresponds with Babić's BBC interview. Kolšek, pp.126, 142. BBC-DOY: Milan 
Babić, pp.16-17. Other sources: ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković, T16603. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: T11311; Witness DST-043, T12939-40. Mihajlo Knežević, p.41.
86 ICTY-Milošević: E-P350.3a (Letter from Col. Dušan Smiljanić, 16/10/1994).
87 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1531-3. ICTY-Krajišnik: Witness Milan Babić, T3376-7. 
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Former JNA security chief Aleksandar Vasiljević is a key source for the claims of the 
Serbian MUP/DB role in Croatia. But although very coy about the role of JNA security 
in the arming of the Serbs, he effectively confirmed their decisive role. According to 
Vasiljević, it was in mid-March 1991 that the Serbs in Croatia, 'who until then were 
poorly armed', began to arm en masse – as the SFRY Presidency was unable to disarm 
the Croats, they 'had no choice but to organise themselves in order to protect 
themselves.' Serbia decided to support the Serbs in Croatia at this point, he maintains.88 
But whereas Vasiljević claimed that the Serbian MUP armed Serb forces in East 
Slavonia, for Krajina itself he has suggested that they sent only a few hundred pieces, 
and seemed to confirm that the Krajina was armed by the JNA, characterising it as the 
formation and arming of the territorial defence in the region.89
It is likely that Smiljanić exaggerated somewhat, and the first 15,000 weapons were, at 
least in part, merely moved from depots in Croatian to Serbian areas, out of reach of 
Croatian forces, and only later distributed to the TO, in the summer or autumn.90 Krajina 
certainly did not have 15,000 men under arms in June 1991, and even in July 1991 and 
later some problems with lack of arms were noted.91 But Krajina DB chief Orlović 
confirms they were allowed to take back the Knin police weapons from the JNA in April 
Kolšek, pp.126. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Mustafa Čandić; E-P350.4a (Statement of Mustafa Čandić). 
ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Memorial of the Republic of Croatia: Annexes – Regional Files – Vol.2, 
Part III: Kordun and Lika and Dalmatia', 1/3/2001, Annex 339 (Witness Statement of Mustafa 
Čandić), pp.33-35. Annex 340 (Witness Statement of S. Š.), p.36. Mamula, p.238. Mihajlo Knežević, 
pp.87, 139. Also see: footnotes 119-14.
88 ICTY-Karadžić: Statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević, para 85, 71. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Aleksandar 
Vasiljević, T8071. Milošević and Jović in The Hague also said Serbs began to arm themselves after 
the failure of disarmament. ICTY-Milošević: T29293-4.
89  'Lovas Case', Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević (Belgrade: 21/6/2010), accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Transkripti/lovas.html, pp.4, 12-13, 22, 86. BBC-DOY: Aleksandar Vasiljević, 
p.29. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević, T15778-9. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Aleksandar 
Vasiljević, T8073-4. ICTY-Karadžić: Statement of Aleksandar Vasiljević, Para 71. Also: Borisav 
Jović, op. cit., pp.325, 340.
90 Interviews: Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina State Security (DB), 1991-92 (Belgrade: 7/2009); Petar 
Ajdinović, JNA security officer (Belgrade: 6/2011). ICTY-Milošević: Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević, 
T15778-9. Mihajlo Knežević, p.41.
91 Dušan Glavaš, pp.42-54. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 62 (JNA security report, 14/6/1991), p. 
150; Document 71 (Daily intelligence report, 2/7/1991), p.171; Document 105 (JNA report, 7/1991), 
pp.222-3; Knjiga 4, Document 110 (Report of Glina War Presidency, 2/6/1992), pp.323-4. Degoricija, 
p.56. ICTY-Martić: Witness Mile Dakić, T10013-4. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1100 (Wartime 
experience of 13th Infantry Brigade of SVK in Slunj, 3/8/1994); E-D109 (Report on Benkovac TO, 
25/11/1991). CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, p.71.
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1991, after Plitvice,92 and JNA assistance to Serbian forces had certainly begun by 
June,93 and in a large-scale fashion by July, something which numerous sources 
independently describe.94 (The JNA also began arming Bosnian Serb territorial defence 
units from about July 1991 onwards.)95
Organised and Disorganised Arming
At the ICTY, and in many published works, the arming of the Serbs has been presented 
as a highly organised and directed operation, part of Belgrade's 'joint criminal enterprise' 
for war in Croatia, with the initiative coming from Belgrade (i.e. Milošević).96 Much 
evidence suggests, however, that the arming of the Serbs in Croatia was somewhat 
disorganised and often driven by local requests rather than decisions in Belgrade, with a 
marked lack of co-ordination between the various actors, and intermediaries, involved.
Arming definitely varied by region, depending on local requests and the attitude of local 
JNA officials. For example, Kostajnica in Banija was still not properly armed in July 
1991, and the local JNA refused to arm local Serbs on the grounds that they were 
92 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). Svetislav Spasojević, 'Kadijević zaustavlja akciju 'Štit' 
[Interview with Aleksandar Vasiljević]', NIN, 17/7/1992, p.56
93 ICTY-Martić: E-44E (SAOK DB report, 11/6/1991). Or May: Degoricija, p.72.
94 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 79 (Krajina DB report, Korenica, 19/7/1991), pp.180-1. ICJ: Croatia 
v. Yugoslavia: 'Reply of the Republic of Croatia, Vol.1', 20/12/2010, pp.137-40; 'Reply of the Republic 
of Croatia, Vol.2: Annexes 1-41', 20/12/2010, Annex 28 (Witness Statement of M.Ž.), p.156; 
'Memorial of the Republic of Croatia: Annexes – General Annexes – Volume 4', 1/3/2001, Annex 
146D ('What to do with the Serbs of Gorski Kotar', 17/4/1994), pp.293-7; 'Memorial of the Republic 
of Croatia: Annexes – Regional Files – Vol.2, Part III: Kordun and Lika and Dalmatia', 1/3/2001, 
Annex 338 (Witness Statement of D.T.), pp.29-33; Annex 340 (Witness Statement of S. Š.), p.36. 
ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Submission: Public Versions of Confidential Exhibits Part 1 (2/4/2013), 
pp.4, 228-9; Witness Borislav Bogunović, T6018-25. ICTY-Martić: E-73 (Wartime Record of Plaški 
Brigade, 1995); Witness Nikola Medaković, T9112-3. ICTY-Milošević: E-P328.3 (Incidents of Joint 
Actions by JNA and Terrorists). 'Iz knjige Ivana Stržića: Ogulinski kraj u Domovinskom Ratu', 
2/10/2014, accessed 1/12/2014 from: http://www.saborsko.net/index.php/arhiva/2289-isokudr. 
Degoricia, p.73. 
95 See, for example: ICTY-Milošević: E-P600 (Witness Statement of Miroslav Deronjić). ICTY-
Krajišnik: E-P48.1 (Diary of Petar Janković); E-P51 (Report of Milutin Kukanjac, 19/3/1992). ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-D958 (Banja Luka SUP report, 6/9/1991), p.7; E-D1675 (Report of SR BH 
Territorial Defence, 18/2/1992); Witness Osman Selak, T17374.
96 See ICTY OTP Briefs in Milošević, Martić and Stanišić/Simatović, and, for example: Judah, pp.169-
72. LeBor, pp.139-44. Tanner, p.225-33. Gagnon, pp.80, 143-4. CIA, pp.25-33.
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'Chetniks' and would not join the new Yugoslav communist party, the SK-PJ (League of 
Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia), which the JNA leadership backed. The JNA 
corps in neighbouring Bosnia, however, then responded favourably, and they allegedly 
formed the best equipped unit in the whole region. The largest armed formation in 
Banija, the Dvor-based 7th Banija Division, named after a Partisan division in the 
Second World War, was also apparently established in the same way, that July.97
A number of sources report that retired general Dušan Pekić, a Croatian Serb 'National 
Hero' from the Second World War, activist of the Belgrade-based 'Association of Serbs 
from Croatia' and former president of the Veterans Association of Yugoslavia, was 
involved in the distribution of arms to Serbs in Croatia.98 Pekić had been part of the SK-
PJ, and others in that party, retired Croatian Serb generals, also seem to have been 
involved – some sources suggest that they were the main distributor of arms in Eastern 
Slavonia, claiming to have distributed 12-13,000 pieces there.99 These high-ranking 
former generals were extremely well connected and used those connections to get arms 
from various sources. They were certainly not hindered by the JNA, and by summer at 
least seem to have had the approval of its leadership.100 Serbian officials also co-
operated with them, and the arms Pekić sent to Eastern Slavonia may have come from 
Serbian TO stocks via Serbia's Ministry of Defence.101
97 The unit's name was chosen precisely in order to acquire arms from the communists who had access to 
them (either the JNA or SK-PJ), again indicating that they, rather than the Serbian government or 
police, were the key source of arms. Dušan Glavaš, pp.42-54. ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Reply of the 
Republic of Croatia, Vol.1', 20/12/2010, p.138. Also see: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1100 (Wartime 
experience of 13th Infantry Brigade of SVK in Slunj, 3/8/1994).
98 Among others: ICTY-Šešelj: T4330-8, 15713-5. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Borivoje Savic, 
T1900-1. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D394 (Official Note, DB Serbia, 25/7/1991). Filip Švarm, 'Who 
is Veljko Džakula', Vreme News Digest Agency, 14/2/1994.
99 ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a ('The Serbian Army', book by Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.105-6. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Borivoje Savic, T1900. See also: 'SPO Demands 'Legal' Serbian Army', 
Tanjug, 13/7/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-135, 15/7/1991.
100 Mamula, pp.236-8. Kolšek cited in Boljkovac, p.340.
101 ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Memorial of the Republic of Croatia: Annexes – General Annexes – 
Volume 4', 1/3/2001, Annex 146D ('What to do with the Serbs of Gorski Kotar', 17/4/1994), pp.293-4. 
ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a ('The Serbian Army', book by Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.140, 105.
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However, Pekić does seem to have been operating autonomously, and was not simply an 
agent of Serbia (or the JNA, of which he was very critical).102 Serbia's officials did not 
want to arm people on party lines (the SK-PJ), and on the contrary saw that as a 
problem. There was even uncontrolled – and for Serbian officials, problematic - 
distribution of weapons in parts of Serbia itself, which was linked to Pekić.103 Although 
Milošević clearly approved arming the Serbs in Croatia from spring 1991, and 
organised efforts to this effect were made by both the Serbian police and the JNA, this 
process was nevertheless often rather chaotic and uncontrolled, driven by requests from 
locals and people such as Pekić, with often unintended consequences.
This is illustrated by a Serbian DB report from Frenki, sent from Knin in late July 
1991.104 Frenki reported how Babić had arranged, via the local JNA, for Serbia's 
Minister of Defence Miodrag Jokić to send a small shipment of arms to Knin. Frenki 
warned that Babić intended to use these to arm his own loyal party militia, which would 
lead to disunity in Krajina's defence, and urged that Jokić be so informed. This indicates 
the lack of co-ordination/central direction in Belgrade, with one part of the Serbian 
government helping to arm units to which another part of the Serbian government was 
implacably opposed.
An August 1991 report by the Serbian DB summarising its information on Dušan Pekić, 
meanwhile, reveals in part how such conflicts could arise.105 Almost all of the 
information in the report is derived from DB monitoring of Šešelj and other opposition 
radicals, and their interactions with Pekić that the DB had incidentally recorded. Pekić 
was not himself subject to monitoring or surveillance, most likely because of how 
102 '300 Croat Serbs Hold Support Rally in Belgrade', Tanjug, 5/11/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-214, 
5/11/1991. Nobilo & Letica, p.111.
103 ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a ('The Serbian Army', book by Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.104-6, 176-8. 
Domovina Intercepts: B6957 (Milošević-Karadžić, 9/7/1991); B6742 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
23/9/1991).
104 ICTY-Martić: E-499 (Report by Frenki, 28/7/1991).
105 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1336 (Official Note, Information on Dušan Pekić, DB Serbia, 
9/8/1991).
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influential and prominent he was. It is not, therefore, surprising that officials in 
Belgrade did not have a full picture of what was happening.106
Western Slavonia: A 'Smoking Gun' Study
On a secretive matter such as arms shipments, it is difficult to gain concrete and reliable 
information. For the region of Western Slavonia, however, there are a number of 
'smoking gun' sources – including three reports from the Serbian DB itself in mid-1991, 
two of them by Branko Pavić, a local rebel organiser who had apparently joined the 
DB.107 Stanišić appears to have viewed Western Slavonia as a pivotal region in the 
conflict,108 and examining the situation there is a useful indicator of how things were 
happening.
In a report dated 15 May 1991 Pavić describes how in late 1990 the SDS had initiated 
the formation of village units, armed with hunting and short arms, in co-operation with 
local police. Immediately after the Pakrac events in March 1991 they proceeded with 
the creation of mass armed formations, and by 15 May 1991 had organised about 1,500 
men. However, of the men in Pakrac (half of the total) only 20% had (old) military 
weapons, and many were unarmed, lacking even hunting rifles, while those in 
neighbouring regions had only 18 military weapons and 200 hunting rifles between 
them. Pavić therefore requested from Belgrade the 'essential' supply of about 1,100 
automatic rifles with ammunition, as well as communications equipment.109
106 See also: ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a ('The Serbian Army', book by Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.129, 
177. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D273 (DB Serbia report, 18/7/1991); E-
D1336 (Official Note, Information on Dušan Pekić, DB Serbia, 9/8/1991); E-D67 (Information about 
Paramilitary Formations, DB Serbia, 1/8/1991). Cvijetin Milivojević, 'Ready for War', Borba, 
28/8/1991, p.10, in FBIS-EER-91-137, 13/9/1991. 'Territorial Defense Denies Forming Armed Units', 
Tanjug, 1/8/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-149, 2/8/1991.
107 Officially, Pavić joined in autumn 1991. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D2685 (Decisions Re: Branko 
Pavić, MUP Serbia, 9/1991).
108 Domovina Intercepts: B6960 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 9/9/1991); C2536 (Karadžić-Milošević, 19/9/1991); 
B6946 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 14/12/1991). ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2452 (Correspondence from 
Jovica Stanišić to Minister of Defence of Serbia, MUP Serbia, 9/12/1991).
109 Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, pp.106-9.
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Five weeks later, on 21 June 1991, Pavić submitted another report. In Pakrac they had 
the same number of men, but apart from some anti-tank weapons not mentioned 
previously, the situation was identical: only about 20% had military arms, and they had 
no communications equipment.110 Thus, five weeks on, Pavić's request had apparently 
not been met, and none of the 'essential' equipment given, by the Serbian DB or anyone 
else.
On 25 July 1991, meanwhile, the Serbian DB reported on the organising of armed 
formations in most of Western Slavonia aside from Pakrac, following an interview with 
a leading figure from the region. The source reported that there had been a real problem 
in arming units that had been established, and until recently they 'did not have any 
weapons other than hunting and illegal weapons obtained through smuggling channels'. 
On 15 July 1991, however, 1,700 barrels were obtained from local military depots and 
distributed by the SDS, mostly automatic weapons but also mortars and hand-held 
rocket launchers. This was arranged by Dušan Pekić personally, and negotiations were 
underway for more to be distributed. Training of the units was also being conducted in 
local JNA barracks, and another JNA commander had provided weapons without telling 
his superior.111
Other documents confirm this JNA assistance. The Doljane barracks in Daruvar seems 
to have been pivotal. According to a contemporary account, already in April 1991 pro-
Serb commanders began training and forming JNA units from local Serbs. It was 
decided to start moving arms to Serbian areas, where these battalions were being 
formed, and the first truck left on 3 June 1991. 4-5,000 barrels were removed in this 
way, and gradually distributed to the Serbs. This was done on local initiative, contrary 
to explicit instructions from superiors, including the military district command, 
although Smiljanić's team may have been involved.112 A number of other sources 
110 Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, p.114.
111 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D394 (Official Note, DB Serbia, 25/7/1991).
112 Aleksandar S. Jovanović, Poraz – koreni poraza (Belgrade:  LDIJ, 2001), pp.145-54, 176.
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confirm this distribution,113 and Croatian police sources recorded the first large quantity 
of arms from the Doljane depot to Pakrac in late June 1991.114
These sources thus strongly indicate that there was no significant assistance from the 
Serbian MUP/DB to Western Slavonia, at least before late July 1991 – despite Stanišić 
reportedly viewing it as a key region in the conflict. In mid-June 1991 in Pakrac, the 
centre of rebellion, they still only had a few hundred military weapons, and the weapons 
that began to arrive subsequently were from local JNA warehouses - not Serbia - thanks 
to the OB, sympathetic local commanders and Pekić. The situation undoubtedly varied 
by region, with arming in the Knin Krajina, for example, beginning earlier than 
elsewhere. But this example gives an indication of the relative importance of different 
sources of arms, which conflicts strongly with the notion of an early, mass, organised 
arming operation by the Serbian police.
113 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 5, Documents 227-9 (Recommendations for promotion of Dušan Saratlić, Stevo 
Prodanović, Marko Vujić, 1992), pp.424-8. ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Reply of the Republic of 
Croatia, Vol.1', 20/12/2010, p.138. Also: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1152 (Report by Security 
Organ for Western Slavonia, 22/11/1991). 'Grubišno Polje Case', Witness Rade Čakmak (Belgrade: 
30/3/2009), accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Transkripti/grubisno_polje.html.
114 Miškulin, 'Srpska pobuna...', p.388. Also: ICTY-Milošević: Witness Đuro Matovina, T11008-11. 
Interview Veljko Džakula (Zagreb: 30/9/2009).
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5.5. Moderates, Extremists and Militarisation
A final issue worth considering is: what was the attitude of Serbs in Croatia to the 
acquisition of arms? To what extent was this arming initiated by locals, or by Belgrade 
and extremist minorities, as suggested by, for example, Gagnon?
The pacifist inclinations of Rašković have been noted in the literature. However, 
Rašković also understood and endorsed what he saw as the desire of Krajina Serbs for 
defence against Croatian aggression. In the run-up to the August 1990 referendum he 
suggested they would call on the JNA to protect them in the event of Croatian police 
intervention,115 and after the events of 17 August publicly sought intervention by federal 
organs, for protection from this 'militaristic attack on the Serb people in Croatia'.116 In 
January 1991 Rašković himself took credit for the fact that 'today there cannot be a 
conflict in our Krajina between the Croatian police and Serbian nation [which would 
not] turn into a conflict of the Croatian police and the [JNA]', noting that 'here also Mr 
Milošević personally helped us, and also we with our efforts won that'.117 Thus, 
Milošević's promises of JNA protection followed requests from the SDS, including from 
Rašković himself.118
Rašković does not seem to have advocated arming in autumn and winter 1990 and 
sought to avoid conflict, even saying in November that 'I am claiming now that 
barricades are not the way to defend the Serbian people. I do not support those who are 
arming the people.'119 However, he was involved in appointing the staff to manage the 
barricades on 18 August, and surely knew that close allies of his, such as SDS VP 
115 Dušan Pilić, 'La Croazia teme la guerra civile si riaccende il conflitto con i Serbi', La Repubblica, 
15/8/1990.
116 'Rašković To Ask for Federal 'Intervention'', Ljubljana Domestic Service, 18/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-
90-161, 20/8/1990. 'Najveća želja - sprečiti krvopriliće', Borba, 20/8/1990, p.3.
117 Snježana Stamatović, 'Autonomija nije pala s neba', Borba, 12-13/1/1991, p.5. Similarly: S. 
Stamatović & Z. Tarle, 'Biće tu još neprijatnosti', Borba, 2-3/3/1991, p.15.
118 See also: Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.231. ICTY-Hadžić: T9444.
119 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.132. On the other hand, see: Jovan Rašković, 'What DANAS Does Not 
Dare To Publish', NIN, 28/12/1990, pp.28-29, in FBIS-EER-91-018, 11/2/1991.
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Bogoljub Popović and his own driver/escort in Krajina, Dragan Batas, were advocating 
and involved in the arming of the people.120 Rašković spoke sometimes of an unarmed, 
Gandhi-style march on Zagreb and other pacifist ideas,121 but it seems he did not try to 
impose these on the SDS, where the idea of the need for defence dominated. In fact, he 
even seemed to adopt a more radical stance than Babić in relation to the January 1991 
disarmament plan, calling on Serbs not to obey the SFRY Presidency's order on the 
grounds that, unlike the Croats, the Serbs were not really armed, possessing only 
hunting weapons which they had paid for themselves.122 Moreover, in February he noted 
that given Croatian arming, 'I think that conditions are reached that we think about... 
[the fact] that also Serbs in Croatia have to arm themselves. Because of that we will 
most likely propose that those parts of population, and here I think predominantly about 
Serbs in Croatia, have to be and become in a legal way the reserve composition of the 
[JNA]. In that way a certain balance would be established'.123 He subsequently told Knin 
crowds who sought arms that 'You do not have arms, and I told you not to hand them in'. 
He claimed that 'I will not take you to a war but to peace', but if the Croats 'attack, we 
shall defend ourselves', calling on the JNA 'to arm the Serbian people as its reserve 
force, because we are all JNA members, its best and largest flank.'124
Many of Rašković's more moderate allies in the SDS were also involved in, or 
supported the acquisition of, arms. For example, the president of Obrovac, Sergej 
Veselinović, who was close to Rašković and even involved in preparations for the 
Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF) in mid-1991,125 had been involved in the procurement 
and distribution of arms from practically the start, and was close with Dubajić.126 
120 Boguljub Popović, 'Srpski gandi', in Zbornik o Jovanu Raškoviću (Novi Sad & Belgrade: 2002), 
pp.215-7. Predrag Popović, 'Trebalo je da slušamo Tuđmana [Interview with Simo Dubajić]'', Intervju, 
13/3/1995, pp.52-3. ICTY-Martić: E-872 (Statement of Ognjen Biserko, 2/12/1990). ICTY-Milošević: 
Witness Milan Babić, T12920-1. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 55 (Official Note about 
connections between Arkan and Milan Babić, 31/5/1991), pp.138-9.
121 For example: Miloš Rajković, 'Rašković Threatens 'Great March'', Belgrade Domestic Service, 
22/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-164, 23/8/1990. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.224. Bogoljub Popović.
122 Petrović, p.14. S. Stamatović, 'Zbunjenost u Kninu', Borba, 21/1/1991, p.5.
123 Milorad Vučelić, 'Osjetiti Bartolomejsku noć', NIN, 15/2/1991, p.23.
124 'Serbian Leaders Emphasize Serb Unity', Tanjug, 19/2/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-035, 21/2/1991.
125 Zoran Daskalović, 'Three Serbian Mistakes', Danas, 23/7/1991, in FBIS-EER-91-118, 7/8/1991. 
ICTY-Martić: Witness Veljko Džakula, T399, 423.
126 Interviews: Lazar Macura; Ratko Ličina; Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 2007, 2009). ICJ: Croatia v. 
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Vukčević, meanwhile, sent a telegram to the JNA leadership immediately after 17 
August, 'asking that the parts of the Serbian people who were considered as the reserve 
force of the JNA – because all of us were reservists of the JNA – should have uniforms 
and weapons distributed to them because we shouldn't worry ourselves how to get hold 
of weapons. And thus... they would be able to defend themselves, if necessary.'127 In 
April 1991 Slavonian SDS leaders noted that Serbs were 'increasingly relying on 
themselves for self-defence', 'disappointed' with the JNA's 'tardy and inadequate 
response' to Croatian actions, and the following month Džakula was involved in seeking 
Serb opposition volunteers from Serbia.128 By summer 1991 even the president of 
Vrginmost municipality, an anti-SDS communist and founder of the SDF, was also 
seeking arms for defence.129
In the context of Croatian arming and the perception of a threat, including the threat of 
being taken out of Yugoslavia and into an independent Croatia, many Serbs in the 
Krajina and Slavonia sought JNA protection and felt the need for arming and organising 
in self-defence. Thus, Belgrade was not arming extremist minorities to provoke conflict, 
as suggested by authors such as Gagnon; it sent arms primarily in response to demands 
from mainstream Croatian Serb representatives, and long after those demands began.
It is certainly true that arms often ended up in the hands of extremists, as it was 
precisely they who were the first to sign up for war. Many of the people who proclaimed 
themselves 'first fighters' (prvoborci), and their units, later descended into crime, looting 
and paramilitarism. This was a feature of all sides of the wars in the former Yugoslavia: 
Boljkovac, the most moderate HDZ official, was expanding the Croatian police with 
precisely such people, and the former communist Špegelj was giving them arms, while 
the most prominent Bosnian defenders of Sarajevo in 1992-93 were notorious 
Yugoslavia: 'Memorial of the Republic of Croatia: Annexes – General Annexes – Volume 4', 1/3/2001, 
Annex 55 (JNA report, 10/12/1990), pp.141-2. Dubajić, 'Otvoreno pismo Slobodanu Miloševiću', 
17/3/1991, in Radaković.
127 ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Vojislav Vukčević, T11076.
128 ICTY-Hadžić: T9443-4. ICTY-Martić: E-235a (SDS Slavonia meeting, 8/5/1991).
129 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, p.175.
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criminals.130 However, the demand for arms came from mainstream local leaderships, 
including many who were more moderately inclined. That those arms often ended up 
with extremists was a feature of the Yugoslav conflicts in general.
130 Donia, pp.162-3. Hoare, pp.98-9.
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5.6. Conclusions
From autumn 1990 onwards many Serbs in Croatia, including their local leaderships, 
sought arms. Serbia, however, offered only fairly limited assistance at first, most likely 
as it was counting on an alliance with the JNA, and did not want to unnecessarily 
alienate it by creating Serb paramilitary units. At most a few thousand hunting weapons 
were sold to the Krajina Serbs, and any assistance from the Serbian MUP/DB in this 
period fell far short of Krajina desires. Croatian arming and military organising far 
outstripped that by the Krajina Serbs at this stage. These facts encourage a re-
assessment of this aspect of the idea of Belgrade-backed 'Serbian aggression' and 
Croatian 'defence', at least for this time period, and support the idea that a 'security 
dilemma' was in play.
By March 1991, given the arming of the Croatian side, the failure of the JNA to disarm 
Croat formations and the evident approach of conflict, there appears to have been a shift 
in policy in favour of arming the Serbs in Croatia. More significant arms and assistance 
were then provided by Serbia. But Serbia's direct assistance was soon far outstripped by 
the JNA, which began arming the Serbs in Croatia (and Bosnia) as its reserve flank for 
the coming conflict. Serbia obviously supported that move by the JNA and had been 
advocating it, but was not the direct source of those arms. In fact, many of the arms that 
did come from Serbian stocks were actually distributed by intermediaries, such as 
Dušan Pekić, rather than directly by the Serbian police. Indeed, local requests, from 
Croatian Serb 'moderates' as well as radicals, seem to have determined the distribution 
of arms as much as decisions in Belgrade, in a rather chaotic and uncontrolled process - 
a far cry from the image of an organised and directed scheme of mass arming by 
Milošević's subordinates.
As we shall see in Chapter 7, Serbia's own direct influence on Krajina Serb forces was, 
in fact, rather limited. Before considering this, however, I will now look at the role of 
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Serbia in Krajina Serb politics in 1990-91, focusing on Belgrade's relationship with the 
SDS and its key leaders, Rašković and Babić.
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Chapter 6: Serbia and the Serbian Democratic Party
In 1989 the first Serbian nationalist protests erupted in Knin, and it was out of these first 
stirrings of Serbian unrest that the SDS emerged. Scholars often associate the Serbian 
nationalist movement in Croatia with the authorities of the Republic of Serbia, with a 
pronounced tendency to view the SDS and its leaders as puppets of Belgrade. Milan 
Babić in particular is generally characterised as a stooge of Milošević, a politician 
whom Belgrade simply created in place of Rašković. Rašković's independence from, 
and disagreements with, Milošević, by contrast, are often recognised. The reason for 
this replacement is usually located in Rašković's moderation, with Babić seen as a 
suitably hardline successor.
This chapter examines these assertions, looking in detail at the relationship between the 
key leaders of the SDS and the authorities in Serbia, particularly Milošević himself, and 
the role, if any, that Serbia played in the SDS's internal factional politics. It covers the 
period from the first Serbian unrest in Croatia in 1989 to late 1991, focusing on the key 
leadership contest in this period, between Rašković and Babić, and how this conflict 
played out in the Krajina region where Babić was based. Although Rašković's 
independence from Milošević is often acknowledged, I also examine the nuances of 
their relationship, as this provides essential context for examining the relationship of 
other Croatian Serb leaders with Milošević. I also look at the reasons behind Babić's rise 
as a leader. Belgrade's attitude has been given both as the reason why some people 
supported him, and why some people opposed him, so it is important to explain how he 
acquired support (and encountered opposition). First, however, I will examine another 
faction among Serbs in Croatia: the Serbs of the League of Communists of Croatia 
(SKH).
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6.1. 'SDS' and 'SKH' Serbs
As well as growing Serbian nationalist activities outside the ruling SKH, in 1989-90 
there was also a split within the party itself, with Serb-dominated SKH organs and 
representatives becoming increasingly critical of the Zagreb leadership.1 This split 
widened after the election of a new SKH leadership headed by Ivica Račan in December 
1989, and would become complete after the spring 1990 elections.2 In those elections 
most Serbs, including most Serbs in the Krajina, had voted for SKH representatives, and 
it was only gradually over the course of 1990 and the first half of 1991 that the SDS 
achieved complete dominance. SKH Serb representatives in this period occupied an 
uneasy and uncertain position between Zagreb and Knin, and lacked political 
organisation and momentum.3
In summer-autumn 1990, however, there was an attempt to create precisely such 
momentum, as leading SKH Serb Borislav Mikelić formed a multinational, but 
predominantly Serb, 'Socialist Party of Croatia – Party of Yugoslav Orientation' 
(Socijalistička partija Hrvatske - Partija jugoslavenske orijentacije, SPH-PJO), based 
primarily in his home region of Banija.4 Mikelić opposed both the HDZ and the SDS 
from a socialist and pro-Yugoslav (but also pro-Serbian) perspective, and argued for the 
maintanence of Croatia in federal Yugoslavia, with Serbian national equality – but not 
autonomy - in Croatia.5 Despite some initial successes, however, the party failed to gain 
1 This mainly involved local boards and representatives from Serb-inhabitted regions. A real range of 
views could be found among Serbs in the SKH, and the most prominent, long-standing Serbs in the 
party's leadership, such as Dušan Dragosavac and Stanko Stojčević, were not involved in this split. 
There were also Serbs such as Dušan Plećaš, executive secretary of the SDP in 1990-91, who were 
firmly on the 'Croatian' side. Interview Dušan Plećaš (Zagreb: 7/10/2009).
2 See, for example: Zoran Krželj, 'The Flexible Pattern of Nationalism', Borba, 10/6/1989, in FBIS-
EEU-89-201, 19/10/1989. Gojko Marinković, 'Raskol hrvatskih komunista', Danas, 12/6/1990, pp.9-
11. Chapter 'O Kninskoj Krajini i Tromeđi (1989-1991)' in Radaković.
3 See, for example: Zoran Daskalović, 'Zašto su otišili', Danas, 12/2/1991, pp.21-2.
4 The party's secretary, Goran Babić, was a Croatian, and there was reportedly a 60:40 split between 
Serbs and Croats in the party's leadership and membership. Interviews: Borislav Mikelić; Nikola 
Dobrijević, president of the Sisak branch of the SPH-PJO, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 2007).
5 Interview Borislav Mikelić (Belgrade: 2007). 'New Croatian Socialist Party Established', Tanjug, 
25/8/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-167, 28/8/1990. 'Serbs Hold Protest Rally in Baniski Grabovac', 
Belgrade Domestic Service, 1/10/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-191, 2/10/1990.
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a significant following, partly due to the hospitalisation of Mikelić in October 1990, and 
by 1991 the party was a non-factor.6
A point worth bearing in mind when considering Serbian media support or sympathy for 
the SDS and its leaders is that, in fact, these SKH Serbs were far closer to Belgrade than 
activists of the SDS, both ideologically, as communists/former communists, and in 
personal contacts and connections, since they had been part of the united League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia. There is evidence that Mikelić was connected with official 
Belgrade and to some extent co-ordinating with them with regard to the SPH-PJO.7 The 
announcement of the party's formation was front page news for Serbian daily Politika, 
and the party received direct support from Milošević's SPS, whose general secretary 
attended the founding of its Knin branch in November 1990 – a direct challenge to the 
SDS.8
This is not to suggest that the SPH-PJO was a movement hatched in Belgrade, or that 
Belgrade had fully thrown its weight behind the party in opposition to the SDS. But the 
SPH-PJO was certainly much more in line with Belgrade's political preferences than the 
Serbian nationalist and anti-communist SDS, and this was fairly evident. SNV Vice-
President Mile Dakić, president of the small 'Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party' 
in Croatia, for example, recalls that Milošević, as a communist, never liked the SDS, 
and when he, Babić and Milošević met in January 1991, Milošević spoke much more 
with him, as leader of a Yugoslav party, than Babić.9
6 Mikelić crashed his car, which, he claims, was sabotaged by the HDZ. Interview Borislav Mikelić 
(Belgrade: 2007).
7 Mamula, pp.202-4. Tomac, pp.135, 141. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.12 (Babić Interview), p.56.
8 Joško Čelan, 'Doviđenja, Raškoviću?', Vjesnik, 10/9/1990, p.12. Marinko Čulić, 'Tko su vođe Srba', 
Danas, 6/11/1990, pp.10-11.
9 Interview Mile Dakić (Belgrade: 5/11/2007). Similarly, in Bosnia, Milošević showed favouritism 
towards Dragan Đokanović, leader of a small 'Democratic Federalists' party. Đokanović has recalled 
that 'I received full support from Milošević and that is one of the reasons I rose in politics in Bosnia', 
with Milošević asking Karadžić to ensure his presence at two meetings Milošević had in Sarajevo in 
1991. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-D38 (Witness Statement of Dragan Đokanović), p.4.
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If Milošević really had been able to choose who represented the Croatian Serbs in 1990, 
there can be little doubt that it would have been such former communists. Indeed, when 
he did exert such influence, he picked people like this – most notably Mikelić, as RSK 
Prime Minister in 1994-95.10 But in 1990-91 Belgrade's evident preferences in this 
respect clearly had little impact on the ground in the Krajina. People there were not 
watching Belgrade to decide whom to support. Belgrade's preference for the SKH Serbs 
also reinforces the point that although, as we shall see, SDS activists did benefit from 
sympathetic media coverage, this was more a consequence of the Serbian media's 
nationalist stance towards Croatia than a deliberate and conscious effort to promote the 
SDS.
10 Interview Slobodan Jarčević, RSK Foreign Minister, 1992-93 (Belgrade: 2007, 2011).
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6.2. The First Serbian Unrest in Croatia and the Formation of 
the SDS
In the late 1980s the official Serbian media adopted an increasingly nationalist and 
critical perspective towards Croatia, effectively the 'Memorandum' perspective, and the 
media was opened up to Serbian nationalists, including those from Croatia. Most of the 
initial organisers of the Serbian movement in Croatia benefited either from connections 
with the SANU elite or the sympathy of the Serbian media, which many of them were 
cited by or wrote articles for.11
Rašković was one such person. He appears to have already been well known in the Knin 
area at the time, and had been close with Dobrica Ćosić and other leading SANU figures 
- intellectuals and dissidents - since the 1970s, formally becoming a member of SANU 
in December 1988.12 In the 1980s he also began to appear on Serbian political 
talkshows, becoming known as an analyst and critic across Yugoslavia. This apparently 
intensified in the late 1980s, and by October 1989 future Tuđman advisor Slaven Letica 
was already complaining that Rašković was being promoted by the Serbian media.13
The first Serbian unrest in Croatia took place in Knin in February 1989, when locals 
protested against perceived Croatian and Slovenian support for Albanian separatism in 
Kosovo. Jovan Opačić and Simo Dubajić were among those elected to the protest 
committee and the main speakers at the rally.14 The next disturbance came in July 1989, 
11 Interview Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007). Kovačević, p.24. 'Knin Society Criticises 'Croatian 
Bureaucrats'', Belgrade Domestic Service, 7/9/1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-173, 8/9/1989. Marko Lopušina, 
'Srbi u Hrvatskoj: Po potkazuje Podravsku Slatinu', Intervju, 25/5/1990, pp.11-13.
12 Četnik, p.228. Tanasije Mladenovic, Usputne skice za portrete (Belgrade: Zavod za udzbenike i 
nastavna sredstva, 1995), pp.123-9, 149. Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.171.
13 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.190-1. Kovačević, pp.109-10. Interview Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 
11/2007). Rašković had appeared on Zagreb TV already in the 1970s: Mladenovic, p.123. Others 
suggest it was in summer 1990 that the Serbian media began to support the SDS: Marinko Čulić, 
'Pohod udruženih voždova', Danas, 10/7/1990, pp.13-15. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, 
T12873.
14 Interview Marko Dobrijević, Organisational Secretary of SDS, 1990-1 (Belgrade: 5/8/2007). 
Kovačević, p.24
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following a controversial decision by the Croatian Assembly to maintain the official 
term 'the Croatian literary language', which most Serbs had opposed,15 and an even more 
controversial proposal, supported by a quarter of deputies, to remove the Serbs from the 
constitutional definition of Croatia. Serbs in Croatia almost universally defended the 
existing definition, viewing it as the foundation of Serbian equality in Croatia, and 
many were outraged that the Sabor had even discussed such a proposal, with Mikelić 
resigning from the assembly in protest. The Croatian leadership was also criticised for 
its weak defence of the existing definition, undoubtedly a reflection of the fact that, as 
then SKH secretary Drago Dimitrović recalls, leading Croats in the SKH did in fact 
think it should be revised, although they had agreed not to pursue the issue as their Serb 
colleagues were opposed.16
Meanwhile, an official commemoration of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo had been 
scheduled in Knin for 8-9 July. With 30,000 people attending the proceedings on 9 July, 
including Serbs from elsewhere in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, events partly developed 
into a protest against Zagreb, with nationalist slogans and posters of Milošević.17 The 
day before a Serbian cultural society 'Zora' (Dawn) had also been founded – really a 
proto-party of local Serb nationalists - with Opačić as its president. With the support of 
a radical contingent from Nova Pazova, Serbia, Opačić then interrupted the official 
proceedings of the commemoration to give a speech of his own, and he and 
subsequently twenty other local Serbs were arrested and sentenced to several months' 
imprisonment. This catapulted him into the limelight, confirming his popularity in the 
Knin region.18
15 Technically, a decision on changes was postponed. The full definition was 'the Croatian literary 
language, the standard form of the national language of Croats and Serbs in Croatia, which is called 
either Croatian or Serbian', though the term 'Croatian literary language' was commonly used. 
'Languages as Stumbling Block', Politika, 23/6/1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-125, 30/6/1989. Milan Rakas, 
'Oil on the Fire', Borba, 23/6/1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-123, 28/6/1989. Keith Langston & Anita Peti-
Stantić, Language Planning and National Identity in Croatia (Basingstoke-New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), pp.110-1. For the language debates see: Meri Štajduhar, 'Lingvisti i političari', 
Danas, 27/6/1989, pp.12-3. Dragović-Soso, pp.232-3.
16 Interview Drago Dmitrović (Zagreb: 9/10/2009). Marinko Čulić, 'Amandmani bez pogače', Danas, 
27/6/1989, pp.11-13. 'Dragosavac Views Milošević's Statements', Vjesnik, 13/8/1989, in FBIS-EEU-
89-162, 23/8/1989. Perić, p.255.
17 Interview Borislav Mikelić (Belgrade: 2007). Sell, pp.115-6.
18 Interviews: Veljko Popović; Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007).
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Serbia’s intelligentsia, arguing that Opačić was arrested simply for being a Serb and 
speaking out for Serb rights, led a united campaign for his release.19 These nationalist 
activities in both Croatia and Belgrade enjoyed the open sympathies of the Serbian 
authorities. Jović wrote in his diary at the time that Serbs in Croatia were asking for 
'equality', while in September Vojvodina requested that the federal party, rather than 
local authorities, investigate the issue – causing an angry Croatian reaction that their 
sovereignty was being attacked by their being reduced to 'local authorities'.20 Serbian 
party official Ratomir Vico pointed to the controversial constitutional proposals and 
considered it 'quite natural that many parts of the public are disturbed by the content of 
the Knin judgements'.21 At the end of the year several Serbian officials, such as the 
hardliner Kertes, even suggested an autonomous province could be founded for Serbs in 
Croatia.22
Various people from Belgrade - intellectuals and journalists who were originally from 
Knin - had also played an important role in these events. Mikelić explains that 
academics in Belgrade originally from the Knin region, in alliance with local Serb 
nationalists, pressured the local municipal leadership into proposing a Kosovo 
commemoration. The local leadership agreed to this fearing that otherwise they would 
be replaced, such was the atmosphere in Knin already.23 These Belgraders also played a 
prominent role in the creation of 'Zora', which they in fact seem to have instigated.24
It is also possible that Milošević knew something would occur that July, as he 
personally instructed Serbia's delegation to the celebration to leave after the first day, 
19 See: Dragović-Soso, pp.235-7.
20 'Vojvodina LC on Repressions at Celebrations', Zagreb Domestic Service, 8/9/1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-
177, 14/9/1989. 'Dimitrović on 'Provocations' Against Croatia', Zagreb Domestic Service, 14/9/1989, 
in FBIS-EEU-89-181, 20/9/1989. 'LCY Central Committee Proceedings Reported', Tanjug, 11/9/1989, 
in FBIS-EEU-89-178, 11/9/1989.
21 Slavko Čuruvija, 'Divisions without Quarrels, Quarrels Because of Unification', Borba, 16-17/9/1989, 
p.5, in FBIS-EEU-89-188, 29/9/1989.
22 Marinko Čulić, 'Nešto između', Danas, 12/12/1989, pp.22-3. 'Pokrajine', Danas, 19/12/1989, pp.30-
31. Krmpotić, p.12.
23 Interview Borislav Mikelić (Belgrade: 2007).
24 Miloš Jevtič, Ostaje priča: razgovori sa Jovanom Radulovićem (Valjevo: Kej, 1999), pp.90-1. 
Interview Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007).
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meaning they did not participate in the main event which Opačić and the radicals 
visiting from Serbia interrupted.25 On the other hand, the Serbian authorities were 
publicly disassociating themselves from those radicals, before as well as after the Knin 
events, and Croatian SFRJ Presidency member Stipe Šuvar's pointed non-attendance of 
Serbia's own Kosovo celebrations a week earlier could also explain this.26
It was out of the Serbian nationalist circles in Knin and Dalmatia involved in these 
events in 1989 that the SDS would emerge. Already in late 1989 the draft programme 
had been written and an initiative board, consisting of the leaders of 'Zora' and some 
others, was created. The formation of a party was not publicly announced, however, 
until 27 January 1990 (an announcement broadcast on Belgrade TV). The SDS was 
formally constituted at its founding session in Knin on 17 February, with Rašković as its 
president.27
Already in 1989 Rašković was popular in Knin and seen by both the Croatian state and 
local Serbian nationalists as a leader of Serbian nationalists in Dalmatia. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church proposed him as a speaker at the Kosovo celebration in Knin in July 
1989, and Opačić's protest was actually initially over the fact that official organs had not 
allowed Rašković to speak. (Politika then published his undelivered speech.)28 Rašković 
was also a member of the main board of 'Zora', although he had not attended its 
founding in July. He was thus a fairly natural choice for president of the SDS. 
25 Jovan Kablar, 'Politčko previranje u predvečerje građanskog rata u Hrvatskoj', in Milojko Budimir 
(ed), Građanski Rat u Hrvatskoj, 1991-95, Zbornik Radova 6 (Belgrade: Udruženje Srba iz Hrvatske, 
2010), p.155.
26 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.22-4, 37-8, 79. RFE, Svjedoci Raspada: Stipe Šuvar. Marinko Čulić, 
'Kokarde opet sjaje', Danas, 18/7/1989, pp.7-10. 'Partija i solidarnost', Danas, 18/7/1989, p.32. Gojko 
Marinković, 'Napad je najbolja odbrane', Danas, 25/7/1989, pp.12-13. 'Solidarity' Defends Work in 
Public Statement', Tanjug, 18/6/1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-118, 21/6/1989. D. Vučinić et al, 'Discussion 
of Interethnic Relations', Borba, 31/7/1989, in FBIS-EEU-89-151, 8/8/1989. The 'Sava Society' of the 
Novi Pazar radicals was the nucleus of several leading Serbian opposition parties, and was banned 
when its transformation into a party was announced in January 1990: 'Work of Sava Society Banned', 
Tanjug, 13/1/1990, FBIS-EEU-90-011, 17/1/1990.
27 ICTY-Martić: Witness Branko Popović. Branko Popović, 'Osnivanje Srpske Demokratske Stranke', in 
Ćosić et al, pp.185-197. Jevtič, p.91.
28 Branko Popović, pp.185-197. Kovačević, pp.109-10. Kablar, p.153. Đorđe Ličina, 'Indictment in Petty 
Politicians' Encirclement', Vjesnik, 3/11/1989, p.4., in FBIS-EER-89-116, 24/101989.
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Rašković's links with Belgrade intellectuals did, however, certainly help secure his 
leadership of these Serb nationalists, with Ćosić, for example, advising Opačić in late 
1989 to connect with Rašković, and also helping draft the SDS's programme.29
The official Serbian authorities, however, do not appear to have been involved in 'Zora' 
or the SDS. In fact, the people in Belgrade that Rašković was most connected with were 
involved with the founding of the opposition Democratic Party in Serbia, and Rašković 
initially wanted the SDS to be merely the Croatian branch of that party, which other 
locals rejected.30
We can thus see that Serbian nationalist activities in Croatia developed with the support 
or sympathy of official Serbia, mainly through the media. However, although Serbian 
nationalists in Croatia benefited from media access and support, their direct connections 
were with Belgrade's nationalist intellectuals – many of whom were later on the side of 
the Serbian opposition rather than the regime - rather than official leaders or institutions. 
In addition, Rašković and Opačić both arose to prominence locally. Although they 
benefited from their connections with and support from Belgrade intellectuals and the 
Serbian media, it would be an exaggeration to conclude that they were ‘created’ by 
either official or unofficial Belgrade.
29 Četnik, p.228. Branko Popović, pp.191-3. Dragović-Soso. p.237. Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, p.451.
30 Branko Popović, p.191. Interviews with SDS officials Branko Marjanović, Marko Dobrijević and 
Petar Štikovac (Belgrade: 2007). Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.224. Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.168. 
Radulovic, Sudbina krajine, p.16. Jevtič, pp.91-2.
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6.3. Rašković and Belgrade
I will now consider the relationship between Rašković and official Belgrade; the extent 
to which Milošević ever had any influence or control over him; the reasons why 
Milošević came to oppose Rašković; and whether Belgrade had any role in the first 
attempt, in August 1990, to depose him as president of the SDS.
Rašković and Milošević
Rašković had been part of dissident Serbian nationalist, anti-communist circles since the 
1970s. He was much closer to the Serbian opposition than to the regime, originally 
wanting the SDS to be a branch of Belgrade's Democratic Party. Above all, he was close 
to Ćosić, whom he considered his 'spiritual father'. Ćosić helped promote him as leader 
of the SDS and was involved in the formation of the party, as well as the drafting of its 
programme.31 Ćosić later began meeting with Milošević, and in 1992-93 even served as 
President of the reduced Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). However, it was only in 
March 1990 that Ćosić and Milošević first came into contact, so it is very unlikely that 
they were working together to promote Rašković.32
Rašković's own stance on Milošević and his regime was somewhat mixed. He 
recognised what he saw as Milošević's contribution to unifying the Serbian nation in 
Serbia, but also regarded him as a communist relic and rather undemocratic figure. He 
made this stance publicly clear on numerous occasions, and in discussions with 
Milošević himself. He also supported the SDS running in Serbia's elections, to 
contribute to the creation of a mixed parliament and thus democratisation.33 At the same 
31 Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.171. Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, p.451. Četnik, pp.228-9.
32 Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.161. Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.121.
33 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.159, 207, 211, 25, 236-8, 286-8, 313. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.204. 
Evica Kostovska, 'Stranke složene – u osudama', Borba, 21/5/1991, p.3. B. Lazukić, 'Srpska vlada 
mora da se izvini srpskom narodu', Borba, 18/6/1990, p.3. Snježana Stamatović, 'Srbi po rodu – 
Hrvatska po domu', Borba, 18/6/1990, p.7. Jovan Rašković, 'Draškovićeve manipulacije', NIN, 
6/12/1990, p.13. Snježana Stamatović, 'Autonomija nije pala s neba', Borba, 12-13/1/1991, p.5. ICTY-
Babić: E-PS7.1.10 (Babić Interview), pp.44-47. Srđan Radulović, 'Naprsli štit srpstva', NIN, 3/5/1991. 
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time, however, Rašković did want Milošević to support the stances of the Serbs in 
Croatia, both internationally and in talks with Zagreb, as well as to help protect them 
through the JNA.34 This held true for most in the SDS, although somewhat less so for 
Rašković, as he was less wedded to the JNA/armed solution than others, and placed 
stock in negotiations as a solution. Rašković also seems to have regarded himself as a 
principled individual, more of an ideologue and intellectual than a politician, and was 
less prone to act tactically (by, for example, covering up his criticism of Milošević to 
secure his support).
Nevertheless, Rašković did temper his criticism at times, and try to assuage Milošević. 
For example, after the content of Rašković's talks with Croatian officials in August 1990 
was leaked, with him quoted as calling Milošević a 'Bolshevik' and a 'tyrant', Rašković 
wrote an open-letter to Milošević praising his achievements for the Serbian nation. 
Around the same time he also apparently agreed with Milošević to limit the SDS's 
activities in Serbia, although he soon reneged on this.35
It appears that Ćosić introduced Rašković to Milošević. They first met in about June 
1990 and then a number of times thereafter, including in large group meetings with 
other Serbian nationalist intellectuals and politicians, such as Ćosić and Karadžić. 
Reliable sources refer to at least five meetings of Rašković with Milošević in 1990.36 In 
1991 they had contact through an intermediary at least once, in April.37 However, the 
available evidence suggests that Rašković was not under Milošević’s influence or 
control, and that they never had a particularly good relationship. Ćosić, indeed, later 
recalled that Milošević 'did not like' Rašković because of his 'anti-communist' stance, 
and only agreed to meet him in the first place on Ćosić's 'persistent insistence'.38
Petar Damjanić, 'Podjelena Srbija', Vreme, 22/4/1991, p.29. Interviews Branko Marijanović; Mile 
Dakić (Belgrade: 11/2007).
34 For example: Snježana Stamatović, 'Autonomija nije pala s neba', Borba, 12-13/1/1991, p.5.
35 Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.338-9. Petrović, p.24.
36 Interview Branko Marijanović (Belgrade: 11/2007). Petrović, pp.23-4. Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.170. 
Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.158. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.10 (Babić Interview), pp.44-51.
37 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.203, 230-1.
38 Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, p.139.
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National questions were not the only topics of discussion between Rašković and 
Milošević. They also discussed political developments in Serbia and had intellectual and 
theoretical discussions about political systems and other issues. Rašković openly 
disagreed with Milošević on these topics.39 Regarding SDS activities in Serbia, 
Rašković apparently agreed with Milošević in September 1990 to limit SDS electoral 
participation to fielding some candidates in Vojvodina, where they would take votes 
from the opposition rather than the SPS.40 Later, however, despite the clear opposition 
of Belgrade (and the Serbian opposition), he supported the full participation of the SDS 
in Serbia’s elections and made considerable effort at the SDS main board meeting of 22 
November 1990 to persuade the party to support this, almost succeeding. He then 
supported the SDS Serbia faction’s break-away and participation regardless (though 
also endorsing Milošević's candidacy for President of Serbia).41 This indicates 
Milošević’s very limited influence on him, particularly as the participation of the SDS 
in Serbia’s elections was a relatively minor issue compared with the future of Croatia’s 
Serbs.
It therefore seems very unlikely that Milošević had any role in forming the SDS’s 
programme in 1990. The core programme of the right to self-determination (and linking 
that to Croatia's relationship with Yugoslavia), regional autonomy via the Association 
and potentially territorial autonomy was all developed and publicly spoken of before 
Rašković and Milošević met. The SNV was initiated by Babić and Opačić, neither of 
whom seem to have been in contact with Belgrade at the time, while Rašković himself 
defended both the Association and the SNV and denied that Belgrade had anything to do 
with them.42 Slavonian SDS leader Vukčević has claimed that Belgrade advocated 
waiting until Croatia declared its constitution before declaring SAOK, and that it was 
39 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.171-2, 204. Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.313. R. Matijas, 'Učesnik radio 
drame', Borba, 2/8/1990, p.9. Interview Branko Marijanović (Belgrade: 7/11/2007). R. Matijas, 
'Učesnik radio drame', Borba, 2/8/1990. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.1.10 (Babić Interview), pp.44-47.
40 Petrović, p.24. And see: footnote 108.
41 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.3 (Babić Interview), pp.16-17. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.171-2. Rašković, 
Luda zemlja, p.211. Interview Branko Marijanović (Belgrade: 7/11/2007). Snježana Stamatović, 'Ne 
priznajemo diktat Zagreba', Borba, 7/1/1991, p.5. Snježana Stamatović, 'Autonomija nije pala s neba', 
Borba, 12-13/1/1991, p.5. Jovan Rašković, 'Draškovićeve manipulacije', NIN, 6/12/1990, p.13.
42 Milić of Mačve, p.175.
Chapter 6: Serbia and the Serbian Democratic Party
266
for this reason that Rašković and Babić both rejected a proposal he made to form SAOK 
in November 1990, only to then declare it a month later.43 It seems unlikely that 
Rašković was following any guidance from Belgrade, however, and, as discussed later, 
the same applies to Babić.
Rašković described discussions with Milošević on two issues connected with Croatia: 
Rašković's idea for a Gandhi-style unarmed Serb march on Zagreb, and for a united 
Krajina state should Yugoslavia disintegrate. He mentioned these ideas in meetings of 
15-20 eminent figures, including Milošević, all of whom apart from Ćosić strongly 
rejected them (though Ćosić himself has since dismissed them as 'naïve' and 'silly').44 
The proposal for a Gandhi march was never implemented, but that most in the SDS in 
Krajina favoured armed 'resistance' easily accounts for this, and Rašković did not 
abandon his pacifist ideas, continuing to advocate them at key moments. The united 
Krajina state concept, meanwhile, continued to be regularly advocated by Rašković 
regardless of Milošević's opposition.
The available evidence thus suggests that, despite receiving some media support and 
meeting with Milošević a number of times in 1990, Rašković was, as most of the 
existing literature suggests, an independent figure and not co-ordinating with Milošević 
or following his instructions, nor even particularly influenced by him.
Belgrade Turns Against Rašković
On 31 July 1990 Danas published the controversial transcript of Rašković's recent talks 
with Tuđman. Three weeks later, meanwhile, details of Rašković's meeting with 
Croatian Interior Minister Boljkovac were published in the Croatian media, again 
showing him as seeking compromise and disassociating himself from the 'great 
43 Marijana Milosavljević, ‘Prof Vojislav Vukčević, Advokat: Šepanje do sledećeg rata’, NIN, 20/3/1992, 
p.26.
44 Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.170. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.158. Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, 
pp.139-40.
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Bolshevik' and 'tyrant' Milošević.45 The Serbian state media appears to have been very 
critical of Rašković over these revelations, and around this time began actively 
opposing him.46 Although Politika published Rašković's open letter supporting 
Milošević in September, for example, its editorial criticised him for chatting with 
Boljkovac while the defenders were on the barricades, making clear where Belgrade's 
sentiments lay.47 Publication in NIN of an interview with Rašković explaining the two 
incidents was allegedly delayed by two months, and other editorial comments 
highlighted Belgrade's preference for Babić over Rašković.48 Rašković did still have 
plenty of access to the Belgrade media, and there does not appear to have been a major, 
open campaign against him as there was against Babić in spring 1992, over the Vance 
peace plan.49 But it was certainly clear that Rašković was out of favour. Milošević 
seems to have stopped meeting with him in 1991, and a leading figure of the Serbian 
state media reportedly said that Rašković was more dangerous for Serbs in Croatia than 
Tuđman.50
It is usually assumed that Belgrade opposed Rašković because of his relative 
moderation. Certainly, his pacifist and anti-war approach contrasted with Milošević's, 
and there may have been doubt in Belgrade as to Rašković's commitment to the Serbian 
cause.51 Informed sources also mention other major reasons for their conflict, however. 
45 See: Rašković, Luda zemlja, pp.305-338.
46 ICTY-Martić: Witness Branko Popović, general secretary of the SDS (1990-92), T8090. ICTY-
Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T12894.
47 This was widely noted in the Croatian media: Milan Jajčinović, 'Suverenitet na kušnji', Danas, 
11/9/1990, pp.18-19. Joško Čelan, 'Doviđenja, Raškoviću?', Vjesnik, 10/9/1990, p.12.
48 Dragan Tanasić, 'Dr Jovan Rašković, predsednik Srpske Demokratske Stranke: Nisam političar', 
Intervju, No.243, 28/9/1990, pp.19-23. Tanasić. Toma Džadžić, 'Hedonizam Jovana Raškovića', NIN, 
22/2/1991, p.19. Also: 'Instead of an Apology, the Fall of a Bastille', NIN, 29/3/1991, pp.14-16, in 
FBIS-EER-91-060, 6/5/1991
49 For example: 'Rijec je o zloupotrebi', Borba, 1/8/1990, p.5. Jovan Rašković, 'What DANAS Does Not 
Dare To Publish', NIN, 28/12/1990, pp.28-29, in FBIS-EER-91-018, 11/2/1991. Milorad Vučelić, 
'Osjetiti Bartolomejsku noć', NIN, 15/2/1991, p.23.
50 Četnik, p.238. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-043. Also: Mamula, p.201. 'Instead of an 
Apology, the Fall of a Bastille', NIN, 29/3/1991, pp.14-16, in FBIS-EER-91-060, 6/5/1991. Activists 
of the Association of Serbs from Croatia in Belgrade, who had good contacts with the Serbian regime, 
also reportedly supported Babić against Rašković. ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-037 (Veljko Džakula), 
T103466. Jović recalls that the state media would reflect Milošević's views of Serb leaders outside 
Serbia: ICTY-Milošević- E-P596.1a (Statement of Borisav Jović), p.35.
51 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.1.10 (Babić Interview), pp.49-50. Mamula, p.201. Četnik, p.328. Đukić, 
Lovljenje vetra, p.170.
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Ćosić, for example, notes that Milošević did not like Rašković's anti-communism, 
considering him a 'conservative' and 'opportunist' even before they met, while some 
suggest that Milošević feared Rašković's popularity within Serbia itself.52 Rašković's 
public criticisms of Milošević and support for opposition activities in Serbia were also 
undoubtedly a factor: Milošević wanted, by contrast, to use Serb leaders outside Serbia 
to bolster his domestic position, via statements of support and endorsement.53 
Sometimes Rašković was actually more radical than Milošević - for example, in his 
advocacy of a united Krajina state, and his position on the SFRJ Presidency order on 
disarmament in January 1991. Indeed, in the The Hague Babić explained Milošević's 
opposition to Rašković with reference to Rašković's attacks on the JNA over its failure 
to disarm Croats, as well as his public criticisms of Milošević.54 Rašković's relative 
moderation was thus just one of a number of factors explaining why he and Milošević 
came into conflict.
Schism in the SDS
The leaking of the Tuđman-Rašković transcripts had immediate consequences for 
Rašković within the SDS. At the next meeting of the SDS leadership, on 7 August 1990, 
Opačić and Zelenbaba sought Rašković’s resignation, arguing that the transcripts 
showed that he was ‘neither Serbian nor democratic’.55 They received very little support, 
however - they had failed to cultivate followers within the party structures, and even 
those around Babić who were critical of Rašković considered him a better choice for 
now.56
52 Hudelist, Beogradski dnevnik, p.139. Jovan Kesar, 'Jovan Rašković', Večernji Novosti, 5/9/2007, 
accessed 1/8/2014 from: www.krajinaforce.com. Đukić, Lovljenje vetra, p.170. Dragan Tanasić. 
Interviews: Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007); Milorad Pupovac (Zagreb: 1/10/2009).
53 'We Do Not Allow Fratricide of the Serbian People', Politika, 11/3/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-050, 
14/3/1991. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13109, T13565.
54 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13107-8.
55 Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007).
56 Interviews: Marko Dobrijević, Petar Štikovac (Belgrade: 5/8/2007).
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Vukčević believes this attempted deposing of Rašković was ordered by Belgrade.57 It 
does seem that it was around then that Belgrade turned against Rašković, and some 
evidence indicates an external role in this party crisis. Babić claimed that the day before 
the transcripts were published, Krste Bjelić (a Serb from Croatia who was then RTV 
Belgrade correspondent in Knin, and later a main editor of RTV Belgrade) was with 
Rašković and ‘probably informing him’ of the transcripts’ imminent publication, and 
that Rašković then proposed Babić as SNV president as ‘I’m finished’. At the 7 August 
meeting Babić heard that Bjelić had already prepared his news item on Rašković’s 
resignation.58 SDS vice-president Branko Marijanović, meanwhile, recalls that Bjelić 
urged him to support Opačić in replacing Rašković, which he rejected. He believes, 
however, that this was only Bjelić’s personal initiative.59
Opačić/Zelenbaba and Belgrade turned against Rašković partly for the same reasons: a 
belief that he was insufficiently hardline or perhaps insincere, which was provoked or 
confirmed by the transcripts.60 But it seems unlikely that the schism in the leadership 
followed Belgrade’s orders, rather than, for example, Bjelić acting independently (as 
Marjanović believes). Opačić was very much an independent figure, and I have not seen 
any evidence that he ever even met Milošević. He supported the SDS running in 
Serbia’s elections, and when he left the SDS in September 1990 he joined the main 
Serbian opposition party, the Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO), 
supporting its leader Vuk Drašković against Milošević.61 Zelenbaba was a similar 
character, and likewise joined the SPO.62 And, contrary to Babić's claims, Rašković 
himself never suggested that Belgrade played any role in his proposal of Babić as SNV 
57 Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007).
58 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.2 (Babić Interview), pp.31-2.
59 Interview Branko Marijanović (Belgrade: 6/11/2007).
60 The two were also highly ambitious, and dissatisfied with Rašković's leadership and his promotion of 
Babić.
61 Miroslav Ivić, 'Komunisti više nigdje nemaju šansi', Borba, 24/5/1990, p.5. Interview Mile Bosnić, 
SDS official (Belgrade: 2/11/2009).
62 Marinko Čulić, 'Rob države u drazavi', Danas, 21/8/1990, pp.16-17. Srđan Spanović, 'Emperor Dušan 
and His Parish', Start (Zagreb), 19/1/1991, pp.45-7, in FBIS-EEU-91-027, 4/3/1991.
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President, something for which he always took credit, despite his conflicts with both 
Babić and Belgrade.63
63 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.154-5, 203.
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6.4. Babić and Belgrade
Babić: Late Joiner, Fast Riser
Babić was a late joiner to the SDS. A dentist and from 1989 an acting director of Knin 
medical centre, Babić had been a member of the SKH and was even a delegate at its last 
conference in December 1989. He played no role in the events of 1989, but by early 
1990 was considering forming a party to represent the Knin region. Until the SDS's 
formal founding on 17 February 1990, however, he remained a SKH member and 
president of the SKH board in the hospital. SDS activists encountered him in their 
efforts to find places to hold their meetings and invited him to speak at the SDS's 
founding, where he was elected one of the twenty-four members of the Main Board. A 
few days later, with Rašković’s backing, he was elected to head the party’s electoral 
staff body, in charge of organising for the elections. He was deemed to have performed 
this function well, and around late April was elected head of the SDS municipal 
committee for Knin. After the elections Rašković then supported him as the SDS 
candidate for President of Knin SO.64
Babić was very ambitious, and soon began making his influence felt. He only rose, 
however, because of the strong backing of Rašković. Rašković was not interested in 
acquiring posts or power himself, preferring to be a sort of national tribune or spiritual 
guide of the Serbian people - saying, for example, when declining to take the post of 
SNV President, that 'I will be your Khomeni', and that, when the first Serbian 
government was formed, he would just be director of Knin hospital.65 He felt that Babić 
would be able to lead the ‘hard’ wing of the party, and probably also wanted to use 
64 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.2 (Babić Interview); E-PS-7-2-3 (Babić Interview), pp.9-10. Knežević, 'Srpska 
demokratska stranka', pp. 9-10. Opačić, pp.155-7. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.154.
65 Interview Mile Dakić, SNV Vice-President, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 5/11/2007). Dobrica Ćosić, indeed, 
called him 'an anti-politician in politics'. Rašković, Luda zemlja, p.7. Also see: Petrović, p.17. BBC-
DOY: Vojislav Šešelj, pp.4-5. Mladenovic, pp.145, 150. Golubović, p.128. Dragan Pavlović, p.198.
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Babić to offset the influence of Opačić and Zelenbaba, both popular and hardline figures 
with great ambitions who, indeed, soon tried to oust him. 
It was only thanks to Rašković’s backing that Babić was elected president of Knin SO 
on 23 May 1990. At the time he had minimal public presence - as Lazar Macura, vice-
president of Knin in 1990-93, recalls, ‘nobody knew [Babić] before the 1990 
elections’.66 Moreover, in his efforts to establish influence and sideline possible rivals, 
Babić had already alienated key people active in the SDS in Knin, including all three 
Sabor deputies from the municipality (Opačić, Zelenbaba and Radoslav Tanjga). They 
warned that Babić was power-hungry, intolerant and acted like a tyrant, and urged 
Rašković not to propose him for Knin president. Opačić even sent a dramatic letter to 
Rašković warning that Babić intended ultimately to replace them all. Nevertheless, 
Rašković backed Babić, who was thus elected.67
Rašković subsequently supported Babić becoming president of the Association of 
Municipalities, which was natural as Knin was its centre, and they announced its 
formation together. Babić progressively set about building his power-base and asserting 
himself as the regional leader, with Rašković’s support. On 6 July Babić led the 
opposition to the new constitutional amendments, at a meeting of Serb municipal 
leaders and Sabor representatives in Knin chaired jointly with Rašković. The mass rally 
in Srb and formation of the SNV followed, initiated by Babić together with Opačić, at 
first against Rašković's wishes. Against people’s expectations, at the SNV's first 
meeting on 31 July, Rašković then proposed Babić as its president.68 Now, as president 
of Knin, the Association and the SNV, Babić was a leading figure with a strong claim to 
legitimacy as a leader of the Serb people, at least of Krajina. Babić also set about 
66 Interview Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007). Also: Knežević, 'Srpska demokratska stranka', pp. 11-
21.
67 Opačić, pp.155-7. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.154-5, 203, 221-2.
68 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.154-5. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.2 (Babić Interview), pp.31-2. Interview 
Mile Dakić (Belgrade: 5/11/2007)
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promoting his allies, including his friends and neighbours, and sidelining opponents and 
potential rivals such as Opačić and Zelenbaba.69
The Sidelining of Opačić and Zelenbaba
The sidelining of popular radical Jovan Opačić, the key protagonist of events in 1989, 
and his main ally Dušan Zelenbaba, was important to the early rise of Babić, as it 
enabled him to later lead the hardline opposition to Rašković. Opačić had originally 
intended to be the head of government of Knin, but declined due to his disagreements 
with Babić, and also ultimately declined to take the post of Sabor vice-president offered 
by Zagreb.70 He thus had no special function beyond being a Sabor deputy. Nor did he 
or Zelenbaba acquire any special post in the SNV, which Babić dominated. After the 
leaking of the transcripts, they then sought Rašković’s resignation, but failed to win 
support, isolating themselves. Then, in September 1990, partly in protest at the rise of 
Babić, they left the SDS for the SPO and completed their sidelining from events, 
particularly as many condemned their departure from the SDS as treachery.71
Although Opačić and Zelenbaba were popular among the Knin public, they lacked 
support in the party structures. Babić’s supporters told me that the two were 'bad 
politicians' and operatic figures who acted like hurt prima donnas, while Zelenbaba was 
'a drunkard' who 'you couldn't do anything with'.72 As Dušan Orlović recalls, 'Those two 
were like characters from Disney cartoons. One was always singing some songs, the 
other liked to drink a lot... They weren’t good enough for a serious function... Babić was 
69 Babić's friend/neighbour Dušan Vjestica, for example, rapidly became secretary of the Association, 
secretary of the SNV, and then president of Gračac government.
70 Opačić, pp.155-7.
71 Petar Samardžija, 'Split in the Serbian Democratic Party: Leadership Dispute', Politika: The  
International Weekly, 29/9/1990, p.7. S. Stamatović, 'Uzdrmani, ali na nogama', Borba, 21/9/1990, 
p.3. Opačić, p.157.
72 Interviews with Dušan Orlović, Lazar Macura, Ratko Ličina, Veljko Popović, Marko Dobrijević, Petar 
Štikovac (Belgrade: 2007, 2009). Petar Samardžija, 'Split in the Serbian Democratic Party: Leadership 
Dispute', Politika: The International Weekly, 29/9/1990, p.7. Dejan Jović, 'Manje oduševljena, više 
podjela', Danas, 31/7/1990, pp.19-22. Dejan Jović, 'I Tuđman i Rašković rastu', Danas, 28/8/1990, 
pp.30-33.
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absolutely right in marginalising them.'73 Babić promoted his own supporters and 
sidelined opponents, and proved a better politician than they. Control of a municipality, 
the 'base of resistance' to the Croatian authorities, also proved a much better base than 
public support or a position as a Sabor deputy. In addition, Babić did not play his hand 
too early, maintaining an alliance with Rašković that summer, unlike Opačić and 
Zelenbaba, who sought to remove Rašković at a moment of crisis in relations with the 
Croatian government.74 Their absence from the SDS for the subsequent crucial months 
was then a great boon to Babić’s efforts to establish himself as the dominant leader of 
Krajina.
Explaining the Rise of Babić
Babić certainly had negative qualities, which people such as Opačić had highlighted as 
early as spring 1990. He is described by many of those he worked with as ambitious, 
vain, arrogant, intolerant and paranoid. As Macura recalls: 'He was very severe. He had 
to be number one, and you couldn’t oppose him.'75 He regarded himself as a top Serbian 
leader, strove to concentrate all power in his hands, and would make important 
decisions completely independently, rejecting compromise with others. If he felt like it, 
he would not turn up to scheduled meetings, or arrive hours late, often because of his 
habit of sleeping into the afternoon. He would appoint people to top posts without even 
consulting them (they finding out about their appointment on the evening news), and 
then fall out with them and dismiss them shortly afterwards.76 With such behaviour and 
73 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
74 Petar Samardžija, 'Split in the Serbian Democratic Party: Leadership Dispute', Politika: The  
International Weekly, 29/9/1990, p.7. S.Stamatović, 'Uzdrmani, ali na nogama', Borba, 21/9/1990, p.3.
75 Interviews: Ratko Ličina, Lazar Macura, Veljko Popović (Belgrade: 11/2007). Mićo Jelić-Grnović, 
Roman o srbima (Belgrade: Srpska knjiga Ruma, 2004), p.112.
76 Interviews with Knin, SDS, SNV and RSK officials Lazar Macura, Vojislav Vukčević, Dušan Orlović, 
Slobodan Jarčević, Đorđe Bjegović, Borislav Mikelić, Branko Perić, Mile Bosnić, Mile Dakić 
(Belgrade: 2007, 2009, 2011). Interview Milorad Pupovac (Zagreb: 1/10/2009). ICTY-Milošević: 
Witnesses C-037 (Veljko Džakula), T103501-2; Vojislav Šešelj, T43289-90; Milislav Đorđevic; E-
P568.9a (The Serbian Army, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.136-43. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić, 
T9706. ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Veljko Džakula; Radoslav Maksić, T1184-5, 1197; Lazar Macura, 
T8206. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: DST-043. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P154.14.A.1 (Intercept Karadžić-
Vukić, 10/1991). Domovina Intercept: C2352 (Karadžić-Ćosić, 11/11/1991). Opačić, pp.155-7. Jevtič, 
pp.92-3. Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.385. Dan Stets, 'A Man Who Can Thwart Yugoslav Peace Hopes 
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ambitions, he often alienated people who did not consider him a ‘great man’,77 a ‘king 
or emperor’.78 (Babić had much in common with Milošević in this respect.)79
Babić had other qualities that enabled his rise, however, including an impressive 
knowledge of the demographic distribution of Serbs in Croatia, down to each individual 
village.80 His supporters, and even some of his opponents, regarded him as a decisive 
and practical politician who could get things done. Whereas Rašković was off touring 
and giving speeches at rallies, Babić remained in Knin, dealing daily with issues that 
arose in the region.81 People therefore looked to him as a leader, and he seems to have 
been good at judging the mood in the region, escalating his programme in line with it. 
As SDS official Mile Bosnić recalls: ‘We trusted him because we thought that he was 
the one who most directly and most efficiently conveyed our positions and our opinions 
and translated them into proposals of decisions.’82 Although the programmatic 
differences between Rašković and Babić were not great in 1990, certain hardliners 
clearly mistrusted Rašković, particularly since the leaks, and the same ambiguity in 
rhetoric that enhanced Rašković's appeal to moderates could also create suspicion 
among radicals, many of whom therefore rallied around Babić (whose approach 
concerning negotiations and the Serbian rebellion was also obviously more hardline). 
The division between supporters of Babić and Rašković was not simply hardliners 
versus moderates – many hardliners actually supported Rašković – but it is certainly 
true that Babić found his supporters among the hardliners alone, and it was they who 
formed Babić's support base. And with Opačić and Zelenbaba out of the picture, Babić 
was well positioned to take the lead of such people.
Milan Babić Says He Will Not Disarm Serbian Fighters In His Region.', The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
3/2/1992,
77 Interview Dušan Vještica (Belgrade: 9/11/2007).
78 Interview Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007).
79 See, for example: Ćosić, Lična istorija jednog doba, Vol. 4. Vladislav Jovanović. Borisav Jović, 
Knjiga o Miloševiću (ICTY translation).
80 Interviews: Ratko Ličina, Lazar Macura, Veljko Popović (Belgrade: 11/2007). Mićo Jelić-Grnović, 
Roman o srbima (Belgrade: Srpska knjiga Ruma, 2004), p.112.
81 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.2 (Babić Interview), p.23. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-D313.E (Statement of Mile Bosnić), p.16.
82 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Mile Bosnić, T125647.
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Rašković himself recalled that he supported Babić as a ‘young man' with a ‘very 
rational’ programme 'who will have strength to lead disputes with Croatian state’, even 
seeing Babić's 'coldness' and 'narcissism' as ‘beneficial to the party’. He also maintained 
that Babić did not have ‘charisma’, but that his ‘rational’ programme was supported by 
the people, which ‘also does not accept [him] as a leader, but accepts him as very useful 
man.’83 Others, on the other hand, do recall Babić as popular and charismatic.84 He 
certainly was popular later – in January 1992 British journalist Misha Glenny found that 
even anti-SDS moderates in Knin he had met eighteen months earlier were now 
supporting Babić, and he probably won the presidential elections in the RSK in late 
1993.85 However, it appears that it was only gradually, and after he acquired his top 
posts, that Babić established a popular presence.
Babić and Rašković attended some rallies together in the summer, but even at the mass 
rally in Srb, Babić only read the text of the SNV's Declaration. He emerged more into 
the spotlight with the controversy over the referendum and the 'Balvan Revolution'. 
Around autumn 1990 the official Serbian media also began promoting Babić to the 
detriment of Rašković. Babić critic Ilija Petrović emphasises the role of RTV Belgrade 
reporter Bjelić in creating Babić, acting as 'a kind of court journalist and biographer' and 
promoting him as 'Alpha and Omega' among Serbs in Krajina. Babić himself recalled 
that Bjelić would always ask him for statements, later bragging that he had 'made a 
politician out of me'.86
This role should not be exaggerated, however: it is hardly surprising that, during those 
tumultuous months, the president of Knin, the Association and the SNV began to have a 
greater media presence, and Croatian media at the time already described Babić as being 
Rašković's number two, or even more influential than Rašković.87 Moreover, Rašković 
83 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.154-5, 203, 221-2.
84 Interview Veljko Popović (Belgrade: 8/11/2007)
85 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p.20.
86 Petrović, p.15. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13003-4.
87 Marinko Čulić, 'Rob države u drazavi', Danas, 21/8/1990, pp.16-17. Jasna Babić, 'Čije je oružje', 
Danas, 18/9/1990, pp.13-15. Also: S. Stamatović, 'Uzdrmani, ali na nogama', Borba, 21/9/1990, p.3.
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rather foolishly chose this moment to go on a six-week fund-raising tour of North 
America, absenting himself in this key period, from mid-September to late October, so 
it is hardly surprising that Babić's stature grew then.88 Babić's control of Knin Radio was 
probably also significant in expanding his popular base. This was a key media source in 
the region, and by spring 1991 was even refusing access to Rašković, on Babić's 
orders.89
It is also important to note that throughout the period of their leadership struggle 
Rašković was actually more popular than Babić among Serbs in Croatia. Babić 
functioned very much as a regional leader and lacked support outside the Krajina, while 
Rašković appealed to moderates as well as hardliners. The closest that Babić came to 
reaching Rašković's popularity was in November 1990, when a poll indicated that 76% 
of Serbs in Croatia viewed Rašković favourably and 71% Babić.90 However, Babić's 
popularity dropped significantly in December 1990, most likely because of his clashes 
with Rašković and the formation of SAOK, which Babić was most associated with and 
was probably a less popular move outside of Krajina. Then, 86% of Serbs had a positive 
view of Rašković but only 54% of Babić.91 These polls indicate that Rašković continued 
to be more popular than Babić until at least April 1991. In March, for example, 64% 
viewed him positively, but only 49% Babić.92 This suggests the limited impact that 
Belgrade media preference for Babić over Rašković had.
In summary, Babić rose thanks to his strategic alliance with Rašković, adept political 
manoeuvring and positioning himself as a seemingly effective hardline regional leader. 
Babić occupied a space that, in many ways, Rašković left empty and even helped Babić 
88 I. Radovanović, ''Dva rata' u mesec dana', Borba, 2/10/1990, p.2.
89 S. Stamatović, 'Predsednik u off-u, raskol u etru', Borba, 20/2/1991, p.5. Opačić, pp.158, 160. B. 
Solesa, 'The Subordinate Role Separates the Fellow Fighters', Borba, 30/10/1991, p.4. In FBIS-EEU-
91-230, 29/11/1991. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.339.
90 Dejan Jović, 'Slavlju je kraj', Danas, 4/12/1990, pp.7-9.
91 Dejan Jović, 'Čemu se nadaju', Danas, 1/1/1991, pp.29-31.
92 Dejan Jović, 'Srbi otpisuju Babića' Danas, 9/4/1991, pp.37-9. And: Dejan Jović, 'Tuđman opet vodi', 
Danas, 5/2/1991, pp.29-31. Dejan Jović, 'Skok Ante Marković', Danas, 5/3/1991, pp.19-21. Dejan 
Jović, 'Manolić gubi podršku', Danas, 7/5/1991, pp.31-3. Dejan Jović, 'Mesić bježi Tuđmanu', Danas, 
4/6/1991, p.11-13. Dejan Jović, 'Mesić i dalje prvi', Danas, 30/7/1991, pp.30-31.
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to fill, Rašković preferring to be an ideologue than a governing official. Belgrade's role 
in his rise seems to have been limited to helping popularise him as a leader after he 
acquired his top posts, a role which was probably not especially significant.
Babić and Milošević
Babić is widely seen in the existing literature as being 'Belgrade's man'. Initially, 
however, he does not even seem to have sought contact with Belgrade. Babić reportedly 
said in July 1990 that the 'Bolshevik' Milošević would never support them because of 
their association with the Chetniks, and that they would only contact him when they had 
separated from Croatia, to seek Krajina's annexation to Serbia.93 In August 1990, 
meanwhile, Babić reportedly told Rašković that he (Rašković) should be president of 
Serbia, and the SDS should be formed there and take over power from Milošević.94 
Babić also claimed that when he was introduced to Jovica Stanišić in late August 1990, 
they never really established contact, because Babić was not interested in taking any 
advice or orders from anyone.95
Babić first established contact with Belgrade in mid-August 1990, over the referendum 
controversy and the threat of Croatian police intervention. A meeting was agreed of a 
SNV delegation led by Babić, and federal President Jović and Interior Minister Petar 
Gračanin. Although they received support over their right to a plebiscite and to self-
determination, and Jović told them that the JNA would protect them, Babić told the 
BBC that he was disappointed they had not offered anything more substantive. 
Belgrade, Babić recalled, seemed to have expected a larger delegation there to air their 
complaints publicly, as the Kosovo Serbs had in the 1980s.96 Later, at the beginning of 
October, precisely such a meeting was organised, of representatives of Serbs from all 
93 Milić of Mačve, pp.173-4.
94 Interview Mile Dakić (Belgrade: 5/11/2007).
95 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.5 (Babić Interview), pp.23-6. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T12932-3. 
BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, pp.4-5.
96 BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.10. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.1.10 (Babić Interview), pp.35-6. ICTY-Milošević: 
E-P352.1a (Minutes of SNV, 16/8/1990).
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over Croatia – about 30 in total – with Jović and Milošević. Babić was not interested in 
being part of such a large delegation, however, and sent others in his place.97 It was 
around this time that Babić and Milošević first met, and Babić testified that Milošević 
actually asked why he hadn’t contacted him sooner.98
Babić claimed that this first meeting took place on the request of Rašković, then in 
America, in order to get Milošević’s opinion on the SDS running in the recently 
announced Serbian elections. The meeting only lasted about half an hour, and Babić did 
not specifically recall anything else being discussed. He also stated, however, that the 
recurring topic of such meetings was the situation in Krajina, and that Milošević would 
generally assure him that the Serbs had the right to self-determination and would be 
protected by the JNA.99
Rašković later said that he was certain that Babić and Milošević, when they established 
contact while he was in America, had agreed 'some other project which was not mine, 
and with which I would not agree'.100 In May 1991 he even suggested that Babić's 
faction, which by then had effectively seceded from the SDS, should use instead the 
name of Milošević's party, the SPS.101 When Babić declared Krajina's annexation to 
Serbia in April 1991, Rašković, assuming that Babić was co-ordinating with Milošević, 
sent Milošević a message accusing him of conducting a politics 'of blood to the knees' 
and being interested only in the territory of Serbs in Croatia, rather than the people. 
Milošević responded that he was equally surprised by Babić's moves, that Babić did it 
all by his own hand and simply placed Milošević before the finished act, and that 
annexation put him in a very difficult position. Rašković believed Milošević and 
97 ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Vojislav Vukčević, T11079-82. ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Veljko Džakula, T393-
5; Ljubica Vujanić, T8480-90.
98 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13477-8.
99 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13093-4, 13477-8. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.3 (Babić 
Interview), p.17; E-PS7.1.10 (Babić Interview), pp.16, 23, 37, 42-3.
100 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.203.
101 Srđan Radulović, 'Naprsli štit srpstva', NIN, 3/5/1991.
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therefore, as he said in June 1991, doubted his own prior impression of co-ordination 
between the two.102
It is probably fair to assume that Milošević's direct assurance of support for self-
determination gave some encouragement to Babić, and it is interesting that it was in 
October that the SDS formally adopted its more radical policy: territorial autonomy in 
federal Yugoslavia and secession in any other case. But Babić’s account in The Hague 
suggested that the overlap of his and Milošević’s programmes was coincidental, and that 
he had not directly coordinated the formation of SAOK, or disassociation from Croatia, 
with Belgrade – that, as he claimed in mid-1991, they worked exclusively according to 
their 'own scenario' rather than one from Belgrade, regardless of whether their politics 
had 'coincided'.103 The only direct role that Babić ascribed to Milošević in SAOK’s 
policies in this period was the decision on secession on 16 March 1991 – Milošević, he 
recalled, phoned him and told him to ‘support Yugoslavia’. Babić said 'fine', and that 
afternoon the Krajina leadership met and decided on secession from Croatia. This was 
simply the next step in Babić’s programme, however, not a policy shift, and Krajina's 
'disassociation' from Croatia two weeks earlier had itself been characterised as a 
decision to 'separate from Croatia' and 'remain in Yugoslavia'.104 Moreover, this was just 
Babić's interpretation of what Milošević meant, and what Babić and his allies felt was 
the best move at the time – as he told Hague investigators, he wasn't really sure what 
Milošević meant by this phrase.105 The JNA was then considering a coup, and it is 
possible that Milošević wanted to solidify Krajina's separation from Croatia to prevent 
any attempt by the JNA to reverse that and force a (united) Croatia to remain in 
Yugoslavia. Milošević may have simply been advising Babić to take a pro-Yugoslav 
stance and thereby avoid arrest by the military, however - in January 1991, when JNA 
102 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.203, 230-1. Pupovac also recalls Rašković talking about this message he 
sent to Milošević. Interview Milorad Pupovac (Zagreb: 1/10/2009)
103 Srđan Radulović, 'End of the Croatian State', NIN, 12/7/1991, pp.15-16, in FBIS-EER-91-109, 
24/7/1991.
104 As Babić himself noted at the time: Zoran Daskalović, 'Kula od karata', Danas, 26/3/1991, pp.23-4. 
'Milan Babić on Resolution', Tanjug, 28/2/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-041, 1/3/1991.
105 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.12 (Babić Interview), p.3. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.6 (Babić Interview), pp.16-18.
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intervention was also being discussed, he had apparently invited Babić to stay in 
Belgrade for this reason.106
The only other evidence I have seen on Belgrade's attitude to SAOK suggests that 
Belgrade advised waiting until Croatia passed its constitution before forming an 
autonomous region,107 and Belgrade's support for Mikelić and his SPH-PJO also counts 
against the idea of Babić's Krajina politics being co-ordinated with Belgrade, as Mikelić 
favoured Croatia remaining in Yugoslavia without any Serbian autonomy.
Babić's strategy of recursive secession from Croatia probably matched sentiments in 
Belgrade and certainly does not seem to have received any opposition, however, and 
Babić and Milošević did begin forming an alliance of sorts in this period. Babić sought 
Belgrade’s assistance in implementing his programme of secession from Croatia, and its 
support against Rašković, while Milošević supported the sidelining of Rašković and 
sought Babić’s support for domestic political purposes. Babić’s account suggests that 
the two were closest in spring 1991. From October 1990 to January 1991 (inclusive) 
they met six times (and spoke on the phone once), but only three of these meetings were 
one-to-one, and all had specific agendas. For February and March 1991, however, Babić 
describes a further five meetings and two phone calls, and for three of the meetings does 
not mention any particular purpose. Babić describes meeting Milošević before and after 
a trip to Geneva in mid-February, for example, without mentioning any reason for the 
meetings. Milošević, Babić recalled, then spoke negatively about Rašković and said 
Babić should 'replace him', giving direct support to his campaign against Rašković.108
Babić, meanwhile, had opposed the SDS’s entry into the Serbian elections, in line with 
Belgrade’s wishes, and persuaded the SDS main board to accept this - by a majority of 
one - on 22 November 1990. Babić’s allies then gave a direct message of pre-electoral 
106 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić.
107 Marijana Milosavljević, ‘Prof Vojislav Vukčević, Advokat: Šepanje do sledećeg rata’, NIN, 20/3/1992, 
p.26.
108 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13107.
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support to Milošević in the Serbian elections.109 Babić also adopted a more pro-
Milošević stance in public, and supported the federal presidency order on 
disarmament.110 Finally, he gave Milošević direct support over the March 1991 
opposition protests in Belgrade.111 (A poll at the time indicated that 81% of Serbs in 
Croatia supported the disarmament order, while the Belgrade protests were apparently 
widely seen in the Krajina as harming Serbian unity, so these moves were not 
particularly controversial for Babić.)112
Even in these months, however, Babić was never as close to Milošević as, for example, 
Bosnian SDS leader Radovan Karadžić, who first met Milošević in September 1990 and 
in 1991 communicated with him by phone several times a week, sometimes daily, and, 
like Babić, supported Milošević on the domestic political scene in Serbia.113 (Even this 
close relationship did not make Karadžić Milošević's puppet, and Milošević was 
actually very critical of some of Karadžić's most important political moves, such as the 
formation of a Serbian Assembly in October 1991 and of the RS in January 1992.)114
109 Petar Štikovac & Marko Dobrijević, 'I na nebu, i na zemlju', Borba, 17/12/1990, p.2. Stefan Grubač, 
'Zašto smo podržavali Miloševića', NIN, 14/12/1990, p.18. Stefan Grubač, 'Pitanje koje postavlje 
zastava u Kninu', NIN, 18/1/1991, p.16. Contrast: Snježana Stamatović, 'Autonomija nije pala s neba', 
Borba, 12-13/1/1991, p.5.
110 For example: 'Šta je rekao dr Milan Babić', NIN, 8/3/1991, pp.17-19.
111 Stefan Grubač & Luka Mičeta, 'Srpska država – imperativ', NIN, 22/3/1991, pp.17-18. 'We Do Not 
Allow Fratricide of the Serbian People', Politika, 11/3/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-050, 14/3/1991. 'Knin 
Leader Says Croatian Law Invalid', Tanjug, 21/3/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-057, 25/3/1991. ICTY-
Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13109. Kovačević, pp.44-5.
112 Dejan Jović, 'Tuđman opet vodi', Danas, 5/2/1991, pp.29-31. Petar Damjanić, 'Podjelena Srbija', 
Vreme, 22/4/1991, p.29.
113 Đoko Kesić, 'Nisam Miloševićev poslušnik', Borba, 26/2/1991, p.7. Boško Savković, 'Predsjednik 
SDS Bosne i Hercegovina: Svaki potok nije granica', Intervju, 12/10/1990, pp.4-7. 'Serbia Said Aiding 
Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina', Tanjug, 15/12/1990, in FBIS-EEU-90-242, 17/12/1990. Dada 
Vujasnovic, 'A State Which Is Coming Unwound', Duga, 26/10/1991, pp.17-19 in FBIS-EEU-91-249, 
2712/1991. ICTY-Milošević: E-P537.2a ('The Assembly of Republika Srpska, 1992-1995', Robert 
Donia), p.86. ICTY-Karadžić: Witness Dušan Kozić, T36981. ICTY-Krajišnik: Witness Radomir 
Nešković, Vice-President of Executive Board of Bosnian SDS, T16612-16; E-D38 (Witness Statement 
of Dragan Đokanović), p.4; E-P64A.460.1 (Interview Jovan Rašković, Društvo, 22/4/1992). See also 
Domovina Intercepts.
114 Domovina Intercepts: B6846 (Karadžić-Milošević, 24/10/1991); B7016 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
10/1/1992). Milošević also opposed the formation of a Bosnian SNV in October 1990 (although the 
SPS general-secretary had attended its foundation), in this case apparently to some effect. Donia, p.64.
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Moreover, the relationship between Milošević and Babić largely broke down on 1 April 
1991, when, sparked partly by mistrust of Milošević’s talks with Tuđman in 
Karađorđevo, Babić unilaterally declared Krajina’s annexation to Serbia. Not only did 
Babić not tell Milošević of this, but at the time Stanko Cvijan, Serbian Minister for 
Serbs Outside Serbia, was present in the region to discuss co-operation with SAOK, and 
on the podium next to Babić when Babić made this announcement, without any warning 
to him.115 This declaration was a deliberate provocation to Serbia - 'Let them scratch 
their heads with what they will do', Babić thought at the time.116 It was partly intended 
as a ‘test’ of Milošević's intentions, partly a reflection of Babić's more radical ideology, 
and was probably also an attempt to further radicalise the conflict and widen his own 
popular support. This contradicted Milošević’s strategy of only responding to steps 
taken by the other side and not initiating unilateral changes, and also his support for a 
federal Yugoslavia rather than an enlarged Serbia. Milošević therefore phoned Babić 
angrily demanding that he withdraw the declaration, which Babić refused.117 The two 
were thereafter in almost constant conflict over Babić’s politics, which Babić would 
only sometimes slightly amend in response to Belgrade’s demands.118 Moreover, in 
public, too, Babić would thereafter on occasion contradict or be critical of official 
Belgrade.119
Following the declaration on annexation, in May 1991 Krajina held a referendum on 
annexation to Serbia and remaining in Yugoslavia. Milošević insisted that the 
referendum only pertain to remaining in Yugoslavia, which Rašković and others in the 
SDS also advocated, but Babić persisted with a referendum on annexation. After the 
referendum Babić sent a delegation to Belgrade to present the results to the Serbian 
Assembly, although Milošević had asked him not to do this – another 'political 
115 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.25 (Babić Interview), p.39.
116 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.12 (Babić Interview), p.9. BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.17.
117 See Babić Hague testimonies and interviews. Also: Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who Disappeared', 
NIN, 18/12/1992, pp.18-21, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 15/1/1993. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-D38 (Statement of 
Dragan Djokanovic), p.7.
118 See: ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.12 (Babić Interview).
119 For example: 'Babić Says Presidency Session 'Doomed To Fail'', Tanjug, 4/5/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-
087, 6/5/1991. Srđan Radulović, 'End of the Croatian State', NIN, 12/7/1991, pp.15-16, in FBIS-EER-
91-109, 24/7/1991.
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provocation'. The Assembly refused to receive them, but some opposition deputies did 
raise the issue, creating a political problem for the authorities.120 At the end of May 1991 
Babić then initiated the formation of a Krajina government with republic-level rather 
than province-level titles (minister, rather than secretary), which Milošević reportedly 
opposed.121
In April 1991, meanwhile, Babić had resolved that if annexation to Serbia was not 
accepted, he would initiate unification of the Croatian and Bosnian Krajinas, and 
gathered some Bosnian Krajina Serb officials to publicly announce this intention.122 
This was contrary to the policy of both Milošević and the Bosnian SDS, which wished 
to retain Bosnia as a whole in Yugoslavia, and support its unity until others disrupted it 
by seeking secession. Nevertheless, Babić persisted with this policy, and in late June 
1991 arranged with Bosnian Krajina officials to announce unification, despite the 
strident opposition of both the Bosnian SDS and Belgrade.123 Babić would continue to 
make periodic announcements of unification with Bosnian Krajina and that he was 
representing their interests, to the ire of the Bosnian SDS leadership and Belgrade.124
Meanwhile, from July 1991 Krajina began declaring its direct implementation of the 
laws of the Republic of Serbia, in line with Babić's annexation policy. Milošević urged 
Babić to copy Serbia's laws if he wished, but declare them Krajina's, but Babić ignored 
120 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.12 (Babić Interview), pp.49-51. ICTY-Martić: Ljubica Vujanić. In June he sent 
a similar appeal to the Vojvodina Assembly. Srđan Radulović, 'Most na Uni', NIN, 28/6/1991, p.20. 
Petrović, p.92.
121 ICTY-Martić: Witness Lazar Macura, T8201.
122 HDMC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 45 (JNA report, 2/4/1991), p.106. 'Republican Presidents Comments 
Following Meeting', Tanjug, 11/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-072, 15/4/1991. ICTY-Krajišnik: Witness 
Momčilo Krajišnik, T23042; E-177.A.1 (Momčilo Krajišnik Interview, spring 91).
123 ICTY-Milošević: E-P352.46-7. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P154 (Statement of Milan Babić), p.7. Interview 
Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007). 'Bosanska Krajina, Serbia's Krajina Unite', Tanjug, 27/6/1991, in 
FBIS-EEU-91-125, 28/6/1991. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P395.B.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Milošević, 
28/6/1991).
124 Domovina Intercepts: B6625 (Karadžić-Milošević, 29/7/1991); C2521 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
9/8/1991); C2375 (Karadžić-Grković-Brđanin, 16/10/1991); B9534 (Karadžić-Đokanović, 
20/10/1991); C2352 (Karadžić-Ćosić, 11/11/1991); B6946 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 14/12/1991). B7077 
(Karadžić-Ćosić, 15/2/1992). ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P154.15.A.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Vukić-Grahovac-
Sendić, 16/10/1991). Caspersen, op. cit., p.79.
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him.125 In October 1991, meanwhile, the conflict between Babić and Milošević acquired 
a new public dimension, when Babić publicly claimed that Milošević had tried to 
pressure him into accepting autonomy within Croatia.126 And, finally, in November 1991 
the two entered a final, bitter conflict over the Vance plan.127
Thus, from April 1991 onwards, Milošević and Babić had an extremely bad personal 
and political relationship. This was not just a clash over one or two incidents, or a 
conflict that was quickly resolved as Donia asserts128 – it was basically incessant, and 
over many different issues. In intercepted conversations with Karadžić from June 1991 
to spring 1992, Milošević continually expressed his exasperation with Babić, calling 
him a 'crazy motherfucker', a 'fool', a 'jerk', a 'pig', a 'complete idiot', 'insane' and 
'Tuđman's player',129 and there were occasions where Babić failed to attend scheduled 
meetings, claiming to be ill, or Milošević simply refused to receive him.130 The two 
were in agreement on the fundamental issue of securing Serbian territorial self-
determination in Croatia, but in conflict on virtually everything else. This extremely 
poor relationship between Babić and Milošević from April 1991 onwards further 
reinforces the conclusion that their 'alliance' from late 1990 to spring 1991 was more a 
temporary coincidence of views than Babić actively co-ordinating with or following 
instructions from Milošević.
125 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić; E-P531.52-3.
126 'Babić on 'Pressure' To Accept Proposals', Tanjug, 31/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-212, 1/11/1991
127 Belgrade was also apparently against the proclamation of the RSK in December 1991. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Mile Bosnić.
128 Donia, p.76.
129 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P395.B.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Milošević, 28/6/1991). Domovina Intercepts: C2370 
(Karadžić-Milošević, 8/10/1991); B6846 (Karadžić-Milošević, 24/10/1991); B6913 (Karadžić-
Milošević, 23/11/1991). B6932 (Karadžić-Milošević, 11/12/1991); C2437 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
10/2/1992). ICTY-Milošević: E-P154.25.A.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Milošević, 6/12/1991).
130 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13202; E-D333.2e (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 3/1/1992), 
p.2; E-P568.9a (The Serbian Army, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.136-43. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P64A.45.1 
(Intercept Karadžić-Babić, 17/6/1991).
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6.5. Serbia and the Sidelining of Rašković
The Babić-Rašković Confrontation
There had already been some tensions and disagreements between Babić and Rašković 
in summer 1990, but Babić generally posited himself as an ally of Rašković in this 
period, and had not openly opposed him over the leaks.131 At the same time, Babić was 
clearly building up his own power-base, promoting his supporters and allies. Some key 
hardliners within the party, most notably founding members Marko Dobrijević and Petar 
Štikovac, organisational secretary and chairman of the executive board respectively, 
also gravitated towards him and became very close allies.132 In late October 1990 
Babić's faction had its first open conflict with Rašković, when they denounced as 
unauthorised Vukčević's talks with the HDZ in Zagreb. Rašković, still then in America, 
wrote a letter in support of Vukčević. He and Babić then clashed openly in November 
1990 over the participation of the SDS in Serbia's elections, Babić winning by a 
majority of one.133 Babić's faction then began a campaign against Rašković, including, 
as Rašković noted in January 1991, following and denouncing his public statements. 
For example, in December 1990 the Croatian media published some positive remarks by 
Rašković about the new constitution. Although they were clearly taken out of context, 
Babić's allies publicly disassociated themselves from them, while in January 1991 they 
did the same over his opposition to the SFRJ Presidency order on disarmament, which 
they claimed could only serve Zagreb.134 Dobrijević and Štikovac would issue 
statements in the name of the SDS, although Rašković's supporters claim they were not 
131 Petar Samardžija, 'Split in the Serbian Democratic Party: Leadership Dispute', Politika: The  
International Weekly, 29/9/1990, p.7. S. Stamatović, 'Uzdrmani, ali na nogama', Borba, 21/9/1990, 
p.3.
132 Interviews: Marko Dobrijević, Petar Štikovac (Belgrade: 5/8/2007). As well as Dobrijević and 
Štikovac themselves, many other SDS officials confirmed to me that they were Babić's closest allies at 
the time.
133 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.171-2.
134 This disagreement may have been slightly bogus, as Rašković was talking of the arms Serbs had 
bought, which Babić's faction never actually intended to hand in. It is unclear what Rašković's stance 
was in relation to the police weapons. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, p.131. Petrović, p.14. S. Stamatović, 
'Zbunjenost u Kninu', Borba, 21/1/1991, p.5.
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authorised to do so, while Babić was also allegedly stacking the main board of the party 
with his supporters.135
In late 1990 Babić also began to talk about creating an SDS regional board for Krajina, 
just as there was, for example, a regional board for Slavonia.136 Already in January 1991 
statements were issued in the name of such a board, though it was only formally 
founded on 16 March 1991.137 Clearly on the defensive, in spring 1991 Rašković 
brought Opačić and Zelenbaba back into the party – though both radical, they were 
implacably opposed to Babić and now on Rašković's side. At meetings of the SDS Main 
and Executive Boards in February and March 1991, meanwhile, the proposal for a 
Krajina regional board, and the activities of Štikovac and Dobrijević, were discussed. 
Babić's allies claim that they had a majority in the Main Board but acknowledge that in 
the Executive Board of the party, composed of its founders and key leaders, Rašković 
won. (Rašković's allies claim that they had an overwhelming majority in the Main 
Board, too.)138 The Executive Board condemned the formation of the Krajina faction as 
intended to break-up the SDS, and removed Dobrijević and Štikovac. At a 30 March 
1991 meeting of the SDS leadership in Obrovac, meanwhile, Rašković's policy of 
negotiating and avoiding conflict received overwhelming support (although Babić and 
some of his allies declined to attend).139
Most of the founders of the SDS, in particular, were with Rašković, even many 
hardliners, and Serbs outside the Krajina were nearly all associated with Rašković rather 
than Babić. Many of the SDS founders who supported Rašković were from the Knin 
Krajina and active there, and, indeed, even some key municipal mayors backed 
135 Momir Ilić, 'Odlazak pregovarača', NIN, 19/4/1991, p.14.
136 Opačić, pp.157-60.
137 S. Stamatović, 'Prvi miran san', Borba, 11/1/1991, p.2.
138 Interviews: Marko Dobrijević, Peter Štikovac, Mile Bosnić (Belgrade: 2007). Caspersen, op. cit., p.54. 
S. Stamatović, 'Predsednik u off-u, raskol u etru', Borba, 20/2/1991, p.5. Srđan Radulović, 'Naprsli štit 
srpstva', NIN, 3/5/1991. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.202, 336. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Vojislav 
Vukčević.
139 Zoran Daskalović, 'Bečarac s puncanjem', Danas, 9/4/1991, p.20-22. Interviews: Veljko Džakula 
(Zagreb: 30/9/2009); Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2007). ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-037 (Veljko 
Džakula), T103457-8. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić. Jelena Lovrić, 'We'll Go To Knin, Too...', 
Danas, 9/4/1991, pp.18-19, in FBIS-EER-91-075, 4/6/1991.
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Rašković: the presidents of Obrovac and Benkovac, for example, while Gračac, 
Korenica and Lapac (and Knin) were with Babić.140
Rašković also seems to have been more popular than Babić in this period – even, 
apparently, in Knin itself, where in February 1991 a crowd actually booed Babić and 
cheered Rašković.141 The issues here were not really moderation or the political stances 
of the two regarding Krajina (that same crowd also cheered for Šešelj and demanded 
arms), but Rašković's charisma and personal popularity, which Babić could not match, 
and the perception that Babić was causing factional in-fighting within the SDS. Despite 
the insinuations of Babić's supporters about Rašković, his popularity with the public, it 
seems, was not particularly affected by the leaks of mid-1990, and people in Knin did 
not generally accept the notion that he was a traitor to the Serb cause.142
Despite all these strengths on Rašković's side, however, Babić was the ultimate victor of 
this struggle. His base in the Knin region was strong enough to maintain his position. 
Rašković could not remove him: regardless of popular opinion, Babić held the reins of 
power and had control of the administration, police and local media. Babić was 
president of the SNV and SAOK, and his opponents could not contest his legitimacy 
without bringing into question these structures which they had themselves helped create. 
140 Of the initial 17 organisers of the SDS, I was able to determine the approximate political stances of 
14. Of these, 8 (including Rašković) supported Rašković and 6 Babić in their 1991 conflict. But 
although some of them were simultaneously open to talks, at least 5 of Rašković’s 7 supporters had 
essentially hardline positions, supporting the creation of SAOK and then its secession from Croatia. 
Branko Popović, pp.193-4. Bogoljub Popović. ICTY-Martić: Witness Branko Popović, T8084. ICTY-
Milošević: Witness Veljko Džakula, T399. Interviews: Veljko Džakula and Milorad Pupovac (Zagreb: 
2009); Branko Perić, Branko Marijanović, Ratko Ličina and Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 2007, 2009). 
ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2470 (Official Note, DB Serbia, 30/8/1994); Witness DST-043. ICTY-
Hadžić: Witnesses Borivoje Savić; Goran Hadžić; Vojislav Vukčević. I. Radovanovic & V. Ilic, 'The 
Dilemmas of Natural Allies', Borba, 8/2/1991, p.4, in FBIS-EEU-91-034, 20/2/1991. See earlier 
information about Dušan Zelenbaba.
141 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.221-2. BBC-DOY: Vojislav Šešelj, pp.4-5. Also: ICTY-Milošević: 
Witness Milan Babić, T13017, 13565. I. Radovanovic & V. Ilic, 'The Dilemmas of Natural Allies', 
Borba, 8/2/1991, p.4, in FBIS-EEU-91-034, 20/2/1991.
142 Ibid. Babić allies told me that Rašković's daughter was married to a relative of Šibenik police chief 
Ante Bujas (in fact, the Bujas she was married to was no relation), and there was also talk that 
Rašković's father had served the NDH. Interviews: Marko Dobrijević, Petar Štikovac, Dušan Orlović 
(Belgrade: 8/2007, 7/2009). ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.10 (Babić Interview), pp.13-14. Barić, Sprska 
pobuna, pp.214-5.
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The formation of the SAOK government in May 1991 illustrates this well. Supposedly a 
government principally of technical experts, it was in fact stacked with Babić's 
supporters, many of them his politically unknown friends and neighbours, 
overwhelmingly from Knin. Although unhappy with their exclusion from the 
government, Rašković's allies seem to have accepted its formation - it was, evidently, 
difficult for them to contest Babić's legitimacy without also bringing Krajina into 
disrepute and themselves appearing factional.143 Babić also continued to develop further 
institutions to give him both legitimacy and freedom to act independently, creating a 
SAOK Assembly which seems to have been very subordinate to him (Rašković later 
called it 'Babić's Assembly'), and upgrading his Krajina SDS 'regional board' to a 'main 
board', developing it as a de facto separate party.144
Babić's ultimate triumph then seems to have been secured by the continuing 
radicalisation of the situation in Croatia, which, as Rašković himself acknowledged, 
gave Babić more popular support and legitimacy. As Knin and Zagreb escalated their 
stances, by March 1991 Babić had declared secession from Croatia, an apparently 
popular move.145 The first armed conflicts and deaths further decreased the relevance of 
Rašković, who struggled to embrace war and still occasionally found himself 
advocating pacifism and negotiations, out of step with the Knin Krajina public. The 30 
March 1991 meeting where the SDS decided in favour of negotiations, for example, was 
immediately followed by a Croatian operation against Krajina forces Babić had sent to 
Plitvice, Korenica, which brought the first deaths of the war and the arrest and beating 
of a number of SDS officials.146 The last three Serb-majority municipalities yet to join 
143 Only one Rašković ally, Dušan Štarević, was given a post, as vice-president.
144 Ljuba Stojić, ‘Bio sam i junak i izdajnik’, NIN, 20/12/1991, p.18. Srđan Radulović, 'Naprsli štit 
srpstva', NIN, 3/5/1991.
145 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, pp.221-2.
146 Zoran Daskalović, 'Bečarac s puncanjem', Danas, 9/4/1991, p.20-22. Interview Mile Bosnić 
(Belgrade: 11/2007). ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Goran Hadžić, Boirvoje Savić. ICTY-Milošević: 
Witness Milan Babić, T13953-4. Jelena Lovrić, 'We'll Go To Knin, Too...', Danas, 9/4/1991, pp.18-19, 
in FBIS-EER-91-075, 4/6/1991. HDMC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 45 (JNA report, 2/4/1991), p.106. 
This operation was insisted on by Boljkovac, the most prominent moderate in the Croatian 
government, against the wishes of Tuđman, who did not want to complicate his negotiations with 
Milošević – again showing how the 'security dilemma' was fuelling the conflict. Boljkovac, pp.231-2.
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Krajina then did so, while Babić declared annexation to Serbia.147 The escalating 
conflict also increased pressures not to be seen as someone causing division, with 
mounting accusations of 'treachery' and physical threats towards moderates.148 In mid-
July 1991, for example, Veljko Džakula had to temporarily flee to Belgrade after rebel 
hardliners threatened to kill him, and there was even the first murder of a Serb 
moderate: Goran Dmitrović, a leading activist of the SK-PJ in Lika, was arrested by 
Krajina police and died from beatings.149
In addition, Rašković left the region in early 1991. Unable to live safely in Šibenik 
(despite some Croatian police protection), after his daughter was assaulted in Zagreb 
Rašković took a job in Belgrade and resettled there. Rašković described this as a career 
move, but it seems that Babić had also pressured him and made clear he was unwelcome 
in Knin.150 Politically, it was certainly an unwise move, like his earlier trip to America: 
he 'excluded himself' and 'turned himself into an adviser in the background'.151 Rašković 
continued to visit the region, but living outside Croatia/Krajina undoubtedly decreased 
his relevance.
Thus, despite Rašković having greater popular support within and outside the Krajina, 
including in the party apparatus, Babić was able to triumph in 1991 because he held the 
147 FBIS-EEU-91-062, 1/4/1991.
148 Opačić, pp.166-7. ICTY-Martić: E-1e (Communique of the SDS Krajina, 7/1991); Witness Veljko 
Džakula. Srđan Radulović, 'Jovo – Milane!', NIN, 5/7/1991, p.27. Interview: Milorad Pupovac 
(Zagreb: 1/10/2009). Marijana Milosavljević, ‘Prof Vojislav Vukčević, Advokat: Šepanje do sledećeg 
rata’, NIN, 20/3/1992, p.26. 'Commentary on Serbian-Croatian Dialogue Cited', Tanjug, 14/3/1991, in 
FBIS-EEU-91-051, 15/3/1991. 'Only Babić Understands Negotiations', Borba, 15/3/1991, in FBIS-
EEU-91-058, 26/3/1991. ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-037 (Veljko Džakula), T10347. ICTY-Hadžić: 
Witnesses Veljko Džakula, T297-305; Goran Hadžić, T9399-400, 9410-11; Vojislav Vukčević, 
T11058. Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.339.
149 Džakula testimonies in previous footnote. ICTY-Šešelj: Witness Mladen Kulić, T4425-6. Mamula, 
p.194. Email correspondence with Petar Ajdinović, JNA security officer (2011-12). Miloš Vasić, 
'Neither Unity Nor Law', Vreme, 3/8/1992, pp.18-22, in FBIS-EER-92-110, 19/8/1992. Kovačević, 
p.121.
150 Dragan Pavlović, pp.198-9. S. Stamatović & Z. Tarle, 'Biće tu još neprijatnosti', Borba, 2-3/3/1991, 
p.15. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13564. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Branko Popović. 
Tomo Kuzmanović, 'Nebeski narod traži povratak u domovinu [Interview with Jovan Opačić]', Duga, 
21/6/1996, accessed 1/8/2014 from: https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!
searchin/soc.culture.yugoslavia. ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-037 (Veljko Džakula), T10349.
151 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
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reins of power, leading the SNV and SAOK, and it was difficult for his opponents to 
contest his authority. With Knin and Zagreb escalating their stances, Rašković outside of 
Croatia, and pressures on moderates mounting, Rašković and his key allies' sidelining 
became complete. Babić was the man of the hour and increasingly won popular support, 
such that by January 1992 even moderates in Knin who had opposed the SDS in 1990 
were with him.152
The Role of Serbia
The key question is: how important was Belgrade’s influence in the rise of Babić as the 
leader of Krajina and his triumph over Rašković? I do not believe it was particularly 
significant, for the following reasons. Firstly, Babić had already acquired his top posts 
and become Rašković’s number two before Belgrade seems to have had any role in 
supporting him. The Belgrade media may have subsequently helped build his public 
image, but it was natural that he was in the media at the time, and surely also very 
significant in this respect was Babić's control of local media such as Knin Radio. 
Secondly, Babić was never as popular as Rašković during the main period of their 
conflict, even in Knin, and his subsequent popular support seems to be explained by the 
onset of the conflict with Croatia rather than media support from Belgrade. And, in fact, 
as Belgrade was in conflict with Babić from April 1991, Rašković seems to have again 
received some generous media coverage, and yet he lost his popular standing in the 
region.153 This seems to have particularly been the case in late 1991 and early 1992, 
when Milošević's conflict with Babić reached its peak (and Milošević even allegedly 
asked Rašković to write an article diagnosing Babić as mad), but it was not enough to 
restore Rašković to a position of any relevance in Knin.154
152 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p.20. Also: Jelić-Grnović, p.275
153 For example: Slobodan Reljić, 'Masa gora od čopora', NIN, 10/5/1991, pp.20-23. Uroš Komlenović, 
'Sačuvati srpski obraz', NIN, 31/5/1991, p.12.
154 Rašković agreed, on the condition that he could pronounce the same diagnosis for Milošević. Dragan 
Pavlović, p.199.
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Could Belgrade’s backing have increased Babić’s support among the municipal and 
party apparatus? If so, Belgrade’s influence cannot have been particularly strong, 
because most of the party apparatus backed Rašković, not Babić. Moreover, this would 
fail to explain why those who backed Babić then generally supported him in his battles 
with Belgrade in 1991, with only a few of his allies gradually shifting towards Belgrade 
towards the end of the year, for a variety of reasons (discussed in the following chapter). 
That Babić’s strength was based not on the backing of Belgrade but an independently 
developed support base in Krajina, however, does explain this.
This is not to say that Belgrade’s backing had no role at all. The SDS sought Serbia’s 
support for their struggle, and generally wanted to maintain good relations with 
Milošević: hence, for example, Rašković's open letter to Milošević in September 1990, 
and the November 1990 vote not to participate in the Serbian elections. Already in 
January 1991 Rašković felt obliged to deny rumours that he had poor relations with 
Milošević, claiming on the contrary that they had long and serious conversations, and 
that he enjoyed Milošević's support.155 Belgrade does not appear to have had a 
particularly direct role in this leadership contest, however. SDS officials could 
(narrowly) be won over by arguments against participating in Serbia’s elections so as 
not to cause a conflict with the Serbian government (and opposition), but not, it seems, 
to support the sidelining of Rašković.
In November 1991 Rašković and his associates launched a new public assault on Babić, 
calling for his resignation, and they explained their recent passivity partly by reference 
to Belgrade's previous support for Babić (as well as maintaining Serbian unity).156 
However, they had been very active opposing Babić up until July, and the onset of war 
was probably the key factor explaining their brief period of passivity. As Rašković later 
said, he preferred 'even an undemocratic, even communist Krajina [to] Krajina in an 
Ustashoid state.’157 In addition, from April 1991 onwards on some key issues, such as 
155 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, pp.127-32.
156 'SDS Urges Krajina's Babić To Resign', Tanjug, 15/11/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-222, 18/11/1991.
157 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.230.
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annexation to Serbia, Rašković was actually closer to Belgrade than Babić. It is possible 
that, despite this, Babić tactically cultivated the idea that Milošević stood behind him. In 
January 1992 Milošević sent Babić an open letter concerning his continued opposition 
to the Vance plan, and he noted that 'It has become obvious for quite some time that you 
have been creating an impression among the citizens of Krajina that you make your 
decisions... following agreement with the Serbian leadership', a notion Milošević 
wanted to correct.158 In June 1991, indeed, Babić had falsely told Bosnian Krajina 
representatives that Milošević approved their unification project.159 Rašković and the 
anti-Babić wing of the SDS were, however, aware of his disputes with Milošević over 
annexation and the referendum, undermining the notion that perceived support from 
Belgrade for Babić could have discouraged Rašković from opposing him.
Belgrade did assist Babić in a more indirect manner, through its public and private 
support for the hardline stance favouring Serbian self-determination, hardline media 
and, later, the provision of the means to militarily effect that self-determination. The 
slide to war was certainly influenced by Belgrade's hardline stance, and if Belgrade’s 
encouragement had been in the opposite direction – in favour of peace and compromise 
– it seems reasonable to assume that moderates would have had a greater chance of 
success in these inter-party struggles. The issue of the vast gap between HDZ and SDS 
ideas would certainly have remained, however, and Belgrade's direct role and influence 
over the SDS, Babić and Rašković, appears to have been very limited.
158 ICTY-Milošević: E-D40a.
159 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P154.5.A.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Vukić, 20/6/1991). Domovina Intercept: B6974 
(Karadžić-Kuprešanin, 27/12/1991). Similarly: Mihajlo Knežević, pp.42-3.
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6.6. Conclusions
Although SDS leaders benefited from the Serbian media's openness to Croatian Serb 
nationalists, their movement was autonomous and independent, with few connections 
with official Belgrade at first. Belgrade had very limited influence over political 
developments in Krajina in 1990 and 1991, and the people it might have chosen to 
support, such as former communist Borislav Mikelić, quickly lost out to the SDS. Both 
Babić and Rašković were fundamentally independent figures with their own, 
independent politics. Neither operated on instructions from Belgrade or even 
particularly co-ordinated with Milošević with regard to their key political stances. Babić 
does seem to have positioned himself as an ally of Belgrade against Rašković in late 
1990 and early 1991, supporting Milošević's political position within Serbia, but the 
similarity of their politics regarding Krajina seems to have been the result of 
coincidence rather than co-ordination, and was soon replaced with a bitter and enduring 
conflict. Rašković, Babić and other SDS figures seem to have arisen autonomously, 
from local circumstances, and although Belgrade evidently preferred Babić to Rašković, 
it does not seem to have played a significant part in Babić's rise or his ultimate triumph 
over Rašković.
Serbia's support for hardline politics naturally had some influence on the situation in 
Croatia, as without it war would have been a much less viable option, but Belgrade was 
not directing SDS leaders and had little direct influence on them. If we want to 
understand political developments in Krajina in 1990-91, we must look above all at 
what was going on internally within the region, within Croatia, and on the Knin-Zagreb 
axis, rather than to Belgrade.
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Chapter 7: Serbia and the Serbian Rebellion in 
Krajina: Martić, 'Frenki', 'Captain Dragan' and the 
'Parallel Structure'
Knin police inspector Milan Martić was a key leader of the Serb rebellion in Krajina in 
1990, and in January 1991 would be appointed head of the Krajina Secretariat of the 
Interior (SUP). The Krajina SUP in the first half of 1991 was the main rebel armed force 
in the Knin Krajina, and was augmented in that period by an expansion of its numbers 
and, from spring 1991, the formation of a training camp in Golubić, Knin, out of which 
new units and 'special forces' would emerge.
In The Hague, Martić was portrayed by Milan Babić and the OTP as a puppet of 
Belgrade, the key figure in an alleged 'parallel structure' in the Krajina that actually took 
its instructions from the Serbian MUP/DB, and ultimately Milošević, rather than local 
political leaders such as Babić or Rašković. This 'parallel structure' purportedly 
orchestrated the descent into war in Croatia. The Golubić camp, meanwhile, has been 
seen as a project not of local Krajina structures, but of the Serbian DB, to create its own 
secret fighting units under the command of agent Franko “Frenki” Simatović – the 'Red 
Berets'. Australian Serb émigré 'Captain Dragan' (Dragan Vasiljković) supposedly 
played a key role in this project as a contractor of the DB, with the special units that 
came from Golubić being under the direct command of himself and Frenki, and then 
playing a pivotal role in escalating the war, and the ethnic cleansing of Croats. Martić's 
alleged collaboration with the DB on this project is in turn seen as confirmation of his 
role as part of Belgrade's 'parallel structure'.1 The little that has been written on these 
topics in the secondary literature has included similar assessments.2
The topics covered in this chapter are at the very heart of this thesis: the extent to which 
Belgrade, and Milošević, was controlling or directing developments in Croatia. In The 
1 See OTP Briefs in Milošević, Babić, Martić, Stanišić/Simatović and Hadžić cases.
2 CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.1, pp.83-5, 94, Vol.2, pp.25-33. Caspersen, op. cit., p.58.
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Hague the argument was made, in considerable detail, that Serbia directly controlled 
Krajina Serb rebel forces through Martić, Frenki and Dragan, bypassing Babić and 
Rašković. It is therefore essential to examine those relationships. In addition, Martić 
was an absolutely key personality in the Krajina/RSK, from its origins in 1990 to its fall 
in 1995. As Interior Minister he was in many respects the most powerful figure within 
the Krajina in 1992-93,3 after Babić's fall from power, and from 1994 to the RSK's fall 
he served as its President. In order to gain a full understanding of Krajina-Belgrade 
relations it is essential to understand Martić and his origins. Fathoming the precise role 
of the Serbian DB in Krajina in 1991, and the extent to which it could influence or 
direct Martić and/or the forces that came from Golubić, is also critical for an analysis of 
Belgrade's policies and intentions towards Croatia.
3 ICTY-Martić: Witness Veljko Džakula, T404. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Sergej Veselinović. Kovačević, 
p.121.
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7.1. Milan Martić: Belgrade's Man in Knin?
In The Hague Babić portrayed Martić as the key man in Belgrade's 'parallel structure', a 
puppet of the Serbian DB and ultimately Milošević. In this section I look first at the 
relationship between the two 'Milans', Martić and Babić, in 1991, examining Babić's 
claim that he clashed with Martić over his forces' provocative and aggressive actions, 
such as attacks on Croatian villages in the Krajina. I then examine the relationship 
between Martić and Belgrade, and in particular Martić's complex relationship with the 
Serbian DB, before ending by looking at the reasons behind the rise of Martić, and 
Babić's allegations of a broader 'parallel structure' in Krajina in 1991.
The Two 'Milans': Martić and Babić
We have already seen how problematic Babić's accounts are, and, most notably, how far 
from the truth his allegations about the Council of National Resistance (SNO) appear to 
have been. Far from Martić and an SNO operating independently of and in opposition to 
Babić, Babić actually appears to have been in charge of the SNO, and working together 
with Martić in autumn and winter 1990. In 1991, however, the two certainly did clash, 
and a severe conflict developed between them that lasted, with ebbs and flows, to the 
very end of the RSK's existence in 1995. In The Hague Babić claimed that they fell out 
because of Martić's engagement in a 'joint criminal enterprise' to provoke conflict and 
ethnic cleansing from spring 1991 onwards, via the establishment of new Krajina police 
stations and then attacks on Croatian villages.
Most of the available evidence contradicts Babić's account, however. For example, 
controversial actions taken by the Krajina SUP in the spring, such as establishing new 
police stations, followed public decisions by the Knin authorities led by Babić, refuting 
the notion that Martić was acting independently, and in 1992 Babić himself 
convincingly took credit for these actions.4 On 26 June 1991 the Krajina government 
4 'Situation in Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac 'Tense'', Belgrade Domestic Service, 28/4/1991, and 'Knin 
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'sent an ultimatum demanding unconditional and immediate withdrawal of all police and 
military forces' of Croatia from Krajina, and when the first Krajina attack on Croatian 
forces was launched a week later Martić explained it as resulting from this 'ultimatum 
that all Croatian forces should leave or face attack', while Babić's deputy characterised it 
as part of 'our plan to wipe out all Croat police who remain in Krajina.'5 Babić was 
actively involved in the organisation and mobilisation of Serb troops at the time to 
oppose Croatian 'aggression', and publicly insisted that 'Until Croatia suspends its armed 
invasion, we will have to respond to force with force.'6 His key ally in Banija, Dušan 
Jović, was also the leader of the rebellion in Glina (and has been accused of war crimes 
by Croatia), and Babić visited Banija together with Martić that July, apparently to help 
prepare the operation there, the largest one undertaken by Krajina in this period.7 
Immediately afterwards the government then issued another ultimatum to Croatian 
forces to leave Krajina, while Babić announced that mixed Petrinja and Croat-majority 
Karlovac would be targeted next.8
There is only limited evidence supporting Babić's testimony, most notably a 
disagreement concerning Kijevo, a Croatian village in Knin municipality, in August 
1991. In August 1991 Martić issued an ultimatum to Croatian forces there demanding 
their surrender, and also made some bombastic statements to the press about conquering 
the Croatian city of Zadar. He did this despite the fact that a ceasefire had just been 
declared by the Krajina authorities (on the urging of the SFRJ Presidency). Babić 
Defense Council Requests Army Help', Tanjug, 28/4/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-082, 29/4/1991. 
'Situation Tense; Conflicts 'Expected' Near Knin', Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network, 11/5/1991, in 
FBIS-EEU-91-092, 13/5/1991. Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who Disappeared', NIN, 18/12/1992, 
pp.18-21, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 15/1/1993.
5 'Krajina Demands Croatian Forces Withdraw', Tanjug, 26/6/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-124, 27/6/1991. 
Christopher Bennett, 'Medieval legend returns of marshal Serbian rebel forces', Daily Telegraph, 
17/7/1991. 'Croatian Militiamen Reported Killed in Ljubovo', Belgrade Radio, 3/7/1991, in FBIS-
EEU-91-128, 3/7/1991. Tyler Marshall, 'Serbs and Croats Face Off Along Frontier of Hatred', LA 
Times, 14/7/1991.
6 Srđan Radulović, 'End of the Croatian State', NIN, 12/7/1991, pp.15-16, in FBIS-EER-91-109, 
24/7/1991. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1892 (Order of Mobilisation, SAOK, 11/7/1991). ICTY-
Martić: Witness Zoran Lakić, T10143-4.
7 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, p.196; Knjiga 4, p.325. Jelić-Grnović, pp. 63-5. Statement of Čedomir 
Stefanović, accessed 1/8/2014 from: https://sites.google.com/site/savostrbac/centarzaobuku
%C5%A1amarica.
8 Marc Champion, 'Serbs carve out new borders for Krajina', The Independent, 5/8/1991.
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accused Martić of disobedience, remonstrating with him at a session of the Krajina 
government. Martić apologised for 'recklessness' in his comments to journalists, and 
explained that the ultimatum followed attacks on his forces from Kijevo. Babić 
confirmed the government's support for the ceasefire, and that Kijevo was the 
responsibility of the JNA.9 Kijevo was indeed conquered shortly after this - but this was 
initiated by the JNA, not Martić, after Croatian units attacked JNA troops.10 
In October 1991, meanwhile, NIN correspondent Srđan Radulović reported that 
'Martić's fighters show that they are not quite so inclined to the war-negotiating 
principle of war-making, which the military command of the JNA introduced. From 
people close to Babić and Martić we can find out that Babić more and more often 
reproaches Martić, who evidently considers that every war is led to victory, and not for 
an illusive truce.'11 At the time, Babić's allies argued that the role of Martić's special 
forces had been superseded by the JNA, which 'with strong systems and modern 
weapons... alone can thwart the power of Croatia',12 and one Krajina DB report suggests 
that Babić wanted to disband Martić's forces, accusing them of being a 'mob' engaged in 
looting.13 At the same time, however, Babić himself had an expansive vision of Krajina 
borders, and key allies of his were themselves highly critical of the JNA for not being 
aggressive enough (Babić accusing it of containing 'traitors').14 Sometimes Babić's 
stances were more extreme than Martić's: in early September 1991, for example, he 
publicly denounced some local peace agreements brokered by the JNA in the Knin area, 
while in late 1991 he appears to have been unhappy that additional territories were not 
9 C.C., 'Creation of Larger Defence Structures', Borba, 21/8/1991, p.10, in FBIS-EEU-91-135, 
11/9/1991. BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, p.17; Milan Martić, p.9. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, p.206. 
10 HMDC-DR: Knjiga 1, pp.257-60, 262-4. 'Croatian Troops Withdraw From Kijevo, Vrlika', Tanjug, 
27/8/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-167, 28/8/1991. 'Uvođenje 3. bojne 113. brigade na crtu odbrane 
Skradinskog zaleđa', 3/2/2011, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.novi-
tjednik.hr/zupanija/zupanija/6192-feljton-12.pdf, p.8.
11 Srđan Radulović, 'Politička geometrija', NIN, 4/10/1991, p.15.
12 B. Solesa, 'The Subordinate Role Separates Fellow Fighters', Borba, 30/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-
230, 29/11/1991
13 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, Document 226 (Krajina DB note, 22/10/1991), p.408.
14 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1102 (Report on SAOK TO, 10/10/1991). ICTY-Milošević: E-D333.2e 
(SFRJ Presidency minutes, 3/1/1992), pp.16, 19. Srđan Radulović, 'Granice po Babiću', NIN, 
4/10/1991, p.15.
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occupied.15 In December he even tried to order the bombing of Zagreb, most likely to 
sabotage peace negotiations.16 Nor does there did appear to have been any difference 
between the two concerning the ethnic cleansing of Croats - Babić stated simply that 
'All those who want to leave Serbian Krajina for Croatia should be allowed to do so, and 
vice versa’, and publicly denied detailed international reports of crimes by Serb forces.17
The fundamental reason for the conflict between Babić and Martić seems to have been 
rather banal, and related mainly to Babić's attempts to secure absolute power and his 
intolerance of opposition. Most sources indicate that the two co-operated fairly well 
initially, and in January 1991 Babić had Martić elected Krajina Secretary of the 
Interior.18 Their conflict seems to have originated in late May 1991 when the Krajina 
government was formed, and Babić convinced Martić to accept the post of Defence 
Minister, in charge of the new special forces.19 Babić, as he later explained, wanted to 
'weaken' and 'outwit' Martić by transferring him to this new post, which, although it 
'would have been seen as powerful', 'in terms of the actual remit... was much less 
important'.20 The new Interior Minister, Babić ally Dušan Vjestica, then attempted to 
remove all of Martić's men from their command posts in the police. The police refused 
to follow his orders, while Martić now rejected his transfer. At the end of June 1991, 
Babić gave in and had Martić re-elected Interior Minister.
Babić claimed that it was due to Serbian DB instructions that Martić decided to reject 
his transfer. However, a realisation by Martić that he had been tricked – that this was not 
a promotion, but an attempt to 'outwit' and sideline him - surely sufficiently accounts for 
his change of heart. Babić tended to promote those absolutely loyal to and dependent on 
15 ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a (The Serbian Army, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.136-41. HMDC-DR, 
Knjiga 2, pp.282-3.
16 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1, pp.575-7. Milan Milošević, 'Babić Caput', Vreme News Agency Digest, 
13/1/1992.
17 ‘Babić: Krajina Plans To Recognise Slovenia’, Tanjug, 28/12/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-251, 31/12/1991. 
'Calls for Investigation', Tanjug, 18/1/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-013, 21/1/1992.
18 Interviews: Mile Dakić, Mile Bosnić, Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 2007, 2009). ICTY-Martić: Witnesses 
MM-003; Veljko Džakula, T396. See earlier conclusions on the SNO.
19 Interview Mile Dakić (Belgrade: 5/11/2007). ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Sergej Veselinović, T11749.
20 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1406. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.5 (Babić Interview), pp.11-13.
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him, surrounding himself with people who looked up to him as a 'king or emperor'.21 He 
was, SNV Vice-President Dakić recalls, bothered by Martić's popularity among the 
people, and wanted 'full control', saying in late 1991 that he did not need an Interior 
Minister who had his photo published in all possible magazines.22 Similarly, Babić told 
Serbia's Minister of Defence in late 1991 that he wanted an 'expert' not 'a media star': he 
did not need Martić 'as a personality' and could not tolerate a minister in his government 
opposing him, claiming 'everything could be much better organised with somebody 
else'.23 Martić, on the other hand, insisted on protecting his own authority and role. 
From July 1991 onwards he and Babić were also in conflict over the organisation of 
Krajina armed forces: Martić wanted to be in command of them, or at least retain 
command of his police and special units, while Babić wanted to create a new system 
under his control, and to subordinate or eliminate the role of Martić. The issue primarily 
seems to have been about who, of the two, was in charge, rather than about ethnic 
cleansing or war operations.24
By late 1991 Babić did blame Belgrade for his problems with Martić, at least in part,25 
and it seems likely that by that autumn Belgrade was backing Martić, particularly given 
his connections with the Serbian police and Milošević's problems with Babić.26 
However, it was not Milošević or the Serbian MUP/DB alone that sympathised with 
Martić – so did Rašković, his allies and former allies in the Krajina; some of Babić's 
supporters, who fell out with him on this issue; the JNA, which saw him as a communist 
and pro-Yugoslav 'who belongs 'to us'', unlike the nationalist Babić; Karadžić and Ćosić, 
who saw him as a 'man of the people' and 'more honest', as opposed to Babić, a 'selfish 
tyrant' who 'likes power'; and even anti-war Croatian Serb moderates, who thought that 
21 Interview Lazar Macura (Belgrade: 11/2007).
22 Interview Mile Dakić (Belgrade: 5/11/2007).
23 ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a (The Serbian Army, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.136-41.
24 See for example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Mile Bosnić. ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a (The 
Serbian Army, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.136-41. ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Milan Dragišić, Radoslav 
Maksić. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, pp.205-7.
25 ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a (The Serbian Army, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.136-41. ICTY-Milošević: 
E-D333.2e (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 3/1/1992), p.21. 'Krajina Officials Assess Paris EC Talks', 
Belgrade Radio Network, 31/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-212, 1/11/1991.
26 Radulović, Sudbina krajine, p.36. Mamula, pp.236-7.
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Babić was the main problem and Martić was 'more reasonable'.27 Martić had a strong 
power base in the police and was a popular and respected figure, and Babić's attempts to 
remove him simply were not widely supported.28
Martić and Belgrade
As discussed in Chapter 5, it is probable that figures from the Serbian MUP/DB visited 
the Krajina in autumn or winter 1990, and that Martić established contact with them. 
Then Serbian Minister of the Interior Bogdanović, indeed, has recalled that they 'had 
ties with' Martić, helping him 'begin from nothing'.29 Such contact need not have been 
conspiratorial or imply that Martić was secretly Belgrade's man in Knin, however. 
Martić's contacts with the Serbian police were of a far lower stature than Babić's 
contacts in Belgrade, which from October 1990 included direct contact with Milošević, 
and this did not make Babić Belgrade's puppet.
Martić thought highly of Milošević – as he later recalled with disdain, he saw him as a 
'God, and saviour of Serbs' at the time – but it was apparently only in July 1991 that the 
two first met, by which point Babić had met Milošević about fifteen times.30 Martić thus 
encountered Milošević quite late in comparison with other Serb leaders. This is not 
surprising, as he was merely a minister in the Krajina government, but it does 
27 Rašković, Duša i sloboda, p.224. Radulović, Sudbina krajine, p.36. 'SDS in Knin Forms Two 
Factions', Belgrade Radio, 22/2/1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-036, 24/4/1992. Mamula, p.236. HMDC-DR, 
Knjiga 1, pp.508-9. Domovina Intercepts: C2352 (Karadžić-Ćosić, 11/11/1991); B7077 (Karadžić-
Ćosić, 15/2/1992). ICTY-Karadžić: Witness Statement of Milan Martić, para 48. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-
P356.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Vukić-Radić-Brđanin, 18/11/1991). Interviews: Milorad Pupovac (Zagreb: 
1/10/2009); Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007). 
28 Even someone like TO officer Radoslav Maksić, who Babić brought into Knin, concluded that Babić, 
rather than Martić, was at fault in their conflict. ICTY-Martić: Witness Radoslav Maksić.
29 Nenad Stefanović, 'Logistika službe za volju naroda', Duga, 7-20 January 1995, p. 23, quoted in 
Williams and Cigar, footnote 201.
30 Filip Švarm, 'Dossier: The Fate of Krajina Serbs – To Stay or to Leave', Vreme News Digest Agency, 
3/8/1996. ICTY-Karadžić: Witness Milan Martić, T38132; Witness Statement of Milan Martić, para 
43. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness JF-032, T4640-1. ICTY-Hadžić: T12195-6. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-
P154.5.A.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Vukić, 20/6/1991). According to some press reports Martić also 
claimed to have spoken with Milošević on the phone in early April: Krmpotić, p.47.
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undermine the notion that he was at the helm of Milošević's 'parallel structure' in 
Krajina.
Martić had an enduring relationship with Jovica Stanišić, and it seems likely that this 
relationship had begun by early 1991 at the latest.31 Babić presented Martić as a puppet 
of Stanišić and the DB; former Yugoslav defence secretary Branko Mamula also writes 
that in summer 1991 Milošević's DB 'held all the strings in the Krajina'.32 However, 
MM-003 and Babić both presented evidence that Martić and Stanišić actually had more 
of a co-operative relationship, than one of subordinate/boss. MM-003 explained that 
Martić came to like Stanišić ‘because anything he asked for, he would always get’, and 
he regarded him as his ‘brother’, who would do anything he asked of him.33 Similarly, 
describing the only time he saw the two together in 1991, Babić recalled that they were 
‘[q]uite friendly, they cooperated closely, and Martić listened carefully to what Stanišić 
had to say.’ He added, in contradiction of his whole thesis, that ‘It wasn’t any sort of 
formal subordination but rather taking advice from a senior colleague. It didn’t involve 
any sort of obedience.’34
MM-003 did claim that Stanišić had 'ordered' Martić to establish additional police 
stations in Krajina, expanding the territory under Serbian control. However, this was 
Babić and Martić's own policy – the decisions on establishing new police stations in 
Knin, for example, were issued by Knin authorities led by Babić. MM-003 and Babić 
did not provide any concrete examples of Martić following instructions from Stanišić. 
But, on the contrary, we can find many examples of Martić acting counter to Belgrade's 
wishes in 1991.
As discussed in Chapter 4, Belgrade sometimes favoured moderation, and yet Martić 
followed Babić’s orders in sending units to Plitvice and elsewhere, from March to June 
31 See for example: BBC-DOY: Milan Babić, pp.4-5. Mamula, p.236. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P153.10.A.1 
(Intercept Karadžić-Milošević, 9/9/1991).
32 Mamula, p.237.
33 ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003.
34 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, 1525.
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1991, apparently displeasing Belgrade.35 Martić also angered Milošević with his public 
declarations in April that he had promised to send arms to Krajina, with Milošević 
reportedly asking Babić why he didn't ‘dismiss that fool’.36 And then in June, when 
Martić held a parade of his special forces in Bosnia without consulting Babić – the only 
police action in this entire period definitely not authorised by Babić - Milošević referred 
to it privately as ‘a stupidity which makes a lot of problems to me and to [us all]’, and 
agreed with Karadžić that ‘it cannot be the politics that serves the police, it must be vice 
versa’.37 He expressed exasperation with the Babić-Martić situation: 'First he is not 
listening to him, then he is doing things how he wants, and once like this, the other time 
like that.'38
There is no evidence that Martić opposed Babić on the policy of annexation to Serbia or 
any of the other issues on which Babić and Belgrade clashed on that spring and summer. 
On the contrary, Martić actively supported unification with Bosnian Krajina.39 In June 
1991 he even tried to persuade Bosnian Krajina deputies to support it by falsely 
claiming, along with Babić, that Milošević had endorsed it.40 It was not until the last 
months of 1991 that any notable political differences emerged between Babić and 
Martić, and despite Belgrade's pressure Martić joined Babić in rejecting the Vance plan 
for quite some time. Martić even went so far as to say, at a meeting of the Yugoslav 
Presidency with Krajina leaders in December 1991, also attended by Milošević, that in 
their opposition to the plan they were prepared to rebel against Belgrade just as they had 
against Zagreb.41 Martić does seem to have been the first significant person in Krajina to 
35 Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who Disappeared', NIN, 18/12/1992, pp.18-21, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 
15/1/1993.
36 Silber & Little, p.146.
37 Domovina Intercept: B6549 (Karadžić-Milošević, 11/6/1991). Babić, by contrast, testified that 
'Martić... could not have organised such a parade without coordinating this with people in Belgrade', 
i.e. the DB, further undermining the credibility of his 'parallel structure' thesis. ICTY-Krajišnik: E-
P154 (Witness Statement of Milan Babić), p.7.
38 Domovina Intercept: B6549 (Karadžić-Milošević, 11/6/1991).
39 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D312 (Martić Interview in Pobjeda, 7/7/1991). ICTY-Karadžić: Witness 
Milan Martić, T38106. Biserko, p.430.
40 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P154.5.A.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Vukić, 20/6/1991). Domovina Intercept: B6974 
(Karadžić-Kuprešanin, 27/12/1991).
41 ICTY-Perišić: E-P165.E (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 12/12/1991), p.44. And: ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2364.E (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 9/12/1991), pp.35-6; E-D1582 (Krajina 
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come to support the plan, in mid-January 1992, having been persuaded by Jović, but his 
strident opposition for almost two months is telling.42
Thus, despite his sometimes poor and hostile relations with Babić, in 1991 Martić 
supported the Krajina politics that Babić created, even when they were opposed by 
Belgrade, while in relation to police operations that Belgrade was unhappy with, here 
too he appears to have been following Babić's orders and his own agenda. The agendas 
of Martić and Belgrade did not always coincide, and, although their divergences were 
less pronounced than those of Babić and Belgrade, these differences clearly show that 
Martić was not Serbia's puppet nor operating on its instructions.
Martić, the Krajina Police and the Serbian DB
Martić's relationship with Stanišić, Frenki and others in the MUP/DB was always 
complicated. For example, Martić's advisor in 1994-95 Slobodan Jarčević recalls that 
whenever Martić, then RSK President, was in Belgrade, he would go to Stanišić for 
advice which, Jarčević implies, amounted more to instructions.43 Martić hoped, 
according to Jarčević, that Stanišić would be able to force Milošević to take a more pro-
RSK stance, including military intervention if Croatia attacked.44 In the same period, 
however, he clashed fiercely with Stanišić over the DB's attempts to separate the MUP 
in East Slavonia from Knin.45 As Milošević said at the time, the two had 'argued and 
made up ten times' already.46
A picture emerges for the entire period of 1990-95 that Martić, unlike Babić, was very 
happy, and wanted, to co-operate closely with Belgrade in the fulfilment of their joint 
MUP, 12/12/1991). ICTY-Milošević: E-D333.2e (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 3/1/1992), pp.6-7. 
42 Borisav Jović, op. cit., p.384. ICTY-Martić: E-950 (Martić Interview, 1/1992). BBC-DOY: Milan 
Martić, p.10.
43 Interview Slobodan Jarčević, RSK Foreign Minister, 1992-94 (Belgrade: 2011).
44 Interview Slobodan Jarčević (Belgrade: 2011). Jarčević, pp.581-2, 586.
45 See, for example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-1605 (Intercept Martić-Milošević, 4/10/1994). Jarčević, 
pp.581-2.
46 ICTY-Tolimir: E-P1425.E (Mladić Diary, 4/9/1994-28/1/1995), p.98.
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goal: all Serbs in one state. He was often open to accepting Belgrade's advice as the 
stance of more learned and senior people than himself. A prime example of this was 
when he ran for RSK President in late 1993, and, once elected, advocated the 
appointment of Borislav Mikelić as Prime Minister. Martić's presidential campaign was 
directly supported by Belgrade, on whose urging he probably ran in the first place, 
while Mikelić was clearly Belgrade's candidate for Prime Minister.47 In 1994-95, 
meanwhile, Martić was a strong supporter and collaborator of Belgrade in 'Operation 
Pauk', a joint operation led by the Serbian DB to assist the forces of Muslim rebel Fikret 
Abdić around Bihać in Bosnia, even though this risked some dilution of Martić's own 
authority in the RSK.48
However, Martić was also often highly critical of Belgrade as not nationalist enough, 
even in 1992-93, and he generally protected the Krajina MUP's autonomy and authority, 
as well as his own position, from any encroachments from Serbia.49 Caspersen suggests 
that people such as Martić started out as puppets and later achieved some independence. 
Certainly, despite his collaboration in, for example, 'Operation Pauk', Martić in 1994-95 
did come into increasing conflict with Milošević, culminating in his removal of Mikelić 
in May 1995, as Caspersen and Barić note.50 However, already in 1991-92, Martić was 
both defying requests and instructions from Belgrade and protecting his own authority 
from any potential encroachment by the Serbian DB. 
For example, in September 1991 the Serbian DB sent an urgent message to Martić 
requesting that the arrival and deployment of volunteers from Serbia's main opposition 
party, the SPO, be prevented, on the grounds that their intention was to take arms back 
to Serbia for use in overthrowing the regime. Martić refused, saying that all volunteers 
47 Interview Slobodan Jarčević (Belgrade: 2011).
48 ICTY-Martić: E-666 (Letter from Rade Rašeta, SVK security officer). Mihajlo Knežević, p.201. 
49 For example: Vojislav Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo (Belgrade: Srpska Radikalna Stranka, 2010), 
pp.591-2, 924. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1586 (RSK letter to RS, 2/4/1993); E-D1134 (Yugoslav 
Air Force note, 1/2/1993). HMDC-DR, Knjiga 8, p.474. Also: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Submission: 
Public Versions of Confidential Exhibits Part 1 (2/4/2013), p.47.
50 Caspersen, op. cit., pp.114-20. Nikica Barić, ‘O okolnostima i posljedicama smjene predsjednika 
vlade Republike Srpske Krajine Borislava Mikelića 1995. godine’, Istorija 20. Veka, Vol.28, No.3 
(2010), pp.151-168.
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were welcome. Similarly, in July-August 1991 the DB relayed urgent instructions 
straight from Milošević that the changing of emblems on Krajina uniforms – the 
removal of the red star – must be prevented, as it could lead to conflicts with the JNA: it 
happened anyway.51
Martić clearly endorsed the appointment of Captain Dragan to the Golubić camp in 
spring 1991, and also Frenki's basing himself in the region. Dragan and Frenki left in 
August 1991, and the Golubić camp was disbanded, above all on Babić's demand (as 
discussed later). However, evidence at the ICTY, most notably from MM-003, 
suggested that Martić was also unhappy with Dragan and Frenki trying to increase their 
influence over Krajina forces, and was involved in having them at first sidelined and 
then removed.52 Thus, despite his closeness with Stanišić, Martić seems to have opposed 
any attempt by DB figures such as Frenki to encroach on his territory.
In August 1991, apparently as part of his sidelining of the Serbian DB, Martić had 
arranged that they move from Knin to a new camp in Korenica, established with the 
support of Korenica municipal president Boško Božanić.53 The Serbian DB and their 
chosen men (the nucleus of the 'Red Berets', discussed later) soon left for Serbia, but 
links persisted, and in 1992 Martić moved against some of their allies there. First, in 
January 1992, he ordered the disbandment of a special/paramilitary unit in Korenica 
which was connected with the Serbian DB and Božanić, arresting some of its members. 
The leader of that unit, Predrag Baklajić, fled to a Serbian DB training base in Ilok, 
Eastern Slavonia (and in 1997 would be honoured by them as a fallen comrade, having 
died in Bosnia in 1993).54 In August 1992, the local DB in Korenica, connected with 
Božanić and the Serb DB, responded by arresting several local officials who had been 
51 Filipović, pp.52-7.
52 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses JF-039; Goran Opačić, T18187-9; Aco Drača, T16700-2.
53 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses JF-031; JF-039. ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003; E-565 
(Statement of Neđeljko Orlić, 18/3/1993). Interview Dušan Orlović, head of Krajina DB, 1991-2 
(Belgrade: 7/2009); E-560 (Report of Mihajlo Knežević about Predrag Baklajić, 26/1/1992).
54 ICTY-Martić: E-563 (Information about crimes by special unit in Vrhovine, RSK MUP, 18/2/1992); 
E-564 (Investigation into Baklajić et al,18/3/1992); E-565 (Statement of Neđeljko Orlić, 18/3/1993). 
Mihajlo Knežević, pp.70, 90-1, 113-4. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P3152.E (Excerpt from Serbian 
DB Personnel File of Predrag Baklajić).
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involved in suppressing Baklajić's unit, including the heads of the TO and DB for Lika, 
taking them to the Ilok camp.55 Martić denounced these arrests and immediately moved 
to dismiss Dušan Orlović, head of the Krajina DB, and suspend the work of the entire 
service. Orlović subsequently had to leave Krajina. According to MM-003, Martić 
realised that Orlović was too close to Belgrade and independent of him; he also seems 
to have been involved in the Korenica incidents.56 Orlović subsequently joined the 
Serbian DB, and Martić allegedly ordered that he, Frenki and others were to be arrested 
if they arrived in Krajina, and also, for some months, that the reconstituted Krajina DB 
was forbidden all contacts with the Serbian DB.57
At the same time, some key members of the Krajina MUP were simultaneously 
employed by the Serbian MUP/DB, which may have been for financial reasons, or 
because they were 'on loan' to Martić.58 (Such arrangements were common at the time – 
all former JNA officers in the RSK and RS armies, for example, received their salaries 
and pensions from Belgrade, even when those armies were in open conflict with 
Belgrade.)59 In 1993 Martić even took a Serbian MUP official, Uroš Pokrajac, as his 
'special advisor'.60 Martić, it seems, was happy to co-operate with the MUP/DB, as long 
as he did not feel that they were affecting his authority.
55 Mihajlo Knežević, pp.122-8.
56 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-978 (Statement of MM-003). Also: HMDC-DR, Knjiga 5, pp.211, 247; 
Knjiga 6, p.162. ICTY-Martić: E-565 (Statement of Neđeljko Orlić, 1993). Barić, p.226. Radulović, 
Sudbina krajine, p.62. Kovačević, p.121. Srđan Radulovic, 'Friends Behind the Wings', Borba, 
31/8/1992, p.11, in FBIS-EEU-92-191, 1/10/1992. This was one topic on which Dušan Orlović 
declined to elaborate in his interviews with me, stating only that Martić and he disagreed over how to 
organise the Krajina DB. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
57 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2684.E (Documents related to Dušan Orlović); Witness Aco Drača, 
chief of RSK DB (1994-95); Witness JF-039. And: ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-037 (Veljko Džakula), 
T103500-1.
58 For example, Ilija Kojić and Rade Kostić in East Slavonia (see Chapter 8), and Tošo Pajić in Kordun. 
ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: P2404 (List of DB Employees, 1992-96).
59 Details on this can be found in numerous ICTY exhibits, and, in summary, the Perišić Judgement. This 
also applied in other sectors: former Yugoslav diplomat Slobodan Jarčević, who was RSK Foreign 
Minister in 1992-4 and then an advisor to Martić in 1994-95, for example, received his pay from the 
Yugoslav Foreign Ministry the entire time, though Milošević disliked him and Martić was increasingly 
conflicting with Belgrade. Interview Slobodan Jarčević (Belgrade: 2011).
60 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-978 (Statement of MM-003); E-P1554.E; E-P1555.E; Witness DST-043.
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There can also be little doubt that in 1991 the Krajina SUP received funding from the 
Serbian MUP/DB. However, evidence suggests that for much of 1991 the Krajina SUP 
was still short of funds, and they acquired money from a variety of sources, including 
public donations and, later, the JNA.61 Serbia sent plenty of money Krajina's way from 
1991 onwards, and Krajina and the RSK were in fact practically dependent on various 
forms of aid from Serbia.62 But it is probably more accurate to characterise this as 
sought and granted assistance, rather than as part of a financial relationship implying 
vertical subordination.
Thus, although Martić often had a good relationship with Serbian MUP/DB officials in 
Belgrade, and wanted to collaborate with Belgrade on the fulfilment of their joint goals, 
he was far from being their puppet, and from the outset, even in 1991, we can find 
examples showing the DB's lack of influence over him, and of him protecting his 
authority in the Krajina from any encroachments from Belgrade.
The Rise of Martić (1990-91)
Although Martić probably had contact with figures from the Serbian MUP/DB from late 
1990 or early 1991, he followed his own, independent agenda, which until late 1991 
was influenced more by Babić than Belgrade. Stepping back to examine Martić's rise 
from small town cop in 1990 to Krajina Interior Minister in 1991 partly explains this 
situation, as we can see that he arose autonomously, independently of Belgrade, 
developing from the start his own power base in the police and with the public. The 
authors of Balkan Battlegrounds suggest that someone of Martić's low rank must have 
been coached or assisted by the DB;63 but, in fact, Martić just seems to have been one of 
61 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.18 (Babić Interview), pp.27-9. ICTY-Babić: Defence Motion Annex 2 (Witness 
Statements), p.20. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness DST-043. ICTY-Martić: E-68 (RSK MUP, Milan 
Martić report, 19/5/1992). HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, Document 113 (Minutes of Krajina Government, 
1/11/1991), p.256. 'Lički Osik case', Witness Marko Dragičević, chief of Gračac and Korenica SJSs, 
1991-92 (Belgrade: 4/11/2010), p.95, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/.
62 For example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1677 (MoD Serbia, Information on funds provided for aid 
to Serbs in Croatia, 18/11/1991). Stephen Engelberg, 'Serbia Sending Supplies to Compatriots in 
Croatia', New York Times, 27/7/1991.
63 CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds Vol.2, p.26.
Chapter 7: Serbia and the Serbian Rebellion in Krajina: Martić, 'Frenki', 'Captain Dragan' and the  
'Parallel Structure'
310
the many people in the Yugoslav conflicts, like the HDZ rightists Gojko Šušak and 
Tomislav Merčep, who rapidly acquired top functions despite having little relevant 
experience or expertise.
Martić first emerged into the public eye in July 1990, when along with some SDS 
leaders he initiated a petition against changes in the MUP, such as the adoption of 
Croatian emblems. Most of the Knin police signed and it was published in Politika. 
When a MUP delegation led by Boljkovac visited Knin on 5 July in response, Martić 
led the charges against them. Thereafter, working with Babić, he became the unofficial 
leader of the rebels among the Knin police, and, after 17 August in particular, became 
popular as the public face of Knin resistance, famously announcing to a Croatian TV 
reporter in September that ‘this is the people's police [which] is protecting this people... 
and is against the Croatian government which does us harm'.64 Already on 21 August 
1990, when his dismissal by the MUP was announced, several thousand in Knin rallied 
in his defence until he spoke to them.65 In January 1991 his role as lead organiser of the 
resistance was confirmed when the SAOK Executive Council, consisting of presidents 
of the municipalities in SAOK, unanimously appointed him SAOK Minister of Internal 
Affairs.66 MM-003 suggested that Martić was appointed to this position in part because 
of his DB connections. Babić, however, actually testified that he was then unaware of 
any DB connections of Martić and supported him for the post because he was a very 
popular figure, and he did not have an alternative candidate.67
The fact that Martić arose from local circumstances, and had his own power base in the 
police and the public, explains why he was from the start independent of Belgrade. And 
64 ICTY-Martić: E-5; E-13. ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003, T1980. ICTY-Martić: Witness Veljko 
Džakula, T386, 401. Dušan Glavaš, p.29. Erceg, pp.24-8. Martić may also have lead a delegation of 
Knin police to see Federal Interior Minister Petar Gračanin in August 1990. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.1.10 
(Babić Interview), pp.32-3.
65 'Sedmorica za linč', Borba, 22/8/1990, p.3. ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-096, Knin police chief, 1990. 
Similarly: S. Stamatović, 'Pregovori na Plitvicama?', Borba, 5/9/1990, p.3.
66 ICTY-Martić: E-181E (SAOK IV Minutes, 4/1/1991).
67 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1800-1. Vještica explains Martić's rise in the same way: ICTY-
Babić: Defence Motion Annex 2 (Witness Statements), p.18. On Martić's popularity: Srđan Radulović, 
'Ko to korača desnom?', NIN, 1/11/1991, p.19. Dejan Jović, 'Mesić bjezi Tuđmanu', Danas, 4/6/1991, 
p.11-13.
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this power base and popularity, rather than the backing of Belgrade, sufficiently 
explains his successfully withstanding Babić's attempts to remove him. It was also for 
this reason that in 1991 Martić came to be the main leader of the opposition to Babić 
within Krajina.
The 'Parallel Structure' in 1991: the Krajina Opposition
In 1991 a wide variety of different political factions in the Krajina – Rašković, his allies 
and former allies, and some of Babić's former allies – backed Martić in his struggle with 
Babić. From October 1991 Martić and the opposition faction were in open conflict with 
Babić, who was seeking to eliminate both Martić and the power of municipal leaders 
who opposed him (Babić), and various accusations were thrown around by both sides. 
In November 1991 Babić organised the dismissal of two of his prominent critics - 
Krajina vice-premier Dušan Štarević and assembly president Velibor Matijašević. After 
this the main opposition to Babić was borne by Martić and four dissident municipal 
presidents in Dalmatia-Lika – two former Rašković supporters, and two former Babić 
allies.68
Babić lumped all these people together as part of a 'parallel structure' allegedly 
controlled by the DB, though he did not present any evidence that, for example, these 
former Rašković allies were working with the DB. Štarević, for instance, was an SDS 
founder who initially wanted the party to be part of Serbia's opposition Democratic 
Party.69 In July 1991 he helped found the pro-negotiations SDF, and Babić first 
announced his dismissal in relation to that; yet in The Hague he characterised him as 
part of Belgrade's structure.70 Others simply seem to have opposed Babić's autocratic 
68 Srđan Radulović, 'Ko to korača desnom?', NIN, 1/11/1991, p.19. B. Solesa, 'The Subordinate Role 
Separates Fellow Fighters', Borba, 30/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-230, 29/11/1991. HMDC-DR, 
Knjiga 1, p.408.
69 Interview Branko Marijanović, Vice-President of SDS, 1990-91 (Belgrade: 7/11/2007).
70 Srđan Radulović, 'Peacemakers' in Camouflage Uniforms', NIN, 16/8/1991, pp.14-15 in FBIS-EEU-
91-133, 6/9/1991. Obrovac President Sergej Veselinović was also involved in preparations for the 
SDF: Zoran Daskalović, 'Three Serbian Mistakes', Danas, 23/7/1991, in FBIS-EER-91-118, 7/8/1991. 
Interview Milorad Pupovac (Zagreb: 1/10/2009). ICTY-Martić: Witness Veljko Džakula.
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leadership style, which Opačić and others had highlighted as early as May 1990.71 Babić 
himself dated the dissident presidents' membership in this 'parallel structure' to when, in 
May 1991, he tried to sideline Martić and formed a Krajina government composed 
almost entirely of his politically unknown friends and neighbours, mostly from Knin 
itself, providing rather more credible reasons for these SDS stalwarts' dissatisfaction 
with Babić than any orders from Belgrade (reasons which have also been noted by both 
SDS and Croatian sources).72 The fact that Rašković's supporters among these dissidents 
had supported Rašković, despite Belgrade's obvious preference for Babić, and Babić's 
former supporters had supported him over annexation to Serbia in April-May 1991, 
despite Belgrade's opposition to that, also indicates that these people were not simply 
Belgrade's puppets.
It does seem, however, that these people later jockeyed for support from Belgrade, just 
as Babić previously had in his campaign against Rašković. For example, in early 
November 1991 Martić issued a public statement denying Babić's claims that Milošević 
had tried to pressure him to accept autonomy within Croatia, while the dissident 
municipal presidents declared their 'unreserved support' to Milošević as 'the only 
internationally recognised representative of the Serbian people.''73 There is also evidence 
that one of the municipal presidents, former Babić ally Boško Božanić, became close to 
the Serbian DB, as Babić alleged.74
There does also appear to have been some awareness in Belgrade of the opposition to 
Babić within the Krajina and the possibility of using that against him. As early as June 
1991, for example, when there was the controversy over unification with Bosnian 
Krajina, Karadžić suggested to Milošević talking to the large opposition to Babić within 
71 ICTY-Martić: E-988E (Witness Statement of Mile Dakić), p.7. Degoricija, p.209.
72 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić, T13995. ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1592. Lučić & 
Lovrenović, p.36. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Mile Bosnić, T12680. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, 
pp.185.
73 'Krajina Denies Pressure to Accept EC Agreement', Tanjug, 5/11/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-125, 
6/11/1991. Also: Domovina Intercept: B6742 (Karadžić-Milošević, 23/9/1991). Also see: ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Mile Bosnić, T12680.
74 ICTY-Martić: E-663 (SVK security report, 16/2/1993).
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the Krajina: 'I think somebody should go to Knin, gather those people over there and tell 
him in front of them that he can’t do it... stand on the side of the opposition, on the side 
of Štarević and others, and tell him, Babić, either you will work in co-operation with 
others and abide by the law, otherwise don’t expect that we will follow you in your silly 
actions.'75 In October 1991 Karadžić even suggested to Milošević that Stanišić should 
gather together some of the opposition and talk to them, along with himself, to force 
Babić to be more co-operative. Milošević, however, thought that Stanišić 'cannot do 
anything', and spoke of just inviting Babić for talks again.76
Belgrade's campaign to get the Krajina to accept the Vance peace plan in late 1991 and 
early 1992 sheds a lot of light on these relationships. It took some time, to mid-January 
1992, to persuade Martić to shift towards accepting the plan. Even then, Martić denied 
this at a session of the Krajina government, evidently unwilling to fully break ranks.77 
There were also some signs that the dissidents were more open to Belgrade's line. But it 
seems that it was only after Babić's ally (and recent promotion to head of the Krajina 
Assembly) Mile Paspalj finally defected on 2 February 1992 that the dissident 
municipalities – along with most others - declared their support for the settlement.78 
Moreover, although Babić's opponents were more willing to shift (slowly) to Belgrade's 
position, evidence actually points to their lack of co-ordination with Belgrade. After a 
number of failed attempts to convince Babić to accept the plan, in December 1991 the 
Yugoslav Presidency began to invite wider delegations from Krajina to talks, including 
all municipal presidents. The intention was clearly to try to bypass Babić or overcome 
his opposition by talking directly to others in the Krajina, and Milošević said to 
Karadžić at the time that these 'consultations with the presidents of municipalities 
should be supported... we have to strike them.'79 Babić, however, responded by sending 
75 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P395.B.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Milošević, 28/6/1991).
76 Domovina Intercept: C2370 (Karadžić-Milošević, 8/10/1991). ICTY-Milošević: E-P613.87a (Intercept 
Karadžić-Milošević, 9/10/1991).
77 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 4, p.48.
78 'Report Views Situation, Public Opinion in Krajina', Belgrade Radio Network, 13/1/1992, in FBIS-
EEU-92-009, 14/1/1992, Snježana Stamatović, 'There Will Be No Letting Go', Borba, 18/1/1992, 
p.15, in FBIS-EEU-92-023, 4/2/1991. 'Serbian Krajina Communal Presidents Denounce Babić', 
Belgrade RTB Television Network, 4/2/1991, in FBIS-EEU-92-024, 5/2/1991.
79 Domovina Intercept: B6932 (Karadžić-Milošević, 11/12/1991). Also: ICTY-Milošević: E-P613.87a 
Chapter 7: Serbia and the Serbian Rebellion in Krajina: Martić, 'Frenki', 'Captain Dragan' and the  
'Parallel Structure'
314
a delegation of his own choosing, excluding his opponents (apart from Martić).80 One of 
the dissident municipal presidents found out about the second meeting by chance and 
attended, complained, and requested that he and the other dissidents be included.81 But 
at the third meeting on 3 January 1992, and the final, major meeting on 2 February, 
where Paspalj finally defected, they and others were again excluded, as they later 
complained.82 One would think that if these people really were close to Belgrade, 
Belgrade would have been able to at least directly inform them about these meetings.
Thus, although a few of Babić's opponents may have become close to the Serbian DB, 
and there is some evidence that in late 1991 they were jockeying for Belgrade's support, 
this was far from being a 'parallel structure' controlled by Belgrade. In fact, this was an 
opposition faction consisting of people Babić had alienated by his moves against 
Rašković and then Martić, and other behaviour. Belgrade actually largely failed to use 
the opportunity to exploit these rifts, and this Krajina opposition was very much created 
in the Krajina, not Serbia.
Martić did have a good relationship with his counterparts in the Serbian MUP/DB, 
wanted to co-operate with Belgrade and at times was ready to accept the 'advice' of his 
senior colleagues. However, he arose independently as a result of his own actions in 
alliance with the Knin SDS, and with the support of the Krajina public, and does not 
appear to have been Belgrade's puppet. I have not found any instances of Martić 
following instructions from the DB in 1991, and, on the contrary, there are several 
examples that demonstrate their lack of influence over him.
Babić's opposed Martić because he was too independent and a potential rival, rather 
than because of any engagement in a 'parallel structure', and their conflict primarily 
(Intercept Karadžić-Milošević, 9/10/1991).
80 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2364.E (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 9/12/1991), pp.1, 30.
81 ICTY-Perišić: E-P00165.E (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 12/12/1991), pp.84-7.
82 Borisav Jović, op. cit., pp.384-5. ICTY-Milošević: E-D333.2e (SFRJ Presidency minutes, 3/1/1992). 
'Serbian Krajina Communal Presidents Denounce Babić', Belgrade RTB Television Network, 4/2/1991, 
in FBIS-EEU-92-024, 5/2/1991.
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related to Babić's attempts to remove Martić. Martić persisted because he had his own 
power base in the police, as well as the support of many other politicians in Krajina, and 
much of the public. Eventually, in late 1991, this opposition block in the Krajina did 
attempt to align with Belgrade against Babić, but it was not created by the DB, and, 
rather, evidence suggests a distinct lack of co-ordination between them and Belgrade.
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7.2. Golubić, 'Frenki' and 'Captain Dragan'
In April-May 1991 a training camp was founded in Golubić, Knin, and, around the same 
time, the Serbian DB began a permanent mission to the Krajina, led by Franko “Frenki” 
Simatović. Australian Serb émigré Dragan Vasiljković also turned up and became 
actively involved in Golubić, and was soon hyped by the media under his nom de guerre 
'Captain Dragan'. New units were formed after training in Golubić, and from July 1991 
onwards Krajina began active operations against Croatian forces around Krajina.
For the OTP in The Hague, and the makers of the influential Serbian documentary 
'Jedinica', the above facts are all connected, and this whole story is about the Serbian 
DB.83 Golubić is seen as, from the start, a project of the Serbian DB, rather than Krajina, 
designed to create its own secret fighting units: Frenki's 'Red Berets' (publicly known 
initially as the 'Knindže', Knin ninjas). 'Captain Dragan' was allegedly working for the 
DB, and he and Frenki are portrayed as being directly in charge of the Golubić camp 
and the units that came from there. And through this DB line, Krajina's armed forces 
were therefore ultimately subordinate to Milošević, who was directing the fighting from 
Belgrade. 
A lot of evidence was adduced on this issue in The Hague. The story of Golubić, 
Dragan, Frenki and the 'Red Berets' is usually said to show the power and influence of 
the Serbian DB, and the importance of Serbia's role in orchestrating and providing the 
resources for conflict. In fact, this story reveals the opposite: the limited role that Serbia 
played, the constrained role played by the Serbian DB, and how local Krajina structures, 
not Belgrade, were ultimately in charge in the region.
83 See OTP Briefs in Milošević, Martić and Stanišić/Simatović cases, and Filip Švarm, 'Jedinica' (B92 & 
Vreme, 2003), transcript of Episode 1, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.b92.net/specijal/jedinica-
eng/1_epizoda.php  . 
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The Golubić Myth
Firstly, it is important to note that the training camp in Golubić was of much less 
significance than as portrayed by the OTP. Although it probably did contribute to 
greater discipline and organisation on the Krajina side, the camp only provided brief 
training of 2-3 weeks, was only operational for about three months, and not that many 
people actually went through it – the Trial Chamber in the Stanišić/Simatović case 
estimated between 350 and 700, the higher end of which is probably accurate.84
The contribution of Golubić-trained units to the Serbian war effort was also relatively 
minor. A small, twenty man unit from Knin did play a role in spearheading the Banija 
operation in late July 1991, but there were reportedly 2,500 people, locals, involved in 
that operation.85 When the JNA became actively involved on the Serbian side in 
September 1991 it far eclipsed any role played by these 'special units' from Golubić – 
which, in fact, were often just used for political posturing and/or engaged in crime. 
From early 1992 onwards many of these individuals and units were sidelined or even 
arrested, as Martić tended to prefer professional policemen loyal to him over these 
bombastic and often uncontrollable 'first fighters' (prvoborci).86
Various legends and supposedly legendary figures were created in Golubić, who boasted 
for years to come how they had been the first to take up arms against the 'Ustaše'. But 
84 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Judgement (30/5/2013), p.485. ICTY-Milošević: E-P390.4 (Dragan 
comments on Red Beret veterans); E-P392.1a (Additional Statement of Dragan Vasiljković). Interview 
Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
85 Marina Pjevalica, 'I Will Gladly Return to Krajina', Srpski Glas, 23/3/1992, p.6, in FBIS-EER-92-055, 
4/5/1992.
86 For example, the units of Baklajić (discussed earlier) in Korenica, Šilt in Glina, Budisavljević in Lika, 
and specials in Kostajnica/Dubica. Martić favoured people such as Slobodan Vujko and Marko 
Dragičević, who in 1990 were attacked for their involvement in the MUP's removal of arms from 
SJSs, and Ilija Prijić, a professor who had been involved in the SDF in Zagreb. Miloš Vasić, 'Neither 
Unity Nor Law', Vreme, 3/8/1992, pp.18-22, in FBIS-EER-92-110, 19/8/1992. Interviews and email 
correspondence with RSK DB officials Dušan Orlović and Petar Ajdinovic (2009-2011). Dušan 
Glavaš, pp.73-9. ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Nikola Dobrijević; Josip Josipović; E-290 (Statement of 
Josip Josipović, Sisak SUP, 1/4/1992). Various HMDC-DR documents. Transcripts of the 'Lički Osik 
case' (Belgrade), p.95, available from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/. Reports on the 'Baćin case', available 
from: http://www.documenta.hr.
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their significance in the conflict was minor, and the war was conducted mainly by the 
crusty old communist and (comparatively) Yugoslav-orientated officers of the JNA, 
however inconvenient this fact was for their Serbian critics.87
Captain Dragan and the Founding of Golubić
In addition to exaggerating the significance of the Golubić camp and the units it created, 
the OTP seems to have placed far too much emphasis on the role of Captain Dragan, 
and, also, the extent of his links with the Serbian MUP/DB. Despite bombastic 
statements to the press and Serbian media hype about his 'Knindže', Captain Dragan 
never commanded Krajina's armed forces. In fact, he was not even the head of the 
Golubić camp, who was a local, former Croatian special forces member Dragan Karna.88 
Captain Dragan designed the training programme of Golubić and was its chief 
instructor, and he also helped draft the Banija operation in July 1991, as well as a few 
other operations Krajina conducted at that time. He himself only ever commanded one 
unit of about twenty men (the Knindže), however, which he led in action just twice, in 
Lika and Banija.89 Dragan's training programme does not seem to have been especially 
different from that which locals could themselves have organised,90 and a number of 
sources actually suggest that the Golubić camp had already started running in some 
form prior to the arrival of both Dragan and the DB team.91
This strongly indicates that Golubić was founded by locals, rather than Belgrade. 
Krajina sources explain that the founding of Golubić as a local decision taken by the 
Krajina leadership of Babić and Martić, after the Plitvice clashes of 31 March 1991 
showed the inadequacy of Krajina forces.92 On 1 April 1991 Babić had ordered the 
87 Prelec makes a similar point on the 'tiny' role of DB-connected units in Bosnia compared to the 
Bosnian Serb military: Prelec, p.367.
88 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: T11310-11. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
89 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković, T16714.
90 See evidence cited in ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Simatović Defence Final Brief (15/2/2013), pp.23, 83.
91 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses JF-031; Goran Opačić. ICTY-Martić: Witness Stevo Plejo. 
Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
92 For example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses Mile Bosnić; JF-041; DST-043; Aco Drača. ICTY-
Karadžić: Witness Milan Martić. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
Chapter 7: Serbia and the Serbian Rebellion in Krajina: Martić, 'Frenki', 'Captain Dragan' and the  
'Parallel Structure'
319
mobilisation of the TO across Krajina and registration of volunteers for defence.93 But at 
the time no Krajina TO existed, and it was not formed until the summer, so it seems 
logical that this alternative was sought in the meantime.
Dragan's engagement in this project, on the other hand, did come in large part through 
contacts he had established in Belgrade. Dragan had visited the Krajina previously and 
had ideas of training Krajina forces, and was trying to get support for this in Belgrade. 
He does seem to have won some support, and/or his ideas coincided with thoughts in 
Belgrade of creating new Serbian units through the MUP/DB.94 Dragan established 
contact with Serbian Minister for Energy Nikola Šainović, and then secured a meeting 
at the Serbian MUP, where he met with Frenki (and possibly also Minister Bogdanović). 
Frenki and Dragan met twice, and then sometime in April or early May 1991 Dragan set 
off for Krajina, in the same car as Frenki and his deputy 'Fića'.95
Evidence suggests that Bogdanović was impressed with Dragan's proposal and gave it 
his support - but also that the DB had a more cautious attitude towards him.96 Stanišić 
later told Hague investigators that Bogdanović ordered that they take him to the Krajina 
anyway.97 However, there was another element to this story, too: Dragan's contacts with 
people within the Krajina, which he had already visited twice that spring, meeting with 
Martić and the president of Benkovac, Zdravko Zečević.98 Dragan testified that he didn't 
hear back from the Serbian DB regarding his proposals, got fed up of waiting, and then, 
93 ICTY-Milošević: E-P352.38 (Order of Milan Babić, 1/4/1991).
94 As suggested by: ICTY-Milošević: E-P393 ('By God, We Shall Fight', NIN, 12/4/1991). ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-P3251 (Official Note, DB Serbia, 12/4/1991)
95 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković; E-P392a & E-P392.1a (Statements of Dragan 
Vasiljković). ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P3251 (Official Note, DB Serbia, 12/4/1991); E-P2403.E 
(Decision Re: Franko Simatović, 18/3/1992); E-P2487.E (Decision Re: Dragan Filipović, 18/3/1992); 
E-P2723.E (Decision Re: Milan Radonjić, 18/3/1992); D-117 (Knin TV report); Judgement 
(30/5/2013), pp.465-7. Šešelj, Đavolov segrt, p.464. ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1540.
96 Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, pp.73-81. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P3251 (Official Note, DB 
Serbia, 12/4/1991); E-183.E (Decision, MUP Serbia, 15/8/1991). Witness Aco Drača. ICTY-
Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković, T16473.
97 Šešelj, Đavolov segrt, p.464. Also see: S.K., 'Niko ne prizanje greške', Intervju, 17/4/1992, pp.47-8. 
ICTY-Milošević: E-P643.4 (JNA OB report on Daniel Snedden, 28/8/1991); E-P568.9a (The Serbian 
Army, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.98-108.
98 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses Goran Opačić, Aco Drača, Dejan Lučić. Interview Dušan Orlović 
(Belgrade: 7/2009).
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on the appeal of a Krajina DB member he had got to know, Saša Medaković, resolved to 
go to the Krajina anyway. Frenki initially reacted negatively - 'He said, 'You're trying to 
kill yourself,' probably thinking that he would... dissuade me' - but subsequently offered 
to travel with him.99 This account is also supported by some contemporary comments of 
Dragan.100 Frenki drove Dragan to Medaković's in Knin, and Medaković then brought 
Dragan to Golubić, where Babić, Martić and Orlović agreed to his proposals and 
appointed him.101
Although the exact nature of Dragan's relationship with the DB remains hazy, and it is 
clear from his removal in August 1991 (discussed later) that the DB could have some 
influence on him, it is also clear that he was not simply a DB agent, and had 
independently involved himself in these events. Until spring 1991 he was actively 
involved in Serbia's main opposition party, the SPO, was subject to DB surveillance in 
Belgrade both before and after his involvement in Krajina, and even after Golubić 
clashed with the DB. He subsequently founded several more camps completely 
independently of them.102 And although Dragan won some approval in the Serbian MUP 
for his proposals in April 1991, his contacts in the Krajina also played an important role 
in his appearance there.
This is borne out by the testimonies of both Martić and Babić. Martić has said that he 
did not know whether Dragan was connected to the DB, as he was not interested in that, 
but did consider his arrival part of Serbia's response to Babić's requests for expert 
assistance. Golubić was founded by Martić/Krajina, however.103 Babić, meanwhile, 
99 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković, T16477.
100 Dusko Doder, 'The 'Rambo from Knin' drills his Serb guerrillas thoroughly for war against Croatia', 
The Baltimore Sun, 8/8/1991. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D298 (Aleksandra Plaveški, 'The Captain 
and his Kninjas', 7/1991).
101 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković; E-P392a & E-P392.1a (Statements of Dragan 
Vasiljković). ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1822. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
102 See testimonies and statements of Dragan Vasiljković, and, for example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-
P3251 (Official Note, DB Serbia, 12/4/1991); E-183.E (Decision, MUP Serbia, 15/8/1991); E-P1178 
(Document related to 107th Alfa Training Centre). Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Drugi deo (Belgrade: 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka, 2010), p.315. ICTY-Tolimir: E-P1416.E (Mladić Diary, 27/5/1992-
31/7/1992), pp.243-72.
103 ICTY-Karadžić: Witness Milan Martić, T38125, 38149-51, 38166.
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despite trying to paint Dragan as part of the DB's 'parallel structure', himself said that at 
the time he regarded Dragan as an SPO activist and military professional who had come 
to help, and it was only when he was leaving in August 1991 that he 'grasped that he 
was a part of the system of [the] DB of Serbia'.104
The evidence thus suggests that the creation of Golubić followed local decisions by 
Krajina structures. Belgrade gave its support, following Babić's requests for assistance, 
and it was partly through his contacts in Belgrade that Dragan acquired his position in 
the Krajina. Dragan was not simply a DB agent, however, and his own contacts within 
the Krajina partly explain his appointment there. His own role in Krajina, and the role of 
the Golubić camp, was also considerably less than that suggested in The Hague.
The DB Mission to Krajina
Around April-May 1991 the Serbian DB began a permanent mission to the Knin 
Krajina, with a three member team consisting of Frenki, Dragan Filipović “Fića”, and 
Milan Radonjić “Meda”. In the ICTY Frenki was portrayed as the commander and 
creator of the Golubić camp and the units that came from it, particularly the Knindže, 
and of the whole 'parallel structure': Martić, Dragan, etcetera. The evidence presented at 
The Hague, and elsewhere, including from the OTP's own 'insider' witnesses, however, 
suggests a more nuanced picture.
It appears that Frenki came to the Krajina with a broadly defined mission and may have 
independently involved himself in certain matters. Dragan has recalled that Frenki was 
campaigning within the MUP for a certain approach to be taken, supporting Serbian 
special units, and looking for ways to get involved personally: 'it seemed that Frenki 
was trying to see how he could get involved in the Krajina... I would ask Frenki for 
support and he would tell me that it just was not possible to do it officially'.105 Frenki's 
104 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.18 (Babić Interview), pp.48-51. ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1540-1.
105 ICTY-Milošević: E-P392a & E-P392.1a (Statements of Dragan Vasiljković). And: Filip Švarm, 
'Jedinica' (B92 & Vreme, 2003), transcript of Episode 1, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
Chapter 7: Serbia and the Serbian Rebellion in Krajina: Martić, 'Frenki', 'Captain Dragan' and the  
'Parallel Structure'
322
deputy Fića, meanwhile, has described how they were given a very broad mandate, 
primarily relating to gathering intelligence, and autonomy to do this as they saw fit, 
with few direct instructions from Belgrade.106
At least part of the purpose of the DB's mission was to provide Belgrade with 
intelligence on what was going on in the region.107 Frenki also served, as one 
contemporary source describes him, as 'the chief representative of the Serbian MUP' in 
Knin, co-ordinating assistance from the Serbian state.108 Babić and Martić also seem to 
have understood the DB's mission at least partly as the expert assistance to the Krajina 
SUP which Babić had requested from Milošević (and which Bogdanović recalled 
having provided).109 And, indeed, upon their arrival Frenki and Fića de-bugged Krajina 
offices and buildings, something which the Krajina DB did not have the expertise to do, 
while Fića provided training for several Krajina DB operatives.110
To assist in intelligence, Frenki was sent the daily reports of the Krajina MUP, DB and 
TO (as were Babić, Martić, and other leading personnel).111 Krajina DB chief Orlović 
maintains that they wanted to inform Serbia of what (in their view) was happening, and 
claims that the Serbian DB men were actually dependent on Krajina's collaboration and 
assistance.112 Fića's account supports this, as he describes how, initially, he could do 
nothing in the region, stonewalled by suspicious locals until Orlović assisted him.113
http://www.b92.net/specijal/jedinica-eng/1_epizoda.php.
106 Filipović, pp.48-57.
107 Filipović, pp.48-9.
108 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2615 (Statement of Milenko Sučević, 7/5/1992); Witness JF-039. ICTY-
Martić: E-499 (Report by Frenki, 28/7/1991).
109 Svetislav Spasojević, 'The Man Who Disappeared', NIN, 18/12/1992, pp.18-21, in FBIS-EEU-93-010, 
15/1/1993. ICTY-Karadžić: Witness Milan Martić. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P404 (Interview with 
Radmilo Bogdanović, Duga, 12/2/1993).
110 Filipović, p.49. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). ICTY-Milošević: Witness Milan Babić. 
ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003. Also: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2615 (Statement of Milenko 
Sučević, 7/5/1992)
111 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). This in itself suggests Babić's consent to his mission at 
the time, as it was he who was establishing the Krajina TO.
112 Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
113 Filipović, p.50.
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Contradictory evidence was given in The Hague on the precise role of Frenki in 
Golubić. Frenki was not at the meeting in Golubić where Dragan was appointed, but 
Babić claimed that a month or so later Frenki gave him a tour of the camp, as a 'host and 
the person in charge... the boss.'114 MM-003 also claimed that Frenki oversaw the camp 
and was involved in selecting personnel, promotions, and so forth. Prosecution witness 
JF-031, one of the first commanders at Golubić, however, maintained that Frenki and 
the Serbian DB had no role there at the time, and he did not even see or hear of Frenki 
until June or July 1991, though he could have been involved in the decision to create the 
camp.115 (And a number of Stanišić/Simatović defence witnesses, of course, denied that 
Frenki was involved.) JF-031 and MM-003, as well as few contemporary documents, do 
suggest that Frenki had some involvement in the overall command structure in Krajina 
in June/July 1991, along with Martić and Dragan.116 However, MM-003 was clear that 
Frenki was beneath Martić in this structure, and claimed that Martić began to get 
annoyed with Frenki's attempts to increase his influence. JF-031 also testified that 
Frenki came below Martić, though they would usually agree on matters prior to 
meetings.
On 8 June 1991 Martić organised a demonstrative march of all the troops from 
Golubić117 to neighbouring Drvar in Bosnia, much to the ire of Karadžić and 
Milošević.118 This suggests either Frenki's lack of authority over/involvement with 
Martić and Golubić, or an absence of close co-ordination between Frenki and Belgrade, 
or, most probably, a mixture of the two.
In addition, contrary to OTP's portrayal of the situation in The Hague, there does not 
actually seem to have been a unified system of command across Krajina at the time. 
Only one or two special units from Golubić, consisting of a few dozen men, appear to 
114 ICTY-Krajišnik:Witness Milan Babić, T3378.
115 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses JF-039, JF-031.
116 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P979 (Order by Frenki, 16/6/1991); E-P1179 (Report from Daniel 
Snedden to DB); E-P2673 (Armoured Vehicles project, 21/6/1991). ICTY-Martić: E-622 (Agreement 
on Further Work, Golubić, 14/6/1991).
117 ICTY-Martić: Witness MM-003, T2196.
118 Domovina Intercept: B6549 (Karadžić-Milošević, 11/6/1991).
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have been under the direct command of Knin, with most who trained there usually 
returning to local command structures in their own areas.119 Municipal and party 
leaderships had a strong influence on the DB, police, special forces and territorial 
defence in each municipality, and in many respects they were only loosely 
associated/co-ordinating with Knin. This was particularly the case for the territorial 
defence, which was only being formed on the level of Krajina that July, and the region 
of Banija-Kordun, whose police did not even formally join the Krajina SUP until June-
July 1991. There were a few direct actions from Golubić that summer, but also plenty of 
other fighting erupting at the time, with local defence units and territorial defence.120 
Thus, even Martić and Babić were not directing all the fighting in the region, let alone 
Frenki or Dragan.
MM-003 and Babić also describe how Frenki involved himself with the construction of 
an armoured train in Knin, to be used in fighting, and a document on this project dated 
21 June 1991 is indeed signed by Frenki.121 This in itself indicates that Frenki was 
involving himself in pet projects, rather than having a precise role determined by 
Belgrade, as it is difficult to see why Belgrade would have viewed this as a priority. 
Numerous sources, including Babić himself, also confirm that this train was 
commanded by a local (Blagoje Guška) and constructed with local resources, with 
Babić actually describing how Frenki pestered him with requests to assign resources for 
its construction.122 And in the end only one train was built, rather than the three 
envisaged in the document. All this indicates Frenki's lack of resources and subordinate 
position in Krajina structures.
119 See, for example: ICTY-Milošević: E-P392a & E-P392.1a (Statements of Dragan Vasiljković). ICTY-
Martić: E-568 (Report on the work of Dvor Special Unit, 18/6/1991-7/4/1992); E-600 (Requests to 
give legitimate status to Special Unit Kostajnica, 30/9/1991).
120 For example, see: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D109 (Report on Benkovac TO, 25/11/1991), and 
SAOK TO daily reports in Stanišić/Simatović case and HMDC-DR, Knjiga 1.
121 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2673 (Armoured Vehicles project, 21/6/1991).
122 ICTY-Martić: Witness Milan Babić, T1545. ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.18 (Babić Interview), pp.25-6. 
ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1161 (Politika, 19/9/1991); E-D299 (Report of the Association of Serbs 
from Croatia, 8/8/1991).
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Golubić and the Red Berets
In The Hague, the OTP argued that the formation of the Golubić camp in spring 1991 
was the result of a decision by the Serbian MUP to secretly form special fighting units 
of the Serbian DB, later known as the 'Red Berets'.123 A key piece of evidence for this is 
a ceremony held by the 'Red Berets' in their camp in Kula, Serbia, in 1997. Before 
Milošević and others Frenki gave a speech about the history of the unit, dating its 
formation to 4 May 1991. Milošević greeted its veterans, and various awards were 
given, including to Captain Dragan.124
The 1997 ceremony gives a very misleading impression of the unit, however. Part of the 
purpose of this event was to impress Milošević at a time when his relationship with 
Stanišić and the DB was  poor, and Frenki's speech greatly exaggerated the contribution 
of the 'Red Berets' to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia.125 Frenki said, for example, that 
from October 1991 'the unit provided important support in the liberation of all areas of 
the Republic of Serbian Krajina', with 'around 5,000 soldiers' being co-ordinated by the 
unit command.126 The OTP's own case at the ICTY, however, was that at that stage the 
core of 'the unit' consisted of just 20-30 people in a camp in Serbia, who ventured to the 
front just once, at the request of the JNA. There were a few other units that were 
connected with the Serbian DB at the time, such as Baklajić's unit in Korenica, but their 
numbers and roles were similarly small. Nor is Dragan's attendance at the ceremony 
proof that he was a DB agent, as the ceremony was attended by numerous people who 
had nothing to do with the 'Red Berets', including leading figures from the former JNA 
123 See, for example, OTP Final Briefs in Stanišić/Simatović and Martić cases, and Babić plea agreement.
124 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P61.E (Kula Camp Video, 1997), p.10; E-P1075 (VJ report on DB 
paramilitaries).
125 The effort does not seem to have succeeded, as the 'Red Berets' were subsequently greatly cut back in 
size, and Frenki's role in the unit partly severed. ICTY-Milošević: Witness Radomir Marković, T8698. 
Šešelj, Đavolov segrt, p.536.
126 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P61.E (Kula Camp Video, 1997), p.10.
Chapter 7: Serbia and the Serbian Rebellion in Krajina: Martić, 'Frenki', 'Captain Dragan' and the  
'Parallel Structure'
326
who had opposed them.127 If they had managed to arrive slightly earlier, a group of 
people who had left the unit in 1992 would even have been included.128
The mythology of 'the unit' traced it back to the Knindže, where its members all started 
out and first became acquainted. But the idea that Golubić was about forming the 'Red 
Berets' really makes little sense. Serbia allegedly formed this unit in Krajina, creating it 
mainly of people from that region, in order to hide its links to this top secret unit. But 
Krajina was an area heavily exposed to both Croatian and JNA intelligence, and Golubić 
was never a secret - from its very opening it was heavily publicised to boost Krajina 
morale.129 When Frenki took over the unit from Dragan in autumn 1991 it was precisely 
to Serbia that he took them, establishing a camp in Vojvodina which was, 
unsurprisingly, not publicly announced.130 To entrust such a top secret project to a 
former émigré and opposition activist who was subject to DB surveillance (Captain 
Dragan), after meeting him just one or two times, would also, frankly, be rather bizarre.
When Captain Dragan left the Krajina in August 1991, he told his Knindže to follow 
Frenki, as the only person there whom he trusted. The unit was then partially disbanded, 
as its members were angry with Babić and unwilling to serve him.131 Frenki 
subsequently took twenty or thirty of these men to Korenica, and then Serbia. Frenki 
had obviously got to know these men in this period, but it seems that they only became 
the 'Red Berets' after their time in Knin. Key Prosecution witness JF-031, a founding 
member of the 'Red Berets', was adamant on this fact, as was Dragan.132 Morever, 
although continuity of 'the unit' was always claimed from the Knindže to the 'Red 
Berets', its composition in fact changed significantly. None of the commanding 
personnel of the Golubić camp appear to have had a future in the Serbian DB, for 
127 For example: Aleksandar Vasiljević, Petar Gračanin who was involved in the arrest of the Red Berets 
in Brčko in 1992, etcetera. ICTY-Milošević: E-P390.5.
128 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness JF-031.
129 Degoricija p.87. Srđan Radulović, 'Poslednje smotre', NIN, 5/7/1991, pp.26-7.
130 See testimonies and statements of Dragan Vasiljković, and JF-031.
131 See testimonies and statements of Dragan Vasiljković, and JF-031, and: Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči  
deo, pp.135-6. Marina Pjevalica, 'I Will Gladly Return to Krajina', Srpski Glas, 23/3/1992, p.6, in 
FBIS-EER-92-055, 4/5/1992. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1070.
132 Also: ICTY-Karadžić: Witness Milan Martić, T38161-2.
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example,133 and of the three key leaders of Frenki's unit, only one had been a leading 
man in the Knindže.134
In summary, Frenki had a somewhat ambiguous and multi-faceted role in Krajina in 
1991: providing intelligence to Belgrade, supporting the training and formation of 
Krajina special units, co-ordinating assistance, and probably having some influence on 
command structures, as well as involving himself in projects such as the armoured train. 
Rather than a concrete decision in Belgrade to form a special unit of the Serbian DB 
under Frenki in spring 1991, it seems there was a decision to support the training of the 
Krajina police and their formation of special units. There may also have been thinking 
about forming a unit of the DB, which Frenki probably advocated – Dragan recalls that 
'Frenki had the idea to form the [DB's Red Berets]' and 'lobbied for a long time and 
fought to get permission for it' - but this did not come to fruition until later, after 
Frenki's time in Knin.135
The Expulsion of Dragan and Frenki
In early August 1991 both Dragan and Frenki were removed from the Krajina after 
clashing with Babić. Both then lost whatever functions they had had, and Frenki would 
thereafter only occasionally visit the region rather than being permanently based there. 
Although it was partly via Belgrade that the two were removed, these events clearly 
show that the local Krajina authorities were more powerful than Frenki and Dragan at 
the time.
The conflicts that led to Dragan and Frenki's expulsion erupted mainly on the Babić-
Dragan axis, and do not seem to have concerned, for example, attacks on Croats. In fact, 
at the end of July 1991 the first significant mass crime took place against Croats in 
133 ICTY-Martić: E-622 (Agreement on Further Work, Golubić, 14/6/1991).
134 ICTY-Milošević: E-P390.4 (Dragan comments on Red Beret veterans).
135 Filip Švarm, 'Jedinica' (B92 & Vreme, 2003), transcript of Episode 1, accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.b92.net/specijal/jedinica-eng/1_epizoda.php  . 
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Krajina – the murder of a number of Croat civilians in Dvor – and Dragan and his 
Knindže arrested the suspected perpetrators. This seems to have been controversial in 
Dvor. Martić subsequently had them released on the grounds that Dragan had not had 
the authority to arrest them, though no investigation seems to have followed. Several 
sources confirm that Dragan considered this a major mistake. It is unclear what role, if 
any, Babić had in this, but at the time of his departure from Krajina Dragan gave this as 
one of the reasons he and Babić had fallen out. (The Serb commander in Dvor, Bogdan 
Vajagić, had also been forced into resigning by the criminals; in The Hague Babić 
identified him as the chief exponent of the 'parallel structure' in the region.)136
Aside from this, Dragan and Babić's disagreements arose over fairly minor matters 
connected to power and control. Dragan was an independent figure and acquiring a 
popular profile, not something that Babić would be happy about, and had begun to 
display increasing insubordination towards Babić. Already in June 1991 there was an 
incident where the JNA demanded Dragan stop field training in a certain area. Babić 
assented, but Dragan openly argued with Babić and refused his orders. After the Banija 
operation Dragan then gave a speech in Knin that was openly critical of Babić and the 
SDS.137 Babić also explained that a key trigger for their conflict was when Dragan 
diverted some arms that Babić had arranged to be delivered to his own men.138 Dragan 
next found that Babić had replaced his soldiers in Knin fortress and banned entry to 
him; Dragan ordered them to leave.139 Babić subsequently made it clear that Dragan had 
to go, accusing him of a coup and trying to take over the territorial defence.140 Dragan 
left, and, with the Golubić camp shutting down, advised his Knindže to follow Frenki. It 
was then, Babić says, that he realised Frenki and Dragan were in this together, and he 
136 See testimony and statements of Dragan Vasiljković, and ICTY-Martić: Witness Van Lynden; E-P587-
8 (Reports on Dvor operation, 26-28/7/1991). Dan Stets, 'Mysterious Figure Is Serbia's Top Hero 
'Captain Dragan': Fighter, Humanitarian.', The Philadelphia Inquirer, 19/6/1993. Sydney Morning 
Herald, 18/8/1991.
137 ICTY-Martić: E-590 (Captain Dragan Speech, 31/7/1991). ICTY-Babić: Defence Motion Annex 2 
(Witness Statements, p.20. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses Aco Drača; Mile Bosnić. Interview 
Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
138 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković, T16599-600.
139 Testimonies of Babić, Dragan, DST-043, and Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009).
140 HMDC-DR, Knjiga 2, p.206.
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also seems to have felt threatened by those men, who were angry with him for 
disbanding Golubić and expelling Dragan. Babić phoned Milošević and demanded that 
he withdraw Frenki from the Krajina; Frenki, too, then left.141 As noted, Martić was also 
apparently not unhappy to see Dragan and Frenki leave.
In early August 1991 Stanišić came to Knin in connection with the conflicts then 
erupting between Krajina officials, and Babić recalls him trying to smooth relations 
between him and Martić.142 (According to Fića, Milošević emphasised the absolute 
priority of preventing Serb-Serb clashes.)143 Dragan later testified that Frenki told him to 
go to Belgrade to meet Stanišić, who banned him from returning to Krajina. Stanišić 
also told Hague investigators that he had gone to Knin to withdraw Dragan.144 
Numerous sources, however, indicate that the principal reasons for Dragan's departure 
were local, concerning his clashes with Babić, something the DB thus merely relayed to 
Dragan.145 Dragan had also already announced he was leaving Krajina before receiving 
this ban in Belgrade – a ban which he did not entirely respect, either, briefly visiting the 
region again in November (to Babić's consternation), and returning more permanently in 
1993. Thus, although the DB was involved in Dragan's departure from Krajina, it was 
above all thanks to his conflict with locals, in particular Babić, that he (and then Frenki) 
was pushed out.146
After Frenki's removal the Serbian DB did still have a presence in Korenica, and a camp 
was set up there as Golubić was closing, in co-operation with Korenica SO president 
141 Babić interviews and testimonies. Supported by: ICTY-Stanišić: Witness DST-043, T12949-50. ICTY-
Babić: Defence Motion Annex 2 (Witness Statements), p.2.
142 Babić interviews and testimonies. And: Domovina Intercept: B6636 (Karadžić-Stanišić, 7/8/1991). 
ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dragan Vasiljković, T16501.
143 Filipović, p.57.
144 Šešelj, Đavolov segrt, p.475.
145 For example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness JF-039; Aco Drača; Mile Bosnić; DST-043; E-P1062 
(JNA OB report, information on Daniel Snedden, 28/8/1991). Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, 
pp.135-6. Interview Dušan Orlović (Belgrade: 7/2009). ICTY-Babić: Defence Motion Annex 2 
(Witness Statements), pp.18-20. Filip Švarm et al, 'Put bez povratka, Vreme, 18/10/2001. Srđan 
Radulović, 'Peacemakers' in Camouflage Uniforms', NIN, 16/8/1991, pp.14-15 in FBIS-EEU-91-133, 
6/9/1991. Some external factors can be found in: ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a (The Serbian Army, 
Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), pp.98-108. Šešelj, Đavolov segrt, p.475.
146 Babić interviews and testimonies, and ICTY-Milošević: E-P392a & E-P392.1a (Statements of Dragan 
Vasiljković).
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Boško Božanić, who was opposed to Babić and appears to have had a good relationship 
with the Serbian DB. According to Babić, Milošević later in August asked him to allow 
Frenki to return to Krajina, and Babić relented. Frenki appears to have only occasionally 
visited thereafter, however, and was no longer permanently based in the region.147
The expulsion of Dragan and Frenki from the Krajina showed that the Krajina 
structures, Babić and Martić, were decisive in the region. Whatever influence Dragan 
and Frenki had briefly had largely ended then.148 This is not to say, however, that 
Belgrade thereafter had no influence over Krajina Serb forces. From August 1991 
onwards the SFRJ Presidency organised a number of ceasefires in Croatia, which 
Krajina officials usually assented to and declared they were implementing (sometimes 
after demands from Belgrade).149 Several Karadžić phone intercepts also shed light on 
these relationships. In early September Milošević and the JNA strongly supported a 
ceasefire due to the coming Hague peace conference, and on 6 September Milošević 
expressed his exasperation to Karadžić at controlling radicals: 'They're working all the 
time. I've just checked. The 7th Banija [Division] wants to attack Kostajnica, so I told 
them: “Fuck off. Tomorrow's a peace conference and you're attacking Kostajnica.”... we 
have to enforce discipline.'150 The attack on Kostajnica does indeed appear to have been 
postponed by a few days, by which point Milošević may have endorsed it – on 10 
September he discussed with Karadžić how there were 'very good results' there.151 Some 
willingness to listen to Belgrade on a tactical ceasefire, however, is a far cry from 
everything being closely directed from Serbia. An intercept in mid-October 1991 also 
points to Krajina forces' autonomy from Serbia, as Karadžić, talking about Babić with 
an associate, noted how 'he sets his mind and won’t listen... They stopped a train full of 
147 ICTY-Martić: Witnesses Milan Babić; MM-003; E-565 (Statement of Neđeljko Orlić, 1993). ICTY-
Stanišić-Simatović: JF-031. Filipović confirms he was present in Korenica to the end of 1991, and 
Orlović confirms that this camp was set up with Božanić: Filipović, p.57. Interview Dušan Orlović 
(Belgrade: 7/2009).
148 Though Frenki would return, in a different capacity, in 1994-95.
149 For example: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D366 (MoD Serbia, Order, 18/9/1991).
150 Domovina Intercept: B6672/B6959 (Karadžić-Milošević, 6/9/1991).
151 Domovina Intercept: C2536 (Karadžić-Milošević, 10/9/1991). Adžić, on the other hand, opposed the 
attack on Kostajnica and considered its perpetrators people 'who listen to no-one'. Perhaps Milošević 
and the JNA differed here. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1513 (Mladić-Adžić recording, 13/9/1991).
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women and children. I beg him, Milošević is asking me to beg him, to let the train go. 
You remember the incident.'152 It would, clearly, be absurd for Milošević to ask Karadžić 
to beg Babić to get Krajina forces to release this train, if those forces were in fact 
controlled by Milošević's 'parallel structure', over which Babić had no influence.
Thus, although evidence varies on the precise extent to which Frenki had influence in 
the Krajina, and to which Dragan was associated with the Serbian DB, it seems clear, 
particularly from their expulsion in August 1991, that Martić and Babić were always 
more powerful. The influence and significance of Dragan and Frenki has been in many 
respects exaggerated in The Hague, as has the significance of the Golubić camp, which 
seems to have been as much, if not more, a local decision and project as one decided on 
in Serbia. Far from showing the power of the Serbian DB and a 'parallel structure', these 
escapades in fact reveal the limited role of the Serbian DB, and that Babić and Martić 
were ultimately in charge in the Krajina. Belgrade may have been able to pressure the 
Krajina Serbs to agree to a temporary ceasefire, but Milošević or the DB were not 
controlling or directing Krajina Serb forces as is often alleged.
152 ICTY-Krajišnik: E-P154.15.A.1 (Intercept Karadžić-Vukić-Grahovac-Sendić, 16/10/1991).
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7.3. Conclusions
In 1991 Serbia had greater, and more direct, influence on the security/defence apparatus 
in the Krajina than on its politics. Martić was more willing to listen to and collaborate 
with Belgrade than Babić, and Serbian DB agent Frenki had some traction in the 
security sector in the region that summer.
The extent of Serbia's influence has, however, been exaggerated. The Serbian DB was 
not directing the fighting in the region, in summer 1991 or later, and Frenki's role was 
largely eliminated when Babić demanded his removal that August. 'Captain Dragan' was 
also removed following local demands, and his own influence prior to that, as well as 
his connections with the Serbian DB, have been overstated in The Hague. Martić 
himself was not a creation of Serbia/the DB, but rose to prominence locally, had his 
own power base and conducted his politics independently, actually clashing with 
Belgrade even in 1991. His clashes with Babić in 1991, meanwhile, seem to have 
simply been a power struggle, rather than about Martić's engagement in any 'parallel 
structure' attacking Croats.
This is not to say that Serbia had no influence at all. It was capable of, for example, 
persuading the Krajina Serbs to accept tactical ceasefires. By late 1991 the opposition to 
Babić within Krajina was apparently also jostling for Belgrade's support, and in January 
1992 Martić was the first to convert to accepting the Vance plan as Belgrade demanded. 
But this is far from the image of Milošević directing everything going on in the region, 
via a 'parallel structure' or some other means. If we want to understand developments in 
the security/defence sphere in Krajina in 1990-91, we should, again, look above all at 
Krajina and Croatia, decisions taken in Knin by Babić and Martić, and the interplay 
between the actions of Krajina and Croatia.
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Chapter 8: Eastern Slavonia
In 1991 there were three Serbian autonomous regions (Srpske autonomne oblasti, 
SAOs) that would go on to unite and form the RSK: Krajina, Western Slavonia and 
Eastern Slavonia. It is natural to focus on developments in the Krajina, the main Serb-
populated region within Croatia, because it was here that the Serbian rebellion began 
and most of the key Serbian leaders of the time came from. Western Slavonia, by 
contrast, was mostly occupied by Croatian forces already in 1991 and would not play a 
particularly significant role in RSK politics. But what about Eastern Slavonia, the other 
key region of the RSK? As we shall see, the situation there differed substantially from 
that in Krajina – here, in fact, the available evidence largely supports the conclusion that 
local Serbs fell under the decisive influence or control of Serbia, particularly in the 
security sector.
Slavonia is a large region encompassing most of northern Croatia, which in its east 
borders Vojvodina/Serbia. The eastern-most municipalities of Slavonia contained a 
considerable Serbian population in 1991, but the region was very mixed, with little 
contiguous 'Serb' territory, and predominantly Croat or other nationality (mostly 
Hungarian) villages inbetween the predominantly Serb ones. None of the municipalities 
in the region had an absolute or even relative Serbian majority, and in the whole Eastern 
Slavonia region that was occupied by Serbian forces in 1991 only 34.9% of the 
population was Serbian, Croats forming a relative majority (44.5%) of the population.1
In Slavonia the SKH had strong roots and the SDS had not even formed there by the 
time of the 1990 elections.2 It was only gradually, over the course of the following year, 
that more and more Serbs affiliated with the SDS. Even in spring 1991 there were still 
1 Data from: Dražen Živić, 'Basic Demographic Characteristics of the Displaced Population from the 
Croatian East', Društvena istraživanja, Vol.6, No.28-29 (Zagreb: 1997), pp.195-216. Kubo, 'The 
Radicalisation and Ethnicization of Elections'. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Final Report of the United 
Nations Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (27/5/1994).
2 Interview Vojislav Vukčević (Belgrade: 2007). Miškulin, 'Stranka ugroženog naroda...', p.23.
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many former SKH Serb representatives active in the region, espousing more moderate 
stances and trying to avoid inter-ethnic conflict, while, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
SDS in Eastern Slavonia was also much more moderately inclined than in Krajina, and 
affiliated with Rašković rather than Babić.3
A key reason for the SDS's relative moderation in the region was the fact that Serbs 
there were in the minority, and lacked their own rebel region (though this, of course, 
was also a consequence of their moderation). Lacking a majority in any single 
municipality, it was not easy to form a base of resistance, rebellion and secession, as had 
been done in the Krajina, while the way in which the predominantly Serb settlements 
were dotted around and non-contiguous meant that until war operations began in August 
1991 there was no real Serbian territory as such, just different villages with their own 
armed guards and other forces, with rival Croatian villages and forces inbetween. 
Thanks to the twin factors of relative moderation and lack of a municipal majority, 
when Serbia got more involved in Croatia, in spring, summer and autumn 1991, 
everything – political structures, military structures, the police – was much less 
established in Eastern Slavonia than in SAOK, and this led to Serbian officials 
occupying a much more significant and decisive role in the region. The proximity of 
Eastern Slavonia to Serbia also played a role in this.
3 ICTY-Dokmanović: Witness Milenko Milinković. ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Veljko Džakula, Vojislav 
Vukčević, Goran Hadžić, Borivoje Savić.
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8.1. The Political Leadership of Eastern Slavonia: Goran 
Hadžić
The key political leader of Eastern Slavonia in 1991 was Goran Hadžić. Hadžić had 
been a member of the SKH and in spring 1990 was elected to Vukovar SO on their list. 
He subsequently joined the SDS, however, and was elected founding president of its 
Vukovar branch in June 1990, as well as being a vice-president of the SDS's regional 
board for Slavonia, formed later that year.4 In January 1991 an SNV of Slavonia was 
formed, and he was its main local leader, formally becoming its president in March 
1991.5 At the end of June 1991 a Grand National Assembly of Slavonia, Baranja and 
Western Srem (Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srem, SBZS) was convened, consisting of 
Serb representatives from communes throughout the region, and Hadžić was nominated 
to form a government of the autonomous region (SAO-SBZS). From February 1992 to 
the end of 1993, he went on to be President of the RSK.
There is some evidence that Hadžić had already become popular in the Vukovar region 
in the second half of 1990,6 while a number of sources attribute his wider fame and 
popularity to events in early April 1991, when he was arrested and beaten by Croatian 
police, and some Serbian villages in Eastern Slavonia threw up barricades demanding 
his release.7 Initially, he held relatively moderate stances, and was firmly on Rašković's 
side in his clashes with Babić. At the 30 March 1991 meeting of the SDS in Obrovac, 
for example, he favoured a conciliatory approach and opening negotiations with Zagreb, 
and he had attended talks with Tuđman earlier that month.8 At the time he also had 
contact with Degoricija and Boljkovac of the Croatian MUP, who even went so far as to 
consider him their 'agent'.9 Hadžić was also involved in the radical SNV of Slavonia, 
4 ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-037 (Veljko Džakula), T103465-6.
5 Petrović, pp.61-2. Hadžić claims this was later: ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić, T10084.
6 ICTY-Babić: E-PS7.2.21 (Babić Interview), pp.38-9.
7 For example: ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of Milan Milanović), p.3. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness 
Goran Hadžić, T9386.
8 ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Veljko Džakula, Vojislav Vukčević, Goran Hadžić, Borivoje Savić; T9443. 
Interview Veljko Džakula (Zagreb: 30/9/2009).
9 Boljkovac, p.235. Degoricija, pp.212, 301. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić.
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however, and although moderate with regard to negotiations, he still seems to have been 
in favour of Serbian self-determination in the event of Croatian independence.10
Some sources suggest that Hadžić became more radical after his April 1991 beating, 
though he apparently still had contact with the Croatian MUP until Boljkovac was 
replaced in July 1991.11 By the summer he certainly favoured territorial self-
determination, and achieving that by military means. It seems likely that there was a 
certain amount of opportunism on Hadžić's part - former colleagues of his recall that he 
'was not a serious person' and was 'mostly concerned with himself and his own way of 
life'12 and chasing women,13 and as President of the RSK he spent most of his time in 
Novi Sad, Vojvodina. He was, most likely, keeping his options open in this period, and 
then chose to fully embrace the hardline/war option when events moved in that 
direction.
Hadžić and Milošević
As RSK President from February 1992 onwards, Hadžić appears to have been close to 
Milošević and more willing to follow his lead than Krajina officials like Martić. He was 
also more co-operative with Belgrade than Babić in late 1991 and early 1992, though, 
like Babić, he initially rejected the Vance plan. Whether or not Hadžić was close with 
Milošević or co-ordinating with him in 1991 remains unclear, however, as evidence 
varies considerably.
At The Hague the OTP brought two witnesses who testified to a close connection 
between Hadžić and Milošević already throughout 1991; both, however, have credibility 
issues, and other evidence supports Hadžić's claim that he only came into contact with 
10 ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić, T10089. And: T9443.
11 ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-037 (Veljko Džakula), T103466. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić, 
T10089. Marko Dejanović, ‘Špijun koji nas je mrzio’, accessed 1/11/2011 from: 
http://markodejanovic.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/Hadžić2.pdf.
12 ICTY-Milošević: Witness C-037 (Veljko Džakula), T103466.
13 Interview Slobodan Jarčević, RSK Foreign Minister 1992-94 (Belgrade: 2011).
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Milošević towards the end of the year. The rather confused and confusing witness 
Borislav Bogunović, who served as SAO-SBZS Interior Minister in 1991, said that 
Hadžić reported having met with Milošević probably five or six times between January 
and August 1991, taking instructions from him on what to do in the region. But 
Bogunović also referred to the first meeting as concerning the formation of the 
government, which would place it in May at the very earliest.14 Witness Borivoje Savić, 
secretary of the Vukovar SDS in 1990-91, meanwhile, claimed that Hadžić's first 
meeting with Milošević was in January 1991, and that they drew close from May 1991 
onwards. However, Savić was a highly problematic witness,15 and both he and 
Bogunović themselves cast doubt on their own claims of Hadžić's contacts with 
Milošević, noting that this was only what Hadžić had said at the time and that they did 
not necessarily believe he had really met Milošević.16 Others suggest that Hadžić grew 
close to Milošević after his arrest in April 1991.17 A number of sources also suggest that 
Hadžić had contact with figures from the Serbian MUP/DB by mid-1991 at the latest.18
Hadžić himself, on the other hand, has claimed that his first contact with Milošević was 
around 7 September 1991, when Milošević phoned to persuade him to sign a ceasefire 
(he had seen him previously at a large meeting of Croatian Serbs with Milosevic that 
spring, but they had not spoken). Various meetings with Milošević and other Serbian 
officials then followed, mostly in large groups, in relation to international negotiations 
and the Vance plan.19 Some evidence independently supports Hadžić's testimony. For 
14 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Borislav Bogunović; E-553-4 (Witness Statements of Borislav 
Bogunović)
15 Many aspects of Savić's accounts were highly dubious. An interview he gave after his first testimony, 
which contains numerous fantastic claims, casts further doubt on his credibility: 'Hadžić je radio za 
tajne službe i ono što mu je govorio Milošević', Večernji list, 2/4/2013.
16 ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Borivoje Savić; Borislav Bogunović.
17 ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of Milan Milanović), pp.3, 11. On Hadžić-Milošević links see 
also: 'Lovas Case', Witness Aleksandar Vasiljević (Belgrade: 21/6/2010), accessed 1/8/2014 from: 
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Transkripti/lovas.html, pp.12, 24.  ICJ: Croatia v. Yugoslavia: 'Reply of the 
Republic of Croatia, Volume 2: Annexes 1-41', 20/12/2010, Annex 8 (Witness Statement of Ž. Č.), 
p.41.
18 Željko Peratović, 'Milošević je 1991. nadzirao pripreme Srba za pobunu u Hrvatskoj', Vjesnik, 
13/10/2001, p.3. Karan, p.95. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses Nebojša Bogunović; Borislav 
Bogunović.
19 ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić.
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example, prosecution witness Gajić-Glišić, then secretary to Serbia's Ministry of 
Defence, testified that Milošević was completely unfamiliar with Hadžić, enquiring 
about who he was when he was already off to The Hague for negotiations in October 
1991.20 Gajić-Glišić's recollection is at least slightly off, as Hadžić himself confirms that 
the two had spoken in September.21 An intercepted conversation on 8 October 1991 does 
indicate that Milošević was not very familiar with Hadžić, however: he refers to him as 
'this man Hadžić' and 'this Hadžić', possibly even calling him 'Tadić' in error.22
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusion on when Hadžić came into contact with 
Milošević in 1991, the extent to which they were co-ordinating, and whether this had a 
role in confirming Hadžić's leading position in the Eastern Slavonia region.23 We can, 
however, certainly conclude that Hadžić was not simply 'created' by Milošević, as he 
was already an important regional figure in January 1991, before there are any 
suggestions of them being in contact. He was also obviously independent at first, 
supporting Rašković in spring 1991 despite Belgrade's evident preference for Babić. In 
an April 1991 meeting with American ambassador Warren Zimmerman, a Slavonian 
SDS delegation consisting of Hadžić, Džakula and Sasić even 'stressed that they do not 
take orders or instructions from Belgrade and... clearly implied that Babić and the 
Krajina Serbs do', as well as indicating 'some fear that their interests would be sold out 
in a Milošević/Tuđman deal.24 
In his interactions with Milošević from September 1991 to early 1992, meanwhile, 
Hadžić displayed his independence, but also much greater willingness than Babić to 
listen to Milošević. Hadžić had not wanted to agree to the ceasefire on 7 September 
20 ICTY-Milošević: Witness Dobrila Gajić-Glišić, T27912-3.
21 Also: Željko Peratović, 'Milošević je 1991. nadzirao pripreme Srba za pobunu u Hrvatskoj', Vjesnik, 
13/10/2001, p.3. Avramov, p.272.
22 Domovina Intercept: C2370 (Karadžić-Milošević, 8/10/1991). 
23 Several sources indicate that retired general Radojica Nenežić, a Croatian Serb from the region then 
living in Belgrade, believed that he played a major role in promoting Hadžić as leader of the region, 
which he later regretted - but his interpretation may not have been valid. ICTY-Milošević: E-P568.9a 
(The Serbian Army, Dobrila Gajić-Glišić), p.108. ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Borivoje Savić, Goran 
Hadžić. Karan, p.100.
24 ICTY-Hadžić: T9445.
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1991, for example, but agreed when Milošević persuaded him over the phone. In 
October 1991 he was much more amenable than Babić to Milošević's idea of 'special 
status' and co-operative approach to negotiations, though Milošević still had some 
problems with him – on two occasions when Babić refused to attend international talks, 
for example, Hadžić then joined suit.25 In October 1991 Eastern Slavonia also declared 
unification with Bosnian Krajina, and Hadžić and his colleagues did completely reject 
the Vance plan at first, with Hadžić being openly critical of the 'poor foreign policy of 
Serbia'.26 It was only in late January 1992, when Hadžić received some additional 
guarantees from UN negotiator Marrack Goulding that the plan was indeed status 
neutral, and references to 'Croatia' purely geographic, that he accepted it.27
When the SAOs united into the RSK and Babić was removed in spring 1992, Hadžić 
was elected RSK President. His former colleagues indicate that when President, Hadžić 
regularly communicated with Milošević, and was the latter's main contact in the RSK 
leadership.28 Hadžić did not always follow instructions from Milošević: he insisted on 
running in the December 1993 RSK elections despite Belgrade's opposition, for 
example, while in February 1993 he had supported the dismissal of RSK Defence 
Minister Stojan Španović, to Milošević's considerable anger.29 But on most of the key 
issues where, for example, Martić and most in Krajina were critical of Belgrade, Hadžić 
remained loyal. He alone in the RSK leadership supported the Vance-Owen plan for 
Bosnia in spring 1993, for example, and within the RSK he generally seems to have 
25 Domovina Intercepts: C2370 (Karadžić-Milošević, 8/10/1991); B6846 (Karadžić-Milošević, 
24/10/1991). ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić. 'Slavonia, Baranja, Accept Special Status', Tanjug, 
14/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-199, 15/10/1991. 'Slavonia Serbs Refuse To Be Part of Croatia', 
Belgrade Radio Network, 16/10/1991, in FBIS-EEU-91-201, 17/10/1991
26 'Hadžić: Slavonian Serbs Reject Croatian State', Belgrade Radio Network, 16/1/1992, in FBIS-EEU-
92-011, 16/1/1992. 'Hadžić 'Disappointed' With UN Plan', Belgrade RTV Sat TV, 6/1/1992, in FBIS-
EEU-92-005, 8/1/1995. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić. Domovina Intercept: B6946 (Karadžić-
Stanišić, 14/12/1991). Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
2003), pp.299, 304. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P2364.E (SFRY Presidency minutes, 9/12/1991), 
p.27.
27 Goulding, p.308. ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Goran Hadžić.
28 Interviews: Slobodan Jarčević, Đorđe Bjegović (Belgrade: 2011). ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness 
C-015. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Submission: Public Versions of Confidential Exhibits Part 1 
(2/4/2013), p.26. And: Šešelj, Đavolov segrt, p.609.
29 ICTY-Milošević: E-P667.8.1a (8th Session of the Supreme Defence Council of Yugoslavia, 12/3/1993), 
pp.20-1. ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of Milan Milanović).
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positioned himself as closely connected to Milošević.30 Milošević appears to have 
eventually become frustrated with Hadžić's poor leadership and his lack of authority 
over Krajina, but there was never really much of an issue of Hadžić resisting Belgrade's 
orders, and in 1994-97 he again seems to have been working closely with Milošević as 
leader of Eastern Slavonia.31 In 1995 he also accepted the region's negotiated re-
integration into Croatia, something he may even have been willing to consider earlier, 
too.32 Beyond his basic stance of territorial self-determination, Hadžić seems to have 
lacked firm political convictions and rather than a hardline or fanatical nationalist seems 
to have been something of an opportunist, open to accepting Milošević's leadership and 
basing his position within the RSK on the backing of Belgrade rather than attempting to 
build a support base of his own.
30 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-D1586 (RSK letter to RS, 2/4/1993); Submission: Public Versions of 
Confidential Exhibits Part 1 (2/4/2013), p.26. Interviews: Slobodan Jarčević, Đorđe Bjegović 
(Belgrade: 2011). ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of Milan Milanović).
31 ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of Milan Milanović). Caspersen, op. cit., pp.115-6.
32 ICTY-Hadžić: Witness Geert Ahrens, T7790. Caspersen, op. cit., p.104. Degoricija, p.212.
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8.2. Serbian Rebels in Eastern Slavonia
In Eastern Slavonia efforts to form local Serbian rebel structures came far later than 
they did in Krajina, and had not advanced very far even when the war was beginning, in 
summer and autumn 1991. It was only in early April 1991, after Hadžić was arrested by 
the Croatian police, that barricades first went up in some Serbian villages in Eastern 
Slavonia, about seven months after they had been raised in the Knin Krajina. They came 
down when Hadžić was released. It was around this time that the first significant arms 
arrived in the region from Serbia, going to local village defence structures in Borovo 
and elsewhere.33 The clash in Borovo Selo on 2 May 1991 had a major polarising effect, 
and thereafter barricades sporadically went up in the region, and arming seems to have 
been underway.
In SAO-SBZS the key Serbian rebel structures were local police and territorial defence, 
but efforts to establish these moved slowly. The formation of a SAO police was first 
announced in April 1991, to be formed of local Serb policemen who had abandoned the 
MUP. It was not actually established until July, however. Former Vukovar policeman 
Ilija Kojić was in charge of these efforts, and from July onwards was formally the SAO 
Defence Minister in charge of establishing the TO, too. At the ICTY a number of 
different sources, including the secretary of the SAO police in 1991, testified that the 
founding of the police was co-ordinated with the Serbian MUP/DB in Belgrade and 
Novi Sad.34 As soon as the police was established in July, assistance was sought and 
received from the Serbian and Vojvodina police, and Mihalj Kertes. Arms, equipment, 
uniforms and finances were provided, and whenever new stations were established more 
were requested and supplied.35
33 See: Chapter 5, footnote 80.
34 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: JF-032; T14334; Prosecution Appeal Brief (25/9/2013), p.29. Also: Nikolić 
& Petrović, Rat u Sloveniji, p.290.
35 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses JF-032; JF-030; JF-015; Borislav Bogunović; E-553-4 (Witness 
Statements of Borislav Bogunović); E-P51 (Witness Statement of Milomir Kovačević). Petrović. 
HMDC-DR, Knjiga 6, Document 4 (Report about work of SUP Vukovar), pp.11-2. ICJ: Croatia v. 
Yugoslavia: 'Reply of the Republic of Croatia, Volume 2: Annexes 1-41', 20/12/2010, Annex 8 
(Witness Statement of Ž. Č.), pp.25-8. Testimonies in 'Beli Manastir case' (2011), available from: 
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Kojić was essentially the East Slavonian version of Martić, but, unlike Martić, Kojić 
does not seem to have established a power base of his own, and was instead very closely 
connected with the Serbian MUP/DB. The absence of a firm political leadership or 
governmental institutions at the time, and the easy access to Serbia from the region, 
probably encouraged people like Kojić to turn to Belgrade. Kojić later said that he had 
worked with Stanišić from the beginning of the conflict, and in November 1991 he was 
formally employed by MUP Serbia.36 He was hospitalised in October 1991 and out of 
action for several months, but thereafter returned to be the key person in the RSK MUP 
responsible for Eastern Slavonia. In 1994-95 he then played an integral part in the 
Serbian DB's efforts to separate off the MUP in Eastern Slavonia.37 The precise extent to 
which Kojić co-ordinated with Belgrade/the DB or took orders from them as opposed to 
Hadžić in 1991, or Martić in 1992-93, is unclear, but he certainly had a co-operative, 
and subordinate, attitude towards Belgrade, rather than attempting to create a power 
base or pursue any agenda of his own like Martić.
Along with Kojić, another key personality in the region was Radoslav (Rade) Kostić. 
Kostić was an experienced policeman and local police chief who apparently had 
expectations of being promoted to Assistant Minister before the HDZ came to power.38 
Instead, he was pushed out by the new government. Like a number of other Serbian 
policemen in Croatia at the time, he left for Serbia, where he was employed by the MUP 
(DB), in December 1990, as 'special advisor' to its chief.39 He thereafter seems to have 
been active as a DB agent reporting on the situation in Eastern Slavonia and co-
http://www.hlc-rdc.org.
36 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P1698 (Statement of Ilija Kojić, 15/2/2008); E-P325 (Documents related 
to Ilija Kojić, 1991-2001).
37 See, for example: HMDC-DR, Knjiga 14, Document 72 (Martić letter to Belgrade, 7/10/1994), 
pp.168-8, Document 73 (Minutes, meeting of East Slavonia leadership, 7/10/1994), pp.188-9. ICTY-
Stanišić/Simatović: E-1605 (Intercept Martić-Milošević, 4/10/1994). ICTY-Milošević: E-P681a (VJ 
Counter-Intelligence report on RSK MUP, 11/1994).
38 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Petar Đukic; JF-026, T9814-5. 'Tenja Case (Darko Radivoj)', 
Witness Jovan Rebrača (Belgrade: 8/6/2010), p.6, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/  . 
39 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-P406 (Documents related to Radoslav Kostić, 1990-1999). On other 
police doing this: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Gvozden Gagić, Serbian MUP employee, 
T17107-8. 'Lovas case', Testimony of Milan Devčić (Belgrade: 24/4/2008), p.3, accessed 1/8/2014 
from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/.
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ordinating assistance to the region.40 He was also apparently involved in the creation of 
Serbian police, intelligence and military structures there, particularly in his native 
Baranja (the northern part of Eastern Slavonia).41 When the RSK MUP was formed he 
was one of its leading personnel, responsible it seems mainly for Baranja, despite 
simultaneously working for the DB, and in 1994, like Kojić, he played an active role in 
the separation of the Eastern Slavonia MUP from Knin. He also had some role in the 
DB's special units, and in late 1994 was killed in fighting near Bihać.42 The 'Red Berets' 
subsequently named their main training centre after him.
The Serbian DB thus took an active part in the organisation of rebel structures in East 
Slavonia.43 In addition to this, in autumn 1991 an extremely direct form of assistance 
was given by Serbia in the form of the arrival of a number of policemen from the 
Serbian MUP. In July 1991 the SNV requested that Serbia send back all the Serb 
policemen from the region who (like Kostić) had recently found employment in the 
Serbian MUP. From around August or September 1991 onwards this was done, with 
both regular police being sent and a special MUP unit composed of such people.44 Even 
more significantly, around September 1991 the head of Belgrade's special forces, 
Radovan Stojičić “Badža”, along with his entire unit and some other MUP employees, 
came to the region. Badža was appointed commander of the East Slavonia TO, and took 
formal command of the entire TO and MUP of the region, particularly after Kojić was 
wounded in October. Officially the region's Interior Minister was still the local 
Bogunović, but real authority was held by Badža and his colleagues, and in December 
1991 Bogunović was replaced, mainly due to Badža's low opinion of him.45 Badža's 
40 Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, pp.72, 254-5.
41 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses JF-032; JF-036. 'Tenja Case (Darko Radivoj)', Witness Jovan 
Rebrača (Belgrade: 8/6/2010), pp.6-8, accessed 1/8/2014 from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/  . 
42 ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: DST-074, T13262-3. See also: ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: E-1688 
(Explanation, SVK 11th corps, 15/4/1994). 'Slobodan Medić case' (Belgrade: 2006), witnesses Dragan 
Gavrić and Pero Petrašević, available from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/.
43 See also: 'Tenja Case (Darko Radivoj)', Witness Jovan Rebrača (Belgrade: 8/6/2010), pp.6-8, accessed 
1/8/2014 from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org/  .  And:  'Lovas case', Testimony of Milan Devčić (Belgrade: 
24/4/2008), p.4.
44 Petrović, p.106. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witness Nebojša Bogunović. HMDC-DR, Knjiga 6, 
Document 4 (Report about work of SUP Vukovar), pp.11-12. ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of 
Milan Milanović). Testimonies in 'Beli Manastir case' (2011), available from: http://www.hlc-rdc.org.
45 ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of Milan Milanović). ICTY-Hadžić: Witnesses Goran Hadžić; 
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authority over the TO actually seems to have been limited to 'Operations Group North', 
above Vukovar, while south of the town the TO fell directly under the JNA.46 The police 
throughout the region, however, were connected with his men, and Serbian MUP 
employees, mostly men originally from the region, occupied the main roles.
In December 1991 Badža was appointed Assistant Interior Minister of Serbia, and 
thereafter, with the adoption of the Vance plan, in the first half of 1992 he and almost all 
the other employees of MUP Serbia left the region, including those originally from 
there.47 They had appointed their replacements, however, and the police, intelligence 
and defence structures remained tied to the Serbian MUP, particularly Badža and, 
through Kojić and Kostić, the DB.48
The enduring influence of Serbia on Eastern Slavonia is illustrated by the career path of 
politician Milan Milanović, known as 'Mrgud'. Mrgud was Assistant Minister for 
Transport of SAO-SBZS in 1991, and when Badža arrived he took him as his local 
guide. High-ranking RSK intelligence officer Petar Ajdinović recalls him as a 'person 
that Jovica Stanišić infiltrated' into a high position in the RSK, and Mrgud himself 
testified that it was because he was close to Badža and seen as a connection with 
Belgrade that in December 1991 he was appointed acting Minister of Defence of the 
region. He was the most important figure in defence structures in the region from then 
on, and later formed his own paramilitary unit, the 'Scorpions', in collaboration with the 
Serbian DB.49 By 1994-95 Mrgud seems to have been even more influential than Hadžić 
in Eastern Slavonia, and he led the negotiations over the Erdut Agreement, which 
regulated the region's re-integration into Croatia, in late 1995. And all this was in spite 
Borislav Bogunović. ICTY-Stanišić/Simatović: Witnesses C-015; JF-015; Nebojša Bogunović; 
Borislav Bogunović; E-553-4 (Witness Statements of Borislav Bogunović); Submission: Public 
Versions of Confidential Exhibits Part 1 (2/4/2013), p.26. 
46 ICTY-Mrkšić: Witnesses Dušan Jakšic, T19953-4; Miodrag Panić, T14377; Judgement (27/9/2007).
47 See: footnote 44.
48 See, for example: Šešelj, Policijski dosije: Treči deo, p.592. ICTY-Milošević: E-P327.20a (Letter of 
Dragan Lalić, Secretary of RSK SUP Vukovar, 3/8/1992).
49 Email correspondence with Petar Ajdinović, 2011-12. ICTY-Milošević: E-P550 (Statement of Milan 
Milanović). HMDC-DR, Knjiga 14, Document 73 (Minutes, meeting of East Slavonia leadership, 
7/10/1994), pp.188-9.
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of the fact that, until late 1995, he had never been elected to any position, and owed his 
career, in fact, to his role as Badža's man in Eastern Slavonia, i.e. to Belgrade.
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8.3. Conclusions
The influence of Serbia on Eastern Slavonia from autumn 1991 onwards was 
considerable. In local security and defence structures employees and agents of Belgrade 
occupied the key posts, while in the political sphere, too, the region was much more 
amenable to Belgrade's influence than SAOK. This does not mean that everything that 
happened in Eastern Slavonia was decided in Belgrade; on the contrary, events such as 
the Borovo Selo clash in May 1991 developed autonomously, while Hadžić himself was 
initially on the moderate wing of the SDS and a supporter of Rašković, despite it being 
fairly evident that Rašković was out of favour with Belgrade. Belgrade's influence 
seems to have grown principally in the summer and autumn of 1991, when the war 
proper was already beginning, and was in many respects a consequence of local requests 
for assistance. Hadžić was not simply a puppet, strongly opposing, for example, the 
Vance plan at first. But he was generally much more willing to follow Belgrade's lead 
than either Babić or Martić, and content with local security and defence structures being 
tied closely to Belgrade.
This contrasts strongly with the rather limited influence that Belgrade had over Krajina. 
The situations in the two regions were hugely different. In one, employees of the 
Serbian MUP/DB occupied all the key posts in the security and defence sectors in late 
1991, while the politics were led by an opportunist who for most of his career presented 
himself as an ally and follower of Milošević; in the other, the key people in both politics 
and security were locals who arose independently, had their own power bases, defended 
their positions and their authority from encroachment by Belgrade's agents, and 
regularly clashed with Belgrade in the pursuit of their nationalist and personal agendas.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions
Through a cautious and critical use of a range of primary sources, this thesis has offered 
a detailed examination of Serbia's involvement in the Serbian rebellion and the road to 
war in Croatia in 1990-91. The findings that have been reached challenge a number of 
key assumptions and interpretations common to much of the literature on this topic. 
Whilst these findings cut across the broad schools of thought identified previously 
('orthodox', 'multi-factor' and 'revisionist'), they most strongly undercut the analyses put 
forward in 'orthodox' works, which portray Milošević as the prime orchestrator of the 
conflict and the puppet-master of the Croatian Serbs, and strengthen elements of 'multi-
factor' and 'revisionist' approaches.
Serbia's direct involvement in, and influence over, the Serbian rebellion in Croatia in 
1990-91 was limited. The SDS was a fundamentally autonomous and independent 
movement, and Milošević wielded little influence over both Rašković and Babić. The 
idea that the Serbs in Croatia had the right to territorial self-determination, to secede 
from Croatia and 'remain' in a state with other Serbs, was a core policy of the SDS and 
its president Rašković from the outset, espoused even by the more moderate wings of 
the party in Slavonia, rather than being a principle introduced by Milošević. Milošević 
did prefer Babić to Rašković, but Belgrade's role in the SDS's internal factional politics, 
and specifically the contest between Babić and Rašković, was minor. Babić was very 
much an independent actor, and a long way from being 'Belgrade's man'. He utilised an 
alliance of convenience with Milošević for only a brief period, before entering an 
enduring and bitter political conflict with him. The gradual descent into conflict over the 
course of 1990 and the first half of 1991 is explained well by interactions between 
Croats and Serbs within Croatia – the HDZ and the SDS, Zagreb and Knin. The gulf 
between the two sides was too wide for a compromise to be reached, while a societal 
security dilemma fuelled the conflict's rapid escalation. Although often lagging behind 
SDS hardliners, Rašković nevertheless played an integral role in this process, and it was 
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only much later, as the war was setting in, that he displayed more willingness to 
compromise his beliefs and accept a solution within an independent Croatia.
The armed rebellion in the Krajina, meanwhile, appears to have been launched by locals 
and triggered by actions of the Croatian police, rather than being pre-planned or directed 
by Belgrade. A security dilemma fuelled the arming of both sides, and it is notable that 
Croatian efforts in this respect, with the arming of the HDZ, significantly exceeded 
Krajina Serb efforts initially. Far from arming Serb rebels en masse from mid-1990 
onwards, Belgrade seems to have been slow to respond to Croatian Serb requests for 
arms, basing its policy above all on an alliance with the JNA. Mass arming of the Serbs 
appears to have taken place only from spring 1991 onwards, with the JNA a more 
significant source of arms than Serbia itself. 
It is true that Serbia adopted, from a fairly early stage, a hardline stance towards 
Croatia. Serbia supported territorial self-determination, and Milošević did expect that 
this would have to be imposed on the Croats, anticipating at least some conflict. This 
stance undoubtedly encouraged the Croatian Serb nationalists, and the hardliners 
amongst them, whose politics of 'recursive' secession from Croatia were clearly 
supported by Serbia. But Serbia's approach was based overwhelmingly on an alliance 
with the JNA to secure this solution, and this was far from complete in 1990-91, with 
the JNA still hoping to maintain Yugoslavia as a whole and genuinely trying to prevent 
civil war. Beyond this alliance, Serbia lacked a conscious, deliberate or formulated 
strategy towards Croatia. Far from orchestrating the descent into violence, through a 
'parallel structure' or Serb hardliners, Serbia's leadership often advocated caution, 
precisely because radical moves might alienate the JNA (and the international 
community) and thus be counter-productive to Serbian goals. Serbia had not 'decided' in 
favour of war, and throughout 1990-91 peaceful solutions were still being pursued, 
including a genuine engagement with Tuđman from Karađorđevo onwards and an 
attempt to formulate a more acceptable version of self-determination through the idea of 
'special status'.
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In spring 1991 the Serbian MUP/DB became more actively involved in Croatia, and 
Serbia had greater influence on the security/defence apparatus in the Krajina than on its 
politics. Martić generally showed himself to be more willing than Rašković or Babić to 
listen to and collaborate with Belgrade, and Serbian DB agent Frenki clearly had some 
influence in the security sector in the region that summer. Martić was still very much an 
independent figure, however, prepared to clash with Belgrade even in 1991, while 
Frenki's influence, always limited, was largely curtailed that autumn. Krajina already 
had well-formed political and military/paramilitary structures, and thus Belgrade's 
agents could not assume a significant role, meeting resistance when they tried to do so. 
In Eastern Slavonia, by contrast, as local structures had hardly been formed by this 
point, Serbia's agents effectively organised, and hence controlled, the region's security 
structures. The region's nascent political leadership also proved itself much more 
amenable to Belgrade's influence. The contrast between Krajina and Eastern Slavonia 
was strong on both these issues, and was to endure throughout the RSK's existence.
Considering in detail the nuances of the relationships between Belgrade and the 
Croatian Serbs has highlighted the latter's autonomy and independence from Serbia, and 
Milošević's limited capacity to influence developments in Croatia. It has also shed light 
on the multifaceted nature of these relationships, which varied by sector, by individual, 
by region and by time period. It has moreover revealed that 'Belgrade' was not 
synonymous with Milošević, and different institutions that were formally part of his 
regime, such as the state-controlled media and the Serbian MUP/DB, had their own 
interests and agendas, which did not always coincide with his. They were capable of 
influencing Milošević as well as being influenced by him, and pursued their own 
interests and agendas across the Drina as well as - and at times even instead of – 
Milošević's.
The fundamental issue in Croatia in 1990-91 was that there were intractable 
incompatibilities between Croatian and Serbian thinking on the future of Croatia and, 
specifically, the Serbs in Croatia, both between the dominant factions in Croatia and 
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Serbia, and between Croat and Serb nationalists within Croatia. These differences made 
a negotiated or compromise settlement very unlikely, and security dilemmas soon 
fuelled arming by both sides and a descent into conflict. These basic elements explain 
the war in Croatia well, and the existing focus on grand conspiracies and manipulations 
from Belgrade has, in my opinion, been a misleading distraction from this. There were 
three sides to this 'triadic nexus' conflict, to use Brubaker's terminology, and there has, 
to date, been far too much emphasis on just one of these sides – the 'external national 
homeland', Serbia – to the particular detriment of the 'national minority', the Serbs in 
Croatia, who, rather than being mere instruments of Belgrade, played a decisive role in 
the descent into conflict as autonomous and independent actors in their own right.
The findings of this thesis thus call for further re-examination of Milošević's role in the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. They also call into question the approach taken by the ICTY 
Prosecution in many of its key cases, including the trials of Milošević, Martić and 
Stanišić/Simatović, which have owed much to the 'orthodox' interpretation of Milošević. 
The OTP's adoption of the highly problematic claims of Milan Babić, in particular, 
should encourage a critical perspective towards its conduct  - and opens questions about 
its politicisation.
This thesis also suggests some further avenues for investigation – for example, 
extending this study beyond 1991, and examining in greater depth the roles of the 
Croatian side and the Serbian media, creating a richer picture of the interplay between 
all the different factors in the 'triadic nexus'. The degree of influence that the political 
stances of Serbia indirectly had on the Serbs in Croatia in 1990-91 also warrants further 
examination. As external support was required for hardline politics to be feasible, it 
does seem reasonable to assume that a compromise-inclined Serbian government would 
have strengthened moderates among the Croatian Serbs. On the other hand, such a 
government may have held no sway among Serb nationalists in Croatia, who could then 
have positioned themselves in opposition to Belgrade, allying with the Serbian 
opposition or hardliners in the Serbian police or JNA. This question would best be 
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addressed by a broad examination of the history of Croatian-Serbian relations, and in 
particular of Serbian politics in Croatia, considering the extent to which the stances of 
Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia in 1990-91 were consistent with that history. A 
comparison between the Serbian rebellion in Croatia in 1990-91 and Croatian Serb 
responses to the 'Croatian Spring' of 1970-71 and the 'Sporazum' of 1939 would be 
particularly fruitful in this respect.
Above all, the conclusions of this thesis challenge the portrayal of Milošević as a 
Machiavellian schemer who orchestrated the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars 
in Croatia and Bosnia, and support a much more measured assessment of Milošević's 
goals, strategies and capacity to influence developments in the former Yugoslavia. 
Ramet's comparison with Richard III perhaps remains apt, for Shakespeare's Richard 
III, like 'orthodox' work on Milošević, gives a one-sided and distorted view of the actual 
historical personality.1 An ambitious communist party leader who transformed himself 
into a populist fighter for Serbian interests, Milošević was one of just many political 
actors in the period who, often contrary to their own intentions, contributed to the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. He did not invent the Serbian question in Croatia, and nor did 
he invent the solution which he advocated. Faced with Yugoslavia's disintegration, 
Milošević continued his policy of defending what he saw as Serbian national interests. 
He did so bombastically and with an admittedly easy recourse to force, though not 
without some thought to exploring a compromise with Zagreb. Milošević supported 
what he saw as the right of the Serbian nation in Croatia to remain in Yugoslavia rather 
than face an uncertain future in an independent Croatia. He advocated that Yugoslavia's 
legal armed forces defend both that right and the Serbs in Croatia from Croatian police 
interventions, as requested by mainstream Serb representatives in the Krajina and 
Slavonia. He approved the large-scale arming of the Serbs in Croatia only when JNA 
efforts to reverse Croatian arming had failed, long after Serbs in the Krajina had made 
such demands from him. Serbia's support for hardline politics undoubtedly had some 
influence on the slide into conflict in Croatia, but Milošević was not directing Croatian 
1 Ramet, Balkan Babel, p.72.
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Serb leaders and at this stage had little capacity to control them or developments in 
Croatia in general (including in Eastern Slavonia, before the war began). If we want to 
understand developments in Croatia in 1990-91, then, we must in the first place look at 
what was going on internally within the region, within Croatia, and on the Knin-Zagreb 
axis, rather than to Milošević and to Belgrade.
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Appendix 1: Maps and Tables
Figure 1
Ethnic map of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, according to the 1981 census
Adapted from Jovan Ilić, ‘The Serbs in the Former SR of Croatia’, in Jovan Ilić et al, The Serbian 
Questions in The Balkans (Belgrade: University of Belgrade, Faculty of Geography, 1995). Retrieved 
August 2010 from: http://www.rastko.org.yu/istorija/srbi-balkan/jilic-croatia.html
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Figure 2
Adapted from Ilić, op. cit.
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Figure 3
The territories claimed by the three Serbian Autonomous Regions in Croatia in 1991,  
and the territories actually controlled by Serb forces at the end of 1991, forming the 
RSK.
Adapted from Ilić, op. cit., and ICTY-Martić: E-22.
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Figure 4
Population of Serb-Claimed Territories, 1991 census
The demographic break-downs of the territories claimed by the three Serbian 
Autonomous Regions in Croatia.
Territory Total Serbs Yugoslavs Croats Others
SAO 
Krajina
265,766 71.3%
(189,474)
1.8%
(4,800)
23.9%
(63,493)
3.0%
(7999)
SAO West 
Slavonia
116,486 44.0%
(51,207)
4.2%
(4,864)
38.4%
(44,731)
13.3%
(15,508)
SAO East 
Slavonia
402,152 22.8%
(91,612)
5.2%
(20,721)
61.9%
(248,897)
10.2%
(40,942)
Total 784,404 42.4%
(332,293)
3.9%
(30,385)
45.5%
(357,121)
8.2%
(63,999)
Population of Serb-Occupied Territories, 1991 census
The demographic break-down of the territories actually occupied by Serb forces in  
1991, and which formed the RSK.
Territory Total Serbs Yugoslavs Croats Others
SAO 
Krajina
296,328 66.3%
(196,414)
1.8%
(5,374)
28.9%
(85,584)
3.0%
(8,956)
SAO West 
Slavonia
23,601 60.0%
(14,162)
2.1%
(500)
29.1%
(6,864)
8.8%
(2,077)
SAO East 
Slavonia
193,513 34.9%
(67,561)
6.5%
(12,619)
44.5%
(86,986)
14.1%
(27,337)
Total 513,442 54.2%
(278,137)
3.6%
(18,493)
34.9%
(179,434)
7.5%
(38,410)
Figures for Eastern Slavonia are precisely calculated by Živić. The other figures are 
based on census data but involved some estimations where borders cut through 
municipal lines.
See: Dražen Živić, op. cit.. Kubo, ' The Radicalisation and Ethnicization of Elections'. M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (27/5/1994). ICTY-Martić: Amended Indictment.
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Appendix 2: Dramatis Personae
Brief biographies of some of the personalities involved in the Yugoslav crisis and the  
descent into conflict in Croatia.
Adžić, Blagoje. A Serb from Bosnia, chief of staff of the JNA, 1989-92.
Babić, Milan. SDS official and President of Knin, the Association of Municipalities of 
North Dalmatia and Lika, the Serbian Autonomous Province of Krajina (SAOK) and the 
Republic of Serbian Krajina (1990-92). Babić was removed as RSK President in 
February 1992, following his rejection of the Vance peace plan for Croatia. He later 
served as RSK Foreign Minister (1994-5) and Prime Minister (1995). In 2002 he 
testified against Milošević in the Hague. He was then indicted for war crimes himself 
but made a plea agreement. Sentenced to thirteen years, he committed suicide in 2006.
Bogdanović, Radmilo. Milošević ally and Serbian Interior Minister from the late 1980s 
to May 1991, when he was removed following his controversial role in the March 1991 
opposition protests in Belgrade. He subsequently served as chairman of the Serbian 
Assembly's board for relations with Serbs outside Serbia, and as a functionary of the 
SPS. Regarded as highly influential in the 1990s, and often connected with Arkan.
Boljkovac, Josip. HDZ official and Interior Minister of Croatia (May 1990-July 1991). 
Formerly mayor of Karlovac in the 1960s.
Ćosić, Dobrica. Serbian nationalist writer and intellectual. A Partisan in the Second 
World War, in 1968 he was purged from the Serbian communist party for nationalism, 
having opposed moves to decentralise Serbia. He was subsequently an influential 
dissident, and then in 1992-93 served as President of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.
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Dakić, Mile. A Croatian Serb, president of Vojnić municipality in the 1970s. President 
of the small 'Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party', and Vice-President of the SNV, 
in 1990-91.
Degoricija, Slavko. HDZ and Croatian government official tasked with negotiating 
with the Serbian minority. President of a chamber of the Croatian Assembly in 1990, 
and Assistant Minister of Interior in 1991.
Drašković, Vuk. A Serbian writer and nationalist dissident, in 1990 Drašković founded 
the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO). He and the SPO were the main challengers to 
Milošević and the SPS in Serbia's December 1990 elections. In March 1991 he led 
opposition protests against the Milošević regime in Belgrade. He continued to be a 
prominent opposition leader throughout the 1990s, and served in several post-Milošević 
governments. Initially an a radical Serbian nationalist, from 1991 onwards he gradually 
moderated his stances.
Dubajić, Simo. Serb Partisan from Knin, later a self-declared Serb nationalist and a 
participant in the February 1989 Knin protests. An advisor to the 'Council of National 
Resistance' (autumn 1990), subsequently also involved in the 'Serbian Guard' 
paramilitary formation of Serbian opposition leader Vuk Drašković.
Džakula, Veljko. President of the SDS in Pakrac and leading member of the SDS 
Regional Board for Slavonia (1990-91). President of SAO West Slavonia (1991-92) and 
Deputy Prime Minister of the RSK (1992-93). In 1993-94 he was arrested several times 
for his role in talks with Croatia. Subsequently a key leader of the Serbian minority 
remaining in Croatia.
Filipović, Dragan (“Fiča”). Member of the Serbian DB, active in Krajina in 1991 and 
subsequently involved in the DB's 'Red Berets'.
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Glavaš, Branimir. Influential HDZ rightist in Slavonia. Eventually tried for war crimes 
against Serbian civilians during the war.
Gračanin, Petar. A Second World War Partisan and JNA general, Gračanin was 
President of Serbia in 1987-89 and then Federal Interior Minister in 1989-92.
Hadžić, Goran. President of the SDS in Vukovar and member of the SDS Regional 
Board for Slavonia (1990-91); member of the Serbian National Council of East 
Slavonia (1991); President of SAO East Slavonia (1991-92) and then the RSK (1992-
93). In 1994-97 he was again active as a leader of East Slavonia. In 2011 he was 
arrested in Serbia and extradited to the ICTY for trial for war crimes against Croats and 
other non-Serbs.
Izetbegović, Alija. President of the Bosnian Muslim 'Party of Democratic Action' from 
1990, and President of Bosnia from 1991 to 2000.
Jović, Borisav. Serbia's representative on the SFRY Presidency, 1989-92, an ally of 
Slobodan Milošević and leading official of Milošević's Socialist Party (SPS) until late 
1995.
Kadijević, Veljko. Yugoslav Federal Defence Secretary (1988-92). Born in Imotski, 
Croatia, to a Serb father and a Croatian mother, and married to a Croatian, Kadijević 
declared himself at the time of the disintegration a 'Yugoslav', though he later described 
himself as a Yugoslav Serb.
Karadžić, Radovan. President of the Bosnian SDS (1990-96) and Republika Srpska 
(1992-96). Indicted for genocide in 1995, Karadžić spent many years in hiding before 
being arrested in Belgrade in 2008 and extradicted to the Hague for trial.
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Kertes, Mihajl. A Serbian politician of Hungarian ethnicity, rose to prominence as a 
Milošević supporter in Vojvodina in 1988-89 and later served as a member of the 
Presidency of Serbia (1989-90), Deputy Federal Interior Minister (1992) and Federal 
Minister of Customs (1993-2000). Convicted for corruption after the fall of Milošević.
Letica, Slaven. Principal advisor to President Tuđman in 1990.
Mamula, Branko. Yugoslav Federal Defence Secretary (1983-88). In 1990-91 Mamula 
was involved in the SK-PJ. A Serb from Croatia.
Marković, Ante. President of Croatia (1986-88), and the last Prime Minister of 
Yugoslavia (1989-91). A Croat from Bosnia.
Martić, Milan. A police inspector in Knin, Martić served as Secretary and then 
Minister of the Krajina and RSK police (1991-1994), and then President of the RSK 
(1994-95). Eventually tried and convicted for war crimes at the ICTY.
Mesić, Stjepan (Stipe). Leading official of the HDZ and Croatia, serving as president 
of the HDZ Executive Board, Prime Minister of Croatia (May-August 1990) and 
Croatia's representative on the SFRY Presidency (October 1990-December 1991). He 
split from Tuđman and the HDZ in 1994, and served as President of Croatia from 2000 
to 2010.
Mikelić, Borislav. A prominent Croatian Serb communist in the late 1980s. Member of 
the Central Committees of the League of Communists of Croatia and Yugoslavia (1989-
90), President of the 'Socialist Party of Croatia - Party of Yugoslav Orientation' (1990-
91) and RSK Prime Minister (1994-95).
Milošević, Slobodan. President of the League of Communists of Serbia (1986-89), of 
Serbia (1989-97) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1997-2000). Milošević was 
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overthrown following electoral manipulations in 2000 and extradited to the Hague the 
following year. He died in 2006, before the end of his trial for war crimes in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Kosovo.
Opačić, Jovan. Knin economist and founding President of Serbian cultural society 
'Zora' in 1989, arrested and imprisoned for his role in disturbances in Knin that July. 
Later a founder of the SDS and one of its Sabor Deputies from Knin. He left the party in 
September 1990 but returned in spring 1991. He later served as head of the Red Cross 
of Krajina.
Orlović, Dušan. Secretary of Serbian cultural society 'Zora' from 1989, an organiser of 
the Serbian rebellion in Knin in August 1990, and chief of the Krajina DB from January 
1991 to August 1992. Orlović thereafter served in the Serbian DB, until retirement in 
2005.
Pekić, Dušan. A Croatian Serb Partisan in the Second World War and 'National Hero', 
later a prominent JNA general and head of the Veterans Association of Yugoslavia. In 
1990-91 Pekić was involved in the SK-PJ and the Belgrade-based Association of Serbs 
from Croatia.
Perišić, Momčilo. JNA officer and from 1993 to 1998 commander of the Yugoslav 
army. Eventually tried in the Hague for war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia, but acquitted 
on appeal.
Pupovac, Milorad. Professor of linguistics at Zagreb University, a Croatian Serb 
originally from the Benkovac region, Pupovac was involved in a series of reformist and 
social democratic parties in Croatia in 1990-91, before initiating the formation of the 
Serbian Democratic Forum in the second half of 1991. He led the SDF until 1995, and 
has continued to be politically active as a key representative of the Serbian community 
in Croatia since then.
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Rašković, Jovan. A Sibenik-based psychiatrist originally from Knin, Rašković was the 
president of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) from its founding in February 1990 to 
his death in July 1992.
Ražnatović, Željko (“Arkan”). Serbian career criminal, engaged by the Federal 
Security Service to assassinate foreign emigres. Leader of 'Red Star' football club fans 
and of the paramilitary 'Serbian Volunteer Guard', also known as 'Arkan's Tigers' (1991-
95). Murdered in Belgrade in 2000.
Šarinić, Hrvoje. Close associate of Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, serving as 
presidential chief of staff, Croatian Prime Minister (1992-3), and envoy for talks with 
Slobodan Milošević (1993-95).
Šeselj, Vojislav. A Serb nationalist and extremist, founder of the Serbian Chetnik 
Movement in 1990, and the Serbian Radical Party in 1991, which he led until handing 
himself over to the ICTY in 2003. His trial is still ongoing.
Simatović, Franko (“Frenki”). A Belgrade-born officer of the Serbian DB of partly 
Croatian descent, Frenki was a prominent DB officer in the 1990s and in charge of their 
famous fighting unit, the 'Red Berets'. Later tried for war crimes at the ICTY, but found 
not guilty in 2013.
Špegelj, Martin. A former JNA commander who served as Croatian Minister of 
Defence from August 1990 to July 1991, and then chief inspector of the Croatian armed 
forces. Later a prominent critic of Tuđman.
Stambolić, Ivan. Milošević's predecessor as President of the Serbian communist party 
and Serbia, a friend of his and his chief patron. The two clashed in 1987, and Stambolić 
was defeated and pushed into resigning and leaving the political life of Serbia. He was 
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murdered in 2000, apparently on Milošević's orders, after rumours that he would be re-
engaging in politics.
Stanišić, Jovića. Prominent official of the Serbian DB, of which he was chief from 
December 1991 to October 1997. Later tried at the ICTY, but – rather surprisingly - 
found not guilty in 2013.
Štarević, Dušan. A Croatian Serb judge in Benkovac, and former president of 
Benkovac municipality. Founder and president of Serbian cultural society 'Prosvjeta' in 
1990-91, involved in the formation of the SDS and the SDF, and vice-president of 
Krajina in 1991. Died in 1992.
Stojičić, Radovan (“Badža”). Head of Belgrade's special police unit, in autumn 1991 
Badža served as commander of the territorial defence of Eastern Slavonia. At the end of 
the year he was promoted to assistant interior minister and chief of all public security in 
Serbia, a post he held until his assassination in 1997.
Tuđman, Franjo. President of the Croatian Democratic Union (from 1989) and Croatia 
(from May 1990) until his death in December 1999. Formerly a Partisan in the Second 
World War and a general in the JNA, Tuđman turned towards nationalism in the 1960s 
and became a dissident after the crushing of the 'Croatian Spring' in 1971, serving 
several spells in prison as a result.
Vance, Cyrus. US Secretary of State (1977-80) and UN diplomat, negotiated the Vance 
plan ending the war in Croatia in autumn and winter 1991, as well as the failed Vance-
Owen peace plan for Bosnia in 1992-93.
Vasiljević, Aleksandar. Deputy chief of JNA security from July 1990, in charge of 
monitoring arming in Croatia. In June 1991 he became its chief, remaining in that post 
until being pushed into retirement in May 1992.
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Vasiljković, Dragan ('Captain Dragan'/Daniel Snedden). A Serb from Belgrade who 
lived in Australia, Vasiljković returned to Yugoslavia in 1990 and began to involve 
himself in local politics. From April or May to August 1991 he was a Krajina special 
forces instructor in the Golubić training camp near Knin, and leader of its 'Knindže' 
unit. He subsequently founded the 'Captain Dragan Foundation' helping disabled war 
veterans, and was involved in several more training camps in Bosnia and Croatia. 
Currently in the process of being extradited from Australia to Croatia on allegations of 
war crimes.
Vukčević, Vojislav. SDS official from Beli Manastir in Baranja, Eastern Slavonia. An 
SDS vice-president from September 1990 and a prominent moderate, he was pushed 
into resigning from the party in April 1991. He was later active in the SPO in Serbia.
Zelenbaba, Dušan. SDS activist and Sabor deputy from Knin (1990-91). He briefly left 
the party with Opačić in September 1990, joining Vuk Drašković's SPO, but returned in 
spring 1991. He later emigrated to Canada.
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Appendix 3: Chronology
Basic chronology of some key events in the Yugoslav crisis and the conflict in Croatia.
1987
September 1987
The 'Eighth Session' of the League of Communists of Serbia. Slobodan Milošević 
triumphs over his former patron Ivan Stambolić.
1988
October 1988
The 'Yoghurt Revolution' in Vojvodina – mass protests lead to the resignation of the 
province's leadership and its replacement with supporters of Milošević.
November 1988
The leadership of Kosovo resigns, to be replaced by officials who endorse proposed 
changes to Serbia's constitution, downgrading the status of the provinces. Mass protests 
of Albanians begin in support of the former leaders.
1989
January 1989
The leadership of Montenegro resigns following protests, to be replaced by allies and 
supporters of Milošević.
28 February 1989
Initiative meeting of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in Zagreb, led by 
Franjo Tuđman.
The first Serb protests take place in Knin.
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23 March 1989
Amendments to Serbia's constitution passed, decreasing the autonomy of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina.
June 1989
Croatian Assembly decides to maintain the existing definition of the 'Croatian literary 
language'. A quarter of deputies support a proposal to remove the Serbs from the 
existing constitutional definition of Croatia.
The HDZ is formally founded.
28 June 1989
Mass rally of more than a million Serbs in Gazimestan, Kosovo, to celebrate the 600th 
anniversary of the Kosovo Battle. Milošević delivers a controversial speech.
7 July 1989
Serbian cultural society 'Zora' is created by Serb nationalists in Knin.
8-9 July 1989
Kosovo Celebration in Knin, which partly turns into a Serb nationalist protest against 
Zagreb. Jovan Opačić, president of 'Zora', is arrested.
September 1989
Slovenia passes constitutional amendments asserting its sovereignty.
1990
January 1990
14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Slovene and Croat 
delegations abandon the congress, bringing the unified Yugoslav party to an end.
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17 February 1990
The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) is founded, with Jovan Rašković as its president.
April - May 1990
Multi-party elections in Croatia. The HDZ takes 55% of Sabor seats with 41.9% of the 
vote. The SDS wins control of a few Serb-majority municipalities around Knin.
10 May 1990.
Rašković has his first formal meeting with Tuđman in Zagreb.
23 May 1990
The SDS decides to form an Association of Municipalities, uniting Serb-majority 
municipalities.
Milan Babić is elected President of Knin.
30 May 1990
Inaugural session of the new Croatian Sabor. New authorities elected, with Tuđman as 
President and Mesić as Prime Minister.
27-28 June 1990
Jović and Milošević first discuss 'cutting off' Croatia and Slovenia.
28 June 1990
The Association of Municipalities of North Dalmatia and Lika is constituted. Babić is 
its President.
23 July 1990
Rašković has his second, and final, meeting with Tuđman, along with his advisor Slaven 
Letica, in Zagreb.
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25 July 1990
Croatia passes amendments to its constitution, which the SDS rejects.
At a mass rally of 120,000 Serbs in Srb, Donji Lapac, the Serbian National Council 
(SNV) is formed. A 'Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbian 
Nation in Croatia' is adopted.
31 July 1990
First meeting of the SNV. Babić is elected its President and a referendum is called on 
Serbian autonomy.
The transcript of Rašković's latest talks with Tuđman is published in Croatian weekly 
Danas.
7 August 1990
SDS leaders Opačić and Zelenbaba seek Rašković's resignation, but fail to win support.
17 August 1990
The 'Balvan Revolution' (Log Revolution), the Serbian rebellion in the Knin Krajina, 
breaks out.
10 September 1990
Babić conducts negotiations with a Croatian state delegation in Donji Lapac.
Late September 1990
Conflicts between Croatian police and Serbs break out in Banija, and tensions escalate 
in the Knin Krajina.
2 October 1990
Croatia and Slovenia officially present their proposal for a Yugoslav confederation.
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20 October 1990
The SDS formally adopts a more radical party policy: territorial autonomy in federal 
Yugoslavia, and secession from Croatia in the event of a confederation or independence.
December 1990
Croatia passes its new constitution, downgrading the status of Serbs and positioning the 
republic for independence. The Serbian Autonomous Province of Krajina (SAOK) is 
formed, led by Babić.
Multi-party elections in Serbia. Slobodan Milošević and his Socialist Party of Serbia 
win.
1991
January 1991
The Krajina Secretariat of the Interior (SUP) is created, headed by Milan Martić.
The JNA releases information on the arming of paramilitary formations across 
Yugoslavia, and the SFRY Presidency adopts a decision on their disarmament. Croatia 
refuses to disarm.
A Serbian National Council (SNV) of East Slavonia is formed.
February 1991
Croatia adopts a decision on 'disassociation' from Yugoslavia; Krajina adopts a decision 
on 'disassociation' from Croatia.
2 March 1991
Croatian police forces intervene in Pakrac, Western Slavonia, after the municipality 
attempts to join SAOK. The JNA in turn steps in as a 'buffer'.
9 March 1991
The Serbian opposition organises mass protests against the Milošević regime in 
Belgrade.
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15 March 1991
The SFRY Presidency fails to adopt the JNA's proposals for Yugoslav-wide 
disarmament of paramilitaries.
16 March 1991
Borisav Jović and other pro-Serb representatives on the SFRY Presidency resign, to 
open the way for a planned JNA coup. The JNA, however, changes its mind and 
declines to act.
Krajina adopts a decision on seceding from Croatia.
Babić forms a separate Regional Board of the SDS for Krajina.
31 March 1991
Croatian police eject Krajina forces from Plitvice parks in Korenica. One Croat and one 
Serb die. The JNA intervenes as a 'buffer'.
1 April 1991.
Krajina declares its annexation to Serbia.
2 May 1991
Clash between Croatian police and Serbs in Borovo Selo, Vukovar. Twelve Croats and 
three Serbs die. The JNA again steps in to separate the two sides.
9 May 1991
SFRY Presidency unanimously approves measures intended to prevent Croat-Serb 
conflicts in Croatia, including the deployment of the JNA in Croatia to prevent clashes.
12 May 1991
Krajina holds referendum on annexing to Serbia and remaining in Yugoslavia.
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19 May 1991
Croatia holds referendum on independence.
25 June 1991
Croatia declares independence from Yugoslavia.
SAO East Slavonia is formed, led by Goran Hadžic.
13 July 1991
Lipik Declaration of Serbian intellectuals and politicians in Croatia.
12 August 1991
SAO West Slavonia is formed, led by Veljko Džakula.
September 1991
Full-scale war breaks out between Croatian forces and the JNA. JNA barracks are 
besieged and attacked throughout Croatia; the JNA launches offensive operations 
against Croatia.
18 October 1991.
'Carrington Plan' presented at EC-sponsored negotiations in the Hague. Serbia rejects 
the plan.
23 November 1991
Geneva Agreement between Tuđman, Milošević and Kadijević, part of the plan of UN 
negotiator Cyrus Vance for JNA withdrawal from Croatia and deployment of UN 
peacekeepers in the Krajinas.
19 December 1991
Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) is formed.
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23 December 1991
Germany recognises Croatia as an independent state. The rest of the world soon follows 
suit.
1992
2-3 January 1992
Lasting ceasefire in Croatia reached. 
February - March 1992
Babić is removed as President of the RSK, following a sustained campaign by Belgrade 
due to his rejection of the Vance peace plan. A united RSK Assembly elects new 
authorities, which support the plan. Goran Hadžic is chosen as the new RSK President.
1993
December 1993 – January 1994
Presidential and parliamentary elections in the RSK. In a run-off between Milan Babić 
and Milan Martić, Martić is declared the winner and becomes President of the RSK. 
Babić's SDS Krajina, however, wins the most parliamentary seats.
1994
29 March 1994
New ceasefire agreement signed between Croatia and RSK.
April 1994
New RSK government is constituted, with Borislav Mikelić as Prime Minister, and 
Babić as Foreign Minister.
December 1994
Economic agreement between Croatia and RSK reached.
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1995
January 1995
The international community's 'Z-4 Plan' for Serbian autonomy within Croatia is 
presented to Zagreb, Knin and Belgrade.
May 1995
'Operation Flash' – Croatia takes control of RSK-controlled West Slavonia. In response, 
Krajina forces shell Zagreb.
RSK Prime Minister Mikelić is dismissed.
August 1995
'Operation Storm' – Croatia takes control of the Krajina. Most of its population flee.
November 1995
'Erdut Agreement' on returning East Slavonia to Croatian control, after UN-
administered transition.
December 1995
Dayton Agreement ending the war in Bosnia.
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